Date   

The Deeply Pessimistic Intellectual Roots of Black Lives Matter, the '1619 Project' and Much Else in Woke America

Inez Jenkins <portlandio@...>
 


Racecraft

Inez Jenkins <portlandio@...>
 

I recently started reading "Racecraft: The Soul of Inequality in American Life', by Barbara J. Fields and Karen Fields. This is a very good book. Here is an excerpt:

"Those who create and re-create race today are not just the mob that killed a young Afro-American man on a street in Brooklyn or the people who join the Klan and the White Order. They are also those academic writers whose invocation of self-propelling "attitudes" and tragic flaws assigns Africans and their descendants a category, placing them in a world exclusively theirs and outside history--a form of intellectual apartheid no less ugly or oppressive, despite its righteous (not to say self-righteous) trappings, than that practiced by the bio- and theo-racists; and for which the victims, like slaves of old, are expected to be grateful.

"They are the academic "liberals" and "progressives" in whose version of race the neutral shibboleths difference and diversity replace words like slavery, injustice, oppression, and exploitation, diverting attention from the anything-but-neutral history these words denote. They are also the Supreme Court and spokesmen for affirmative action, unable to promote or even define justice except by enhancing the authority and prestige of race; which they will continue to do forever so long as the most radical goal of the political opposition remains the reallocation of unemployment, poverty, and injustice rather than their abolition."

A necessary antidote to books like "White Fragility" and "How to be an Anti-Racist".


H-Net Review [H-Africa]: Bondarenko on Leonard, 'Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in Africa'

Andrew Stewart
 



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Date: Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 1:28 PM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Africa]: Bondarenko on Leonard, 'Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in Africa'
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Douglas W. Leonard.  Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of
French Empire in Africa.  London  Bloomsbury Academic, 2020.  248 pp.
 $115.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-78831-520-3.

Reviewed by Dmitri M. Bondarenko (Institute for African Studies of
the Russian Academy of Sciences)
Published on H-Africa (September, 2020)
Commissioned by David D. Hurlbut

A tight connection between anthropology and colonialism--its
political and moral justification and practice--is sometimes regarded
as anthropology's "original sin."[1] Although in reality the
intellectual, sociocultural, and political roots of anthropology as
an academic discipline are much deeper and much more branched, its
inextricable link with colonialism is still evident and undeniable.
Today, many anthropologists view "decolonizing" the discipline as an
urgent and important task. The "decolonization" of anthropology has
become a dominant trend in both the academic writing and social
activism of anthropologists from the former colonial powers and
former colonial possessions, from the "Global North" and "Global
South."

In connection with the above, Douglas W. Leonard's book is no doubt
timely. It is also innovative in at least two respects. Firstly, it
is about the link between colonialism and French anthropology, about
which not very much has been written (especially compared to the
number of publications on British anthropology's encounters with
colonialism). Secondly, Leonard studies this link from a specific
perspective: while it is quite common to come across publications
that describe and discuss how anthropology helped colonialists annex
and rule possessions, his aim is to study why and how anthropologists
failed to provide colonial practitioners with intellectual tools and
vision for effectively dealing with cultural "others" in both North
and sub-Saharan Africa. Leonard argues that the failure of that task
contributed significantly to the eventual crash of the French
colonial project--to the collapse of France's overseas empire,
particularly on the African continent.

Leonard sees the way that French anthropologists looked at Africans
as the fundamental reason for their inability to help colonialists
gain consent of the governed and thus make colonialism a sustainable
political form. They looked at Africans from a positivist and
Eurocentric view that was typical for their time. Africans were
considered by anthropologists to be passive objects of study and
sources of information on which scholars were to formulate their
ostensibly objective--"scientific"--explanations of African cultures
and recommendations for colonial administrators. Anthropologists did
not engage Africans in intercultural intellectual dialogue through
which the latter could be equal participants encouraged to interpret
their cultures the way they saw them themselves. So anthropologists
focused on differences between cultures instead of looking for
similarities between them. This approach generated "intellectual
resistance" in colonies "that sustained French social and
ethnological thinkers as they sought to understand colonial groups"
(p. 2). As a result, none of the strategies of interaction that
colonialists used with African peoples--association with local social
and political institutions that acknowledged difference and
assimilation that favored bringing indigenous institutions to the
French "gold standard"--made the colonial system stable and durable.

Leonard describes in vivid detail the activities of anthropologists,
Africanists, and sociologists, such as Maurice Delafosse, Paul Marty,
Marcel Mauss, and Pierre Bourdieu; the politician Jacques Soustelle;
and military leaders and prominent colonial administrators, including
Louis Faidherbe, Hubert Lyautey, and Joseph Gallieni. In doing so, he
argues that the main mistake that undermined the effort to implement
the associationist approach (and assimilationist even more so) in
French colonies was the desire to "translate" African ideas and norms
into the cultural language of European (particularly French)
modernity. This occurred because "European academics sought to build
a social and political associationist state to link Africans to
France across what anthropologist Arjun Appadurai has described as
the rupture between past and present; modernity thus became an
absolute, a singular achievement to which all others could only
aspire" (p. 3). They neither were able to make the colonial system
effective, nor did they oppose colonialism. On the contrary, the
academics--anthropologists and others--believed that colonialism as a
political system, if perfected, could promote the smooth transition
of Africans to modernity and integration into the modern world, that
is, the world of Western, basically European, modernity in which the
West leads and directs the whole humankind as its most "developed"
and "progressive" part.

What Leonard's book tells us first and foremost, beyond its immediate
topic, is how the general mindset of an epoch manifests itself both
in intellectual life (particularly anthropology as a science) and
politics (colonial practices in this case), and how its
manifestations in different spheres can strengthen a mindset within a
single sociocultural system (the French society of the late
nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries). For several decades now,
cultural relativism has been a dominant trend in the Western mindset,
and it manifests itself equally expressively in anthropology
(especially in such a powerful intellectual tradition as
poststructuralism) and the sociopolitical life of the decolonized
world. It is not by chance that at the turn of the twentieth century,
a reexamination of the notion of modernity began, and the concept of
"multiple modernities" that radically rejects equating of modernity
in general to its Western model as ostensibly the only possible and
universal is becoming more and more popular among anthropologists,
historians, and sociologists.[2] Leonard shows how in the preceding
historical period, the unquestionable Eurocentrism and
"progressivism" of the Western mindset fueled both anthropological
thought and colonial ideology and practice. Colonialism neither gave
birth to anthropology nor, even more so, vice versa. They both were
creations of the same period in the history of the same civilization,
and that is why they had a common mental background. That is why
Eurocentrist anthropology and colonialism went hand in hand until
things changed and they were substituted for anticolonialism coupled
with cultural relativist anthropology.

Leonard's rich evidence and profound analysis makes_ Anthropology,
Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in Africa_ a
valuable source of knowledge and inspiration for historians of
anthropological thought and for students of African history and
European colonialist ideologies and practices. This book will also
become important reading for all those interested in cultural and
sociopolitical dynamics of the world in the times of colonialism and
postcolonialism.

Notes

[1]. See, for example, among many others, Talal Asad, ed.,
_Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter_ (Atlantic Highlands, NJ:
Humanities Press, 1973); Diane Lewis, "Anthropology and Colonialism,"
_Current Anthropology_ 14 (1973): 581-602; Peter Pels and Oscar
Salemink, eds., _Colonial Subjects: Essays on the Practical History
of Anthropology_ (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999);
Peter Pels, "What Has Anthropology Learned from the Anthropology of
Colonialism?," _Social Anthropology_ 16 (2008): 280-99; and Michael
Asch, "Anthropology, Colonialism and the Reflexive Turn: Finding a
Place to Stand," _Anthropologica_ 57 (2015): 481-89.

[2]. See, for example, Arjun Appadurai, _Modernity at Large: Cultural
Dimensions of Globalization_ (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1996); Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar, ed., _Alternative
Modernities: A Millennial Quartet Book_ (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 2001); Peter Wagner, _Theorizing Modernity: Inescapability and
Attainability in Social Theory_ (London: SAGE, 2001); Peter Wagner,
_Modernity as Experience and Interpretation: A New Sociology of
Modernity_ (London: Polity Press, 2008); Peter Wagner, ed., _African,
American and European Trajectories of Modernity: Past Oppression,
Future Justice?_ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015); and
Göran Therborn, "Entangled Modernities," _European Journal of Social
Theory_ 6 (2003): 293-305. On the "multiple modernities" concept, see
especially Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Multiple Modernities," _Daedalus_
129 (2000): 1-29; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ed., _Multiple Modernities_
(London: Routledge, 2002); and Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, _Comparative
Civilizations and Multiple Modernities_, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill,
2003). See also, for example, Eliezer Ben-Rafael and Yitzak
Sternberg, eds., _Comparing Modernities: Pluralism versus Homogenity;
Essays in Homage to Shmuel N. Eisenstadt_ (Leiden: Brill, 2005); and
Gerhard Preyer and Michael Sussmann, eds., _Varieties of Multiple
Modernities_ (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

Citation: Dmitri M. Bondarenko. Review of Leonard, Douglas W.,
_Anthropology, Colonial Policy and the Decline of French Empire in
Africa_. H-Africa, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55644

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart


Block of Ice Twice as Big as Manhattan breaks off Greenland’s largest Ice Shelf, goes into Ocean

Dennis Brasky
 


H-Net Review [H-Africa]: Wylie on Oddy, 'The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer in Algeria'

Andrew Stewart
 



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Date: Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 11:27 AM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Africa]: Wylie on Oddy, 'The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer in Algeria'
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Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>


Jason Oddy.  The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer
in Algeria.  New York  Columbia University Press, Columbia Books on
Architecture and the City, 2019.  Illustrations. 240 pp.  $35.00
(paper), ISBN 978-1-941332-50-4.

Reviewed by Diana Wylie (Boston University)
Published on H-Africa (September, 2020)
Commissioned by David D. Hurlbut

Modernist Architecture in Algeria: An Elegy

British photographer Jason Oddy toted his 5x4-inch plate camera to
Algeria twice, in 2010 and 2013. Long interested in "the politics of
place," he spent a total of one month in the country, training his
lens on three projects built nearly fifty years earlier by legendary
Brazilian modernist Oscar Niemeyer (p. 60).[1] Oddy's starkly
beautiful images of those sites, accompanied by Niemeyer's drawings
and four short essays--three by Oddy and one by architectural
historian Samia Henni--have been published with stylish flair by the
Columbia University Graduate School of Architecture under the
slightly puzzling title The Revolution Will Be Stopped Halfway.

The title derives from a June 1968 conversation between Niemeyer and
Houari Boumediene, president of Algeria. Both men were wrestling with
acute political dilemmas. Niemeyer, a member of Brazil's Communist
Party, had just flown to Algiers from Paris, where the French had
granted him refuge after he fled Brazil's 1964 military coup.
Boumediene was a soldier who, after serving in the Liberation Army
that won independence from France in 1962, had seized the presidency
only three years before this meeting. According to Niemeyer's own
testimony, when he showed the president his design for a new mosque
in Algiers, Boumediene observed that it was rather revolutionary. The
architect responded, "It's a revolutionary mosque. The revolution
can't stop halfway" (p. 40). When titling his book, Oddy changed the
tone of Niemeyer's remark from an optimistic admonition (_can't_, as
in _shouldn't_) to a sad negative (_will stop_), thus signaling the
elegiac nature of his project, apparent in both his photographs and
the text. High modernist hopes for a new world are at stake here, and
the title suggests they are not going to fare well.

It is impossible to divine precisely what was going on in the minds
of the architect and the president on that June day in 1968. Niemeyer
may have been suggesting that the liberation of the Algerian nation
from French control was only part one of the revolution achieved by
the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). Part two would be the
creation of a democratic and egalitarian country where, Oddy
surmises, Niemeyer intended his buildings to "imbue the fledgling
state with dignity and hope" (p. 121). Boumediene, on the other hand,
may have been suggesting that popular taste might be shocked, even
affronted, by a modernist mosque, one whose forty-meter dome would be
supported not by interior columns, as customary, but by three
external walls. Perhaps even more revolutionary would be the stained
glass window punctuating the dome. As Henni writes in her preface,
pointedly subtitled "When Militarism Meets Modernism," Boumediene
probably objected to the untraditional form of the mosque, while
endorsing other revolutionary projects, like new schools that would
modernize local "mentalities" (p. 33). The new president wanted to
raise Algeria's international profile by asserting its independence
from French influence. And so his government hired not only Niemeyer
but also a galaxy of other star architects--Jean-Jacques Deluz,
Fernand Pouillon, Ricardo Bofill, Anatole Kopp, Luigi Moretti, Tange
Kenzo--to change the face of Algeria.

When militarism met modernism, militarism--or at least the tastes and
needs of the FLN--won. Rejected by the committee charged with
planning a new Algiers, Niemeyer's mosque was never built. Most of
his Algerian designs--drawn from the Niemeyer archives in Rio de
Janeiro to fill the book's last section--were never actually
constructed. Boumediene's death in 1978 robbed Niemeyer of the
support he needed to build, for example, an ecologically progressive
zoo to be viewed from a revolving restaurant atop a "space needle,"
as well as a new administrative district across the Bay of Algiers,
which would, in Niemeyer's proud words, "boast ... great originality
with its architecture and location" and express "the future filled
with progress and well-being that the Algerian people are now
building" (p. 149).

Users tend to give Niemeyer's structures, at best, mixed reviews.
Some appreciate the open workshops he designed for Algiers's
architectural school, seeing them as honest and effective efforts to
ensure that students interacted free of hierarchical divisions. On
the other hand, people complain that his classrooms are too hot in
summer and too cold in winter. Some feel oppressed by the sheer
quantity of concrete. And then there is the problem of the vast empty
spaces. Oddy's unpeopled photographs make them look particularly
forlorn. The pictures seem to contradict the claim that the spaces
were meant to instill democratic ideals: the wide plazas make
individuals look insignificant. It is rumored that Boumediene feared
they could be places for subversive assembly: he had the university
bearing his name built in a swampy suburb of Algiers far from the
city center.

It would probably be a mistake to think that the militarists and
modernists were entirely at odds. Modernists, while swearing fidelity
to high democratic ideals, often treated a wide range of significant
obstacles--contemporary popular taste, historically rooted
traditions, and even the landscape--in a high-handed fashion. They
preferred the spectacular to the intimate, the expansive plaza to the
small square. When Niemeyer helped design Brasilia in the late 1950s,
he intended its vast spaces, sculptural buildings, and curvilinear
forms to presage a fresh, democratic start for the one-time South
American empire. Today it is commonly recognized that the sprawling
bureaucratic city is best experienced from the air. An aerial perch
is similarly preferable for those trying to appreciate the auditorium
at the university in Constantine: it is shaped like an open book,
though a vantage point from above is necessary to reveal the pages
curving out and down from a central spine. Niemeyer was competing
with extraordinary natural landscapes: Algiers is built on a steep
coastal escarpment, and the old town of Constantine sits on an island
above a deep, encircling gorge. In these settings, spectacular
buildings--like the book-shaped auditorium--demand attention as if
the architect were asserting the primacy of his own artistic vision
not only above local desires but also above local natural forms.

Oddy displays considerable generosity of spirit toward Niemeyer's
schemes. He admires the architect's exploration of the "sculptural,
even poetic limits" of concrete (p. 61). He appreciates the
"progressive and lyrical possibilities" Niemeyer was aiming for as he
sought to create a "potentially less-hierarchical spatialization of
power" (pp. 64, 109). The key concepts here are "possibility" and
"potential," as opposed to actual "success." Oddy's photographs may
strike viewers as disheartening, an affect he has achieved in some of
his prior, similarly unpeopled projects, like those shot in the
Pentagon and Guantanamo. Paint is peeling. Food wrappers sit on a
window ledge near some forlorn graffiti. Broken chairs and stools are
heaped up, unlikely to be repaired, while sofas are losing their
stuffing. Windows are unwashed, grass uncut, the pool dry, and a
wooden panel has replaced a broken window. Oddy's exploration of the
"undeclared forces that both give rise to and operate in
architectural space" may not require the human presence, but, without
people, his photographs are suffused with a sense of emptiness and
disappointment: a blurry woman walks down a long concrete passageway;
students sitting near the auditorium are dwarfed by its "pages" or
walls (p. 60). Like South African photographer Guy Tillim in _Avenue
Patrice Lumumba_ (2008), he has taken us for a dispiriting walk down
an avenue of postcolonial African dreams.

After overcoming his 2010 difficulty in gaining official Algerian
permission to photograph his sites, Oddy went on to produce a book
that, in effect, invites his readers to reengage with the progressive
political rhetoric of the 1960s. He now understands that his earlier
hope--"that an art project could somehow reinscribe [into
contemporary political discourse] the ideals that had been lying
dormant in Niemeyer's Algerian projects for decades"--was actually
"hubristic and naïve" (pp. 64-65). Neither an architectural nor an
urban historian, Oddy is an artist who has not needed to use
footnotes, do research in Algerian archives, or provide a
comprehensive survey of Niemeyer's work in Algeria. (Ecole
Polytechnique d'Architecture et d'Urbanisme [EPAU], the architectural
school in Algiers, is missing, for example.) With engaging humility,
he confesses that in Algeria he is an outsider.[2]

Oddy's readers should benefit from the abundance of thought-provoking
ironies he has revealed in this elegy to the ideals of the 1960s.
Three stand out for me: that Niemeyer sought refuge from a military
dictatorship in a country whose former colony--for which he
worked--was itself on the road to military rule; that buildings meant
to connect Algeria to the rest of the modern world stand in a country
now unusually cut off from that world; and that modernist optimism
can look both authoritarian and quaintly utopian today. 

Notes

[1]. They comprise buildings on two university campuses (University
of Science and Technology Houari Boumediene at Bab Ezzouar and
University of Mentouri at Constantine) and one Olympic sports hall
(La Coupole, Algiers).

[2]. Harriet Thorpe, "Oscar Niemeyer's Algerian Architecture
Uncovered," _Wallpaper_, November 8, 2019,
https://www.wallpaper.com/architecture/oscar-niemeyer-algeria-jason-oddy-book.

Citation: Diana Wylie. Review of Oddy, Jason, _The Revolution Will Be
Stopped Halfway: Oscar Niemeyer in Algeria_. H-Africa, H-Net Reviews.
September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55562

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart


H-Net Review [H-Environment]: Conz on Kelly, 'To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996'

Andrew Stewart
 



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Date: Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 11:10 AM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Environment]: Conz on Kelly, 'To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996'
To: <h-review@...>
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>


Jill E. Kelly.  To Swim with Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and
Belonging in South Africa, 1800-1996.  African History and Culture
Series. East Lansing  Michigan State University Press, 2018. 
Illustrations. 396 pp.  $49.95 (paper), ISBN 978-1-61186-285-0.

Reviewed by Christopher Conz (Tufts University)
Published on H-Environment (September, 2020)
Commissioned by Daniella McCahey

Environmental changes, policies, and practices are inseparable from
politics. Whether the topic is soil erosion or climate change, the
ways that people think about, experience, and act on environmental
changes are shaped by their relationships to institutions and
governments. In_ To Swim with Crocodiles_, historian Jill E. Kelly
provides an intricate look at the local and national politics of
land, violence, and belonging in the Table Mountain area in what is
now KwaZulu-Natal Province of South Africa (not Table Mountain in
Cape Town). This is not a work that focuses on the environment, but
its nuanced analysis and innovative arguments illustrate a political
and cultural context that scholars of environmental studies can learn
from. Rather than expressing a primary  interest in environment,
Kelly seeks to understand the political roots of the violence of the
1980s and 1990s, often oversimplified by Western media as tribal.

Kelly uses a pair of what she calls cultural inheritances to guide
her analysis that covers two hundred years in this Zulu-speaking
locale. _To Swim with Crocodiles_ takes readers from circa 1800, when
identities in southern Africa derived from family-based chiefdoms,
through multiple phases of White-supremacist rule and Black political
struggle, and finally, to the years following multiparty elections in
1994. First, Kelly defines the cultural inheritance of _ukukhonza _as
"one of affiliation, a social agreement that historically bound
together subjects and leaders to provide land and security" (p.
xxxii). In this reciprocal relationship, chiefs provided land and
security to their subjects, while subjects "khonza-ed" their chiefs
by paying tribute as livestock, labor, or cash. Kelly argues that
_ukukhonza_ has been fluid and has continued to shape the
relationships between chiefs and subjects "even as those bonds were
transformed by colonial and apartheid rule" (p. xxxvi).

Second, Kelly asserts that _ukukhonza_ combined with genealogy to
provide "the language for social and political membership, bringing
to life new or imagined relationships between peoples and with land"
(p. xxxvi). This cosmology is what historian Christopher Lee has
called a genealogical imagination in _Unreasonable Histories:
Nativism, Multiracial Lives, and the Genealogical Imagination in
British Africa_ (2014). Within these cultural inheritances, "land
operated as both physical and cosmological space and a historical
place" (p. xxxvii). Situating these arguments in the literature on
authority, land, and violence, the author acknowledges that "chiefly
connections with colonial and apartheid agents" interfered with the
contract between chiefs and commoners (p. xl). But Kelly stresses
that overemphasizing this perspective obscures how Africans held
leaders accountable. Furthermore, the author suggests that these
cultural inheritances should be considered when rethinking the role
of chiefs in administering land in a deeply inequitable South Africa.

Chapter 1 synthesizes archaeological, ethnographic, and documentary
evidence to provide readers with a solid foundation of chieftainship.
An elaboration of the Central Cattle Pattern, as Africanists know it,
illustrates how chiefs and commoners related to one another through
land allocation, cattle loans, and tribute rendered through labor,
livestock, or military service. This system sustained well-being, yet
it had inequities built into it such as between older families and
later arrivals to a chiefship. Chapter 2 explains how British
authorities employed chiefs to carry out indirect rule. In rural
South Africa, this colonial apparatus regulated land allocation in
ways that favored White settlers. Additionally, chiefs helped collect
taxes, which along with dispossessing Africans of land, served to
compel people to work in mines and on commercial farms. But chiefs
handled this duty in varied ways, often blurring the lines between
collaboration and resistance. On this subject, Kelly uses archival
cases from the secretary of Native Affairs effectively to support her
argument that _ukukhonza_, always evolving, remained central to the
relationship between chiefs, commoners, and land.

Chapter 3 examines how the government bodies that formed the Union of
South Africa in 1910 created new chiefships, drew new jurisdictions,
and strengthened segregationist systems. Of special note is the story
of how "Maguzu Maphumulo became the chief of the newly established
Maphumulo chiefdom" at Table Mountain in 1905 (p. 66). The Nyavu
chiefdom, however, had already been there. The politics between these
two chiefdoms and how their people used genealogical imagination to
claim belonging becomes a central theme throughout the book.
Following the formation of the Union in 1910, the government passed a
series of legislation to dispossess Africans from various tenancy
arrangements in the region, sending many scrambling to find space in
these chiefdoms. Kelly explains how new arrivals sought security and
living space at Table Mountain using _ukukhonza_.

In chapters 4-5 the author explores the political and cultural
dimensions of how betterment schemes--government rural development
projects--played out near Table Mountain. This section is of special
interest to H-Environment readers. At the center is Nagle Dam,
conceived of in 1935 to supply Durban with water and completed in
1951. Kelly uses an impressive collection of oral histories and
detailed maps to show how people were removed, where they moved to,
and how they used _ukukhonza _to navigate this injustice. Here, the
book builds on, among others, Elizabeth Colson's work on the social
consequences of Kariba Dam in Zambia, _The Social Consequences of
Resettlement: The Impact of the Kariba Resettlement upon the Gwembe
Tonga_ (1971). Government efforts to promote commercial agriculture,
control livestock, and consolidate villages provoked resistance.
Frequently seen as agents of a coercive state, chiefs and
agricultural officials were often targets of protest. Addressing the
"androcentrism of betterment schemes," Kelly narrates how women
resisted in the 1950s by destroying cattle-dipping tanks in an action
that one interviewee described as "writing a letter to the
authorities which they could read" (pp. 126, 127).

This book's strength is in how it reconstructs historical
micropolitics to help explain recent conflict in political terms.
Chapters 6-8 demonstrate this approach and its supporting
methodology. Readers gain insight on how chiefs navigated the
apartheid government's efforts in the 1970s to consolidate Africans
into independent Bantustans. We see opportunists like Chief
Mangosuthu Buthelezi establish the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) that
provided a Zulu-nationalist counterweight to liberation parties under
the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), especially the African National
Congress. Meanwhile, Chief Mhlabunzima Maphumulo earned the nickname
"peace chief" by navigating the fraught spaces between local
politics, MDM, and after 1987, the Congress of Traditional Leaders of
South Africa. But as the final chapters clarify through a detailed
examination of the civil war in the 1980s and 1990s, politics was far
more complicated than these affiliations reveal. It is through
_ukukhonza_, above all, that people align themselves. The apartheid
government's support for IFP bears substantial responsibility for the
violence of these years, including the assassination of Mhlabunzima
Maphumulo. But understanding people's motivations means assembling a
longer history of how individuals, families, and chiefdoms saw
themselves in relation to various lineages and to the land that they
claim as theirs.

In_ To Swim with Crocodiles_, Kelly demonstrates how documentary and
oral evidence, combined with a sense of place, can improve our
knowledge of political, social, and cultural change. Scholars and
students of African history and politics, South African studies, and
conflict studies will find this book rich in its analysis and
enlightening in its findings. General readers, however, may find the
naming of chiefs and chiefdoms difficult to follow at times.
H-Environment readers will long for more about ecological changes,
not for the sake of nature as backdrop, but as changes that are
inseparable from political processes. Readers wanting an ecological
analysis of Nagle Dam on par with Allen and Barbara Isaacman's book
on Cahora Bassa Dam in Mozambique, _Dams, Displacement, and the
Delusion of Development: Cahora Bassa and Its Legacies in Mozambique,
1965-2007_ (2013), will have to look elsewhere. Environmental studies
readers, however, will learn much about the local politics of
policymaking, implementation, and resistance in South Africa in ways
reminiscent of such works as Marsha Weisiger's _Dreaming of Sheep in
Navajo Country _(2011).


Citation: Christopher Conz. Review of Kelly, Jill E., _To Swim with
Crocodiles: Land, Violence, and Belonging in South Africa,
1800-1996_. H-Environment, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54859

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart


H-Net Review [H-Judaic]: Judaken on Hammerschlag, 'Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics'

Andrew Stewart
 



Best regards,
Andrew Stewart 
- - -
Subscribe to the Washington Babylon newsletter via https://washingtonbabylon.com/newsletter/

Begin forwarded message:

From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: September 15, 2020 at 6:18:17 AM EDT
To: h-review@...
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Judaic]:  Judaken on Hammerschlag, 'Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics'
Reply-To: h-review@...

Sarah Hammerschlag, ed.  Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on
Religion and Politics.  Brandeis Library of Modern Jewish Thought
Series. Waltham  Brandeis University Press, 2018.  xxvii + 268 pp.  
$26.00 (paper), ISBN 978-1-5126-0186-2; $95.00 (cloth), ISBN
978-1-61168-526-8.

Reviewed by Jonathan Judaken (University of Memphis)
Published on H-Judaic (September, 2020)
Commissioned by Barbara Krawcowicz

French Philoso-Jews and Meta-Rabbis

In this anthology, Sarah Hammerschlag offers readers a dive into the
deep reservoir of modern French Jewish thought. Her brilliantly
curated book is presented in roughly chronological order, exploring
Jewish philosophy and theology as a response to shifting contexts.
For French Jews, these were shaped by the legacy of the French
Revolution's emancipation of its Jewish citizens and the terms of the
Napoleonic social contract established by the Assembly of Notables
(1806), the convening of the "Sanhedrin" (1807), and Napoleon's new
edicts in 1808, most importantly, the establishment of a central
consistory that regulated French Judaism. This emancipation social
contract traded equal rights as citizens in return for acculturation,
"regeneration," or even complete assimilation. Two profound
convulsions challenged the terms of Jewish equality: the Dreyfus
affair and more perniciously the Vichy regime's racial laws. In the
postwar period--the central focus of Hammerschlag's
compilation--French Jewry was transformed by the memory of the Shoah;
the decolonization of North Africa that led to a demographic
transformation as a result of Jews migrating to the metropole from
the Maghreb (often alongside Muslims); and events in Israel,
especially the Six Day War and its aftermath. The ramifications of
these processes continue to shape French Jewry and influence French
Jewish thought.   

Hammerschlag's short introduction sketches this history and sets up
the anthology by setting out the two key themes that structure the
texts she has chosen: the universal and the particular and
identification and disidentification. In the first part of the book,
"The _Israélite _of the Republic," a set of texts from 1860 to 1928
wrestle primarily with the terms of French identity as constituted by
the legacy of the French Revolution. The _Israélite _of her section
title refers to those Jews who accepted the stipulations of French
acculturation, even as they insisted on the universal values of
Jewish thought. The excerpts in the second section, "The Cataclysm
and the Aftermath," were penned during the Holocaust or directly in
response to it, indicating a rupture in the provisos of the French
social contract. The third part, "Universal and Particular: The Jew
and the Political Realm," is a neatly ordered but fraught dialogue
about the significance of Zionism and the State of Israel. The last
part, "Identification, Disidentification," contains a set of
considerations on the meaning of community and belonging for Jewish
philosophers in the post-Holocaust and in a postcolonial world.

The anthology's first contribution is to supplement the
Germano-centrism of modern Jewish thought. The canon is often framed
around German-speaking thinkers from Moses Mendelssohn to Franz
Rosenzweig. In recent years Emmanuel Levinas has served as a
postscript and continuation of this tradition. But the brilliant
array of French Jewish thinkers assembled--often translated for the
first time by Hammerschlag, regularly teaming with Beatrice
Bourgogne--make evident that a parallel stream existed in France from
the nineteenth century. Clearly influenced by their German
counterparts engaged in the academic study of Judaism--the
_Wissenschaft des Judentums_--_La science du judaïsme_ emerged in
France in the 1830s, led by leading Orientalists like Adolphe Franck
and Salomon Munk. The volume begins with two excerpts by Joseph
Salvador (chapter 1) and James Darmesteter (chapter 2) who were part
of this pioneering cohort. I wish that Hammerschlag would have taught
us more about this early history, since we are only offered a glimpse
into developments in the nineteenth century. The other vanguard
voices in part 1 include Bernard Lazare (chapter 4), the paragon of
the conscious pariah so beautifully rendered by Hannah Arendt, and
André Spire (chapter 5), along with Edmond Fleg (chapter 7).[1]

Not only are the individual thinkers that Hammerschlag's anthology
elevates a deep and wide counterpoint to the German tradition, but
she also has a historical plot to her tale. The Dark Years, as the
French often refer to the period of collaboration with the Nazis,
tore apart the identification of Jews with the French state. "There
can be no doubt," writes Hammerschlag, "that the Second World War
altered the terms of French Judaism, the self-understanding of French
Jews, and the project and mission of the nation's Jewish
organizations" (p. xv). A revival of Judaism ensued, she explains:
"Already during the war a reorientation of Jewish life and identity
began to take place at farm schools, in study circles, and in
children's homes. In the spring of 1941, the Jewish poet Edmond Fleg
and the leader of the Jewish scouting movement Robert Gamzon" were
working to educate a new generation of Jewish thinkers to take on the
mantle of vitalizing Judaism (p. xvi). Hammerschlag includes
selections from some of these lesser-known figures like Gamzon
(chapter 9) and Jacob Gordin (chapter 10). Their project influenced
the postwar generation, alongside the well-known work of Levinas
(chapter 11), as did the insights of thinkers like Vladimir
Jankélévitch (chapter 12), who has received some recognition even
by English-language scholars.[2] In short, Hammerschlag's story is
that if the Jewish renaissance was pioneered in Germany in the
interwar years, a blossoming across the Rhine took place in
post-Holocaust Paris. _Tout court_, Paris was the continuation of
Frankfurt and Berlin.

The problem with this story is that there was a Jewish renaissance in
Paris in the interwar years in which a diasporic cultural Zionism
played a central role. This is wholly underplayed by Hammerschlag.
She alludes to it in her introduction to the excerpt on Fleg when she
writes, "Along with André Spire, Jean-Richard Bloch, and Armand
Lunel, he [Fleg] was part of a Jewish literary revival that blossomed
in the decades between the Dreyfus Affair and the Second World War"
(p. 54). This Jewish cultural efflorescence profoundly reshaped
Jewish intellectual life before the rise of the Nazis. As Nadia
Malinovich documents in her important study of this era: "French Jews
began to question how they should define Jewishness in a society
where Jews enjoyed full political equality. Writers who had
previously given little thought to their Jewish identity began to
explore biblical themes, traditional Jewish folklore, and issues of
identity and assimilation in their novels, plays, and poetry. A
plethora of journals focusing on Jewish religion, history, and
culture came into being in France between 1900-1932, when a multitude
of associations that emphasized Jewish distinctiveness--literary
societies, youth groups, religious organizations--also formed. This
blossoming of Jewish cultural life, which contemporaries referred to
as a 'renaissance' or 'awakening', provides a particularly
interesting vantage-point from which to explore the complex ways in
which both 'Jewishness' and 'Frenchness' were renegotiated in the
early twentieth century."[3] The French Jewish cultural renaissance
of the early twentieth century is an area of exciting new work by
Sally Charnow, building on the earlier studies of Malinovich and
others, and deserves more attention.[4]

The failure to give full credence to the cultural revival already at
work before the Holocaust perhaps results in some of Hammerschlag's
errors. Fleg, for example, was not "born into an assimilated family
in Geneva" as Hammerschlag notes (p. 54). Religious observance was an
important part of his upbringing. In _Why I Am a Jew_, in an earlier
part of the book from which she takes her excerpt from Fleg, he
writes, "It seemed natural that my father should, in the morning,
wrap himself in a shawl of white wool with black stripes, and should
bind lengths of leather on his forehead and left arm, while he
murmured words which were not words. I thought grace after a meal as
necessary as the meal itself; and I felt no surprise when, on Friday
evening, my mother stretched forth her fingers over the Sabbath
candles, which shone through them and made them transparent."[5] In
_Why I Am a Jew_, Fleg narrates how his immersion into French culture
led to his drift away from his Jewishness, until the anti-Semitism of
the Dreyfus affair reawakened his return to Judaism, spurring his
cultural Zionism, resulting in the key role he would come to play in
helping to revive Jewish culture in France. This was all at work
before the Holocaust.

The same is true for Albert Memmi, who Hammerschlag likewise suggests
was awakened to his Jewish identity by the Vichy racial laws: "For
some, like the writer Albert Memmi, the [Vichy racial] statutes
motivated a reassertion of Jewish identity, if not in religious
terms, then at least in political ones" (p. xv). Again, this
narrative does not fit the facts. Memmi was raised on the Jewish
cultural traditions of Tunis, went to study in a traditional
religious school as a young boy, and became an avid member of
Hashomer Hatzair as a young man. He never had to rediscover his
Jewish identity provoked by the Vichy collaboration with the Nazis
because his was a Jewish itinerary from the beginning. Suggesting
otherwise would intimate a notion of Jewish identity as static, which
is clearly belied by Hammerschlag's selections. In making these
claims about the hard break occasioned by the rise of Hitlerism,
Hammerschlag seems to generalize a narrative advanced by Samuel Moyn
about Levinas that I have tried to show does not hold in his case
either.[6]

There is no doubt that the Holocaust was a caesura in Jewish life
that irrevocably altered how Jews came to understand themselves in
its wake. But perhaps this was never more the case than in the
argument that the Holocaust left a deeper imprint on individuals'
lives than their early upbringing, which obviously was a formative
lens through which many Jewish intellectuals made sense of the Shoah.
A case that makes the point is Sarah Kofman. Hammerschlag includes an
anguished excerpt from _Smothered Words _(1987) (chapter 13),
Kofman's philosophical meditation on what it means to write and think
after the disaster, including about being Jewish. It is layered by
her own experience of coming to terms with the death of her father,
Rabbi Berek Kofman, who was beaten unconscious and buried alive by a
_kapo_ in Auschwitz for refusing to work on Shabbat. Kofman offers
more extended biographical reflections in _Rue Ordener, Rue Labat
_(1994), her tortured, short memoir of survival in hiding after her
father was deported. She recounts how she survived living with a
Christian woman, whom she calls Mémé, who clearly harbored
anti-Jewish stereotypes but who nonetheless risked her own life to
save Sarah and her mother, even as she introduced Sarah to all the
temptations of forbidden French food and culture. _Rue Ordender, Rue
Labat_ reflects a young child wretched apart by her Jewishness and
her desire to acculturate, which her survival depended on, even as
she considers through suffocated words what her parents meant to her,
and by extension the significance of her being Jewish.

It is fitting that the passages from Kofman close the set of
selections included in part 2, "The Cataclysm and the Aftermath,"
which is opened by a letter from Simone Weil, "What Is a Jew"
(chapter 8). Unlike Kofman, Weil did not even learn she was Jewish
until she was ten, so assimilated were her parents and afraid that
their children would suffer from anti-Semitism. One month after the
Vichy racial laws were passed in October 1940, Weil wrote to Xavier
Vallat, then Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, about why her teaching
position was not renewed. Certainly Weil was aware of Vallat's
anti-Semitism, evident in a notorious speech he gave in the Chamber
of Deputies in June 1936 when socialist Léon Blum became France's
first Jewish prime minister: "Your assumption of power, Mr. Prime
Minister," Vallat bleated, "is unquestionably an historic event. For
the first time, this old Gallo-Roman land will be governed by a
Jew.... I must say out loud what everyone else is thinking to
themselves--that in order to govern this peasant nation that is
France, it is preferable to have someone whose origins, no matter how
modest, disappear into the bowels of our soil, rather than a subtle
Talmudist." After skeptically interrogating what it means to be a Jew
in her epistle to Vallat, Weil insists that she should not be
excluded from her teaching position, since "mine is the Christian,
French, Greek tradition. The Hebraic tradition is alien to me, and no
Statute can make it otherwise" (p. 65). It is little wonder then that
her journey would take her ever deeper into Christian mysticism, even
as the Nazi genocide unfolded across Europe.

Hammerschlag includes a penetrating musing on "the lost children of
Judaism" (the title of chapter 19) like Weil by Jacqueline
Mesnil-Amar. She writes beautifully and movingly about "those
vagabonds, lost from Judaism, who, voluntarily or by circumstance
have abandoned Israel, turned away: the rebels against the law, those
ignorant of tradition" (p. 182). These lost children with their
"extremely subtle and mixed message" represent "another sort of
Judaism" exemplified by writers like Marcel Proust and Max Jacob (p.
183). Their inclusion highlights another contribution of the
anthology: the capacious set of voices that the volume consciously
includes, broadening the contours of modern Jewish thought.

The section titled "Identification, Disidentification" which opens
with Mesnil-Amar closes with an excerpt from an article by Stéphane
Mosès, "Normative Modernity and Critical Modernity" (chapter 24).
Mosès was an innovative interpreter of Rosenzweig and Walter
Benjamin among other Weimar-period German Jewish thinkers and "an
important participant in its postwar French sequel: _l'école juive
de Paris_, as Emmanuel Levinas dubbed it" (p. 245). The underlined
descriptor clearly indicates another important contribution of this
volume--spotlighting as it does the depth of post-Holocaust French
Jewish thought as a continuation of the highpoint of German Jewish
philosophy.

Mosès's essay, which closes the book, brings together the various
contributions of the volume. In it, he argues for a normative modern
tradition that includes "Emmanuel Levinas but also Hermann Cohen and
Franz Rosenzweig" (p. 246). Mosès then sketches the contours of a
"_critical modernity_" that is "represented by authors such as
Benjamin, Kafka, Celan, Arendt, Jabès and in a certain measure,
Scholem, and much later Jacques Derrida." For Mosès, these Jewish
thinkers, in Arendt's words, believe "the thread of tradition is
broken," and "we cannot reconnect it." Mosès continues: there is
only "a _shattered_ past that is no longer capable of inspiring in us
judgments of evident value. In this broken time that expresses the
discontinuity of the past, the contents of faith--I speak now of the
Jewish faith--are no longer audible for us; they no longer correspond
to any experience today" (p. 247). In addition to the selection from
Derrida (chapter 23), the longest in the book, one could also include
the snippets from Hélène Cixous (chapter 22), along with Alain
Finkielkraut's agonized wrestling with the possibility of an
authentic Jewishness after the Shoah in the excerpt from _The
Imaginary Jew_ (chapter 21), as a part of this critical tradition
that Hammerschlag clearly wants to add to the canon of modern Jewish
thought. Léon Ashkénazi in "Tradition and Modernity" (chapter 20),
on the other hand, provides an argument linking normative modernity
back to "the Bible as the identity card of Hebrews.... We study it to
know what we believe in.... afterward, one studies the books that
speak about it. This is the Jewish tradition as it has been for
centuries" (p. 196).

The gamut of debate in _Modern French Jewish Thought _is not only
about the ramifications of Jewish thought across time but also about
the meaning of space, specifically about Zionism. Memmi lays the
groundwork for an argument that Zionism emerges from the experience
of Jews as a colonized people (chapter 14). He writes, "We are, in
short, the forsaken as far as history is concerned. We would like to
go our way unnoticed: but history in doing without us, also
frequently acts against us. Everything happens as though the Jew
offered himself as an expiatory victim, specially marked out for the
meager imagination of executioners, dictators and politicians" (p.
136). For Memmi, the State of Israel is consequently necessary as a
safe haven but also as a crucible for forging new highpoints in
Jewish culture.

Richard Marienstras in "The Jews of the Diaspora, or the Vocation of
a Minority" (chapter 15) demurs. Not only does the Jewish diaspora
show that "there are many ways of assuming and creating the Jewish
destiny," but diasporism is also necessary as part of a struggle
against "the State as it exists today ... a State that transforms
citizens into subjects, producers into cogwheels, public servants
into agents of power, and the majority culture into an instrument of
propaganda and domination" (pp. 145, 150). With the two furthest
points on the spectrum charted, there is also a chapter titled "The
Jewish Dimension of Space: Zionism" (chapter 16) by André Neher and
another titled "Jerusalem" (chapter 17) by Henri Atlan. Finally,
there is also a complicated critique of universalism by Shmuel
Trigano (chapter 18). Along the way, Trigano manages to slam the
neo-Pauline Judeophobia of Alain Badiou and Giorgio Agamben, while
still affirming "the unity of humanity" our "infinite and irreducible
plurality" and the "ingathering in a unique place," all in a few
pages (p. 178).

While Hammerschlag promises that the anthology is no documentary
reader, there are selections that do not meet the yardstick of what
might be included in a course on modern Jewish thought except to
provide context. Zadoc Kahn's "Speech on the Acceptance of His
Position as Chief Rabbi of France" (chapter 3) or Sylvain Levi's
essay "Alliance Israélite Universelle" (chapter 6) would be
examples. But these are quibbles with a fabulously rendered anthology
that can launch readers into the brilliance of modern French Jewish
thought, where a captivating universe of new thinkers remains to be
discovered for many English readers, students, and more seasoned
scholars alike.

Notes

[1]. Hannah Arendt, "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition," in _The
Jewish Writings_, ed. Jerome Kohn and Ron H. Feldman (New York:
Schocken Books, 2007), 275-97.

[2]. Alan Udoff, ed., _Vladimir Jankélévitch and the Question of
Forgiveness_ (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2013).

[3]. Nadia Malinovich, _French and Jewish: Culture and the Politics
of Identity in Early Twentieth-Century France _(Oxford: Littman
Library of Jewish Civilization, 2008), 1.

[4]. See, for example, Sally Charnow, "Imagining a New Jerusalem:
Edmond Fleg and Interwar Ecumenism," _French History_ 27, no. 4
(2013): 557-78; Catherina Fhima, "Au Coeur de la 'renaissance juive'
des années 1920: literature et judéité," _Archives Juives
_(2006): 29-45; and Aron Rodrigue, "Rearticulations of French Jewish
Identities after the Dreyfus Affair," _Jewish Social Studies _3
(1996): 3.

[5]. Edmond Fleg, _Why I Am A Jew_, trans. Victor Gollancz (1928;
repr., London: Victor Gollancz, 1943), 9.

[6]. Jonathan Judaken, "'The Presentiment and Memory of the Nazi
Horror': Emmanuel Levinas and the Holocaust," in _Europe in the Eyes
of Survivors of the Holocaust_, ed. Zeev Mankowitz, David Weinberg,
and Sharon Kangisser Cohen (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2014), 171-206.

_Jonathan Judaken is the Spence L. Wilson Chair in Humanities at
Rhodes College._

Citation: Jonathan Judaken. Review of Hammerschlag, Sarah, ed.,
_Modern French Jewish Thought: Writings on Religion and Politics_.
H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54703

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.



Re: Division of Labor

Andrew Stewart
 

Can one even tabulate the number of fatalities that would result from abandoning chronic healthcare technologies like dialysis machines, iron lungs, oxygen tanks for asthmatics, or premature infant incubators? It is an implicitly Social Darwinist logic exacerbating the absolute worst impacts of structural racism and inequalities. 


Trump Health Aide Pushes Bizarre Conspiracies and Warns of Armed Revolt

Louis Proyect
 

(Reminds me of how Trotsky described the mindset of the Czar and his retinue just before the revolution.)

NY Times, Sept. 15, 2020
Trump Health Aide Pushes Bizarre Conspiracies and Warns of Armed Revolt
By Sharon LaFraniere

WASHINGTON — The top communications official at the powerful cabinet department in charge of combating the coronavirus made outlandish and false accusations on Sunday that career government scientists were engaging in “sedition” in their handling of the pandemic and that left-wing hit squads were preparing for armed insurrection after the election.

Michael R. Caputo, the assistant secretary of public affairs at the Department of Health and Human Services, accused the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention of harboring a “resistance unit” determined to undermine President Trump, even if that opposition bolsters the Covid-19 death toll.

Mr. Caputo, who has faced intense criticism for leading efforts to warp C.D.C. weekly bulletins to fit Mr. Trump’s pandemic narrative, suggested that he personally could be in danger from opponents of the administration. “If you carry guns, buy ammunition, ladies and gentlemen, because it’s going to be hard to get,” he urged his followers.

He went further, saying his physical health was in question, and his “mental health has definitely failed.”

“I don’t like being alone in Washington,” Mr. Caputo said, describing “shadows on the ceiling in my apartment, there alone, shadows are so long.” He also said the mounting number of Covid-19 deaths was taking a toll on him, telling his viewers, “You are not waking up every morning and talking about dead Americans.” The United States has lost more than 194,200 people to the virus. Mr. Caputo urged people to attend Trump rallies, but only with masks.

To a certain extent, Mr. Caputo’s comments in a video he hosted live on his personal Facebook page were simply an amplified version of remarks that the president himself has made. Both men have singled out government scientists and health officials as disloyal, suggested that the election will not be fairly decided, and insinuated that left-wing groups are secretly plotting to incite violence across the United States.

But Mr. Caputo’s attacks were more direct, and they came from one of the officials most responsible for shaping communications around the coronavirus.

C.D.C. scientists “haven’t gotten out of their sweatpants except for meetings at coffee shops” to plot “how they’re going to attack Donald Trump next,” Mr. Caputo said. “There are scientists who work for this government who do not want America to get well, not until after Joe Biden is president.”

A longtime Trump loyalist with no background in health care, Mr. Caputo, 58, was appointed by the White House to his post in April, at a time when the president’s aides suspected the health secretary, Alex M. Azar II, of protecting his public image instead of Mr. Trump’s. Mr. Caputo coordinates the messaging of an 80,000-employee department that is at the center of the pandemic response, overseeing the Food and Drug Administration, the C.D.C. and the National Institutes of Health.

“Mr. Caputo is a critical, integral part of the president’s coronavirus response, leading on public messaging as Americans need public health information to defeat the Covid-19 pandemic,” the Department of Health and Human Services said in a statement.

Mr. Caputo’s Facebook comments were another sign of the administration’s deep antipathy and suspicion for its own scientific experts across the bureaucracy and the growing political pressure on those experts to toe a political line favorable to Mr. Trump.

This weekend, first Politico, then The New York Times and other news media organizations published accounts of how Mr. Caputo and a top aide had routinely worked to revise, delay or even scuttle the core health bulletins of the C.D.C. to paint the administration’s pandemic response in a more positive light. The C.D.C.’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports had previously been so thoroughly shielded from political interference that political appointees only saw them just before they were published.

Mr. Caputo’s 26-minute broadside on Facebook against scientists, the news media and Democrats was also another example of a senior administration official stoking public anxiety about the election and conspiracy theories about the “deep state” — the label Mr. Trump often attaches to the federal Civil Service bureaucracy.

Mr. Caputo predicted that the president would win re-election in November, but that his Democratic opponent, Joseph R. Biden Jr., would refuse to concede, leading to violence. “And when Donald Trump refuses to stand down at the inauguration, the shooting will begin,” he said. “The drills that you’ve seen are nothing.”

There were no obvious signs from administration officials on Monday that Mr. Caputo’s job was in danger. On the contrary, Mr. Trump again added his voice to the administration’s science denialism. As the president visited California to show solidarity with the fire-ravaged West, he challenged the established science of climate change, declaring, “It will start getting cooler.” He added: “Just watch. I don’t think science knows, actually.”

Mr. Caputo’s remarks also dovetailed in part with those of Roger J. Stone Jr., a longtime confidant of both Mr. Caputo and Mr. Trump. Mr. Stone, whose 40-month prison sentence for lying to Congress was commuted by the president in July, told the conspiracy website Infowars on Friday that Mr. Trump should consider declaring martial law if he lost re-election.

Over all, his tone was deeply ominous: He warned, again without evidence, that “there are hit squads being trained all over this country” to mount armed opposition to a second term for Mr. Trump. “You understand that they’re going to have to kill me, and unfortunately, I think that’s where this is going,” Mr. Caputo added.

In a statement on Monday, Mr. Caputo told The Times: “Since joining the administration, my family and I have been continually threatened” and harassed by people who have later been prosecuted. “This weighs heavily on us, and we deeply appreciate the friendship and support of President Trump as we address these matters and keep our children safe.”

He insisted on Facebook that he would weather the controversies, saying, “I’m not going anywhere.” And he boasted of the importance of his role, stating that the president had personally put him in charge of a $250 million public service advertising campaign intended to help the United States return to normal.

The Department of Health and Human Services is trying to use that campaign to attract more minority volunteers for clinical trials of potential Covid-19 vaccines and to ask people who have recovered to donate their blood plasma to help other infected patients. Department officials have complained that congressional Democrats are obstructing the effort.

While Mr. Caputo characterized C.D.C. scientists in withering terms, he said the agency’s director, Dr. Robert R. Redfield, was “one of my closest friends in Washington,” adding, “He is such a good man.” Mr. Caputo is partly credited with helping choose Dr. Redfield’s new interim chief of staff.

Critics say Dr. Redfield has left the Atlanta-based agency open to so much political interference that career scientists are the verge of resigning. The agency was previously seen as mostly apolitical; its reports were internationally respected for their importance and expertise.

Mr. Caputo charged that scientists “deep in the bowels of the C.D.C.” walked “around like they are monks” and “holy men” but engaged in “rotten science.”

He fiercely defended his scientific adviser, Dr. Paul Alexander, who was heavily involved in the effort to reshape the C.D.C.’s Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Reports. Mr. Caputo described Dr. Alexander, an assistant professor at McMaster University in Canada, as “a genius.”

“To allow people to die so that you can replace the president” is a “grievous sin,” Mr. Caputo said. “And these people are all going to hell.”

A public relations specialist, Mr. Caputo has repeatedly claimed that his family and his business suffered hugely because of the investigation by the special counsel, Robert S. Mueller III, into Russian interference in the 2016 presidential election. Mr. Caputo was a minor figure in that inquiry, but he was of interest partly because he had once lived in Russia, had worked for Russian politicians and was contacted in 2016 by a Russian who claimed to have damaging information about Hillary Clinton.

Mr. Caputo referred that person to Mr. Stone and was never charged with any wrongdoing. Mr. Caputo later wrote a book and produced a documentary, both entitled “The Ukraine Hoax,” to undermine the case for Mr. Trump’s impeachment.

Mr. Caputo worked on Mr. Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign for a time but was passed over for a job early in the administration. He remained friendly with Dan Scavino, the former campaign aide who is now the deputy chief of staff for White House communications and played a role in reconnecting Mr. Trump and Mr. Caputo.

Some of Mr. Caputo’s most disturbing comments were centered on what he described as a left-wing plot to harm the administration’s supporters. He claimed baselessly that the killing of a Trump supporter in Portland, Ore., in August by an avowed supporter of the left-wing collective was merely a practice run for more violence.

“Remember the Trump supporter who was shot and killed?” Mr. Caputo said. “That was a drill.”

The man suspected in the shooting, Michael Forest Reinoehl, was shot dead this month by officers from a federally led fugitive task force in Washington State. He “went down fighting,” Mr. Caputo said. “Why? Because he couldn’t say what he had inside him.”

Kitty Bennett contributed research.


Re: Why liberal white women pay a lot of money to learn over dinner how they're racist

Jesse Krugman <jkrugman@...>
 

Someone needs to do an examination of the political economy of today's anti-racism grifters — the books, the corporate seminars, the dinner parties. There are people making a fortune off of this.

 
 
Sent: Monday, September 14, 2020 at 9:12 PM
From: "C. Horgan" <chorgan@...>
To: marxmail@groups.io
Subject: [marxmail] Why liberal white women pay a lot of money to learn over dinner how they're racist

Privilege: Everything except the money in your trust fund.


https://theguardian.com/world/2020/feb/03/race-to-dinner-party-racism-women

 
 


1987: Ernest Mandel - On the potential of history | IIRE

Louis Proyect
 

An excerpt from ‘The dialectic of productive forces, production behaviour and class struggle alongside categories of latency and parametric determinism in the materialist conception of history’.

http://www.iire.org/node/943


Contemporary relevance of Marxian economics | occasional links

Louis Proyect
 


The Revolutionary Answers of C.L.R. James - REBEL

Louis Proyect
 

James put the matter this way:

We say, number 1, that the Negro struggle, the independent Negro struggle, has a vitality and a validity of its own; that it has deep historic roots in the past of America and in present struggles; it has an organic political perspective, along which it is traveling, to one degree or another, and everything shows that at the present time it is traveling with great speed and vigor.

We say, number 2, that this independent Negro movement is able to intervene with terrific force upon the general social and political life of the nation, despite the fact that it is waged under the banner of democratic rights, and is not led necessarily either by the organized labor movement or the Marxist party.

We say, number 3, and this is the most important, that it is able to exercise a powerful influence upon the revolutionary proletariat, that it has got a great contribution to make to the development of the proletariat in the United States, and that it is in itself a constituent part of the struggle for socialism.

James arrived at this position through an application of both Marxist theory and historical example.

http://www.rebelnews.ie/2020/09/11/revolutionary-answers-clr-james/


Court Rules Trump Can Deport 300,000 Migrants Who've Lived in the U.S. Legally for Years

Louis Proyect
 


‘We’ve always known ours was contaminated’: the trouble with America’s water | Water | The Guardian

Louis Proyect
 


California’s Apocalyptic ‘Second Nature’ - Solidarity Beyond the Crisis

Louis Proyect
 


The Rhetorical Weapons of Liberal Nimbyism

Louis Proyect
 

The Rhetorical Weapons of Liberal Nimbyism

How a group of Manhattan liberals used the language of “community” to evict people living in temporary housing from their neighborhood.

An unhoused person
                sitting on the sidewalk in Manhattan as pedestrians
                pass.
CINDY ORD/GETTY IMAGES

The West Side Community Organization describes its mission as twofold: to “advocate for a restored quality of life for residents, visitors, and the small business community” and “advance safer and more compassionate policies regarding New Yorkers who are struggling with homelessness, mental illness, and drug addiction.” As its first official order of business, the hastily assembled 501(c)4 launched a slick campaign to vilify 300 unhoused men in its Upper West Side neighborhood as dangerous criminals, then succeeded in evicting them from the hotel the city had converted to temporary housing in response to the pandemic. Apparently it was the $123,000-median-income families of the liberal Manhattan neighborhood who were the real New Yorkers struggling with (the sight of) homelessness.

Now the men will be going somewhere else. According to The New York Daily News, the city is in the process of relocating other unhoused people, many with disabilities, from a Midtown shelter in order to make room for the newly placeless former residents of the Upper West Side. In a statement on the city’s relocation decision, the organization’s attorney Randy Mastro called it “a testament to community organizing.” The group that came together under the banner of WSCO had started out as strangers, he continued, but came together as a stronger whole “dedicated to saving their neighborhood.”

The inviolable power of private property defines the actions and attitudes that can create and destroy communities; in liberal enclaves like New York, this is done with language. Slippery terms like neighborhood and community are quietly and expertly carved out to exclude the people—nonwhite or ill or poor—who reduce property values. Evictions driven by wealthy residents and property owners become actions taken for the community, and for neighbors, rather than against them. The community “came together” rather than was torn apart. By cloaking the language of profit in the language of safety, these efforts are able to write out the poor and unhoused—those for whom the city is the most hostile and unsafe—from these most basic human identities.


One member of the neighborhood Facebook group that became WSCO told The New York Post that “our community is terrified, angry and frightened.” Their fear was “palpable.” Another resident who opposed sharing her neighborhood with unhoused others asserted that “we’re a progressive-minded community and we tend to be sympathetic to the homeless, but with sex offenders, draw the line.”

Elsewhere in New York, a woman whose neighborhood also saw an influx of unhoused people during the pandemic claimed that she never left her house without pepper spray. The founder of a civilian patrol group complained of “all kinds of chaos … assaults, vandalism, breaking and entering and lewd behavior.” More than 160 business executives wrote to the mayor that “there is widespread anxiety over public safety, cleanliness, and quality-of-life issues that are contributing to deteriorating conditions in commercial districts,” demanding a restoration of the “security and the livability of our communities.” An Upper West Side petition declared, “This situation is making life uncomfortable for residents and putting families, children, and the elderly in harm’s way.”

Those words and identities are not literal or geographical. A resident of a neighborhood in these tellings is not—can’t be—someone who lives in a shelter in that neighborhood.

The language that this nonprofit, and Nimbyism generally, uses is so smooth that reading their literature sometimes makes it sincerely difficult to tell whose side they’re on. Not only did WSCO express concern over the safety of the wealthy residents apparently threatened by the sight of poverty and addiction, but it also insisted that the hotel was not a safe place for these men themselves, who needed the professional services offered by the shelter system. Its language of danger—and concern—was expert. “These individuals are not receiving the critical social and mental health services they so desperately require,” it writes in its fundraising appeal.

This is a laughably paternalistic claim; the well-being and basic needs of unhoused people is clearly not the real concern of these wealthy Upper West Siders who so blatantly attempted to criminalize them. WSCO’s GoFundMe raised over $50,000 in its first two days. It now has over $137,000. It will use these funds, it has informed its donors, to retain lawyers and press people, cover administrative costs, and explore options around private security.

It is typical of respectable liberal discourse that any talk of homelessness is really talk of those affected by others’ homelessness. (Earlier this summer, the Times published a 1,769-word report on the homeless encampment at Powderhorn Park in Minneapolis, out of which 71 words were dedicated to an actual resident of the encampment and the rest to the housed people around it who were coping with this struggle with varying shades of gallantry or concern.) The bullshit liberal politics of decency dictate that to believe in a mechanized and fully functioning system is to acknowledge that homelessness does exist—and we care about it!—but that it has to be dealt with somewhere else where we don’t have to look at it. Then a global pandemic happens and suddenly we are forced to look at poverty, and it appears there is a malfunction in this system, so we start short-circuiting as well, and demand to speak to the manager.

Luc Sante, author of Low Life: Lures and Snares of Old New York, lived on the Upper West Side in the 1970s and remembers a significant enough class difference within the neighborhood then—rotating Columbia students, residents of welfare hotels, cult groups—but never felt a sense of threat. “They spent their days on the benches in the traffic islands on Broadway drinking, perfectly benign,” he told me. (And then, as now, there are many housed residents of the Upper West Side who have organized against the eviction and in support of the unhoused residents.)

Property ownership in such an expensive city changes a relationship to a home, forcing questions about a return on investment and what money is meant to secure you. “It’s not about threat,” Sante said of what’s changed in the ensuing years, “it’s about property values. In those days, it wasn’t that expensive to live on the Upper West Side.”


The Biden Adviser Who Gives Climate Activists Nightmares

Louis Proyect
 

The Biden Adviser Who Gives Climate Activists Nightmares

Ernest Moniz served as Obama’s secretary of energy. His ties to the fossil fuel industry have only deepened since then. Will Biden give him his old job back?

Former Energy Secretary
                Ernest Moniz speaks during the National Clean Energy
                Summit in 2017.
ISAAC BREKKEN/GETTY IMAGES
Former Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz speaks during the National Clean Energy Summit in 2017.

If you haven’t heard of Ernest “Ernie” Moniz, there’s still a good chance you’ve seen a picture of him. The 75-year-old nuclear physicist, MIT professor emeritus, multimillionaire, and former energy secretary for the Obama administration sports longish silver hair that looks fit for a daguerrotype. His aesthetic sensibilities have turned him into a lovable meme among energy wonks, who for the most part regard him as a slightly quirky but eminently competent, whip-smart technocrat, credited as a central figure in negotiating the Iran nuclear deal.

In the last few weeks, this once-improbable figure of controversy has become a symbol of just how much climate politics have changed since the Obama era—a flashpoint in a growing fight over what energy policy should look like in a potential post-Trump government that won’t just be fighting to re-establish the rules and programs he gutted, but transform the country’s energy system in time to avert runaway climate catastrophe. Moniz, a “good friend” of Biden’s, has been informally advising his campaign since at least last May, and his Energy Futures Initiative’s partnership with certain unions has been an influential voice in crafting the former vice president’s and the party’s approach to climate issues. Sources tracking transition talks say he could even be in the running to take back his old job as energy secretary.  

That’s a prospect that worries climate watchers. Earlier this month, 145 progressive groups sent a letter to Joe Biden’s campaign, urging the candidate to “ban all fossil fuel executives, lobbyists, and representatives from any advisory or official position on your campaign, transition team, cabinet, and administration.” Many of them say Moniz fits the bill.

Moniz has had several lucrative relationships with fossil fuel companies during his career, including as an adviser to BP. The Energy Initiative he founded at MIT—like many such initiatives in academia, quietly run on oil money—brought in sizable donations from some of the world’s largest fossil fuel producers, and produced research that made the case for their growth. He disclosed his full financial holdings and industry ties when first being considered to head the Department of Energy in 2013, and resigned from any posts that might carry conflicts of interest. Since leaving government in 2017, though, he’s accepted a paid position with a fossil fueled utility whose work he supported at the DOE. Through it all he’s proudly maintained his commitment to an Obama-era energy strategy climate advocates say belongs in history’s dustbin: the “all of the above” approach first outlined in a 2012 speech, which pairs renewables investment with fossil fuel growth. A representative for Moniz said Moniz would not be available to comment on this story.

The typical defense of a once-and-future political appointee’s between-administration industry work is to normalize it. But “it’s not true that everyone came out and worked for fossil fuel companies or that there are not experts on climate without fossil fuel ties,” said Collin Rees of Oil Change International, one of the groups that signed the letter to Biden opposing fossil fuel appointees. Taking money from the fossil fuel industry was a choice, he said—one taken by Moniz as well as fellow Obama administration alums Amos Hochstein, Jason Bordoff and Heather Zichal, who have accepted jobs, payment, or research funding from fossil fuel companies since leaving government. It wasn’t a universal choice, though: “This is not an indictment of all Obama staffers,” he added.

One of Moniz’s connections that’s come under scrutiny is Southern Company—a mammoth integrated electric utility that got $407 million in financing from the Department of Energy (DOE) during Moniz’s tenure for a “clean coal” plant that was never completed. After championing the doomed project and leaving office, Moniz joined the company’s board in March 2018. According to Southern’s Proxy Statements, he accepted a combined $486,668 worth of fees and stock awards from Southern in 2018 and 2019.

Southern was among the first companies to sue the Obama-era Environmental Protection Agency over the Clean Power Plan, claiming that its compliance timeline was too short and would cost them too much money. Its subsidiaries have spent considerable sums lobbying against climate-friendly policies at the state-level with little transparency. Like many other utilities, Southern helped fund outright climate denial on its own and as a member of the Edison Electric Institute (EEI) and the Global Climate Coalition. In 1991, Southern teamed up with EEI to form the Information Council on the Environment, an ad campaign intended to “reposition global warming as theory (not fact).” A Freedom of Information Request filed by Greenpeace and the Climate Investigations Center found that between 2006 and 2015, Southern spent $400,000 funding the largely debunked research of climate skeptic Wei-Hock “Willie” Soon, complementing donations from ExxonMobil and the American Petroleum Institute. In exchange, Soon allowed Southern to review his work, which focuses mainly on the idea that the sun—rather than greenhouse gas emissions—is to blame for global warming. Southern CEO Tom Fanning has echoed this denial of human-driven global warming in recent years. “Is climate change happening? Certainly. It’s been happening for millennia,” Fanning told CNBC in 2017. Speaking together at a Bipartisan Policy Institute event in 2016, Fanning said he and Moniz were “kind of a tag team,” and the two traveled together on multiple occasions during Moniz’s time at DOE.

Moniz defended his ties to Southern last week after being asked about progressive criticism. “I do not agree with the characterization of the Southern Company as a fossil fuel company,” he told Axios’s Amy Harder, likening the assertion to the idea that “anybody who drives an internal combustion car is a fossil fuel company because they use them.”

This notion that utility companies are not in fact fossil fuel companies, because the energy they provide can theoretically come from anywhere, is not particularly convincing in Southern’s case. Southern generates just 12 percent of its power from renewables, getting more of its power from fossil fuels (72 percent) than the national average (63 percent). One subsidiary, Georgia Power, generates only 3 percent of power from renewables.

But Moniz has ties to bona fide fossil fuel companies, too. And to understand the full extent of them, one has to go back to before he joined the Obama administration.


From 2005 to 2011, Moniz served on BP’s Technology Advisory Council. Although it’s not known whether Moniz was paid for his position, at least one member received a nominal sum of $6,200 for their role. Former BP CEO Lord John Browne is the chair of the non-profit Moniz founded after leaving office, the Energy Futures Initiative (EFI), which launched the same day as Moniz’s for-profit firm, EJM Associates, Inc. EJM, in turn—a “strategic consulting firm that helps clients navigate the transition to a global clean energy economy by advising on a range of energy policy, innovation, and security issues,” per one job description—has a partnership with G2 Net-Zero LNG, a gas export company that Moniz’s Energy Department authorized to export natural gas for 30 years in 2015, when the company was called “G2 LNG.”

The Energy Initiative Moniz founded at MIT counted ExxonMobil, Shell, and Eni among its founding members, a title that came with a minimum $5 million commitment to “support sponsored research projects aligned with their strategic interests.” As of 2012—the year before Moniz left MIT to become Energy Secretary—BP had granted $50 million to the Energy Institute. Moniz was also a founding trustee of the Saudi Aramco-backed King Abdullah Petroleum Studies and Research Center, among several other industry posts he resigned from in advance of his DOE appointment.

A specific concern cited by critics is Moniz’s role championing natural gas and fracking, which is now believed to be behind a spike in atmosphere-warming methane emissions. Prior to joining the Obama administration in 2013, Moniz led the team behind an influential 2011 study from MIT’s Energy Initiative entitled “The Future of Natural Gas,” mapping out an extensive role for natural gas in reducing the country’s emissions. “The analysis in this study provides the confirmation. Natural gas truly is a bridge to a low-carbon future,” Moniz said at a press conference announcing the report. In essence, the study argues that gas is an essential bridge as nuclear power, carbon capture, and renewables become economical in the coming decades.

While presented as independent research, the report itself was sponsored by several fossil fuel companies and front groups. Among the most generous was the American Clean Skies Foundation, founded in 2007 by the late Chesapeake Energy CEO Aubrey McClendon, who was instrumental in helping to sell fracking to Wall Street investors. The report called the environmental impacts of fracking—including methane emissions, which are shorter-lived but 84 times more potent than carbon dioxide—“challenging but manageable.”

Study co-chair Anthony Meggs joined the gas company Talismen Energy before the report was released, just as Moniz took a paid position with ICF International, an energy consultancy that the American Petroleum Institute hired to study the economic benefits of liquified natural gas exports. By the time he resigned from ICF and other other industry posts to become Energy Secretary, Moniz had received $305,648 in compensation from ICF. Another study group member, former CIA director John Deutch, was at the time serving on the board of Cheniere Energy. The same year the report was released, Cheniere became the first company in the Lower 48 states approved to export liquified natural gas after receiving a final greenlight from the DOE.

“It’s hard to under-state the importance of Moniz and Deutch’s report,” Public Accountability Institute researcher Rob Galbraith, who authored an extensive report on the MIT study, tweeted recently. “Beyond creating the architecture for the Obama administration’s fracked gas export regime, it was deployed in media and in Congress to counter popular opposition to fracking in the United States.”

In government, Moniz continued to make the case for natural gas. The fateful 2010 fracking study would even appear in his official White House portrait. Shortly after taking office, Moniz pledged to move “expeditiously” on liquified natural gas export permits. His office opened up key markets for U.S. fossil fuel producers, and approved its second ever export terminal justice after his appointment in May 2013. Moniz appointed the American Gas Association’s Paula Gant to serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Energy for Oil and Natural Gas.


Questioned by reporters over the years, Moniz has defended his various industry ties on the grounds that “industry is an essential part of the climate mitigation solution,” as his spokesperson told the Center for Public Integrity’s Jie Jenny Zou. This was a more widely accepted assertion during the Obama administration, whose flagship, unsuccessful legislative fight on climate was premised on a compromise with polluters. As the full emissions toll of extraction has come into sharper view and the climate crisis has grown more unavoidable, those attitudes have changed amidst demands from an increasingly muscular climate and anti-corporate movement. 

Jeff Hauser, director of the Revolving Door Project, which tracks ties between corporations and government officials, worries that Moniz’s industry ties make him a poor fit for a cabinet position, in particular. “Moniz is chummy with industry leaders who need to be wiped out if the planet is to be saved. This is not a time for amiable people who get along with everyone. That’s particularly true in the executive branch, where we need someone committed to exercising all existing powers, including little-used ones, to avert the climate crisis,” Hauser said. “Collegiality and dealmaking may well be necessary in Congress. Within the executive branch you are going to need someone who pushes lawyers, scientists and policy professionals to get every last bit of carbon and methane reduction that is possible out of the system under current law.”

If anything, while many in his party moved away from Obama-era comfort with fossil fuels, Moniz appears to have doubled down. In April, EFI announced the formation of a partnership with the AFL-CIO Energy Committee known as the Labor Energy Partnership (LEP), whose representative, Austin Keyser, got a lengthy speaking spot during this year’s DNC Platform Committee meeting. One member of the group, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) President Lonnie Stephenson, was recently added to Biden’s transition team, and was already a member of the campaign’s Climate Engagement Advisory Council. IBEW, and Stephenson specifically, has opposed any fossil fuel phaseouts as part of a comprehensive climate plan.

Unsurprisingly, then, one of LEP’s principles is that climate policy “must be based on an ‘all-of-the above’ energy source strategy that is regionally focused, flexible, preserves optionality, and addresses the crisis of stranded workers,” rather than targeting any particular fuel source for phase-out. The position conflicts with current scientific consensus on necessary steps to avoid catastrophic global warming: According to the 2019 Production Gap Report, the world’s governments are on track to produce 50 percent more coal, oil and gas than can safely be burned to keep cap warming at 2 degrees Celsius, and 120 percent more than is consistent with a 1.5 degree target—in line with the “well below” 2 degrees threshold outlined by the Paris Agreement. Fossil fuel use, in other words, would need to decrease, and rapidly.

Moniz, meanwhile, has continued to tout gas as “a critical element” in changing the country’s energy mix, crediting the fuel source for having “caused a revolution that has led to a majority of our carbon reduction” at an event at Tulane University last October. “The transition to a deeply decarbonized economy may not necessarily require the elimination of fossil fuels,” states an EFI report outlining its Green Real Deal, which Moniz launched as a counter to the Green New Deal at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce summit last year. “Natural gas, in particular, will continue to play an important role in providing dispatchable electric power generation and high-temperature industrial process heat—applications that are not readily amenable to non-fossil fuel options.”


Controversy over Moniz’s role in the Biden campaign comes as the campaign attempts to show it’s serious about climate change. In recent months, the campaign has incorporated both proposals and staff members from the farther left and more climate-ambitious Sanders, Inslee, and Warren campaigns. Michelle Deatrick, National Chair of the DNC’s Council on the Environment and Climate Crisis and a Sanders supporter during the primary, says she’s been “very encouraged” by her talks with the Biden campaign during and since the DNC Platform was agreed to in August. “There’s listening going on, and we’re moving toward a bolder plan that approaches what we need to do,” she told me.

Moniz’s proximity to the Biden campaign, however, makes her nervous. “The country’s on fire,” Deatrick said. “Who we put into positions of power are going to have a huge impact on whether or not we escape the worst parts of the climate crisis. We just cannot have people who have a financial interest in continuing our reliance on fossil fuel extraction and emissions.”

In his address to the DNC platform committee in July, Moniz once again emphasized the need for an “all of the above” approach. The first goal of the LEP, moreover, is to “create a national action plan for the deployment of carbon capture, utilization and sequestration technology.” It’s a strategy similar to the one outlined in Southern Company’s goal announced in May of achieving net-zero emissions by 2050, largely through negative emissions technologies, maintaining hearty investments in gas and coal.

“The economics pretty much just don’t work in any situation,” Collin Rees, Senior Campaigner with Oil Change International, says of carbon capture technologies. “The only way they conceivably work is if it’s massively subsidized by the government. It’s incredibly important to the fossil fuel industry that they can hold onto this facade of CCS.”

Meanwhile, Lonnie Stephenson touted the benefits of “clean coal” at a virtual campaign event last week, citing union’s work with Moniz on all-of-the-above energy strategies. That clean coal will power the way to decarbonization has been a common fossil fuel industry talking point with little basis in reality, and climate scientists have warned about the dangers of relying too heavily on that and other still prohibitively expensive, largely unproven carbon removal technologies to mitigate the climate crisis. 

As a board member at Southern Company and former Energy Secretary, Moniz should know the limits of carbon removal better than most: The utility’s Kemper Project was intended to showcase their potential, converting coal to gas and removing the majority of the power plant’s carbon dioxide emissions. Visiting the Kemper site as Energy Secretary in 2013, Moniz said his department was “committed to advancing technologies that make coal more efficient, economical, and environmentally sustainable—securing its place in America’s clean energy future while fighting the effects of climate change.” The facility received generous support from the DOE after it got underway in 2010. Following years of ballooning budgets, mismanagement and alleged fraud, Southern announced in 2018 that the plant would run on conventional natural gas, with costs having ballooned from $2.4 billion to $7.5 billion. As Steve Horn has reported, Southern Company also runs a DOE-backed National Carbon Capture Center that could stand to gain from further federal investment.

“If you’re Moniz, it’s not psychically satisfying to believe you failed to utilize executive branch powers in ways that would avert catastrophe,” said Jeff Hauser, making the case for newer voices in the administration. “You’re much less likely to think that if you come into government relatively fresh, and without an emotional connection to the policies of the past. A clear eyed, science driven view of what’s happening would suggest the policies of the past are insufficient.”

Last time around, Moniz encountered little resistance from lawmakers during his Senate confirmation and was sworn in by a 97-0 vote. Should he get the nod this time, progressives hope that’ll be different. “If you’re Merkley or Markey or Whitehouse,” Demand Progress Executive Director David Segel said, referring to the senators from Oregon, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, respectively, “and want to maintain credibility on climate and somebody like Moniz is put before you then you are going to have to oppose confirmation.” The simpler solution—and the one progressives signing the letter hope for—is that the Biden team will avoid Moniz and similar fossil-fuel enthusiasts altogether.  


Re: Division of Labor

R.O.
 

On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 05:24 AM, <fkalosar101@...> wrote:
But the "analytical tool" alleged here is the e-meter of anarchist theory. 
I would suggest it is the digging stick of anarchist theory. An e-meter is too advanced...


Re: Uneven Development and Imperialism Today: Engaging with the Ideas of David Harvey

Patrick Bond
 

On 9/13/2020 5:56 PM, Esteban Mercatante wrote:
The last few decades have been characterized by weak economic growth in the developed countries, which contrasts with the dynamism shown by China and other countries on the periphery. What does this tell us about the relations that characterize the world capitalist system? 
In this article I engage with the ideas of David Harvey about imperialism.

Comrade Esteban,

This is much appreciated. But if you want some semi-critical feedback (with the disclosure-proviso that I did my PhD under Harvey's supervision, on uneven development in Zimbabwe), I don't think the binary categories you seem to rely upon are sufficiently nuanced to address uneven development, especially uneven and combined development. There is a critical missing category, "sub-imperialism," which is a concept Ruy Mauro Marini developed in the 1960s-70s to explain Brazil's location as deputy sheriff to Washington not only in geopolitical terms, but also with respect to the local trajectory of capital accumulation. Harvey advanced the concept a bit in the early 2000s, in The New Imperialism. I think he was mistaken by not invoking it in the debate with John Smith a couple of years ago, especially in the Review of African Political Economy. (My critique is here.)

You correctly say:

Harvey’s statement about a partial reversal in the drainage of historical wealth could be considered valid: the fact that this “periphery” has become a receptacle for capital on a larger scale, hand in hand with an increase in investment by local capitalists (and in China, above all, by public enterprises), and at the same time these countries have increased their weight in the generation of capital exported to other countries... some economies grow and accumulate at the expense of others, and that those that are showing the most dynamic growth in GDP, manufacturing exports, or foreign investment are not at the center but are a rather limited sector of the periphery.

That "rather limited sector" includes the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa bloc, which helps explain why they line up tightly with imperialism when it comes to amplifying the damage done by multinational corporations, the IMF and World Bank, the WTO, the UNFCCC and even FIFA (recall who nurtured Sepp Blatter in 2010, 2014 and 2018). My co-editor of the book BRICS: An Anti-Capitalist Critique, Ana Garcia from Rio, discuss this here.


If we consider as a bloc all the dependent countries (typically characterized by the multilateral agencies as “emerging” and “developing” countries, or “middle income” and “poor” countries, etc.), they have continued to “drain” wealth towards the rich countries during the last decades.

But these are not "a bloc", they are very distinct in terms of the emerging global division of labour, in which the West has ceded a great deal of its primary role in extracting surpluses from the periphery to semi-peripheral corporations, especially from the BRICS. There are two new books that deal with this: BRICS and Resistance in Africa (which I co-edited) and BRICS and the New American Imperialism (free for download here).


I based this on a 2015 study that reconstructs the net results of global licit and illicit financial flows — including “development aid,” wage remittances, net trade balances, debt services, new loans, foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, and other flows.
Actually, that particular methodology massively underestimates the damage done within the broader wealth drain from South to North, because it ignores what's termed unequal ecological exchange, which in my definition would highlight the drain of depleted non-renewable natural resources. In Africa these are typically $150 bn/year worth of additional South-to-North wealth reduction. The World Bank even admits this scale of unequal exchange by factoring in uncompensated resource depletion. so progressives shouldn't be so far behind the curve. Samir Amin pointed out this problem starting in 1972, and it's been one of the core insights of ecological economics, especially advanced by Herman Daly.


... in the last 20 years the relative weight of the rich (imperialist) countries and the rest of the world has changed in terms of foreign direct investment from these countries (destined to productive enterprises, either by starting them up from scratch or by acquiring some participation in local companies) and, to a lesser extent, in the return flow from these countries to other countries. Today, many “emerging” and “developing” countries also export capital — that is, their residents make foreign direct investments. Most of these are in other “emerging” and “developing” countries, but some make their way to the develop economies
This is where it becomes vital to recognise parts of the "Global North" that are located in sit of sub-imperialist accumulation such as where I've mainly been based the last 30 years: Johannesburg, South Africa. This is not just a branch-plant city but one where voracious extractive industries have been located since the 1880s when half the world's gold was discovered underground, sometimes 4km deep. And the accumulation of capital that occurred here was not just in the circuit of JP Morgan (co-founder of Anglo American) but also entailed a white patriotic bourgeoisie that - until early 1990 when Nelson Mandela was released from jail - was perfectly happy to use Joburg as its hq base. In 1999, there was a massive flight of Anglo, De Beers and many others of the top

    The critical question is whether the semi-periphery (not periphery) is exporting capital (and returning dividends), and whether this is due to countries in this category, led by China, experiencing crises of overaccumulation in their own economies. Where I live, South Africa, this problem has been acute (though of variable intensity over time) since the 1980s and has led to repeated drives to offshore capital. The most formidable example was exactly a year ago when the African continent's largest firm (by far), Naspers, suddenly began relocating most of its wealth (a 31% investment in the Chinese IT firm Tencent) to Amsterdam, in view of the firm's inability to recirculate capital profitably in South Africa.

    That overaccumulation and capital export, in turn, means the rate at which local capital draws in dividends from abroad, compared to foreign capital drawing in dividends from South Africa, has been relatively high at around 60% - though nowhere the level of imperialist economies like the U.S. which hit 215% in 2015-17. A chart (from this book) gives you a sense of the ratios, as imperialist, sub-imperialist and peripheral economies' have differential abilities to retain or attract surpluses:

Profit flows, 2015-17 (average dividend receipts as percent of dividend payments)

imperial
            subimperial dividend flows highlighting BRICS


The fragmentation of production processes and the international dispersion of tasks and activities within them has led to the emergence of production systems without borders — which can be sequential chains or complex networks, and which can be global, regional, or involve only two countries. These systems are commonly referred to as global value chains.
These chains are, fortunately, in retreat - as part of a general deglobalisation of productive capital including trade/GDP, FDI/GDP and cross-border-finance/GDP ratios. In 2007 the global value chains peaked at over 28% of productive capital's output, but by 2018 were down to 22%. Much more localisation is now underway. I have some brief rough-draft lectures on the processes here:

14 - 2000-19 - World economy

15 - 2010s deglobalisation

16 - 2010s BRICS


Thanks for your stimulating article, keep them coming!

Patrick