Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...>
On Tue Mar 19 19, Doug Fraser wrote:
We are on 4.14.77
I will look at cherry picking the tpm from 4.18
I'll take a stab at backporting the commit to 4.14 this
afternoon. There are some minor differences back then, but it
shouldn't too bad. Since it sounds like you are building the kernel, I
can also send along a debugging patch that will spit out the values in
the access and status registers when the status expect data check
We are currently on Alpine 3.8 hoping to move to 3.9 (for other reasons) and also looking to move to 4.19 kernel.
This is going to take some time, but now I have a greater incentive to push on that.
Thank you all for your help in this.
From: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@...>
Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2019 12:07 AM
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@...>
Cc: email@example.com; Doug Fraser <doug.fraser@...>; Kenneth Goldman <kgoldman@...>; Ibmtpm20tss-users@...
Subject: Re: [Ibmtpm20tss-users] [openssl-tpm2-engine] tpm sessions
On Mon Mar 18 19, James Bottomley wrote:
On Mon, 2019-03-18 at 21:05 +0000, Doug Fraser wrote:I wonder if this is problem I was dealing with last year where someone had a tpm getting into a state where they were in the send codepath and getting EIO, Debugging code added to where the expect data checks are showed the access register reading that the locality wasn't active, and that the status register was reading 0xff. Looking at ftrace output was odd, because it showed it going into release_locality, and then it would request_locality and see the locality as active, and not try to request the locality. So a patch went into 4.18 to change the release locality code in the tis driver to check that the access register shows the locality as no longer active before returning instead of returning immediately.
Ken,No as I explained in the other email, the openssl_tpm2_engine mostly
We are interfacing to the TPM via openssl with engine = tpm2, so at
that level, do we have direct access to session control?
The test server requests openssl to encrypt a block of data, then
passes it to the client. The client requests openssl to decrypt the
block, and checks its content. At that point, at the application
level, the transaction is complete.
Is there some other operation that the application has to request
from openssl to flush the related context?
keeps the TPM clear when it's not doing anything even if the key is
present and referenced from an openssl point of view.
I'll go back to something James mentioned in his reply, the failureYes, it's chip->tpm_mutex which is taken in tpm_common_write via
seems to be percolating up from SPI device layer.
Is there a serialization point within the SPI layer to marshal
commands into and out of the TPM?
I noticed a flag based mutex() with tpm_command(), but I haven'twell something caused the -EIO in tpm_try_transmit and that can only
spilled data from that yet.
Is that the serialization point for the interface?
I don't suspect signal integrity at the low clock rate we are
currently running, particularly in regard to the extreme long term
test that was run over the weekend.
come from the underlying driver. For the tis driver it means that
STS_DATA_EXPECT wasn't signalled as it should for transmitting data.
Doug, are you able to test a 4.18 or later kernel?
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