I recently started reading "Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life', by Barbara J. Fields and Karen Fields. This is a very good book. Here is an excerpt:
"Those who create and re-create race today are not just the mob that killed a young Afro-American man on a street in Brooklyn or the people who join the Klan and the White Order. They are also those academic writers whose invocation of self-propelling "attitudes" and tragic flaws assigns Africans and their descendants a category, placing them in a world exclusively theirs and outside history--a form of intellectual apartheid no less ugly or oppressive, despite its righteous (not to say self-righteous) trappings, than that practiced by the bio- and theo-racists; and for which the victims, like slaves of old, are expected to be grateful.
"They are the academic "liberals" and "progressives" in whose version of race the neutral shibboleths difference and diversity replace words like slavery, injustice, oppression, and exploitation, diverting attention from the anything-but-neutral history these words denote. They are also the Supreme Court and spokesmen for affirmative action, unable to promote or even define justice except by enhancing the authority and prestige of race; which they will continue to do forever so long as the most radical goal of the political opposition remains the reallocation of unemployment, poverty, and injustice rather than their abolition."
A necessary antidote to books like "White Fragility" and "How to be an Anti-Racist".
---------- Forwarded message --------- From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW<h-review@...> Date: Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 1:28 PM Subject: H-Net Review [H-Africa]: Bondarenko on Leonard, 'Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in Africa' To: <h-review@...> Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Douglas W. Leonard. Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of
French Empire in Africa. London Bloomsbury Academic, 2020. 248 pp.
$115.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-78831-520-3.
Reviewed by Dmitri M. Bondarenko (Institute for African Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences)
Published on H-Africa (September, 2020)
Commissioned by David D. Hurlbut
A tight connection between anthropology and colonialism--its
political and moral justification and practice--is sometimes regarded
as anthropology's "original sin."[1] Although in reality the
intellectual, sociocultural, and political roots of anthropology as
an academic discipline are much deeper and much more branched, its
inextricable link with colonialism is still evident and undeniable.
Today, many anthropologists view "decolonizing" the discipline as an
urgent and important task. The "decolonization" of anthropology has
become a dominant trend in both the academic writing and social
activism of anthropologists from the former colonial powers and
former colonial possessions, from the "Global North" and "Global
South."
In connection with the above, Douglas W. Leonard's book is no doubt
timely. It is also innovative in at least two respects. Firstly, it
is about the link between colonialism and French anthropology, about
which not very much has been written (especially compared to the
number of publications on British anthropology's encounters with
colonialism). Secondly, Leonard studies this link from a specific
perspective: while it is quite common to come across publications
that describe and discuss how anthropology helped colonialists annex
and rule possessions, his aim is to study why and how anthropologists
failed to provide colonial practitioners with intellectual tools and
vision for effectively dealing with cultural "others" in both North
and sub-Saharan Africa. Leonard argues that the failure of that task
contributed significantly to the eventual crash of the French
colonial project--to the collapse of France's overseas empire,
particularly on the African continent.
Leonard sees the way that French anthropologists looked at Africans
as the fundamental reason for their inability to help colonialists
gain consent of the governed and thus make colonialism a sustainable
political form. They looked at Africans from a positivist and
Eurocentric view that was typical for their time. Africans were
considered by anthropologists to be passive objects of study and
sources of information on which scholars were to formulate their
ostensibly objective--"scientific"--explanations of African cultures
and recommendations for colonial administrators. Anthropologists did
not engage Africans in intercultural intellectual dialogue through
which the latter could be equal participants encouraged to interpret
their cultures the way they saw them themselves. So anthropologists
focused on differences between cultures instead of looking for
similarities between them. This approach generated "intellectual
resistance" in colonies "that sustained French social and
ethnological thinkers as they sought to understand colonial groups"
(p. 2). As a result, none of the strategies of interaction that
colonialists used with African peoples--association with local social
and political institutions that acknowledged difference and
assimilation that favored bringing indigenous institutions to the
French "gold standard"--made the colonial system stable and durable.
Leonard describes in vivid detail the activities of anthropologists,
Africanists, and sociologists, such as Maurice Delafosse, Paul Marty,
Marcel Mauss, and Pierre Bourdieu; the politician Jacques Soustelle;
and military leaders and prominent colonial administrators, including
Louis Faidherbe, Hubert Lyautey, and Joseph Gallieni. In doing so, he
argues that the main mistake that undermined the effort to implement
the associationist approach (and assimilationist even more so) in
French colonies was the desire to "translate" African ideas and norms
into the cultural language of European (particularly French)
modernity. This occurred because "European academics sought to build
a social and political associationist state to link Africans to
France across what anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has described as
the rupture between past and present; modernity thus became an
absolute, a singular achievement to which all others could only
aspire" (p. 3). They neither were able to make the colonial system
effective, nor did they oppose colonialism. On the contrary, the
academics--anthropologists and others--believed that colonialism as a
political system, if perfected, could promote the smooth transition
of Africans to modernity and integration into the modern world, that
is, the world of Western, basically European, modernity in which the
West leads and directs the whole humankind as its most "developed"
and "progressive" part.
What Leonard's book tells us first and foremost, beyond its immediate
topic, is how the general mindset of an epoch manifests itself both
in intellectual life (particularly anthropology as a science) and
politics (colonial practices in this case), and how its
manifestations in different spheres can strengthen a mindset within a
single sociocultural system (the French society of the late
nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries). For several decades now,
cultural relativism has been a dominant trend in the Western mindset,
and it manifests itself equally expressively in anthropology
(especially in such a powerful intellectual tradition as
poststructuralism) and the sociopolitical life of the decolonized
world. It is not by chance that at the turn of the twentieth century,
a reexamination of the notion of modernity began, and the concept of
"multiple modernities" that radically rejects equating of modernity
in general to its Western model as ostensibly the only possible and
universal is becoming more and more popular among anthropologists,
historians, and sociologists.[2] Leonard shows how in the preceding
historical period, the unquestionable Eurocentrism and
"progressivism" of the Western mindset fueled both anthropological
thought and colonial ideology and practice. Colonialism neither gave
birth to anthropology nor, even more so, vice versa. They both were
creations of the same period in the history of the same civilization,
and that is why they had a common mental background. That is why
Eurocentrist anthropology and colonialism went hand in hand until
things changed and they were substituted for anticolonialism coupled
with cultural relativist anthropology.
Leonard's rich evidence and profound analysis makes_ Anthropology,
Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in Africa_ a
valuable source of knowledge and inspiration for historians of
anthropological thought and for students of African history and
European colonialist ideologies and practices. This book will also
become important reading for all those interested in cultural and
sociopolitical dynamics of the world in the times of colonialism and
postcolonialism.
Notes
[1]. See, for example, among many others, Talal Asad, ed.,
_Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter_ (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1973); Diane Lewis, "Anthropology and Colonialism,"
_Current Anthropology_ 14 (1973): 581-602; Peter Pels and Oscar
Salemink, eds., _Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History
of Anthropology_ (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999);
Peter Pels, "What Has Anthropology Learned from the Anthropology of
Colonialism?," _Social Anthropology_ 16 (2008): 280-99; and Michael
Asch, "Anthropology, Colonialism and the Reflexive Turn: Finding a
Place to Stand," _Anthropologica_ 57 (2015): 481-89.
[2]. See, for example, Arjun Appadurai, _Modernity at Large: Cultural
Dimensions of Globalization_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996); Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., _Alternative
Modernities: A Millennial Quartet Book_ (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2001); Peter Wagner, _Theorizing Modernity: Inescapability and
Attainability in Social Theory_ (London: SAGE, 2001); Peter Wagner,
_Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of
Modernity_ (London: Polity Press, 2008); Peter Wagner, ed., _African,
American and European Trajectories of Modernity: Past Oppression,
Future Justice?_ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015); and
Göran Therborn, "Entangled Modernities," _European Journal of Social
Theory_ 6 (2003): 293-305. On the "multiple modernities" concept, see
especially Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," _Daedalus_
129 (2000): 1-29; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ed., _Multiple Modernities_
(London: Routledge, 2002); and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, _Comparative
Civilizations and Multiple Modernities_, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill,
2003). See also, for example, Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzak
Sternberg, eds., _Comparing Modernities: Pluralism versus Homogenity;
Essays in Homage to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt_ (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and
Gerhard Preyer and Michael Sussmann, eds., _Varieties of Multiple
Modernities_ (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
Citation: Dmitri M. Bondarenko. Review of Leonard, Douglas W.,
_Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in
Africa_. H-Africa, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55644
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.
---------- Forwarded message --------- From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW<h-review@...> Date: Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 11:27 AM Subject: H-Net Review [H-Africa]: Wylie on Oddy, 'The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer in Algeria' To: <h-review@...> Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Jason Oddy. The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer
in Algeria. New York Columbia University Press, Columbia Books on
Architecture and the City, 2019. Illustrations. 240 pp. $35.00
(paper), ISBN 978-1-941332-50-4.
Reviewed by Diana Wylie (Boston University)
Published on H-Africa (September, 2020)
Commissioned by David D. Hurlbut
Modernist Architecture in Algeria: An Elegy
British photographer Jason Oddy toted his 5x4-inch plate camera to
Algeria twice, in 2010 and 2013. Long interested in "the politics of
place," he spent a total of one month in the country, training his
lens on three projects built nearly fifty years earlier by legendary
Brazilian modernist Oscar Niemeyer (p. 60).[1] Oddy's starkly
beautiful images of those sites, accompanied by Niemeyer's drawings
and four short essays--three by Oddy and one by architectural
historian Samia Henni--have been published with stylish flair by the
Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture under the
slightly puzzling title The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway.
The title derives from a June 1968 conversation between Niemeyer and
Houari Boumediene, president of Algeria. Both men were wrestling with
acute political dilemmas. Niemeyer, a member of Brazil's Communist
Party, had just flown to Algiers from Paris, where the French had
granted him refuge after he fled Brazil's 1964 military coup.
Boumediene was a soldier who, after serving in the Liberation Army
that won independence from France in 1962, had seized the presidency
only three years before this meeting. According to Niemeyer's own
testimony, when he showed the president his design for a new mosque
in Algiers, Boumediene observed that it was rather revolutionary. The
architect responded, "It's a revolutionary mosque. The revolution
can't stop halfway" (p. 40). When titling his book, Oddy changed the
tone of Niemeyer's remark from an optimistic admonition (_can't_, as
in _shouldn't_) to a sad negative (_will stop_), thus signaling the
elegiac nature of his project, apparent in both his photographs and
the text. High modernist hopes for a new world are at stake here, and
the title suggests they are not going to fare well.
It is impossible to divine precisely what was going on in the minds
of the architect and the president on that June day in 1968. Niemeyer
may have been suggesting that the liberation of the Algerian nation
from French control was only part one of the revolution achieved by
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Part two would be the
creation of a democratic and egalitarian country where, Oddy
surmises, Niemeyer intended his buildings to "imbue the fledgling
state with dignity and hope" (p. 121). Boumediene, on the other hand,
may have been suggesting that popular taste might be shocked, even
affronted, by a modernist mosque, one whose forty-meter dome would be
supported not by interior columns, as customary, but by three
external walls. Perhaps even more revolutionary would be the stained
glass window punctuating the dome. As Henni writes in her preface,
pointedly subtitled "When Militarism Meets Modernism," Boumediene
probably objected to the untraditional form of the mosque, while
endorsing other revolutionary projects, like new schools that would
modernize local "mentalities" (p. 33). The new president wanted to
raise Algeria's international profile by asserting its independence
from French influence. And so his government hired not only Niemeyer
but also a galaxy of other star architects--Jean-Jacques Deluz,
Fernand Pouillon, Ricardo Bofill, Anatole Kopp, Luigi Moretti, Tange
Kenzo--to change the face of Algeria.
When militarism met modernism, militarism--or at least the tastes and
needs of the FLN--won. Rejected by the committee charged with
planning a new Algiers, Niemeyer's mosque was never built. Most of
his Algerian designs--drawn from the Niemeyer archives in Rio de
Janeiro to fill the book's last section--were never actually
constructed. Boumediene's death in 1978 robbed Niemeyer of the
support he needed to build, for example, an ecologically progressive
zoo to be viewed from a revolving restaurant atop a "space needle,"
as well as a new administrative district across the Bay of Algiers,
which would, in Niemeyer's proud words, "boast ... great originality
with its architecture and location" and express "the future filled
with progress and well-being that the Algerian people are now
building" (p. 149).
Users tend to give Niemeyer's structures, at best, mixed reviews.
Some appreciate the open workshops he designed for Algiers's
architectural school, seeing them as honest and effective efforts to
ensure that students interacted free of hierarchical divisions. On
the other hand, people complain that his classrooms are too hot in
summer and too cold in winter. Some feel oppressed by the sheer
quantity of concrete. And then there is the problem of the vast empty
spaces. Oddy's unpeopled photographs make them look particularly
forlorn. The pictures seem to contradict the claim that the spaces
were meant to instill democratic ideals: the wide plazas make
individuals look insignificant. It is rumored that Boumediene feared
they could be places for subversive assembly: he had the university
bearing his name built in a swampy suburb of Algiers far from the
city center.
It would probably be a mistake to think that the militarists and
modernists were entirely at odds. Modernists, while swearing fidelity
to high democratic ideals, often treated a wide range of significant
obstacles--contemporary popular taste, historically rooted
traditions, and even the landscape--in a high-handed fashion. They
preferred the spectacular to the intimate, the expansive plaza to the
small square. When Niemeyer helped design Brasilia in the late 1950s,
he intended its vast spaces, sculptural buildings, and curvilinear
forms to presage a fresh, democratic start for the one-time South
American empire. Today it is commonly recognized that the sprawling
bureaucratic city is best experienced from the air. An aerial perch
is similarly preferable for those trying to appreciate the auditorium
at the university in Constantine: it is shaped like an open book,
though a vantage point from above is necessary to reveal the pages
curving out and down from a central spine. Niemeyer was competing
with extraordinary natural landscapes: Algiers is built on a steep
coastal escarpment, and the old town of Constantine sits on an island
above a deep, encircling gorge. In these settings, spectacular
buildings--like the book-shaped auditorium--demand attention as if
the architect were asserting the primacy of his own artistic vision
not only above local desires but also above local natural forms.
Oddy displays considerable generosity of spirit toward Niemeyer's
schemes. He admires the architect's exploration of the "sculptural,
even poetic limits" of concrete (p. 61). He appreciates the
"progressive and lyrical possibilities" Niemeyer was aiming for as he
sought to create a "potentially less-hierarchical spatialization of
power" (pp. 64, 109). The key concepts here are "possibility" and
"potential," as opposed to actual "success." Oddy's photographs may
strike viewers as disheartening, an affect he has achieved in some of
his prior, similarly unpeopled projects, like those shot in the
Pentagon and Guantanamo. Paint is peeling. Food wrappers sit on a
window ledge near some forlorn graffiti. Broken chairs and stools are
heaped up, unlikely to be repaired, while sofas are losing their
stuffing. Windows are unwashed, grass uncut, the pool dry, and a
wooden panel has replaced a broken window. Oddy's exploration of the
"undeclared forces that both give rise to and operate in
architectural space" may not require the human presence, but, without
people, his photographs are suffused with a sense of emptiness and
disappointment: a blurry woman walks down a long concrete passageway;
students sitting near the auditorium are dwarfed by its "pages" or
walls (p. 60). Like South African photographer Guy Tillim in _Avenue
Patrice Lumumba_ (2008), he has taken us for a dispiriting walk down
an avenue of postcolonial African dreams.
After overcoming his 2010 difficulty in gaining official Algerian
permission to photograph his sites, Oddy went on to produce a book
that, in effect, invites his readers to reengage with the progressive
political rhetoric of the 1960s. He now understands that his earlier
hope--"that an art project could somehow reinscribe [into
contemporary political discourse] the ideals that had been lying
dormant in Niemeyer's Algerian projects for decades"--was actually
"hubristic and naïve" (pp. 64-65). Neither an architectural nor an
urban historian, Oddy is an artist who has not needed to use
footnotes, do research in Algerian archives, or provide a
comprehensive survey of Niemeyer's work in Algeria. (Ecole
Polytechnique d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme [EPAU], the architectural
school in Algiers, is missing, for example.) With engaging humility,
he confesses that in Algeria he is an outsider.[2]
Oddy's readers should benefit from the abundance of thought-provoking
ironies he has revealed in this elegy to the ideals of the 1960s.
Three stand out for me: that Niemeyer sought refuge from a military
dictatorship in a country whose former colony--for which he
worked--was itself on the road to military rule; that buildings meant
to connect Algeria to the rest of the modern world stand in a country
now unusually cut off from that world; and that modernist optimism
can look both authoritarian and quaintly utopian today.
Notes
[1]. They comprise buildings on two university campuses (University
of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene at Bab Ezzouar and
University of Mentouri at Constantine) and one Olympic sports hall
(La Coupole, Algiers).
Citation: Diana Wylie. Review of Oddy, Jason, _The Revolution Will Be
Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer in Algeria_. H-Africa, H-Net Reviews.
September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55562
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.
---------- Forwarded message --------- From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW<h-review@...> Date: Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 11:10 AM Subject: H-Net Review [H-Environment]: Conz on Kelly, 'To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996' To: <h-review@...> Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Jill E. Kelly. To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and
Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996. African History and Culture
Series. East Lansing Michigan State University Press, 2018.
Illustrations. 396 pp. $49.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-61186-285-0.
Reviewed by Christopher Conz (Tufts University)
Published on H-Environment (September, 2020)
Commissioned by Daniella McCahey
Environmental changes, policies, and practices are inseparable from
politics. Whether the topic is soil erosion or climate change, the
ways that people think about, experience, and act on environmental
changes are shaped by their relationships to institutions and
governments. In_ To Swim with Crocodiles_, historian Jill E. Kelly
provides an intricate look at the local and national politics of
land, violence, and belonging in the Table Mountain area in what is
now KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa (not Table Mountain in
Cape Town). This is not a work that focuses on the environment, but
its nuanced analysis and innovative arguments illustrate a political
and cultural context that scholars of environmental studies can learn
from. Rather than expressing a primary interest in environment,
Kelly seeks to understand the political roots of the violence of the
1980s and 1990s, often oversimplified by Western media as tribal.
Kelly uses a pair of what she calls cultural inheritances to guide
her analysis that covers two hundred years in this Zulu-speaking
locale. _To Swim with Crocodiles_ takes readers from circa 1800, when
identities in southern Africa derived from family-based chiefdoms,
through multiple phases of White-supremacist rule and Black political
struggle, and finally, to the years following multiparty elections in
1994. First, Kelly defines the cultural inheritance of _ukukhonza _as
"one of affiliation, a social agreement that historically bound
together subjects and leaders to provide land and security" (p.
xxxii). In this reciprocal relationship, chiefs provided land and
security to their subjects, while subjects "khonza-ed" their chiefs
by paying tribute as livestock, labor, or cash. Kelly argues that
_ukukhonza_ has been fluid and has continued to shape the
relationships between chiefs and subjects "even as those bonds were
transformed by colonial and apartheid rule" (p. xxxvi).
Second, Kelly asserts that _ukukhonza_ combined with genealogy to
provide "the language for social and political membership, bringing
to life new or imagined relationships between peoples and with land"
(p. xxxvi). This cosmology is what historian Christopher Lee has
called a genealogical imagination in _Unreasonable Histories:
Nativism, Multiracial Lives, and the Genealogical Imagination in
British Africa_ (2014). Within these cultural inheritances, "land
operated as both physical and cosmological space and a historical
place" (p. xxxvii). Situating these arguments in the literature on
authority, land, and violence, the author acknowledges that "chiefly
connections with colonial and apartheid agents" interfered with the
contract between chiefs and commoners (p. xl). But Kelly stresses
that overemphasizing this perspective obscures how Africans held
leaders accountable. Furthermore, the author suggests that these
cultural inheritances should be considered when rethinking the role
of chiefs in administering land in a deeply inequitable South Africa.
Chapter 1 synthesizes archaeological, ethnographic, and documentary
evidence to provide readers with a solid foundation of chieftainship.
An elaboration of the Central Cattle Pattern, as Africanists know it,
illustrates how chiefs and commoners related to one another through
land allocation, cattle loans, and tribute rendered through labor,
livestock, or military service. This system sustained well-being, yet
it had inequities built into it such as between older families and
later arrivals to a chiefship. Chapter 2 explains how British
authorities employed chiefs to carry out indirect rule. In rural
South Africa, this colonial apparatus regulated land allocation in
ways that favored White settlers. Additionally, chiefs helped collect
taxes, which along with dispossessing Africans of land, served to
compel people to work in mines and on commercial farms. But chiefs
handled this duty in varied ways, often blurring the lines between
collaboration and resistance. On this subject, Kelly uses archival
cases from the secretary of Native Affairs effectively to support her
argument that _ukukhonza_, always evolving, remained central to the
relationship between chiefs, commoners, and land.
Chapter 3 examines how the government bodies that formed the Union of
South Africa in 1910 created new chiefships, drew new jurisdictions,
and strengthened segregationist systems. Of special note is the story
of how "Maguzu Maphumulo became the chief of the newly established
Maphumulo chiefdom" at Table Mountain in 1905 (p. 66). The Nyavu
chiefdom, however, had already been there. The politics between these
two chiefdoms and how their people used genealogical imagination to
claim belonging becomes a central theme throughout the book.
Following the formation of the Union in 1910, the government passed a
series of legislation to dispossess Africans from various tenancy
arrangements in the region, sending many scrambling to find space in
these chiefdoms. Kelly explains how new arrivals sought security and
living space at Table Mountain using _ukukhonza_.
In chapters 4-5 the author explores the political and cultural
dimensions of how betterment schemes--government rural development
projects--played out near Table Mountain. This section is of special
interest to H-Environment readers. At the center is Nagle Dam,
conceived of in 1935 to supply Durban with water and completed in
1951. Kelly uses an impressive collection of oral histories and
detailed maps to show how people were removed, where they moved to,
and how they used _ukukhonza _to navigate this injustice. Here, the
book builds on, among others, Elizabeth Colson's work on the social
consequences of Kariba Dam in Zambia, _The Social Consequences of
Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement upon the Gwembe
Tonga_ (1971). Government efforts to promote commercial agriculture,
control livestock, and consolidate villages provoked resistance.
Frequently seen as agents of a coercive state, chiefs and
agricultural officials were often targets of protest. Addressing the
"androcentrism of betterment schemes," Kelly narrates how women
resisted in the 1950s by destroying cattle-dipping tanks in an action
that one interviewee described as "writing a letter to the
authorities which they could read" (pp. 126, 127).
This book's strength is in how it reconstructs historical
micropolitics to help explain recent conflict in political terms.
Chapters 6-8 demonstrate this approach and its supporting
methodology. Readers gain insight on how chiefs navigated the
apartheid government's efforts in the 1970s to consolidate Africans
into independent Bantustans. We see opportunists like Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi establish the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) that
provided a Zulu-nationalist counterweight to liberation parties under
the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), especially the African National
Congress. Meanwhile, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo earned the nickname
"peace chief" by navigating the fraught spaces between local
politics, MDM, and after 1987, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of
South Africa. But as the final chapters clarify through a detailed
examination of the civil war in the 1980s and 1990s, politics was far
more complicated than these affiliations reveal. It is through
_ukukhonza_, above all, that people align themselves. The apartheid
government's support for IFP bears substantial responsibility for the
violence of these years, including the assassination of Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo. But understanding people's motivations means assembling a
longer history of how individuals, families, and chiefdoms saw
themselves in relation to various lineages and to the land that they
claim as theirs.
In_ To Swim with Crocodiles_, Kelly demonstrates how documentary and
oral evidence, combined with a sense of place, can improve our
knowledge of political, social, and cultural change. Scholars and
students of African history and politics, South African studies, and
conflict studies will find this book rich in its analysis and
enlightening in its findings. General readers, however, may find the
naming of chiefs and chiefdoms difficult to follow at times.
H-Environment readers will long for more about ecological changes,
not for the sake of nature as backdrop, but as changes that are
inseparable from political processes. Readers wanting an ecological
analysis of Nagle Dam on par with Allen and Barbara Isaacman's book
on Cahora Bassa Dam in Mozambique, _Dams, Displacement, and the
Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique,
1965-2007_ (2013), will have to look elsewhere. Environmental studies
readers, however, will learn much about the local politics of
policymaking, implementation, and resistance in South Africa in ways
reminiscent of such works as Marsha Weisiger's _Dreaming of Sheep in
Navajo Country _(2011).
Citation: Christopher Conz. Review of Kelly, Jill E., _To Swim with
Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa,
1800-1996_. H-Environment, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54859
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...> Date: September 15, 2020 at 6:18:17 AM EDT To: h-review@... Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...> Subject:H-Net Review [H-Judaic]: Judaken on Hammerschlag, 'Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics' Reply-To: h-review@...
Sarah Hammerschlag, ed. Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics. Brandeis Library of Modern Jewish Thought Series. Waltham Brandeis University Press, 2018. xxvii + 268 pp. $26.00 (paper), ISBN 978-1-5126-0186-2; $95.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-61168-526-8.
Reviewed by Jonathan Judaken (University of Memphis) Published on H-Judaic (September, 2020) Commissioned by Barbara Krawcowicz
French Philoso-Jews and Meta-Rabbis
In this anthology, Sarah Hammerschlag offers readers a dive into the deep reservoir of modern French Jewish thought. Her brilliantly curated book is presented in roughly chronological order, exploring Jewish philosophy and theology as a response to shifting contexts. For French Jews, these were shaped by the legacy of the French Revolution's emancipation of its Jewish citizens and the terms of the Napoleonic social contract established by the Assembly of Notables (1806), the convening of the "Sanhedrin" (1807), and Napoleon's new edicts in 1808, most importantly, the establishment of a central consistory that regulated French Judaism. This emancipation social contract traded equal rights as citizens in return for acculturation, "regeneration," or even complete assimilation. Two profound convulsions challenged the terms of Jewish equality: the Dreyfus affair and more perniciously the Vichy regime's racial laws. In the postwar period--the central focus of Hammerschlag's compilation--French Jewry was transformed by the memory of the Shoah; the decolonization of North Africa that led to a demographic transformation as a result of Jews migrating to the metropole from the Maghreb (often alongside Muslims); and events in Israel, especially the Six Day War and its aftermath. The ramifications of these processes continue to shape French Jewry and influence French Jewish thought.
Hammerschlag's short introduction sketches this history and sets up the anthology by setting out the two key themes that structure the texts she has chosen: the universal and the particular and identification and disidentification. In the first part of the book, "The _Israélite _of the Republic," a set of texts from 1860 to 1928 wrestle primarily with the terms of French identity as constituted by the legacy of the French Revolution. The _Israélite _of her section title refers to those Jews who accepted the stipulations of French acculturation, even as they insisted on the universal values of Jewish thought. The excerpts in the second section, "The Cataclysm and the Aftermath," were penned during the Holocaust or directly in response to it, indicating a rupture in the provisos of the French social contract. The third part, "Universal and Particular: The Jew and the Political Realm," is a neatly ordered but fraught dialogue about the significance of Zionism and the State of Israel. The last part, "Identification, Disidentification," contains a set of considerations on the meaning of community and belonging for Jewish philosophers in the post-Holocaust and in a postcolonial world.
The anthology's first contribution is to supplement the Germano-centrism of modern Jewish thought. The canon is often framed around German-speaking thinkers from Moses Mendelssohn to Franz Rosenzweig. In recent years Emmanuel Levinas has served as a postscript and continuation of this tradition. But the brilliant array of French Jewish thinkers assembled--often translated for the first time by Hammerschlag, regularly teaming with Beatrice Bourgogne--make evident that a parallel stream existed in France from the nineteenth century. Clearly influenced by their German counterparts engaged in the academic study of Judaism--the _Wissenschaft des Judentums_--_La science du judaïsme_ emerged in France in the 1830s, led by leading Orientalists like Adolphe Franck and Salomon Munk. The volume begins with two excerpts by Joseph Salvador (chapter 1) and James Darmesteter (chapter 2) who were part of this pioneering cohort. I wish that Hammerschlag would have taught us more about this early history, since we are only offered a glimpse into developments in the nineteenth century. The other vanguard voices in part 1 include Bernard Lazare (chapter 4), the paragon of the conscious pariah so beautifully rendered by Hannah Arendt, and André Spire (chapter 5), along with Edmond Fleg (chapter 7).[1]
Not only are the individual thinkers that Hammerschlag's anthology elevates a deep and wide counterpoint to the German tradition, but she also has a historical plot to her tale. The Dark Years, as the French often refer to the period of collaboration with the Nazis, tore apart the identification of Jews with the French state. "There can be no doubt," writes Hammerschlag, "that the Second World War altered the terms of French Judaism, the self-understanding of French Jews, and the project and mission of the nation's Jewish organizations" (p. xv). A revival of Judaism ensued, she explains: "Already during the war a reorientation of Jewish life and identity began to take place at farm schools, in study circles, and in children's homes. In the spring of 1941, the Jewish poet Edmond Fleg and the leader of the Jewish scouting movement Robert Gamzon" were working to educate a new generation of Jewish thinkers to take on the mantle of vitalizing Judaism (p. xvi). Hammerschlag includes selections from some of these lesser-known figures like Gamzon (chapter 9) and Jacob Gordin (chapter 10). Their project influenced the postwar generation, alongside the well-known work of Levinas (chapter 11), as did the insights of thinkers like Vladimir Jankélévitch (chapter 12), who has received some recognition even by English-language scholars.[2] In short, Hammerschlag's story is that if the Jewish renaissance was pioneered in Germany in the interwar years, a blossoming across the Rhine took place in post-Holocaust Paris. _Tout court_, Paris was the continuation of Frankfurt and Berlin.
The problem with this story is that there was a Jewish renaissance in Paris in the interwar years in which a diasporic cultural Zionism played a central role. This is wholly underplayed by Hammerschlag. She alludes to it in her introduction to the excerpt on Fleg when she writes, "Along with André Spire, Jean-Richard Bloch, and Armand Lunel, he [Fleg] was part of a Jewish literary revival that blossomed in the decades between the Dreyfus Affair and the Second World War" (p. 54). This Jewish cultural efflorescence profoundly reshaped Jewish intellectual life before the rise of the Nazis. As Nadia Malinovich documents in her important study of this era: "French Jews began to question how they should define Jewishness in a society where Jews enjoyed full political equality. Writers who had previously given little thought to their Jewish identity began to explore biblical themes, traditional Jewish folklore, and issues of identity and assimilation in their novels, plays, and poetry. A plethora of journals focusing on Jewish religion, history, and culture came into being in France between 1900-1932, when a multitude of associations that emphasized Jewish distinctiveness--literary societies, youth groups, religious organizations--also formed. This blossoming of Jewish cultural life, which contemporaries referred to as a 'renaissance' or 'awakening', provides a particularly interesting vantage-point from which to explore the complex ways in which both 'Jewishness' and 'Frenchness' were renegotiated in the early twentieth century."[3] The French Jewish cultural renaissance of the early twentieth century is an area of exciting new work by Sally Charnow, building on the earlier studies of Malinovich and others, and deserves more attention.[4]
The failure to give full credence to the cultural revival already at work before the Holocaust perhaps results in some of Hammerschlag's errors. Fleg, for example, was not "born into an assimilated family in Geneva" as Hammerschlag notes (p. 54). Religious observance was an important part of his upbringing. In _Why I Am a Jew_, in an earlier part of the book from which she takes her excerpt from Fleg, he writes, "It seemed natural that my father should, in the morning, wrap himself in a shawl of white wool with black stripes, and should bind lengths of leather on his forehead and left arm, while he murmured words which were not words. I thought grace after a meal as necessary as the meal itself; and I felt no surprise when, on Friday evening, my mother stretched forth her fingers over the Sabbath candles, which shone through them and made them transparent."[5] In _Why I Am a Jew_, Fleg narrates how his immersion into French culture led to his drift away from his Jewishness, until the anti-Semitism of the Dreyfus affair reawakened his return to Judaism, spurring his cultural Zionism, resulting in the key role he would come to play in helping to revive Jewish culture in France. This was all at work before the Holocaust.
The same is true for Albert Memmi, who Hammerschlag likewise suggests was awakened to his Jewish identity by the Vichy racial laws: "For some, like the writer Albert Memmi, the [Vichy racial] statutes motivated a reassertion of Jewish identity, if not in religious terms, then at least in political ones" (p. xv). Again, this narrative does not fit the facts. Memmi was raised on the Jewish cultural traditions of Tunis, went to study in a traditional religious school as a young boy, and became an avid member of Hashomer Hatzair as a young man. He never had to rediscover his Jewish identity provoked by the Vichy collaboration with the Nazis because his was a Jewish itinerary from the beginning. Suggesting otherwise would intimate a notion of Jewish identity as static, which is clearly belied by Hammerschlag's selections. In making these claims about the hard break occasioned by the rise of Hitlerism, Hammerschlag seems to generalize a narrative advanced by Samuel Moyn about Levinas that I have tried to show does not hold in his case either.[6]
There is no doubt that the Holocaust was a caesura in Jewish life that irrevocably altered how Jews came to understand themselves in its wake. But perhaps this was never more the case than in the argument that the Holocaust left a deeper imprint on individuals' lives than their early upbringing, which obviously was a formative lens through which many Jewish intellectuals made sense of the Shoah. A case that makes the point is Sarah Kofman. Hammerschlag includes an anguished excerpt from _Smothered Words _(1987) (chapter 13), Kofman's philosophical meditation on what it means to write and think after the disaster, including about being Jewish. It is layered by her own experience of coming to terms with the death of her father, Rabbi Berek Kofman, who was beaten unconscious and buried alive by a _kapo_ in Auschwitz for refusing to work on Shabbat. Kofman offers more extended biographical reflections in _Rue Ordener, Rue Labat _(1994), her tortured, short memoir of survival in hiding after her father was deported. She recounts how she survived living with a Christian woman, whom she calls Mémé, who clearly harbored anti-Jewish stereotypes but who nonetheless risked her own life to save Sarah and her mother, even as she introduced Sarah to all the temptations of forbidden French food and culture. _Rue Ordender, Rue Labat_ reflects a young child wretched apart by her Jewishness and her desire to acculturate, which her survival depended on, even as she considers through suffocated words what her parents meant to her, and by extension the significance of her being Jewish.
It is fitting that the passages from Kofman close the set of selections included in part 2, "The Cataclysm and the Aftermath," which is opened by a letter from Simone Weil, "What Is a Jew" (chapter 8). Unlike Kofman, Weil did not even learn she was Jewish until she was ten, so assimilated were her parents and afraid that their children would suffer from anti-Semitism. One month after the Vichy racial laws were passed in October 1940, Weil wrote to Xavier Vallat, then Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, about why her teaching position was not renewed. Certainly Weil was aware of Vallat's anti-Semitism, evident in a notorious speech he gave in the Chamber of Deputies in June 1936 when socialist Léon Blum became France's first Jewish prime minister: "Your assumption of power, Mr. Prime Minister," Vallat bleated, "is unquestionably an historic event. For the first time, this old Gallo-Roman land will be governed by a Jew.... I must say out loud what everyone else is thinking to themselves--that in order to govern this peasant nation that is France, it is preferable to have someone whose origins, no matter how modest, disappear into the bowels of our soil, rather than a subtle Talmudist." After skeptically interrogating what it means to be a Jew in her epistle to Vallat, Weil insists that she should not be excluded from her teaching position, since "mine is the Christian, French, Greek tradition. The Hebraic tradition is alien to me, and no Statute can make it otherwise" (p. 65). It is little wonder then that her journey would take her ever deeper into Christian mysticism, even as the Nazi genocide unfolded across Europe.
Hammerschlag includes a penetrating musing on "the lost children of Judaism" (the title of chapter 19) like Weil by Jacqueline Mesnil-Amar. She writes beautifully and movingly about "those vagabonds, lost from Judaism, who, voluntarily or by circumstance have abandoned Israel, turned away: the rebels against the law, those ignorant of tradition" (p. 182). These lost children with their "extremely subtle and mixed message" represent "another sort of Judaism" exemplified by writers like Marcel Proust and Max Jacob (p. 183). Their inclusion highlights another contribution of the anthology: the capacious set of voices that the volume consciously includes, broadening the contours of modern Jewish thought.
The section titled "Identification, Disidentification" which opens with Mesnil-Amar closes with an excerpt from an article by Stéphane Mosès, "Normative Modernity and Critical Modernity" (chapter 24). Mosès was an innovative interpreter of Rosenzweig and Walter Benjamin among other Weimar-period German Jewish thinkers and "an important participant in its postwar French sequel: _l'école juive de Paris_, as Emmanuel Levinas dubbed it" (p. 245). The underlined descriptor clearly indicates another important contribution of this volume--spotlighting as it does the depth of post-Holocaust French Jewish thought as a continuation of the highpoint of German Jewish philosophy.
Mosès's essay, which closes the book, brings together the various contributions of the volume. In it, he argues for a normative modern tradition that includes "Emmanuel Levinas but also Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig" (p. 246). Mosès then sketches the contours of a "_critical modernity_" that is "represented by authors such as Benjamin, Kafka, Celan, Arendt, Jabès and in a certain measure, Scholem, and much later Jacques Derrida." For Mosès, these Jewish thinkers, in Arendt's words, believe "the thread of tradition is broken," and "we cannot reconnect it." Mosès continues: there is only "a _shattered_ past that is no longer capable of inspiring in us judgments of evident value. In this broken time that expresses the discontinuity of the past, the contents of faith--I speak now of the Jewish faith--are no longer audible for us; they no longer correspond to any experience today" (p. 247). In addition to the selection from Derrida (chapter 23), the longest in the book, one could also include the snippets from Hélène Cixous (chapter 22), along with Alain Finkielkraut's agonized wrestling with the possibility of an authentic Jewishness after the Shoah in the excerpt from _The Imaginary Jew_ (chapter 21), as a part of this critical tradition that Hammerschlag clearly wants to add to the canon of modern Jewish thought. Léon Ashkénazi in "Tradition and Modernity" (chapter 20), on the other hand, provides an argument linking normative modernity back to "the Bible as the identity card of Hebrews.... We study it to know what we believe in.... afterward, one studies the books that speak about it. This is the Jewish tradition as it has been for centuries" (p. 196).
The gamut of debate in _Modern French Jewish Thought _is not only about the ramifications of Jewish thought across time but also about the meaning of space, specifically about Zionism. Memmi lays the groundwork for an argument that Zionism emerges from the experience of Jews as a colonized people (chapter 14). He writes, "We are, in short, the forsaken as far as history is concerned. We would like to go our way unnoticed: but history in doing without us, also frequently acts against us. Everything happens as though the Jew offered himself as an expiatory victim, specially marked out for the meager imagination of executioners, dictators and politicians" (p. 136). For Memmi, the State of Israel is consequently necessary as a safe haven but also as a crucible for forging new highpoints in Jewish culture.
Richard Marienstras in "The Jews of the Diaspora, or the Vocation of a Minority" (chapter 15) demurs. Not only does the Jewish diaspora show that "there are many ways of assuming and creating the Jewish destiny," but diasporism is also necessary as part of a struggle against "the State as it exists today ... a State that transforms citizens into subjects, producers into cogwheels, public servants into agents of power, and the majority culture into an instrument of propaganda and domination" (pp. 145, 150). With the two furthest points on the spectrum charted, there is also a chapter titled "The Jewish Dimension of Space: Zionism" (chapter 16) by André Neher and another titled "Jerusalem" (chapter 17) by Henri Atlan. Finally, there is also a complicated critique of universalism by Shmuel Trigano (chapter 18). Along the way, Trigano manages to slam the neo-Pauline Judeophobia of Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben, while still affirming "the unity of humanity" our "infinite and irreducible plurality" and the "ingathering in a unique place," all in a few pages (p. 178).
While Hammerschlag promises that the anthology is no documentary reader, there are selections that do not meet the yardstick of what might be included in a course on modern Jewish thought except to provide context. Zadoc Kahn's "Speech on the Acceptance of His Position as Chief Rabbi of France" (chapter 3) or Sylvain Levi's essay "Alliance Israélite Universelle" (chapter 6) would be examples. But these are quibbles with a fabulously rendered anthology that can launch readers into the brilliance of modern French Jewish thought, where a captivating universe of new thinkers remains to be discovered for many English readers, students, and more seasoned scholars alike.
Notes
[1]. Hannah Arendt, "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition," in _The Jewish Writings_, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York: Schocken Books, 2007), 275-97.
[2]. Alan Udoff, ed., _Vladimir Jankélévitch and the Question of Forgiveness_ (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013).
[3]. Nadia Malinovich, _French and Jewish: Culture and the Politics of Identity in Early Twentieth-Century France _(Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2008), 1.
[4]. See, for example, Sally Charnow, "Imagining a New Jerusalem: Edmond Fleg and Interwar Ecumenism," _French History_ 27, no. 4 (2013): 557-78; Catherina Fhima, "Au Coeur de la 'renaissance juive' des années 1920: literature et judéité," _Archives Juives _(2006): 29-45; and Aron Rodrigue, "Rearticulations of French Jewish Identities after the Dreyfus Affair," _Jewish Social Studies _3 (1996): 3.
[5]. Edmond Fleg, _Why I Am A Jew_, trans. Victor Gollancz (1928; repr., London: Victor Gollancz, 1943), 9.
[6]. Jonathan Judaken, "'The Presentiment and Memory of the Nazi Horror': Emmanuel Levinas and the Holocaust," in _Europe in the Eyes of Survivors of the Holocaust_, ed. Zeev Mankowitz, David Weinberg, and Sharon Kangisser Cohen (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2014), 171-206.
_Jonathan Judaken is the Spence L. Wilson Chair in Humanities at Rhodes College._
Citation: Jonathan Judaken. Review of Hammerschlag, Sarah, ed., _Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics_. H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54703
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Can one even tabulate the number of fatalities that would result from abandoning chronic healthcare technologies like dialysis machines, iron lungs, oxygen tanks for asthmatics, or premature infant incubators? It is an implicitly Social Darwinist logic exacerbating the absolute worst impacts of structural racism and inequalities.
(Reminds me of how Trotsky described the mindset
of the Czar and his retinue just before the revolution.)
NY Times, Sept. 15, 2020
Trump Health Aide Pushes Bizarre Conspiracies and Warns of Armed
Revolt
By Sharon LaFraniere
WASHINGTON — The top communications official at the powerful
cabinet department in charge of combating the coronavirus made
outlandish and false accusations on Sunday that career
government scientists were engaging in “sedition” in their
handling of the pandemic and that left-wing hit squads were
preparing for armed insurrection after the election.
Michael R. Caputo, the assistant secretary of public affairs at
the Department of Health and Human Services, accused the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention of harboring a “resistance
unit” determined to undermine President Trump, even if that
opposition bolsters the Covid-19 death toll.
Mr. Caputo, who has faced intense criticism for leading efforts
to warp C.D.C. weekly bulletins to fit Mr. Trump’s pandemic
narrative, suggested that he personally could be in danger from
opponents of the administration. “If you carry guns, buy
ammunition, ladies and gentlemen, because it’s going to be hard
to get,” he urged his followers.
He went further, saying his physical health was in question, and
his “mental health has definitely failed.”
“I don’t like being alone in Washington,” Mr. Caputo said,
describing “shadows on the ceiling in my apartment, there alone,
shadows are so long.” He also said the mounting number of
Covid-19 deaths was taking a toll on him, telling his viewers,
“You are not waking up every morning and talking about dead
Americans.” The United States has lost more than 194,200 people
to the virus. Mr. Caputo urged people to attend Trump rallies,
but only with masks.
To a certain extent, Mr. Caputo’s comments in a video he hosted
live on his personal Facebook page were simply an amplified
version of remarks that the president himself has made. Both men
have singled out government scientists and health officials as
disloyal, suggested that the election will not be fairly
decided, and insinuated that left-wing groups are secretly
plotting to incite violence across the United States.
But Mr. Caputo’s attacks were more direct, and they came from
one of the officials most responsible for shaping communications
around the coronavirus.
C.D.C. scientists “haven’t gotten out of their sweatpants except
for meetings at coffee shops” to plot “how they’re going to
attack Donald Trump next,” Mr. Caputo said. “There are
scientists who work for this government who do not want America
to get well, not until after Joe Biden is president.”
A longtime Trump loyalist with no background in health care, Mr.
Caputo, 58, was appointed by the White House to his post in
April, at a time when the president’s aides suspected the health
secretary, Alex M. Azar II, of protecting his public image
instead of Mr. Trump’s. Mr. Caputo coordinates the messaging of
an 80,000-employee department that is at the center of the
pandemic response, overseeing the Food and Drug Administration,
the C.D.C. and the National Institutes of Health.
“Mr. Caputo is a critical, integral part of the president’s
coronavirus response, leading on public messaging as Americans
need public health information to defeat the Covid-19 pandemic,”
the Department of Health and Human Services said in a statement.
Mr. Caputo’s Facebook comments were another sign of the
administration’s deep antipathy and suspicion for its own
scientific experts across the bureaucracy and the growing
political pressure on those experts to toe a political line
favorable to Mr. Trump.
This weekend, first Politico, then The New York Times and other
news media organizations published accounts of how Mr. Caputo
and a top aide had routinely worked to revise, delay or even
scuttle the core health bulletins of the C.D.C. to paint the
administration’s pandemic response in a more positive light. The
C.D.C.’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports had previously
been so thoroughly shielded from political interference that
political appointees only saw them just before they were
published.
Mr. Caputo’s 26-minute broadside on Facebook against scientists,
the news media and Democrats was also another example of a
senior administration official stoking public anxiety about the
election and conspiracy theories about the “deep state” — the
label Mr. Trump often attaches to the federal Civil Service
bureaucracy.
Mr. Caputo predicted that the president would win re-election in
November, but that his Democratic opponent, Joseph R. Biden Jr.,
would refuse to concede, leading to violence. “And when Donald
Trump refuses to stand down at the inauguration, the shooting
will begin,” he said. “The drills that you’ve seen are nothing.”
There were no obvious signs from administration officials on
Monday that Mr. Caputo’s job was in danger. On the contrary, Mr.
Trump again added his voice to the administration’s science
denialism. As the president visited California to show
solidarity with the fire-ravaged West, he challenged the
established science of climate change, declaring, “It will start
getting cooler.” He added: “Just watch. I don’t think science
knows, actually.”
Mr. Caputo’s remarks also dovetailed in part with those of Roger
J. Stone Jr., a longtime confidant of both Mr. Caputo and Mr.
Trump. Mr. Stone, whose 40-month prison sentence for lying to
Congress was commuted by the president in July, told the
conspiracy website Infowars on Friday that Mr. Trump should
consider declaring martial law if he lost re-election.
Over all, his tone was deeply ominous: He warned, again without
evidence, that “there are hit squads being trained all over this
country” to mount armed opposition to a second term for Mr.
Trump. “You understand that they’re going to have to kill me,
and unfortunately, I think that’s where this is going,” Mr.
Caputo added.
In a statement on Monday, Mr. Caputo told The Times: “Since
joining the administration, my family and I have been
continually threatened” and harassed by people who have later
been prosecuted. “This weighs heavily on us, and we deeply
appreciate the friendship and support of President Trump as we
address these matters and keep our children safe.”
He insisted on Facebook that he would weather the controversies,
saying, “I’m not going anywhere.” And he boasted of the
importance of his role, stating that the president had
personally put him in charge of a $250 million public service
advertising campaign intended to help the United States return
to normal.
The Department of Health and Human Services is trying to use
that campaign to attract more minority volunteers for clinical
trials of potential Covid-19 vaccines and to ask people who have
recovered to donate their blood plasma to help other infected
patients. Department officials have complained that
congressional Democrats are obstructing the effort.
While Mr. Caputo characterized C.D.C. scientists in withering
terms, he said the agency’s director, Dr. Robert R. Redfield,
was “one of my closest friends in Washington,” adding, “He is
such a good man.” Mr. Caputo is partly credited with helping
choose Dr. Redfield’s new interim chief of staff.
Critics say Dr. Redfield has left the Atlanta-based agency open
to so much political interference that career scientists are the
verge of resigning. The agency was previously seen as mostly
apolitical; its reports were internationally respected for their
importance and expertise.
Mr. Caputo charged that scientists “deep in the bowels of the
C.D.C.” walked “around like they are monks” and “holy men” but
engaged in “rotten science.”
He fiercely defended his scientific adviser, Dr. Paul Alexander,
who was heavily involved in the effort to reshape the C.D.C.’s
Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports. Mr. Caputo described Dr.
Alexander, an assistant professor at McMaster University in
Canada, as “a genius.”
“To allow people to die so that you can replace the president”
is a “grievous sin,” Mr. Caputo said. “And these people are all
going to hell.”
A public relations specialist, Mr. Caputo has repeatedly claimed
that his family and his business suffered hugely because of the
investigation by the special counsel, Robert S. Mueller III,
into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Mr.
Caputo was a minor figure in that inquiry, but he was of
interest partly because he had once lived in Russia, had worked
for Russian politicians and was contacted in 2016 by a Russian
who claimed to have damaging information about Hillary Clinton.
Mr. Caputo referred that person to Mr. Stone and was never
charged with any wrongdoing. Mr. Caputo later wrote a book and
produced a documentary, both entitled “The Ukraine Hoax,” to
undermine the case for Mr. Trump’s impeachment.
Mr. Caputo worked on Mr. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign for
a time but was passed over for a job early in the
administration. He remained friendly with Dan Scavino, the
former campaign aide who is now the deputy chief of staff for
White House communications and played a role in reconnecting Mr.
Trump and Mr. Caputo.
Some of Mr. Caputo’s most disturbing comments were centered on
what he described as a left-wing plot to harm the
administration’s supporters. He claimed baselessly that the
killing of a Trump supporter in Portland, Ore., in August by an
avowed supporter of the left-wing collective was merely a
practice run for more violence.
“Remember the Trump supporter who was shot and killed?” Mr.
Caputo said. “That was a drill.”
The man suspected in the shooting, Michael Forest Reinoehl, was
shot dead this month by officers from a federally led fugitive
task force in Washington State. He “went down fighting,” Mr.
Caputo said. “Why? Because he couldn’t say what he had inside
him.”
Someone needs to do an examination of the political economy of today's anti-racism grifters — the books, the corporate seminars, the dinner parties. There are people making a fortune off of this.
Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 at 9:12 PM From: "C. Horgan" <chorgan@...> To: marxmail@groups.io Subject: [marxmail] Why liberal white women pay a lot of money to learn over dinner how they're racist
Privilege: Everything except the money in your trust fund.
An excerpt
from ‘The dialectic of productive forces, production behaviour
and class struggle alongside categories of latency and
parametric determinism in the materialist conception of
history’.
We say, number 1, that the Negro struggle,
the independent Negro struggle, has a vitality and a validity of
its own; that it has deep historic roots in the past of America
and in present struggles; it has an organic political
perspective, along which it is traveling, to one degree or
another, and everything shows that at the present time it is
traveling with great speed and vigor.
We say, number 2, that this independent
Negro movement is able to intervene with terrific force upon the
general social and political life of the nation, despite the
fact that it is waged under the banner of democratic rights, and
is not led necessarily either by the organized labor movement or
the Marxist party.
We say, number 3, and this is the most
important, that it is able to exercise a powerful influence upon
the revolutionary proletariat, that it has got a great
contribution to make to the development of the proletariat in
the United States, and that it is in itself a constituent part
of the struggle for socialism.
James arrived at this
position through an application of both Marxist theory and
historical example.
How a group of
Manhattan liberals used the language of “community” to
evict people living in temporary housing from their
neighborhood.
CINDY ORD/GETTY IMAGES
The
West Side Community Organization describes itsmissionas twofold: to
“advocate for a restored quality of life for residents,
visitors, and the small business community” and “advance
safer and more compassionate policies regarding New
Yorkers who are struggling with homelessness, mental
illness, and drug addiction.” As its first official order
of business, the hastily assembled 501(c)4 launched a
slick campaign to vilify 300 unhoused men in its Upper
West Side neighborhood as dangerous criminals, then
succeeded inevicting themfrom
the hotel the city had converted to temporary housing in
response to the pandemic. Apparently it was the $123,000-median-income familiesof
the liberal Manhattan neighborhood who were the real New
Yorkers struggling with (the sight of) homelessness.
Now
the men will be going somewhere else.According toThe
New York Daily News,the city is in the
process of relocating other unhoused people, many with
disabilities, from a Midtown shelter in order to make room
for the newly placeless former residents of the Upper West
Side.In astatementon
the city’s relocation decision, the organization’s
attorney Randy Mastro called it “a testament to
community organizing.” The group that came together
under the banner of WSCO had started out as strangers,
he continued, but came together as a stronger whole
“dedicated to saving their neighborhood.”
The
inviolable power of private property defines the actions
and attitudes that can create and destroy communities; in
liberal enclaves like New York, this is done with
language. Slippery terms likeneighborhoodandcommunityare
quietly and expertly carved out to exclude the
people—nonwhite or ill or poor—who reduce property values.
Evictions driven by wealthy residents and property owners
become actions taken for the community, and for neighbors,
rather than against them. The community “came together”
rather than was torn apart. By cloaking the language of
profit in the language of safety, these efforts are able
to write out the poor and unhoused—those for whom the city
is the most hostile and unsafe—from these most basic human
identities.
One
member of the neighborhood Facebook group that became WSCOtoldThe
New York Postthat “our community is
terrified, angry and frightened.” Theirfearwas
“palpable.” Another resident who opposed sharing her
neighborhood with unhoused othersassertedthat
“we’re a progressive-minded community and we tend to be
sympathetic to the homeless, but with sex offenders, draw
the line.”
Elsewhere
in New York, a woman whose neighborhood also saw an influx
of unhoused people during the pandemicclaimedthat
she never left her house without pepper spray.The
founder of a civilian patrol groupcomplainedof
“all kinds of chaos … assaults, vandalism, breaking and
entering and lewd behavior.”More
than 160 business executiveswroteto
the mayor that “there is widespread anxiety over public
safety, cleanliness, and quality-of-life issues that are
contributing to deteriorating conditions in commercial
districts,” demanding a restoration of the “security and
the livability of our communities.” An Upper West Side
petitiondeclared,
“This situation is making life uncomfortable for
residents and putting families, children, and the
elderly in harm’s way.”
Those
words and identities are not literal or geographical. A
resident of a neighborhood in these tellings is not—can’t
be—someone who lives in a shelter in that neighborhood.
The
language that this nonprofit, and Nimbyism generally, uses
is so smooth that reading their literature sometimes makes
it sincerely difficult to tell whose side they’re on. Not
only did WSCO express concern over the safety of the
wealthy residents apparently threatened by the sight of
poverty and addiction, but it also insisted that the hotel
was not a safe place for these men themselves, who needed
the professional services offered by the shelter system.Its
language of danger—and concern—was expert.“These
individuals are not receiving the critical social and
mental health services they so desperately require,” it
writes in its fundraising appeal.
This
is a laughably paternalistic claim; the well-being and
basic needs of unhoused people is clearly not the real
concern of these wealthy Upper West Siders who so
blatantly attempted to criminalize them. WSCO’sGoFundMeraised
over $50,000 in its first two days. It now has over
$137,000. It will use these funds,it has informed its donors, to retain
lawyers and press people, cover administrative costs, and
explore options around private security.
It is
typical of respectable liberal discourse that any talk of
homelessness is really talk of those affected by others’
homelessness. (Earlier this summer, theTimespublished
a 1,769-wordreporton
the homeless encampment at Powderhorn Park in Minneapolis,
out of which 71 words were dedicated to an actual resident
of the encampment and the rest to the housed people around
it who were coping with this struggle with varying shades
of gallantry or concern.) The bullshit liberal politics of
decency dictate that to believe in a mechanized and fully
functioning system is to acknowledge that homelessness
does exist—and we care about it!—but that it has to be
dealt with somewhere else where we don’t have to look at
it. Then a global pandemic happens and suddenly we are
forced to look at poverty, and it appears there is a
malfunction in this system, so we start short-circuiting
as well, and demand to speak to the manager.
Luc
Sante, author ofLow Life: Lures and
Snares of Old New York,lived on the
Upper West Side in the 1970s and remembers a significant
enough class difference within the neighborhood
then—rotating Columbia students, residents of welfare
hotels, cult groups—but never felt a sense of threat.
“They spent their days on the benches in the traffic
islands on Broadway drinking, perfectly benign,” he told
me. (And then, as now, there are many housed residents of
the Upper West Side who haveorganized against the
evictionand in support of the unhoused
residents.)
Property
ownership in such an expensive city changes a relationship
to a home, forcing questions about a return on investment
and what money is meant to secure you. “It’s not about
threat,” Sante said of what’s changed in the ensuing
years, “it’s about property values. In those days, it
wasn’t that expensive to live on the Upper West Side.”
The Biden
Adviser Who Gives Climate Activists Nightmares
Ernest Moniz served
as Obama’s secretary of energy. His ties to the fossil
fuel industry have only deepened since then. Will
Biden give him his old job back?
ISAAC BREKKEN/GETTY IMAGES
Former
Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz speaks during the National
Clean Energy Summit in 2017.
If
you haven’t heard of Ernest “Ernie” Moniz, there’s still a
good chance you’ve seen a picture of him. The 75-year-old
nuclear physicist,MIT professor
emeritus, multimillionaire, and former energy secretary
for the Obama administration sports longish silver hair
that looks fit for a daguerrotype. His aesthetic
sensibilities have turned him into a lovable meme among
energy wonks, who for the most part regard him as a
slightly quirky but eminently competent, whip-smart
technocrat, credited as a central figure in negotiating
the Iran nuclear deal.
In
the last few weeks, this once-improbable figure of
controversy has become a symbol of just how much climate
politics have changed since the Obama era—a flashpoint in
a growing fight over what energy policy should look like
in a potential post-Trump government that won’t just be
fighting to re-establish the rules and programs he gutted,
but transform the country’s energy system in time to avert
runaway climate catastrophe. Moniz, a “good friend” of
Biden’s, has been informally advising his campaign since
at least last May, and his
Energy Futures Initiative’s partnership with certain
unions has been an influential voice in crafting the
former vice president’s and the party’s approach to
climate issues. Sources tracking transition talks say he
could even be in the running to take back his old job as
energy secretary.
That’s
a prospect that worries climate watchers. Earlier this
month, 145 progressive groups sent aletterto
Joe Biden’s campaign, urging the candidate to “ban all
fossil fuel executives, lobbyists, and representatives
from any advisory or official position on your campaign,
transition team, cabinet, and administration.” Many of
them say Moniz fits the bill.
Moniz
hashad several lucrative
relationships with fossil fuel companies during his
career, including as an adviser to BP. The Energy
Initiative he founded at MIT—like many such initiatives in
academia, quietly
run on oil money—brought in sizable donations from
some of the world’s largest fossil fuel producers, and
produced research that made the case for their growth. He
disclosed his full financial holdings and industry ties
when first being considered to head the Department of
Energy in 2013, and resigned from any posts that might
carry conflicts of interest. Since leaving government in
2017, though, he’s accepted a paid position with a fossil
fueled utility whose work he supported at the DOE. Through
it all he’s proudly maintained his commitment to an
Obama-era energy strategy climate advocates say belongs in
history’s dustbin: the “all of the above” approachfirst outlinedin
a 2012 speech, which pairs renewables investment with
fossil fuel growth. A representative for Moniz said Moniz
would not be available to comment on this story.
The
typical defense of a once-and-future political appointee’s
between-administration industry work is to normalize it.
But “it’s not true that everyone came out and worked for
fossil fuel companies or that there are not experts on
climate without fossil fuel ties,” said Collin Rees of Oil
Change International, one of the groups that signed the
letter to Biden opposing fossil fuel appointees. Taking
money from the fossil fuel industry was a choice, he
said—one taken byMoniz as well as fellow Obama
administration alums Amos Hochstein, Jason Bordoff and
Heather Zichal, who have accepted jobs, payment, or
research funding from fossil fuel companies since leaving
government.It wasn’t a universal
choice, though: “This is not an indictment of all Obama
staffers,” he added.
One
of Moniz’s connections that’s come under scrutiny is
Southern Company—a mammoth integrated electric utility
that got$407 million in
financing from the Department of Energy (DOE) during
Moniz’s tenure for a “clean coal” plant that was never
completed. After championing the doomed project and
leaving office, Moniz joined the company’s board in March
2018. According to Southern’s Proxy Statements, he
accepted a combined $486,668 worth of fees and stock
awards from Southern in2018and2019.
Southern
was among the first companies to sue the Obama-era
Environmental Protection Agency over the Clean Power Plan,
claiming that its compliance timeline was too short and
would cost them too much money. Itssubsidiarieshave
spent considerable sums lobbying against climate-friendly
policies at the state-level withlittle transparency.
Like many other utilities, Southern helped fund outright
climate denial on its own and as a member of theEdison Electric
Institute(EEI) and the Global Climate
Coalition. In 1991, Southern teamed up with EEI to form
the Information Council on the Environment, an ad campaignintendedto
“reposition global warming as theory (not fact).” AFreedom of Information
Requestfiled by Greenpeace and the
Climate Investigations Center found that between 2006 and
2015, Southern spent $400,000 funding the largelydebunkedresearch
of climate skeptic Wei-Hock “Willie” Soon, complementing
donations from ExxonMobil and the American Petroleum
Institute. In exchange, Soon allowed Southern to review
his work, which focuses mainly on the idea that the
sun—rather than greenhouse gas emissions—is to blame for
global warming. Southern CEO Tom Fanning has echoed this
denial of human-driven global warming in recent years. “Is
climate change happening? Certainly. It’s been happening
for millennia,” FanningtoldCNBC
in 2017. Speaking together at a Bipartisan Policy
Institute event in 2016, Fanning said he and Moniz were “kind of a tag team,”
and the two traveled together on multiple occasions during
Moniz’s time at DOE.
Moniz
defended his ties to Southern last week after being asked
about progressivecriticism. “I do not
agree with the characterization of the Southern Company as
a fossil fuel company,” hetoldAxios’s
Amy Harder, likening the assertion to the idea that
“anybody who drives an internal combustion car is a fossil
fuel company because they use them.”
This
notion that utility companies are not in fact fossil fuel
companies, because the energy they provide can
theoretically come from anywhere, is not particularly
convincing in Southern’s case. Southern generates just 12
percent of its power from renewables, getting more of its
power from fossil fuels (72 percent) than
thenational average(63
percent). One subsidiary, Georgia Power, generates only 3
percent of power from renewables.
But
Monizhas ties to bona fide fossil
fuel companies, too. And to understand the full extent of
them, one has to go back to before he joined the Obama
administration.
From
2005 to 2011, Moniz served on BP’s Technology Advisory
Council. Although it’s not known whether Moniz was paid
for his position, at least one member received a nominal
sum of $6,200 for their role. Former BP CEO Lord John
Browne is the chair of the non-profit Moniz founded after
leaving office, the Energy Futures Initiative (EFI),
which launched the same day as Moniz’s for-profit firm,
EJM Associates, Inc. EJM, in turn—a “strategic consulting
firm that helps clients navigate the transition to a
global clean energy economy by advising on a range of
energy policy, innovation, and security issues,” per onejob description—has
apartnershipwith G2 Net-Zero LNG, a
gas export company that Moniz’s Energy Departmentauthorizedto
export natural gas for 30 years in 2015, when the company
was called “G2 LNG.”
The
Energy Initiative Moniz founded at MIT counted ExxonMobil,
Shell, and Eni among itsfounding members, a
title that came with aminimum $5 million
commitment to “support sponsored research projects
aligned with their strategic interests.” As of 2012—the
year before Moniz left MIT to become Energy Secretary—BP
had granted $50 million to the Energy Institute. Moniz was
also afounding trusteeof
the Saudi Aramco-backed King Abdullah Petroleum Studies
and Research Center, among several other industry posts heresigned fromin
advance of his DOE appointment.
A
specific concern cited by critics is Moniz’s role
championing natural gas and fracking, which is now
believed to be behind aspikein
atmosphere-warming methane emissions. Prior to joining the
Obama administration in 2013, Moniz led the team behind
an influential 2011study from MIT’s Energy
Initiative entitled “The Future of Natural Gas,” mapping
out an extensive role for natural gas in reducing the
country’s emissions. “The analysis in this study provides
the confirmation. Natural gas truly is a bridge to a
low-carbon future,” Moniz said at a press conference
announcing the report. In essence, the study argues that
gas is an essential bridge as nuclear power, carbon
capture, and renewables become economical in the coming
decades.
While
presented as independent research, the report itself was
sponsored by several fossil fuel companies and front
groups. Among the most generous was the American Clean
Skies Foundation, founded in 2007 by the late Chesapeake
Energy CEO Aubrey McClendon, who was instrumental in
helping to sell fracking to Wall Street
investors. The report called the environmental impacts of
fracking—including methane emissions, which are
shorter-lived but 84 times more potent than carbon
dioxide—“challenging but manageable.”
Study
co-chair Anthony Meggs joined the gas company Talismen
Energy before the report was released, just as Moniz tooka
paid position with ICF International, an energy
consultancy that the American Petroleum Institute hired to study the
economic benefits of liquified natural gas exports. By the
time he resigned from ICF and other other industry posts
to become Energy Secretary, Moniz had received $305,648 in
compensation from ICF. Another study group member, former
CIA director John Deutch, was at the time serving on the
board of Cheniere Energy. The same year the report was
released, Cheniere became the first company in the Lower
48 states approved to export liquified natural gas after
receiving a final greenlight from
the DOE.
“It’s
hard to under-state the importance of Moniz and Deutch’s
report,” Public Accountability Institute researcher Rob
Galbraith, who authored an extensive report on
the MIT study, tweeted recently. “Beyond
creating the architecture for the Obama administration’s
fracked gas export regime, it was deployed in media and in
Congress to counter popular opposition to fracking in the
United States.”
In
government, Moniz continuedto make the case for
natural gas. The fateful 2010 fracking study would even appear in his
official White House portrait. Shortly after taking
office, Moniz pledged to move “expeditiously” on
liquified natural gas export permits. His office opened up
key markets for U.S. fossil fuel producers, and approved its second
ever export terminal justice after his appointment in May
2013. Moniz appointed the
American Gas Association’s Paula Gant to serve as Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Oil and Natural Gas.
Questioned
by reporters over the years, Moniz hasdefendedhis
various industry ties on the grounds that “industry is an
essential part of the climate mitigation solution,” as his
spokesperson told the Center for Public Integrity’s Jie
Jenny Zou. This was a more widely accepted assertion
during the Obama administration, whose flagship,
unsuccessful legislative fight on climate was premised on
a compromise with polluters. As the fullemissions tollof
extraction has come into sharper view and the climate
crisis has grown more unavoidable, those attitudes have
changed amidst demands from an increasingly muscular
climate and anti-corporate movement.
Jeff
Hauser, director of the Revolving Door Project, which
tracks ties between corporations and government officials,
worries that Moniz’s industry ties make him a poor fit for
a cabinet position, in particular. “Moniz is chummy with
industry leaders who need to be wiped out if the planet is
to be saved. This is not a time for amiable people who get
along with everyone. That’s particularly true in the
executive branch, where we need someone committed to
exercising all existing powers, including little-used
ones, to avert the climate crisis,” Hauser said.
“Collegiality and dealmaking may well be necessary in
Congress. Within the executive branch you are going to
need someone who pushes lawyers, scientists and policy
professionals to get every last bit of carbon and methane
reduction that is possible out of the system under current
law.”
If
anything, while many in his party moved away from
Obama-era comfort with fossil fuels, Moniz appears to have
doubled down. In April,EFI announced the formation
of a partnership with the AFL-CIO Energy Committee known
as the Labor Energy Partnership (LEP), whose
representative, Austin Keyser, got a lengthy speaking spot
during this year’s DNC Platform Committee meeting. One
member of the group, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers (IBEW) President Lonnie Stephenson, was
recently added to Biden’s transition team, and was already
a member of the campaign’s Climate Engagement Advisory
Council. IBEW, and Stephenson specifically, hasopposed any fossil
fuel phaseouts as part of a comprehensive climate plan.
Unsurprisingly,
then, one of LEP’s principles is that climate policy “must
be based on an ‘all-of-the above’ energy source strategy
that is regionally focused, flexible, preserves
optionality, and addresses the crisis of stranded
workers,” rather than targeting any particular fuel source
for phase-out. The position conflicts with current
scientific consensus on necessary steps to avoid
catastrophic global warming: According to the2019 Production Gap Report, the
world’s governments are on track to produce 50 percent
more coal, oil and gas than can safely be burned to keep
cap warming at 2 degrees Celsius, and 120 percent more than is consistent
with a 1.5 degree target—in line with the “well below” 2
degrees threshold outlined by the Paris Agreement. Fossil
fuel use, in other words, would need to decrease, and
rapidly.
Moniz,
meanwhile, has continued totoutgas
as “a critical element” in changing the country’s energy
mix, crediting the fuel source for having “caused a
revolution that has led to a majority of our carbon
reduction” at an event at Tulane University last October.
“The transition to a deeply decarbonized economy may not
necessarily require the elimination of fossil fuels,”
states anEFI reportoutlining
its Green Real Deal, which Moniz launchedas
a counter to the Green New Deal at a U.S. Chamber of
Commerce summit last year. “Natural gas, in particular,
will continue to play an important role in providing
dispatchable electric power generation and
high-temperature industrial process heat—applications that
are not readily amenable to non-fossil fuel options.”
Controversy
over Moniz’s role in the Biden campaign comes as the
campaign attempts to show it’s serious about climate
change. In recent months, the campaign has incorporated
both proposals and staff members from the farther left and
more climate-ambitious Sanders, Inslee, and Warren
campaigns. Michelle Deatrick, National Chair of the DNC’s
Council on the Environment and Climate Crisis and a
Sanders supporter during the primary, says she’s been
“very encouraged” by her talks with the Biden campaign
during and since the DNC Platform was agreed to in August.
“There’s listening going on, and we’re moving toward a
bolder plan that approaches what we need to do,” she told
me.
Moniz’s
proximity to the Biden campaign, however, makes her
nervous.“The country’s on fire,”
Deatrick said. “Who we put into positions of power are
going to have a huge impact on whether or not we escape
the worst parts of the climate crisis. We just cannot
have people who have a financial interest in continuing
our reliance on fossil fuel extraction and emissions.”
In
his address to the DNC platform committee in July, Moniz
once again emphasized the need for an “all of the above”
approach. Thefirst goalof
the LEP, moreover, is to “create a national action plan
for the deployment of carbon capture, utilization and
sequestration technology.” It’s a strategy similar to the
one outlined in Southern Company’s goalannounced
in May of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, largely
through negative emissions technologies, maintaining
hearty investments in gas and coal.
“The
economics pretty much just don’t work in any situation,”
Collin Rees, Senior Campaigner with Oil Change
International, says of carbon capture technologies. “The
only way they conceivably work is if it’s massively
subsidized by the government. It’s incredibly important
to the fossil fuel industry that they can hold onto this
facade of CCS.”
Meanwhile,
Lonnie Stephensontoutedthe
benefits of “clean coal” at a virtual campaign event last
week, citing union’s work with Moniz on all-of-the-above
energy strategies. That clean coal will power the way to
decarbonization has been a common fossil fuel industry
talking point with little basis in reality, and climate
scientists havewarnedabout
the dangers of relying too heavily on that and other still
prohibitively expensive, largely unproven carbon removal
technologies to mitigate the climate crisis.
As a
board member at Southern Company and former Energy
Secretary, Moniz should know the limits of carbon removal
better than most: The utility’sKemper Projectwas
intended to showcase their potential, converting coal to
gas and removing the majority of the power plant’s carbon
dioxide emissions. Visitingthe
Kemper site as Energy Secretary in 2013, Moniz said his
department was “committed to advancing technologies that
make coal more efficient, economical, and environmentally
sustainable—securing its place in America’s clean energy
future while fighting the effects of climate change.” The
facility received generous support from the DOE after it
got underway in 2010. Following years of ballooning
budgets, mismanagement andalleged fraud,
Southern announced in 2018 that the plant would run on
conventional natural gas, with costs having ballooned from
$2.4 billion to $7.5 billion. As Steve Horn has reported, Southern
Company also runs a DOE-backed National Carbon Capture
Center that could stand to gain from further federal
investment.
“If
you’re Moniz, it’s not psychically satisfying to believe
you failed to utilize executive branch powers in ways that
would avert catastrophe,” said Jeff Hauser, making the
case for newer voices in the administration. “You’re much
less likely to think that if you come into government
relatively fresh, and without an emotional connection to
the policies of the past. A clear eyed, science driven
view of what’s happening would suggest the policies of the
past are insufficient.”
Last
time around, Moniz encountered little resistance from
lawmakers during his Senate confirmation and was sworn in
by a 97-0 vote. Should he get the nod this time,
progressives hope that’ll be different. “If you’re Merkley
or Markey or Whitehouse,” Demand Progress Executive
Director David Segel said, referring to the senators from
Oregon, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, respectively,
“and want to maintain credibility on climate and somebody
like Moniz is put before you then you are going to have to
oppose confirmation.” The simpler solution—and the one
progressives signing the letter hope for—is that the Biden
team will avoid Moniz and similar fossil-fuel enthusiasts
altogether.
The
last few decades have been characterized by weak economic
growth in the developed countries, which contrasts with the
dynamism shown by China and other countries on the periphery.
What does this tell us about the relations that characterize
the world capitalist system?
In this article I engage with the ideas of David Harvey
about imperialism.
This is much appreciated. But if you want some semi-critical
feedback (with the disclosure-proviso that I did my PhD under
Harvey's supervision, on uneven development in Zimbabwe), I don't
think the binary categories you seem to rely upon are sufficiently
nuanced to address uneven development, especially uneven and
combined development. There is a critical missing category,
"sub-imperialism," which is a concept Ruy Mauro Marini developed
in the 1960s-70s to explain Brazil's location as deputy sheriff to
Washington not only in geopolitical terms, but also with respect
to the local trajectory of capital accumulation. Harvey advanced
the concept a bit in the early 2000s, in The New Imperialism.
I think he was mistaken by not invoking it in the debate with
John Smith a couple of years ago, especially in the Review of
African Political Economy. (My critique is here.)
You correctly say:
Harvey’s
statement about a partial reversal in the drainage of historical
wealth could be considered valid: the fact that this “periphery”
has become a receptacle for capital on a larger scale, hand in
hand with an increase in investment by local capitalists (and in
China, above all, by public enterprises), and at the same time
these countries have increased their weight in the generation of
capital exported to other countries... some
economies grow and accumulate at the expense of others, and
that those that are showing the most dynamic growth in GDP,
manufacturing exports, or foreign investment are not at the
center but are a rather limited sector of the periphery.
That "rather limited sector" includes the
Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa bloc, which helps explain
why they line up tightly with imperialism when it comes to
amplifying the damage done by multinational corporations, the IMF
and World Bank, the WTO, the UNFCCC and even FIFA (recall who
nurtured Sepp Blatter in 2010, 2014 and 2018). My co-editor of the
book BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique, Ana Garcia from
Rio, discuss this here.
If we
consider as a bloc all the dependent countries (typically
characterized by the multilateral agencies as “emerging” and
“developing” countries, or “middle income” and “poor” countries,
etc.), they have continued to “drain” wealth towards the rich
countries during the last decades.
But these are not "a bloc", they are very distinct in terms of
the emerging global division of labour, in which the West has
ceded a great deal of its primary role in extracting surpluses
from the periphery to semi-peripheral corporations, especially
from the BRICS. There are two new books that deal with this: BRICS
and Resistance in Africa(which I co-edited) and BRICS
and the New American Imperialism (free for download here).
I based
this on a 2015 study that reconstructs the net results of
global licit and illicit financial flows — including
“development aid,” wage remittances, net trade balances,
debt services, new loans, foreign direct investment (FDI),
portfolio investment, and other flows.
Actually, that particular methodology massively underestimates
the damage done within the broader wealth drain from South to
North, because it ignores what's termed unequal ecological
exchange, which in my definition would highlight the drain of
depleted non-renewable natural resources. In Africa these are
typically $150 bn/year worth of additional South-to-North
wealth reduction. The
World Bank even admits this scale of unequal exchange by
factoring in uncompensated resource depletion. so progressives
shouldn't be so far behind the curve. Samir Amin pointed out
this problem starting in 1972, and it's been one of the core
insights of ecological economics, especially advanced by Herman
Daly.
... in the last 20 years the relative
weight of the rich (imperialist) countries and the rest of the
world has changed in terms of foreign direct investment from
these countries (destined to productive enterprises, either by
starting them up from scratch or by acquiring some
participation in local companies) and, to a lesser extent, in
the return flow from these countries to other countries.
Today, many “emerging” and “developing” countries also export
capital — that is, their residents make foreign direct
investments. Most of these are in other “emerging” and
“developing” countries, but some make their way to the develop
economies
This is where it becomes vital to recognise parts of the "Global
North" that are located in sit of sub-imperialist accumulation
such as where I've mainly been based the last 30 years:
Johannesburg, South Africa. This is not just a branch-plant city
but one where voracious extractive industries have been located
since the 1880s when half the world's gold was discovered
underground, sometimes 4km deep. And the accumulation of capital
that occurred here was not just in the circuit of JP Morgan
(co-founder of Anglo American) but also entailed a white
patriotic bourgeoisie that - until early 1990 when Nelson
Mandela was released from jail - was perfectly happy to use
Joburg as its hq base. In 1999, there was a massive flight of
Anglo, De Beers and many others of the top
The critical question is
whether the semi-periphery (not periphery) is exporting
capital (and returning dividends), and whether this is due to
countries in this category, led by China, experiencing crises of
overaccumulation in their own economies. Where I live, South
Africa, this
problem has been acute (though of variable intensity over
time) since the 1980s and has led to repeated drives to offshore
capital. The most formidable example was exactly a year ago when
the African continent's largest firm (by far), Naspers, suddenly
began relocating most of its wealth (a 31% investment in the
Chinese IT firm Tencent) to Amsterdam, in view of the firm's
inability to recirculate capital profitably in South Africa.
That overaccumulation and
capital export, in turn, means the rate at which local capital
draws in dividends from abroad, compared to foreign capital
drawing in dividends from South Africa, has been relatively high
at around 60% - though nowhere the level of imperialist
economies like the U.S. which hit 215% in 2015-17. A chart (from
this
book) gives you a sense of the ratios, as imperialist,
sub-imperialist and peripheral economies' have differential
abilities to retain or attract surpluses:
Profit
flows,
2015-17 (average dividend receipts as percent of dividend
payments)
The
fragmentation of production processes and the international
dispersion of tasks and activities within them has led to
the emergence of production systems without borders — which
can be sequential chains or complex networks, and which can
be global, regional, or involve only two countries. These
systems are commonly referred to as global value chains.
These chains are, fortunately, in retreat - as part of a general
deglobalisation of productive capital including trade/GDP,
FDI/GDP and cross-border-finance/GDP ratios. In 2007 the global
value chains peaked at over 28% of productive capital's output,
but by 2018 were down to 22%. Much more localisation is now
underway. I have some brief rough-draft lectures on the
processes here: