Date   

An Indigenous Canadian Journalist Was Covering a Protest. Then He Got Arrested.

Louis Proyect
 

An Indigenous Canadian Journalist Was Covering a Protest. Then He Got Arrested.

He is one of four reporters arrested while covering Indigenous affairs in a country that has been trying to make amends for its colonial past.

Karl Dockstader, an Indigenous radio reporter, is
                  blocked from reporting on a major Indigenous event in
                  his own backyard.
Karl Dockstader, an Indigenous radio reporter, is blocked from reporting on a major Indigenous event in his own backyard.Credit...Tara Walton for The New York Times

OTTAWA — The land was theirs, the Indigenous protesters said, and so they tried to prevent the housing project near Niagara Falls from going forward — burning tires to block a highway, spray-painting slogans on the construction company’s equipment and setting an excavator on fire.

The demonstrations didn’t get much national attention, but Karl Dockstader, a local Indigenous reporter, thought it was a big story.

As the protests grew larger over the summer, he returned repeatedly to the site, finally deciding to pitch a tent nearby to do more in-depth reporting.

Then he received an email from the Ontario Provincial Police. They wanted to meet with him.

When he showed up, the police arrested him, and charged him with criminal mischief, and with violating an injunction against the blockade. Now, as he awaits resolution of the case, Mr. Dockstader, who is co-host of a weekly talk radio program that focuses on Indigenous issues, is himself blocked from reporting on a major Indigenous event in his own backyard.

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Mr. Dockstader’s arrest is one of four recent arrests of reporters covering Indigenous protests in Canada, and journalism and civil rights groups immediately leapt to his defense. Canada’s constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech includes freedom of the press as a “fundamental freedom.”

“It’s an abuse of power,” said Brent Jolly, the president of Canadian Association of Journalists. “And it’s a pretty effective way for them to shut down debate.”

Pamela Palmater, a Mi’kmaq lawyer who holds a chair in Indigenous law at Ryerson University in Toronto, said the arrests also suggest an effort to silence coverage of Indigenous issues, which could undermine the country’s efforts under Prime Minister Justin Trudeau to make reconciliation with Indigenous people for past wrongs.

“It’s preventing our stories, our side, our version from getting out there, whether it’s an Indigenous or non-Indigenous journalist who has been arrested, it runs counter to reconciliation,” Ms. Palmater said.

Image
Broadcast media in February reporting at a railway blockade supporting the indigenous Wet’suwet’en Nation, in St. Lambert, Quebec.Credit...Christinne Muschi/Reuters

Appeals court judges in Newfoundland and Labrador said as much in March, when they unanimously reversed the conviction of Justin Brake, a Canadian journalist who was arrested in 2016 for violating an injunction against protests by Indigenous groups against a hydro electric dam project in Labrador.

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“To achieve the goal of reconciliation better understanding of aboriginal issues and aboriginal peoples is needed,” the judges wrote. “This places heightened importance on ensuring that independently-reported information on aboriginal issues, including aboriginal protests, is available to the extent possible.”

The court also strongly criticized the trial court for not considering Mr. Brake’s status as a journalist, writing that an injunction can limit “freedom of the press and, in appropriate cases like the present one, the protection of rights pertaining to Indigenous interests.”

In February, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police arrested Melissa Cox, a documentary filmmaker from New York, at an Indigenous rail blockade in British Columbia, again saying she broke an injunction. A court dismissed those charges last month, without explanation.

About two weeks after Mr. Dockstader was arrested, another reporter covering the blockade, Starla Myers, was also arrested by the Ontario police, and charged with two criminal counts of mischief and disobeying a court order.

Ms. Myers, a member of the Mohawk Turtle Clan and a nurse who also works for the Mohawk-owned website Real Peoples Media, is now under similar restrictions as those imposed on Mr. Dockstader.

The office of Carolyn Bennett, the federal minister responsible for relations, did not comment directly on the arrests but said that when it comes to reconciliation, “we believe the best way to resolve outstanding issues is through respectful and collaborative dialogue,” adding that “a strong, independent, and free press is essential.” A spokeswoman for Doug Ford, the Ontario premier, referred questions about the arrests to the police.

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The Indigenous press in Canada includes the national Aboriginal Peoples Television Network, which reaches more than 11 million subscribers, and an Indigenous unit within the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the national broadcaster, as well as dozens of smaller outlets like Mr. Dockstader’s show and numerous podcasts.

Not only do these outlets employ Indigenous journalists, they are often the first or only news organizations to report on Indigenous matters.

“The arrests are particularly egregious when the small number of Indigenous journalists in this country are also prevented from covering their own stories,” Dr. Palmater said.

Mr. Dockstader, 40, is the host, along with Sean Vanderklis, of “One Dish, One Mic,” which was a podcast but became an AM radio station, CKTB, a year ago. The show focuses on local Indigenous issues in Caledonia, Ontario, which includes the community of the Six Nations of the Grand River.

That community has a decades-long history of disputes over land claims.

Mr. Dockstader, a Haudenosaunee member of the Oneida Bear Clan, grew up in southwestern Ontario as well as Buffalo, N.Y., and worked as a chef for about 15 years.

About two years ago, he began hosting the radio show. Earlier this year he and Mr. Vanderklis won a prestigious Indigenous journalism fellowship, which will give them training through the C.B.C.

Mr. Dockstader is also the language program coordinator at the native friendship center in Fort Erie, Ontario, which provides services and activities for Indigenous people in the city.

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The story he was covering began on July 20, when about a dozen people gathered to block construction of a housing development they contend is being built on Indigenous land. As was the case at a blockade elsewhere in Ontario earlier this year, they raised Six Nations flags and painted “1492 Land Back Lane” on a construction container, a mock reference to Christopher Columbus’s arrival in the Americas.

Image
Protesters have occupied a parcel of land in
                    Caledonia, Ontario, since July as part of an effort
                    to halt construction of a housing development.
Protesters have occupied a parcel of land in Caledonia, Ontario, since July as part of an effort to halt construction of a housing development.Credit...Tara Walton for The New York Times

Mr. Dockstader and Mr. Vanderklis drove to see the protest on the first day.

“These things start out as tiny things and you just never know what’s going to happen,” Mr. Dockstader said.

After a police raid on Aug. 5 that resulted in arrests, more protesters arrived, leading to blockades on more roads. In all, Mr. Dockstader made 15 trips to the site.

By late August, Mr. Dockstader decided to pitch his tent.

“I was interested in establishing a relationship with people that were in charge as opposed to just running around snapping photos, having cool things to post and getting clicks,” he said. “I was there for the sole purpose of documenting what was happening and doing a deeper dive.”

Being present at the scene was contrary to the injunction, but before the charges were brought earlier this month, Mr. Dockstader’s lawyer told the police he was there as a journalist, not a protester.

In an email, Constable Rod Leclair, a police spokesman, declined to offer any specifics about Mr. Dockstader’s case but said “engaging in activities outside of their reporting purpose, could subject media personnel to charges in relation to violation of a court order and other applicable offenses.”

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The police say Mr. Dockstader was charged with criminal mischief because of events on Aug. 29, the last day he was at the blockade.

“There was a concert and a lacrosse game,” said Mr. Dockstader of that day. “I posted a video to my social media feed that was sort of a recap of the week. And I honestly thought I was free and clear.”

He is now barred him from returning to the blockade and from interviewing people connected with it. His lawyer is trying to get those terms revised.

Ms. Myers, the other journalist arrested after reporting from the site, said she acted only as an observer, and crossed onto the land covered by the injunction after reporters and camera crews from large media outlets did so.

“Sometimes when you tell these stories it makes people uncomfortable,” she said. “What do you do with people who make you comfortable? You charge them and silence them.”

Mr. Dockstader is set to appear in court in November.

“For me,” Mr. Dockstader said, “I set the hard line of having journalists protected so that it’s not police using their discretion to decide what is and isn’t journalism. But they clearly seem to want to foray into that territory. They just don’t care.”


Carbonbrief

R.O.
 

https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/worlds-richest-1-cause-double-co2-emissions-of-poorest-50-says-oxfam
Daily Briefing
World’s richest 1% cause double CO2 emissions of poorest 50%, says Oxfam

https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/warming-shrinks-arctic-ocean-ice-to-2nd-lowest-on-record
Warming shrinks Arctic Ocean ice to 2nd lowest on record


H-Net Review [H-LatAm]: Borucki on Freeman, 'A Silver River in a Silver World: Dutch Trade in the Rio de la Plata, 1648-1678'

Andrew Stewart
 



Best regards,
Andrew Stewart 
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Subscribe to the Washington Babylon newsletter via https://washingtonbabylon.com/newsletter/

Begin forwarded message:

From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: September 22, 2020 at 11:29:23 AM EDT
To: h-review@...
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Subject: H-Net Review [H-LatAm]:  Borucki on Freeman, 'A Silver River in a Silver World: Dutch Trade in the Rio de la Plata, 1648-1678'
Reply-To: h-review@...

David Freeman.  A Silver River in a Silver World: Dutch Trade in the
Rio de la Plata, 1648-1678.  Cambridge Latin American Studies Series.
Cambridge  Cambridge University Press, 2020.  xiv + 226 pp.  $99.99
(cloth), ISBN 978-1-108-41749-5.

Reviewed by Alex Borucki (University of California, Irvine)
Published on H-LatAm (September, 2020)
Commissioned by Casey M. Lurtz

The more we read about the Dutch, the more we realize that our
understanding of the Atlantic World will continue to have significant
gaps until we engage more deeply with their actions across the
Atlantic-Pacific axis of silver, slaves, and trade emerging in the
sixteenth century. Historians of Spanish America rarely read Dutch
primary sources, and historians of the Dutch Atlantic rarely read
Spanish records (though most commonly both of these groups read
English). David Freeman is one of the few historians who read these
three languages as well as Portuguese, all essential for examining
colonial Río de la Plata's Atlantic trade. In addition, Freeman is
one of the very few historians to have conducted archival research in
both the Netherlands and Buenos Aires, further supplemented in this
book with archival sources from France, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Indeed, Freeman is the first to examine Spanish-language
notary registers inserted within Dutch-language files in the Dutch
notarial archives (only Zakarías Moutoukias has worked on the Dutch
records of the Río de la Plata). Freeman affirms the centrality of
archives in the historian's toolkit as that which sets this
profession apart from other scholars in the humanities and social
sciences. It takes a vocation and great patience to dig through these
repositories and master the knowledge to connect historical
characters and processes in seventeenth-century notarial records in
Spanish and Dutch. Freeman's work makes clear that historians who
fail to do this work may end up repeating commonplace impressions and
interpretations. This excellent book instead surprises the reader on
many fronts regarding Dutch-Spanish trading partnerships in Buenos
Aires, and it should be translated into Spanish for further
circulation in Latin America.

Freeman puts forward an important argument about how we envision
"contraband" as a form of local governance in the Spanish Americas.
As he puts it: "Dutch trade flowed through Buenos Aires both inward
and outward not because the governors were greedy and corrupt (which
ultimately increased risk and diminished opportunities), but because
they functioned within a system of governance that allowed them to
interpret royal will to best serve local and regional communities"
(p. 7). Indeed, seventeenth-century Spanish colonial authorities
rarely used the word _contrabando_ to refer to what we would call
contraband today. Instead, Freeman uses the terms "registered" and
"unregistered" to refer to the legal standing of the commodities
(including enslaved people) being exchanged in Buenos Aires and on
board of Dutch ships, in order to avoid modern conceptions of
contraband that could misinform our understanding of these
developments.

Dutch trade in the Río de la Plata depended on establishing reliable
connections with local governors and merchants and on a legal
architecture centered on notarized agreements between Spanish and
Dutch associates. The centrality of local authorities and
partnerships between Dutch traders living outside and inside Buenos
Aires and Spanish merchants and officials of Buenos Aires is
illustrated by the close relationship between the governor of Buenos
Aires, Pedro de Baygorri, and Dutch merchant Albert Jansen. Local
government and merchant communities mattered. In this Spanish-Dutch
partnership, the Buenos Aires-based Spanish merchants took on the
less risky role_, _while the Dutch took most of the risk. Spaniards
(some of mixed European and African ancestry) conducted commerce of
Dutch merchandise from Buenos Aires to Lima and Potosí, the source
of the silver lubricating this trade, and probably enjoyed
comparatively greater profits from this commerce than transatlantic
shippers, such as the Dutch, who were more exposed to losses and
uncertainty. A quantitative analysis of merchant accounts, if these
survive, could shed light on this issue. Most of these transactions
were notarized rather than being done secretly and informally in the
middle of the night . A structure of ink and paper, of legal
jurisdiction and rights on property, knit together Amsterdam and
Buenos Aires: "the notarial cultures in Amsterdam and Buenos Aires
bound these men even when their face-to-face contacts were rare" (p.
193). These contracts functioned to set in writing the legalization
of this unregistered merchandise and enslaved Africans, which allowed
a safe passage from Buenos Aires to the inland (and thus provided
safeguard against Spanish officers in such places as Córdoba,
Tucumán, and Mendoza, who could confiscate merchandise and slaves).
This world of ink and paper, combined with family links and
friendships, reduced the risk for the Dutch and their local Spanish
counterparts conducting cross-cultural trade in the Río de la Plata
and bridged different legal communities and cultures.

Events in Buenos Aires and the Atlantic World brought this trade to
an end about 1680. Freeman finds that specific prohibitions against
Dutch trade in Buenos Aires issued by Madrid, a greater number of
ships (_navíos de registro _and _navíos de aviso_) sent from Spain
to more frequently connect the Río de la Plata with the metropolis,
and the renewal of the Portuguese trade in the Río de la Plata after
1668 and prior to the Portuguese foundation of Colonia del Sacramento
in the shores opposite to Buenos Aires in 1680, all contributed to
this decline. The creation of the _audiencia_ (high court) of Buenos
Aires in 1663 with a new governor who intended to curtail
unregistered ships arriving in the context of the Spanish loss of
Jamaica (1655, with Spanish recognition in 1670) also influenced the
decline of Dutch trade in Buenos Aires. While the Third Anglo-Dutch
War (1672-74) that crippled Dutch shipping also had a role, Freeman
rightfully recognizes that Curaçao became the main Dutch center of
transshipping in the Americas in the 1660s, which led the Dutch
shipping presence in Buenos Aires to disappear by 1680.

Freeman addresses the Dutch presence in the Caribbean at the
beginning and at the end of his book. Yet we may wonder about the
commonalities and differences of Dutch trade in the Río de la Plata
in 1648-78, compared to Dutch involvement in New Granada and
Venezuela in those years. Detailed scrutiny of the Dutch in the
Caribbean could have helped qualify Freeman's assessment of Dutch
commerce in Buenos Aires. Freeman asserts that between 1654 and the
1660s "much of the [Dutch] direct trade with Spanish America went
through Buenos Aires" (p. 87). Evidence from the traffic of captives
shows that, in the decade of 1650, more captives arrived in Dutch
ships from Africa to the Spanish Caribbean and circum-Caribbean than
to the Río de la Plata (www.slavevoyages.org), before the decline of
Dutch trade in Buenos Aires in the 1660s. And this is without
counting the slave trade from Curaçao to the Spanish colonies.
Evidence from the Transatlantic Slave Trade Database suggests the
need for further clarification and qualification when comparing the
Dutch commerce of goods in the Spanish circum-Caribbean vis-à-vis
Buenos Aires. Notwithstanding, this is the best examination of the
Dutch trade in colonial Río de la Plata to date, and an example of
micro-analysis based of the itinerant life of Jansen in the
Netherlands, Spain, and the Río de la Plata, among other places.

Citation: Alex Borucki. Review of Freeman, David, _A Silver River in
a Silver World: Dutch Trade in the Rio de la Plata, 1648-1678_.
H-LatAm, H-Net Reviews. September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55407

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.



Re: in re/ "Latest 100 Messages"

Ken Hiebert
 

test       


Re: in re/ "Latest 100 Messages"

ecosocialism@...
 

Thank you for letting me know that the "Latest 100" list is still available. I thought it was lost, but I have now changed my Bookmark. Much better!


Rob Wallace forwards critiques of the Jacobin defense of herd immunity on FB #2

Louis Proyect
 

Here's the second criticism I'll post on the Jacobin interview around COVID-19. It's from Michael Friedman, a professor of biology at the American University of Antigua School of Medicine. He posted it on the Spirit of 1848 listserv. [Friedman is a Marxmail alumni.]
_______________________
Hi folks,
I would imagine that my NWAEG and SftP comrade Katherine Yih is on this list and I would welcome her feedback. I am greatly disappointed with this interview with her and professor of medicine Martin Kulldorff. Their "radical strategy" boils down to building up herd immunity, not much different from what elements of the Trump or Johnson administrations favor, and which, despite Kulldorff's view, failed in Sweden.
In essence, during the course of their interview, both Yih and Kulldorff ignore the most problematic element of Covid-19 epidemiology, the high rate of transmission of the virus. In the process, they rely on the speculative (at this point) scenario of developing herd immunity.
Yih starts off by disavowing efforts to prevent transmission, particularly via lockdowns. In effect, then, she accepts the status quo handed to us by the Trump administration, which allowed rampant transmission to the point where it would now, as Yih rightly notes, be quite difficult (although not impossible) to contain. She also dismisses the development and efficacy of vaccines, at least within a reasonable time period and with sufficient accessibility. She is probably partially correct, here. Instead, she favors strategic approaches to building up herd immunity.
She advocates, "instead of a medically oriented approach that focuses on the individual patient and seeks (unrealistically) to prevent new infections across the board, we need a public health–oriented approach that focuses on the population and seeks to use patterns, or epidemiologic features, of the disease to minimize the number of cases of severe disease and death over the long run, as herd immunity builds up."
But, after pointing out that 90% of mortality occurs in older people, and the reality that mortality is differential among social groups for structural reasons, this rings hollow. The objection to a herd immunity approach is twofold. First, it's attainment would entail an unacceptable number of deaths. Given the nature of our capitalist society, with the inequity in co-morbidities and risks and accessibility of health care, and given the biology of ageing, and even the state of medical technology, Yih's words about "minimizing the number of cases of severe disease and death over the long run," are meaningless.
Second of all, herd immunity depends on the biology of the virus and the complexities of our immune systems. Earlier, in her dismissal of anticipating vaccines, Yih asserts, "neither the effectiveness nor the duration of immunity from any of these vaccines is known as yet." But, the same is true of herd immunity. We simply don't know the duration, exact mechanisms or efficacy of the human response to this coronavirus. There have been a growing number of apparent reinfections. We don't know how long immunity lasts. If it is of short duration, that would seem to preclude herd immunity or mean that an impossibly high proportion of the overall population must be infected at any one time for it to occur. We don't know why, in some cases, antibodies are not produced. We don't know why some of those exposed don't contract the virus. Most basically, we don't know what proportion of the population must be infected to attain herd immunity. In other words, the same caveats apply to herd immunity as to vaccines, but with much more statistical uncertainty, since these are not controlled experiments.
Then Kulldorf states, "Children and young adults have minimal risk, and there is no scientific or public health rationale to close day care centers, schools, or colleges. In-person education is critically important for both the intellectual and social development for all kids, but school closures are especially harmful for working-class children whose parents cannot afford tutors, pod schools, or private schools." Bewilderingly, his first argument abstracts from the very population health arguments he and Katherine seek to rely on. The rationale for closing "day care centers, schools and colleges" is not simply the risk to young people, who may have "minimal risk" for severe symptoms (which may turn out to not be so minimal, given what researchers and physicians are finding about chronic symptoms even among apparently asymptomatic cases), but not for infection. In fact, transmission rates among young people are the highest of any age-based demographic. The major risk, here, is to teachers, school staff and all the adults in those children's lives. Kulldorff's second argument simply rewarms the obvious and constant barrage of Hobbesian choices imposed on all working class people in our society, dilemnas which will only be resolved through socialist revolution. And the reforms that could mitigate those choices cut both ways. But, it is just as easy or easier to demand paid time off for parents to supervise home-bound, distance-learning children, as it would be to take some unspecified measures to prevent transmission among children in classrooms and from them to adults. Kulldorff's argument that "in-person" is better for intellectual development is specious if he considers himself a public health professional.
Kulldorff rightly rejects a theoretical dichotamy between vaccines and natural herd immunity, but he again reconciles these by asserting "Whatever strategy we use for COVID-19, we will eventually reach herd immunity, either with a vaccine, through natural infections, or a combination of the two. So, the question is not whether we get to herd immunity or not." But, yes, that is indeed the question. Or one of them. As he then states, "We do not know what percent immunity to the coronavirus is needed to achieve herd immunity, but we do know that if there are many older people in the group that are infected, there will be many deaths. On the other hand, if mostly young people are infected, there will be very few deaths." And, here, again, he ignores the issue of transmission. Kids are not boxed off from adults and seniors.
Kulldorff applauds Sweden's strategy of looking to natural herd immunity to control the disease,"except for the failure to protect nursing home residents in Stockholm, the country has done well without a lockdown. For example, day care centers and schools were never closed for children aged one to fifteen, with zero COVID-19 deaths as a result and only a few hospitalizations. Moreover, teachers faced the same risk as the average among other professions. COVID-19 mortality is now close to zero in Sweden, and the United States has now passed Sweden in terms of deaths per million inhabitants, despite Sweden having an older, more high-risk population." Done well? If I am not mistaken, Sweden contributed among the greatest number of deaths in Europe. And his assertion begs the question, has Sweden achieved that herd immunity? Is it even close? And what will the final cost be IF it does? We may soon find out if it is there, with numbers of cases rapidly climbing in Europe. Further, Sweden has a sharp advantage over the United States. It's postwar Social Democratic regime succeeded in greatly leveling the social playing field. Income inequalty is vastly less and Swedes have access to a range of health and social services to which U.S. resdents are not privvy. Kullforff offers a misleading argument here: "To date, Swedish COVID-19 mortality has been higher than in some and lower than in other lockdown countries. While it is popular to compare COVID-19 mortality rates between countries, it’s not a great metric." The point is not to compare numbers, but to ask if any population is willing to accept tens of thousands of deaths, when these can be prevented. What is worth comparing are the strategies used to prevent deaths. And, in this, New Zealand and a number of other countries stand above the rest.
Kulldorff asserts that "a universal lockdown can successfully postpone cases into the future, as it has done in some countries, but in doing so it also postpones the buildup of immunity." The latter, of course, is the whole point: to out-wait the virus so either its R0 drops below 1, or until there is a vaccine. Nevertheless, his age-stratifed herd immunity approach essentially does the same, but for vulnerable sectors. The elderly and vulnerable protected under their hazy scenarios will, of course, not have the opportunity to build up herd immunity. They will continue to be vulnerable, unless they represent an insignificant proportion of the population, such that the overall population's herd immunity eventually protects them. Yet, for the epidemiological and immunological reasons given above, how likely is this latter scenario? Contrary to Kulldorff, the nursing home dead in Sweden were not "aberrations." Moreover, you cannot simultaneously protect the elderly and vulnerable if you allow free transmission of coronavirus in the general population while you are waiting for the Holy Grail.
Yih throws in an economic argument that muddies the water, somewhat: "millions of working-class people have lost their jobs and find it impossible to find new ones in the current shuttered economy." Well, yes. But we only have to go back 12 years to see that this is the nature of the capitalist economy. In fact, there were many signs of a looming major recession before the pandemic hit. Did the pandemic worsen the crisis? You bet. But, only a liberal with a classical productivist fetish would seek to resolve this by demanding that "younger" people be put back to work amid a pandemic. The correct answer is a broad program, like the pandemic-modified Green New Deal.
According to Yih, "Liberal elites, including the Democratic Party establishment, have actively ceded this terrain, instead emphasizing the importance of lowering infection rates (across the board) until a vaccine becomes generally available. I think the liberal elites’ adoption of this approach stems from the easy appeal of keeping “everyone” safe together with a class position for which the lockdown strategy is in fact safer as well as quite easy to ride out. Liberal elites simply can’t see or can’t feel how this strategy continues to fail the working class and also small business owners."
In fact, in a capitalist society, *both* (reopen the economy or lock it down) are ruling class options, because capital will throw workers under the bus in either scenario. And workers will be protected under neither. Given that, the BEST strategy is still a "curve-levelling" one, not to wait for the herd immunity Holy Grail, but to fight for adequate measures of prevention and protection, universal healthcare, paid leaves of absence and sick leave, the right to decent housing, a frontal attack on racism (and ageism) in all spheres, but now more than never in healthcare, housing, criminal justice and employment. In some cases, yes, we will need full or targeted lockdowns, as in China. Where economic activities must continue, workers must be assured PPE and stringent regard for numbers, ventilation and spacing. And, yes, schools and other indoor spaces of assembly must be shuttered as needed, with online education and necessary time off for parents provided. On a personal note, I'm 65 and will refuse to walk into a classroom with college students who just spent the weekend partying. Regardless of Kulldorff's (baseless) assertions.
Michael Friedman, MPH, PhD


Rob Wallace forwards critiques of the Jacobin defense of herd immunity on FB #1

Louis Proyect
 

Several of you asked what my take was on the latest Jacobin interview on COVID-19. I haven't read it thoroughly. But here's the first of two critiques I'll share. Tim Lacy is Director of the Medical Student Learning Environment at the University of Illinois College of Medicine.
I will say that a couple weeks ago I noted the development of a leftist mirror stage. Whatever the switch in political chirality, the interviewees here (and others) may be miming Trumpist command (and the Democrats' staged infirmity) as if the natural order of things.
The gesticulation matches a political impotence with biomedical magical thinking. Because we are unable to get the bourgeoisie to pay for a community health response that matches COVID's scale, including, as in other countries, paying everyone to huddle down and ride out the outbreak, the *virus* must not be as dangerous as it seems.
_______________________________
Glad to see Jacobin engaging this topic. Here is my 13-Point Response and Criticism. Please read to the bottom, when I get to the complications faced by the CTU:
1. Kulldorff, early on in the interview, emphasizes age-specific responses to COVID-19 and references a piece by him from April 2020. What we know now, and didn't know then, were the after-effects on young people who catch the virus, and the effects on so-called long-haulers. These effects argue for the existing, cautious stay-at-home orders for all, including young students, college-aged people, and those in their twenties and thirties. We are still learning the parameters of this disease. It may be true that those under 50 and without underlying conditions are unlikely to die from COVID-19, but widespread, long-term health effects from those "recovered" may be just as damaging to the populace and the economy. Katherine Yih refers to these long-term effects in her responses. Kulldorff is wrong to emphasize that children and young adults have "minimal risks." He should say unknown but fewer risks (i.e., non-mortal) than those over 60 who contract this.
2. The answer to Yih's point about being locked down is testing and contact tracing, not focusing on the potential unreliability of vaccines. We now possess fast-turnaround tests (the IL and Yale saliva tests), which enable quick quarantines for individuals. Those tests should be made widespread. That is a medically-oriented approach that is historically tested and proven (i.e., contact tracing and isolation).
3. The answer to the effects on the working-class is a generous, pandemic-focused Universal Basic Income. That enables people to stay home, and minimizes the massive inequalities that have continued unabated through the pandemic. That extra income would enable flexibilities to see young children through the pandemic with one or more parents available.
4. Kulldorff's advocacy for herd immunity is absolutely dangerous. It should not be a medical focus, but rather a "happy" accident that occurs when viable, equitable medical interventions fail or run out. What has happened in Sweden should be a cautionary tale for all who think the herd immunity strategy is viable in countries with significant populations over the age of 60. Yes, the article addresses Sweden, but not in as detailed a fashion as it deserves. Lots of elderly people died in Sweden. Kulldorff is right, however, when Kulldorff says the question is how to get there with minimal casualties. The answers are testing, contact tracing, universal health insurance, and pandemic-related UBI until a viable vaccine is ready for all.
5. This article, strangely for Jacobin, actually concedes too much to our current landscape and conditions---meaning of authoritarian, unchecked, and minimally-regulated capitalism in the United States versus the science of medicine and public health. I can't believe UBI and universal healthcare are not emphasized herein!
6. Neither Yih nor Kulldorff address the very real and ethical question of how many people they are willing to sacrifice, or to let be subject to long-term complications, to reach herd immunity. 1? 100? 1000? 10000? 100000? How many aged people were sacrificed in Sweden?
7. Regarding Sweden generally, you must look at those mortality and casualty numbers per capita, not absolutely. You also have to look at Sweden's healthcare infrastructure, general mental health incoming to the pandemic, and culture of mutual support. One must extrapolate very cautiously from Sweden. Kulldorff eventually gets to this point when the conversation turns to Denmark, Finland, and Norway.
8. In relation to secondary and tertiary effects in terms of non-COVID-19 illnesses (cancer, heart disease, immunizations, dental care, etc.), the answer again is universal healthcare and UBI. Young people need and benefit from quick, early treatment---enabled by a robust testing and contact tracing regime. A solid universal healthcare system would enable, perhaps, the prevention of young from a severity of infection that would cause the emerging long-term health risks.
9. The disproportionate burden of COVID-19 has fallen on people of color and the aged. The article is right to hammer this home. The Professional Managerial Class has focused on protecting its assets (homes, families, retirement accounts) rather than enabling universal services that would enable a softer lockdown. The conservatism of the PMC has hurt our disadvantaged communities. The PMC is the entity that doesn't want extended health, welfare, and unemployment benefits. The selfishness of healthy aged white people has helped enable the disproportionate burden.
10. The politicization of this crisis by our president has created and fostered a COVID-19 culture war. This has dissolved any viable middle way that would've given thought to at least temporary UBI and universal healthcare measures, and undermined the testing and tracing regime. It's not the Left-Right divide so much as a divide manufactured by our autocratically-inclined president.
11. I agree that an age-targeted strategy can be viable, but only when the young are well-protected as well from any kind of potential widespread infection. We don't want to create a high-maintenance cohort of recovered youth with potentially expensive, not-fully-known long-term side-effects. Some medical "conservatism" on behalf of youth--even when they don't want to be protected---is warranted.
12. Yih suggests that "progressives need to reject the unquestioning lockdown approach." I would agree if I saw progressives accepting the lockdown unquestioningly. I see by contrast, for instance, the centrist yet mildly progressive IL Governor Pritzker talking about phases, regions, and best-available science. This has enabled some (imperfect) flexibility around the state. It is true that some businesses could've been given more flexibility earlier, but the state also seems to want to ramp up the rapid testing possibilities and contact tracing.
13. The two medical professionals interviewed here seem to underestimate the complications of youthful asymptomatic spreaders, and the difficulties of age separation in relation to social interactions. Schools, for instance, are often led by older people who are susceptible to more intense consequences from child super spreaders. Those teachers then return to homes with their kids and maybe a susceptible relative. There is a reason why Chicago's CTU, a champion of working-class parents and social responsibility, has advocated for remote learning. It's trying to protect its middle-class teachers as well as its working class students and their parents. What of multi-generational homes, where aged family members receive better care from family than they would at any elder-care facility? The CTU operates in a diverse milieu, balancing numerous interests for the good of all. It has been an advocate for stay-at-home education and supported conservative, medically-informed stay-at-home orders. I also feel certain that the CTU would champion UBI and universal healthcare for all, to ease the pandemic-related burdens of all.
30Jay Arena, Thomas Weyts and 28 others
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Faculty Members Joined a Day of Action to Protest Racial Inequality. Now 2 Are in Hot Water.

Louis Proyect
 

Faculty Members Joined a Day of Action to Protest Racial Inequality. Now 2 Are in Hot Water.

They say participation in the national Scholar Strike is a matter of academic freedom. But at two universities, that claim is being contested.

PettitStrike-0918-art
ILLUSTRATION BY THE CHRONICLE

Two tenured professors at different universities are in hot water after participating in the Scholar Strike, a national action meant to call awareness to police brutality against Black people.

At the University of Mississippi, the state auditor, Shad White, told the university to pursue terminating James M. Thomas after the associate professor of sociology engaged, according to White, in an illegal work stoppage. White’s targeting of Thomas — first reported by the Clarion Ledger — has been criticized by other scholars as intimidation and an attempt to score political points in a red state. (White did not respond to a request for comment but said on Twitter that people want him to “give this professor a pass” because they agree with the professor’s politics. “No,” he concluded.)

And at Texas A&M University, the dean reported Wendy Leo Moore, an associate professor of sociology, to the provost after Moore indicated she would participate in a work stoppage. For several days, Moore told The Chronicle, she thought she was going to lose her job.

Both Moore and Thomas say their decisions were well within their rights under academic freedom, and believe they shouldn’t face professional consequences for what were pedagogical decisions. And they fear the moves will intimidate their colleagues, including those who don’t have the security of tenure.

Teach-Ins About Racial Justice

Two scholars, Kevin Gannon and Anthea Butler, came up with the Scholar Strike in the wake of this summer’s protests against racism and police brutality. Universities are not immune to these problems, Gannon, a professor of history at Grand View University, who writes regularly for The Chronicle, and Butler, an associate professor of religious studies and Africana studies at the University of Pennsylvania, wrote in an essay explaining the movement. So for two days, on September 8 and 9, professors, students, and staff members would “step away from their regular duties and classes to engage in teach-ins about racial injustice in America, policing, and racism in America,” they wrote.

Some instructors, including those sympathetic to protests and labor movements, criticized the action. It’s the wrong tactic, commented one professor on the American Association of University Professors’s blog, because it negatively affects students who were already anxious about this semester.

Some scholarly organizations, including the American Sociological Association, put out statements in support. The American Political Science Association said it “recognizes and respects the academic freedom of political scientists who participate.”

ASA’s statement is partly what swayed Moore. During the pandemic, Moore said she’s tried to be more available than ever to her students, so she thought hard about what it would mean to be inaccessible for two days. But ultimately, she felt a responsibility — as a white, tenured professor — to engage in a work stoppage, not a teach-in, because it was in her power to do so.

On the morning of September 7, Moore explained her reasoning to her students. For two weeks after George Floyd’s death, she and her children had worked at pop-up food banks and participated in protests in St. Paul and Minneapolis, she wrote in an email. She saw the Scholar Strike as an extension of those social-justice activities. She included links to learn more about the strike and about police violence and racial inequality.

She canceled her Tuesday office hours and told students who normally had a Zoom class that day that they could drop in on Thursday’s class if they wanted to.

Moore also offered to stay on Thursday’s Zoom meeting an extra hour to answer any questions about class materials, the strike, or issues of racism and police brutality. She’d hold office hours later that day and would be available for meetings that Friday and over the weekend, she told them.

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Later that morning, Moore got a Facebook message from her interim department head, Pat Rubio Goldsmith, asking her to give him a call. According to Moore, he told her that the upper administration wanted her to walk back the work stoppage by sending another email to her students, saying she’d do a different sort of action, like a teach-in. He told her, “I don’t want to lose you.” The impression she got, Moore said, was that she could be fired.

Reached for comment, Goldsmith confirmed he spoke with Moore about her initial email but declined to comment further.

That afternoon, Moore’s dean, Pamela R. Matthews, circulated a memo about the Scholar Strike written by the university system’s chief legal officer.

In the memo, Ray Bonilla said that he’d been advised there was a national effort to organize a strike or temporary work stoppage among faculty members. “I do not have information on the details of this effort,” he wrote. “Even so, it is important for you to know that any A&M System employees participating in such a strike or walkout will be violating Texas law.”

Citing a state law, Bonilla said that any employee who violates the statute “forfeits all civil-service rights, re-employment rights, and any other rights, benefits, and privileges the employee enjoys as a result of public employment.” So the consequences are “significant,” Bonilla wrote.

Matthews sent Bonilla’s memo to department heads. “If you anticipate that it is necessary or even simply helpful,” the dean wrote, “feel free to communicate with faculty and staff so that they are aware of the very serious potential consequences.” Moore’s department chair disseminated the memo to all sociology faculty members, graduate students, and staff members.

By that point, Moore says she was hysterical over the possibility of being fired. She had a conversation with her adult children about what to do, and they supported her sticking to her ideals. She’d also gotten a couple of positive emails from her students, who said they were grateful for her action.

And Moore, who is also an attorney, read over Bonilla’s memo, and she disagreed with his interpretation of Texas law. That evening, she emailed Goldsmith and Matthews, telling them why.

First, her decision, which was in “solidarity with national social-movement activities,” was not part of an organized work stoppage against the university or the state of Texas itself, she wrote. Secondly, the subsection of the law that Bonilla cites is part of a larger body of legislation that concerns work strikes “in conjunction with organized labor for the purpose of influencing labor negotiations,” Moore wrote. Whereas the Scholar Strike, while it includes work stoppages, is not related to labor negotiations.

“As I hope you can see, my decision to express my support of Black Lives Matter, the #ScholarStrike, and racial justice through participation in a work stoppage was taken with thought and care,” Moore wrote. “I informed students that I was balancing participation in this important social movement with their needs in this already difficult time.”

Matthews, the dean, wrote back, telling Moore she appreciated and respected Moore’s position, but was obligated to notify the provost and the general counsel’s office. The next morning, she emailed the provost to say that Moore was participating and had been “informed of the potentially serious consequences of her decision.”

Moore says she asked her department head to forward the email she’d written explaining her rationale and her legal interpretation to the provost. Then, she waited.

Meanwhile, word spread about Moore’s decision among students and their parents. “I’m not paying for them to take a day off,” wrote one parent on a Facebook thread about Moore’s email. “The best part of waking up isn’t Folgers in my cup — it’s getting the ability to get rid of horrible professors who broke the law and lost all of their employee rights, including tenure,” commented another user.

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On Monday, September 14, Moore says she met with the university’s chief risk, ethics, and compliance officer. According to Moore, the questions he asked did not seem geared toward a decision of termination. She said he told her he’d be writing up a report and sharing it with the dean of faculties.

At this point, Moore says she’s not sure what’s going to happen. (The university communications office did not respond to a request for comment, nor did Matthews, Bonilla, or Kevin McGinnis, the chief compliance officer.)

Moore said she’s less afraid of losing her job than she was a week ago. She thinks she’s on solid legal ground. But the ordeal has cost her, she said. She lost a week of work. She had to turn off her camera during a faculty meeting to keep her colleagues from seeing her cry.

The university’s decisions “infringed upon my freedom of expression and freedom of participation in this national movement in support of Black lives,” Moore said. She worries about those in less secure positions than her, who were already scared to stand up for what they believed in.

‘Within the Bounds of My Job Roles’

Thomas, too, sees his case as something that could have a lasting, chilling effect on others at the university. “I was entirely within the bounds of my job roles and responsibilities,” he said in a statement sent to The Chronicle. “That my university hasn’t affirmed that yet should worry every single one of my colleagues.”

Thomas declined to comment further but provided a memo he wrote about the incident that explained his reasoning for participating in the Scholar Strike.

He’s a sociologist who studies, among other things, race and racism in the United States. The national action was a chance, he wrote, to connect the content of his courses with what was going on in the real world.

Before the strike began, Thomas talked about the action on Twitter, saying that “if you have tenure, your #ScholarStrike activity needs to be a work stoppage. Tell your students you’re not working.”

He emailed his students to say that for the next two days, he wouldn’t be responding to emails or holding Zoom meetings, including office hours, or providing course-related instruction. He encouraged them to learn more about the history of police violence in the U.S. and sent a link to resources. He shared some of those resources on Twitter.

On Monday, September 14, White, the state auditor, cited the email Thomas sent to his students and posts he’d made on social media in his letter to Glenn Boyce, the chancellor of the University of Mississippi. Strikes, or any concerted work stoppage, are illegal in Mississippi, White wrote. And the penalties are clear. If an employee has engaged in a strike, a court shall order “the termination of his or her employment.”

White requested that the university withhold Thomas’s pay and also that the university “proceed to court to hear the matter of Prof. Thomas’s termination.”

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When news broke about White’s letter, some observers criticized the Republican’s decision as a political maneuver to target Thomas, who has drawn ire from state Republicans before. In 2018, he faced backlash for encouraging people on Twitter to harass senators in public. He later clarified his comment wasn’t meant to be taken literally, the Clarion Ledger reported.

A colleague of Thomas’s wrote an open letter, saying that White’s action was an attempt to score “some cheap political points” and use “intimidation tactics in an attempt to silence faculty.”

For his part, Thomas strongly disputes White’s claim that he engaged in a work stoppage. “The irony of Mr. White’s accusations against me is that to prepare my course materials and engage my students in the pedagogy related to #ScholarStrike required extra effort, and extra work time, on my part,” he wrote in his memo. “Time neither he nor the armed agents he sent to my home considered.” (White confirmed to the Clarion Ledger that his office sent two agents to Thomas’ home before he sent the letter to Boyce. White said that Thomas “wasn’t interested” in talking to them.)

On the days of the Scholar Strike, Thomas says he shifted his focus away from his administrative work onto the “pedagogical and creative activities” related to the Scholar Strike. He worked on a manuscript and submitted it for consideration in an edited volume, and he answered several emails.

“My choice to provide this opportunity for my students is fundamentally grounded in my academic freedom,” Thomas wrote, “the bedrock of everything we do at this university and others like it.” White’s characterization of his activities demonstrates “his clear misunderstanding of the role and responsibilities of faculty members in institutions of higher education.”

It’s unclear where Thomas’s case now stands. The scholar wants a strong rebuke of White’s claims from the university administration — something he hasn’t gotten yet.

A spokesman for the university declined to comment on what he called a personnel matter.


Europe Drives Destruction of US Forests in the Name of Fighting Climate Change

Louis Proyect
 

In my defense of "The Planet of the Humans" (https://www.counterpunch.org/2020/05/08/beyond-the-uproar-over-planet-of-humans/), I pointed out that it's critics were wrong to claim that biomass energy was a thing of the past. It may have wound down in the USA but as this article points out, it is going like gangbusters in Europe with the fuel coming from American forests.

https://truthout.org/articles/europe-drives-destruction-of-us-forests-in-the-name-of-fighting-climate-change/


Webinar on Crisis in Eastern Mediterranean Saturday Sept 26

Praxis Perhaps
 


Re: in re/ "Latest 100 Messages"

Les Schaffer
 

fair enough. for me, the first line gives me a sense of the article, is it just a link, is it a repost of something else, is somebody making a point. i love it.

in any case, Lou feels many people have grown used to and appreciate the Latest 100, so it aint goin away.

Les

On 9/21/20 10:26 PM, David Walters wrote:
But the listing of messages IMO sucks...the use of the first line(s) of the message is a complete waste of screen space.


Re: in re/ "Latest 100 Messages"

David Walters
 

Just a few comments on this. I do love the new composition page with the ability to format text and so on. This is literally taking the list from the 1990s to the 2020s. So thanks for that. But the listing of messages IMO sucks...the use of the first line(s) of the message is a complete waste of screen space. That is why the http://marxmail.org/maillist.html is so valuable. I can quickly review the last set of messages by title for the entire day or two. The new listing is extremely annoying and I can only view about a subject titles. So the way it is now is perfect. I can use both quite easily.

David Walters


Re: in re/ "Latest 100 Messages"

Robert Rosengard
 

Thanks for your work in keeping this valuable site going.

Bob Rosengard


-----Original Message-----
From: Les Schaffer <les.schaffer@...>
To: marxmail@groups.io
Sent: Mon, Sep 21, 2020 2:45 pm
Subject: [Special] [marxmail] in re/ "Latest 100 Messages"

a number of people are reading marxmail at the  "Latest 100 messages from Marxism list" website. due to changes i made (to the code that generates the Latest 100)  in the last couple days, not everyone's email to marxmail has been reflected on the Latest 100 site. i've just fine-tuned those changes so this should no longer happen.

if for some reason you notice an email you sent to marxmail did not make it to the Latest 100, please let me know and i will continue fine-tuning.

for those of you that have grown accustomed to reading the Latest 100, know that you can get nearly the same result by browsing to https://groups.io/g/marxmail/topics

Les


Re: Monday email delivery delays

Les Schaffer
 

from the excellent groups.io manuals i've learned how quoted text can be handled in the groups.io web interface. see the following Tips here
- Quoting part of a message (Reply only)
-  Quote Whole Post (Reply only)
- Trim Quote Whole Post (Reply only)

here are two screenshots i took of the process.





To Those Who Believe in Voting - CounterPunch.org

Louis Proyect
 


Re: Monday email delivery delays

Les Schaffer
 

What are you using for reading and replying? an email program like Outlook or Thunderbird, or Google's web interface, or the groups.io web interface?

on google web interface or Thunderbird it is possible to delete the quoted text. in the former case you have to click the three dots that say (when your mouse is hovered over) "Show trimmed content". then you can clip as needed. Thunderbird (and Outlook???) display the quoted text by default.

the groups.io web interface does not appear to allow trimming of quoted text. i can check on the moderator's forum to see if there are workarounds/fixes for this.

Les

On 9/21/20 6:07 PM, Stephen Gosch wrote:
Hello,

I have wanted to reply to some messages but am stymied when it comes to clipping all extraneous text. I am unable to delete text. Is there another way?

Thanks.


Re: Monday email delivery delays

Stephen Gosch
 

Hello,

I have wanted to reply to some messages but am stymied when it comes to clipping all extraneous text. I am unable to delete text. Is there another way?

Thanks.

On Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 4:18 PM Les Schaffer <les.schaffer@...> wrote:
We were notified this afternoon that there were issues delivering
groups.io email today. the system should start clearing "now" (meaning
you probably wont get this message until earlier email clears).

groups.io has been a pleasure to work with so far. here is there second
email on the issue, below.

Les

----------------

Hi All,

As you've hopefully noticed, email has started to flow again. We have
quite a backlog to work through, however, so it will take some time
before we're caught up. I believe I've stabilized things. No email was
lost, and the problem didn't affect any other part of the service.

I will post at least one more time in this topic when we're fully caught
up with the backlog. And, probably tomorrow, I will post a #postmortem
detailing what happened and what changes I'll be making.







Re: Progressive Patriotism | Lefteast

RKOB
 

What a shameful piece! "Progressive Patriotism" in Russia can only mean pro-imperialist social-patriotism. Unsurpringly these "left-wing" authors (the RSD has connections to the Mandelite "Fourth International") write more than 4,400 words - but not a single word about Chechnya or Syria where the peope suffer particularly cruelly under the "Russkij Mir"!

Those interested might want to take a look to chapter XVIII of my book “Anti-Imperialism in the Age of Great Power Rivalry” where I briefly dealt with this organization.

https://www.thecommunists.net/theory/anti-imperialism-in-the-age-of-great-power-rivalry/

Am 21.09.2020 um 13:30 schrieb Louis Proyect:

Translated from the Russian original on Colta.ru by Maxim Edwards. LeftEast publishes this text not by way of unreserved endorsement but rather in an effort to initiate a debate about leftist strategy. In our editorial discussion at least, it generated plenty of questions: Do we need to limit our imagination of political community to the form of the nation-state? Can we meaningfully expect to control the meaning of the notoriously shape-shifting ideology of nationalism? Hasn’t the progressive patriot niche in Russia been already occupied by forces that are not all that progressive, ranging from the Communist Party of the Russian Federation to red conservatives (kraskony) on- and off-line? How applicable is the authors’ version of progressive patriotism beyond Russia, or put another way, what has been the experience of leftist political formations based on it in Hungary (the Fourth Republic) or Latin America? Some of these questions have already been debated on Russian-language social media. What we hope to do with this translation is to broaden the debate around Kirill and Oleg’s very important and clearly articulated strategy proposal.

https://www.criticatac.ro/lefteast/progressive-patriotism/

-- 
Revolutionär-Kommunistische Organisation BEFREIUNG
(Österreichische Sektion der RCIT, www.thecommunists.net)
www.rkob.net
aktiv@...
Tel./SMS/WhatsApp/Telegram: +43-650-4068314

Virenfrei. www.avast.com


Monday email delivery delays

Les Schaffer
 

We were notified this afternoon that there were issues delivering groups.io email today. the system should start clearing "now" (meaning you probably wont get this message until earlier email clears).

groups.io has been a pleasure to work with so far. here is there second email on the issue, below.

Les

----------------

Hi All,

As you've hopefully noticed, email has started to flow again. We have quite a backlog to work through, however, so it will take some time before we're caught up. I believe I've stabilized things. No email was lost, and the problem didn't affect any other part of the service.

I will post at least one more time in this topic when we're fully caught up with the backlog. And, probably tomorrow, I will post a #postmortem detailing what happened and what changes I'll be making.


H-Net Review [H-Slavery]: Barker on Fuente and Gross, 'Becoming Free, Becoming Black: Race, Freedom, and Law in Cuba, Virginia, and Louisiana'

Andrew Stewart
 



---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: Mon, Sep 21, 2020 at 3:23 PM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Slavery]: Barker on Fuente and Gross, 'Becoming Free, Becoming Black: Race, Freedom, and Law in Cuba, Virginia, and Louisiana'
To: <h-review@...>
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>


Alejandro de la Fuente, Ariela Julie Gross.  Becoming Free, Becoming
Black: Race, Freedom, and Law in Cuba, Virginia, and Louisiana. 
Cambridge  Cambridge University Press, 2020.  294 pp.  $24.95
(cloth), ISBN 978-1-108-48064-2.

Reviewed by Patrick Barker (Yale University)
Published on H-Slavery (September, 2020)
Commissioned by Andrew J. Kettler

Collaboratively researched and written, this is a richly detailed and
carefully argued book that traces the evolution of distinct racial
regimes in three Atlantic slave societies, namely Cuba, Louisiana,
and Virginia, over the _longue durée_. From their foundation as
colonies of the Spanish, French, and English empires, respectively,
through to the late 1850s, de la Fuente and Gross demonstrate how
laws of race and freedom came to shape the emergence of different
racial regimes in what became the United States and what remained
Spanish Cuba. In each of these jurisdictions, slaveholding elites
racially ordered their localized legal regimes in ways that heavily
discriminated against Afro-descended peoples. However, by the 1850s,
the legal link between "whiteness and citizenship"--and by extension,
Blackness and slavery--was most clearly expressed in anti-Black laws
of freedom and race in Louisiana and Virginia. While anti-Blackness
had found legal expression in the earliest laws governing slave
society in Spanish Cuba, by the 1850s, the colony's law still
permitted free communities of color to participate meaningfully as
rights-bearing subjects in ways that were roundly suppressed by
lawmakers in Louisiana and Virginia. Resultantly, for free
communities of color, the racial barriers to belonging were "much
farther advanced" in Louisiana and Virginia than in Cuba on the eve
of the US Civil War (p. 222).

De la Fuente and Gross provide a compelling and original argument as
to how and why these distinct racial regimes came into being by the
late 1850s. Harnessing comprehensive insights from an extensive range
of legal documentation housed in Cuban, Spanish, and US archives, the
authors argue it was the "law of freedom" and "not the law of
slavery" that proved "most crucial" in creating racial regimes in
each of these societies (p. 4). In particular, it was the degrees of
racialized severity with which slaveholding elites could--or could
not--regulate manumission, interracial unions, and the rights of free
communities of color over the _longue durée_, which effectively
shaped the contours of these distinct legal regimes of anti-Blackness
in the US south and Cuba by 1860.

As the others make clear, however, even in Louisiana and Virginia,
slaveholding elites were never fully able to enact what de la Fuente
and Gross call the "dichotomous world that they envisioned"--namely a
world in which African ancestry was made entirely synonymous with
degradation and slavery (p. 220). De la Fuente and Gross explain that
white slaveholding elites could never fully exact this racial
ordering project because across every era and with varying degrees of
success, people of African descent always found ways to pursue and
secure legal freedom in each jurisdiction. Once free, communities of
color struggled to make their freedoms meaningful despite the racist
laws that so often restricted their public lives and haunted their
private relationships. In doing so, free people of African descent,
particularly in Cuba and in specific eras in Louisiana and Virginia,
were able to form numerically significant and lasting free
communities of color that stood in defiance of slaveholders'
long-standing efforts to equate Blackness with slave status.
_Becoming Free, Becoming Black _is thus not merely a study of how
elite slaveholders crafted anti-Black laws to suit their own
political and economic goals. Through a multigenerational analysis of
enslaved peoples' manumission and litigation strategies, the authors
illustrate how people of African ancestry negotiated and gave shape
to the laws of freedom and race and did so in often remarkable and
creative ways. This theme of study has of course animated much of the
most recent and exciting historical scholarship on race and the law
in Americas, but _Becoming Free, Becoming Black _adds to that body of
work by excavating a deep history of Black manumission and litigation
strategies in legal systems informed by different legal precedents
and imperial legacies.[1]


De la Fuente and Gross draw their many insights from an extensive
multilingual study of legal documentation produced over more than
three centuries and housed in Cuban, Spanish, and US archives. To
understand how, when, and why slaveholding elites imposed racialized
regulations on people of African descent and the laws of freedom, de
la Fuente and Gross analyze sources produced at a range of
administrative levels of power. Such sources include municipal and
policing ordinances, assembly records, state laws, imperial codes,
and royal edicts. The authors' assessment of enslaved claims-making
and litigation strategies is made possible by close readings of
individual claims and court cases, along with aggregate analyses of
the strategies pursued by the enslaved over time, where the available
data permits. For this element of the project, the authors collected
and analyzed a remarkable range of legal documents, including
legislative minutes, court records, trial records, notarial deeds,
and wills, among other types of sources. Complementing their analyses
of these archival sources, the book's clarity of argument and its
endnotes demonstrate a deep engagement with a large body of
comparative historical literature on race and slavery in the
Americas, charting back to sociologist Frank Tannenbaum's _Slave
&amp; Citizen_, first published in 1946.

The book consists of five chapters, each comparative in form. The
first chapter explores to what degree legal and social precedents
informed the laws of race during the earliest stages of colonial
settlement in each society. De la Fuente and Gross show how early
settlers in Cuba and Louisiana inscribed African ancestry as a
distinct marker of social degradation. Several ordinances between the
1550s and early seventeenth century demonstrate that anti-Black
ideology was a fixture in early Spanish Cuba's law. Local ordinances
governing crime, commercial life, political participation, and
so-called vagrants contained racially discriminatory provisions that
prescribed disproportionate policing and punishment for people of
African descent. In developing Cuba's early racial regime, the
authors explain that Iberian settlers were drawing on racialized
ideas about blood purity (_limpieza de sangre_) and racial codes
already enacted in the Iberian Peninsula. Some of Cuba's earliest
municipal ordinances bore a remarkable similarity to the legal codes
policing racial order in slaveholding Iberian cities like Lisbon,
Seville, and Valencia, where African slavery and free communities of
color were already visible elements of urban life. While Cuba's
authorities created localized racial ordinances that embodied Iberian
legal precedent, French Louisiana's slaveholding elites borrowed from
and then expanded the racialized regulations contained within the
French empire's Code Noir_ _of 1685 when making Louisiana's first
anti-Black civil code, the Code Noir_ _of 1724. The Louisiana code
contained numerous provisions not listed in the French Antillean code
of 1685 and prescribed discriminatory punishments for freed Black
transgressors of the law, racial restrictions on interracial marriage
and sex, and even attempted to constrain Black social mobility by
banning donations and legacies from white settlers.

The early colonial process of race-making, as de la Fuente and Gross
show, was more gradual in English Virginia than in French Louisiana
and Spanish Cuba. When English settlers disembarked in what became
Virginia in 1607, they "lacked clear precedents" for the legal
enslavement of people of African descent and therefore did not have a
clear legal distinction of race from which they could draw. According
to the authors, the laws governing racial status in English Virginia
"remained unsettled and open to interpretation" in the colony during
the earliest decades of settlement (p. 16). Before the late 1650s,
some Black subjects were able to win their freedoms and enjoyed
rights later available to only white English settlers. Virginia's
legal system would begin to change in 1659, as a statute that reduced
import duties for slave traders simultaneously discussed the
importation of "negroes" rather than slaves, suggesting lawmakers had
already begun conflating African ancestry with slave status. However,
the lack of clear legal and social precedent in Virginia did not
prevent slaveholding elites from borrowing legal principles from
other legal regimes. Just three years after the 1659 law, Virginia's
legislators adopted the _partus sequitur ventrem_ (offspring follows
belly) principle, which instituted that slave status was inheritable
via the maternal line.[2] By introducing this principle, Virginian
lawmakers had subverted English legal doctrine and replaced it with a
Roman principle already practiced in Iberian and French colonies.
Virginia slaveholding elites began to develop more explicitly
anti-Black laws, the authors argue, not because of a particular event
such as Bacon's Rebellion. Instead, slaveholders began to restrict
laws of freedom and racialize existing legal codes in ways that
discriminated against people of African descent because of longer-run
structural changes in Virginia's demography and economy.[3] As the
migration of English servants slowed down and the plantation economy
expanded in the latter half of the seventeenth century, Virginia's
lawmakers--in effect--sought to maintain and more tightly control
their captive African labor force. To support those aims, lawmakers
began to more deliberately use "race as a marker of degradation" (p.
58).

Chapter 2 shifts to consider the legal contours of manumission and
interracial marriage in each society before the 1770s. By seeking
freedom through any legal means available, de la Fuente and Gross
argue in this chapter, "slaves breached the racial order" and were
not passive recipients of freedoms granted by white slaveholders (p.
41). However, the possibilities available to the enslaved for
pursuing legal freedom differed considerably across these societies.
Manumission was part "of the traditional architecture of slavery" in
Iberian society (p. 43). Additionally, interracial marriage and sex
were legally unregulated in Cuba until 1778. Unlike early Spanish
Cuba's racialized municipal ordinances, which explicitly
discriminated against Cubans of African descent, lawmakers never
restricted the colony's manumission laws, nor did they tie those laws
to race. Instead, Spanish officials and slaveholders viewed
manumission as an "ordinary practice" safeguarded by long-standing
Roman principles in the law of Iberian slavery (p. 45). Enslaved
people in Cuba could make use of manumission by will, faithful
service, and self-purchase practices, including that of
_coartación_, a commonly deployed form of incremental self-purchase,
across the entire period of study. Women in Cuba were also
consistently the most likely to obtain their legal freedoms through
manumission, as they were in Louisiana and Virginia. At the turn of
the seventeenth century, women constituted as many as 65 percent of
people manumitted in Havana, a trend that only continued into the
eighteenth century. Most freed peoples in Cuba won their freedom
through self-purchase. Because Cuba's race laws--like French
Louisiana and after 1662, Virginia--adhered to the principle of
_partus sequitur ventrem_, children also inherited freedom through
the maternal line. Longer-term, manumission unrestricted by race and
the prevalence of women claimants meant Cuba's free communities of
color grew to a far higher proportional rate than in French Louisiana
and what became British Virginia before 1770.

In French Louisiana and what became British Virginia, on the other
hand, lawmakers succeeded in racializing and tightly restricting
manumission practices in ways that discriminated against people of
African descent. As plantation slavery expanded in English Virginia
during the latter half of the seventeenth century, the colony's
legislators increasingly restricted manumission and marriage
practices based on race. The colony's first comprehensive slave code
in 1691 described freed peoples as an "inconvenience" and imposed
mandatory fines on slaveholders who manumitted enslaved people of
African ancestry (p. 60). By the early eighteenth century,
slaveholders tightened the laws even further. In 1723, Virginia's
legislature banned manumission in all cases except for "meritorious
service" and mandated that the colony's governor and council mediate
all manumissions. As in the well-known case of James Papaw, some
enslaved people still managed to obtain their freedom despite such
deliberately onerous stipulations. However, in practice, most
manumissions were few and far between, and mostly enacted through
wills for what slaveholders called "faithful service" (pp. 60-61). As
in Virginia, French Louisiana's lawmakers restricted manumission in
deliberately onerous and racially discriminatory ways. Slaveholding
elites' efforts to suppress manumission and interracial union in both
societies were not always successful. Nevertheless, by 1770
slaveholding elites in French Louisiana and British Virginia had
developed legal systems of race and freedom that aimed to suppress
the formation of free communities of color using techniques not
implemented in Cuba.

The book's third chapter explores how enslaved people negotiated
manumission and the courts during the Age of Revolution, an era of
great paradox. As the pressures to end or reform slavery grew in each
society from within and without, slaveholding elites sought ways to
protect the institution's future. Slaveholders succeeded in expanding
racial slavery in each society. At the same time, reformers and
revolutionaries installed new legal apparatuses through which
enslaved claimants could seek their freedom, often opening up
opportunities unavailable to claimants in the prerevolutionary era.
Throughout the era, free communities of color grew in size as
enslaved people took advantage of the still limited but significant
opportunities the laws of freedom afforded them in each society.
During this period, manumissions increased in Virginia, and so too
did the size of the state's free communities of color. National
legislation expanded the laws of freedom, while Virginia's court
system grew considerably in the last decades of the eighteenth
century. These changes to the state's legal system were exploited by
enslaved claimants who sought their freedom through manumission and
the courts. The Manumission Act of 1782, despised by many Virginia
slaveholders, permitted freed peoples to remain in Virginia after
claiming their freedom and mandated that manumissions no longer
required legislative approval. The Freedom Suit Act of 1795 enabled
enslaved people to sue for freedom themselves, without a legal
guardian required in the court. Other laws, not originally designed
to encourage freedom suits among the enslaved, nonetheless prompted
enslaved claimants to litigate for their freedom. For instance, the
Importation Act of 1778 banned imported captives from Africa or other
states. After learning that slaveholders' penalties for illegal
importation included the emancipation of trafficked captives,
enslaved litigants sued for their freedom, especially in Virginia's
border counties. Enslaved people also made use of a growing county
court system to sue for their freedom. After learning of a series of
cases in the 1770s that "affirmed that Indians could only have
legally been held as slaves between 1682 and 1705," numerous
claimants began to invoke their indigenous ancestry and press for
freedom in Virginia's expanded court system.[4] In Accomack County,
de la Fuente and Gross argue, this legal argument formed the "most
common basis for freedom suits" (p. 95).

During the Age of Revolution, free communities of color also grew
numerically in Louisiana and Cuba. As the authors argue, unlike in
Virginia, this process was "not the product of revolution," but
rather a result of the Spanish crown's more gradual efforts to expand
its colonial legal apparatus and raise imperial revenues under
Bourbon rule (p. 11). Following the Seven Years' War, the Spanish
empire governed Louisiana between the 1760s and early nineteenth
century. The transfer of governance from the French to the Spanish
empire brought with it an expanded legal apparatus for Black
claims-making, as the colony's laws of race and freedom came to
mirror those long in force in Spanish Cuba. Enslaved people soon
learned how to negotiate the Spanish legal system in the colony. By
the end of the century, manumissions increased, especially those
involving _gracioso_ (self-purchase), and enslaved people also made
use of _coartación_. In Cuba, enslaved people exploited new
institutions such as the _síndico procurador, _or slaves' protector,
while also utilizing older customary practices like self-purchase. 

However, the growing presence of free Black communities in all of
these societies during the Age of Revolution prompted a fierce
backlash from slaveholding elites in each society. As chapters 4 and
5 show, slaveholding elites between the 1830s and 1850s viewed free
communities as hotbeds of abolitionist radicalism and potential
rebellion. The very presence of sizeable numbers of freed peoples
worked to subvert the binary racial orders imagined by slaveholders
as necessary to defend slavery's future. In the United States,
slaveholding elites were more able to realize their visions of firmly
equating Blackness with slavery in the late antebellum era. In
contrast, Iberian legal precedent and the comparatively large size of
Cuba's freed communities of color prohibited Cuban officials from
attempting to reform the colony's law of freedom. Set against rising
antislavery pressures in the North and the threat of Black
insurrection in their midst, chapter 4 shows how slaveholding elites
in Louisiana and Virginia sought to protect US slavery's future by
suppressing manumission and promoting campaigns to expel free people
of color. Lawmakers in both jurisdictions also restricted the
manumission practices introduced during the Age of Revolution. In
Virginia, the state legislature overturned revolutionary-era reforms
that allowed freed people to remain in the state after earning their
freedom from slavery. In 1851, the Virginia state constitution
"reiterated that slaves emancipated after that date" would "forfeit
their freedom" if they remained in the state for more than a year (p.
162). In 1857, lawmakers in Louisiana banned manumissions altogether.
While Cuban slaveholding elites admired these US legislators' efforts
and complained about enslaved peoples' use of the colony's court and
manumission systems, they "stopped short of insinuating that
manumission policies should change" (p. 171). Cuba's authorities
discussed the expulsion of Black Cubans in the 1830s, but never
publicly promoted campaigns like those of their North American
counterparts. Cuban lawmakers did not avoid supporting such campaigns
due to their affinity for free communities of color. Instead,
officials were afraid that support for such campaigns would provoke
resistance from a numerically preponderant class of free Black people
in a colony already threatened by slave rebellion.

The fifth and final chapter primarily concentrates on the laws
regulating the civic and social lives of free people of color in the
decades preceding the US Civil War. By the late 1850s, lawmakers had
introduced numerous regulations in Louisiana and Virginia that
racially restricted the freedom to educate, freedom to marry and
inherit property, freedom to worship, and freedom to participate in
civic life. In these US states, Black freedom's meaning and its
already precarious future were under full and frontal assault by the
eve of the Civil War. Black educational and religious institutions,
in particular, were favored targets of slaveholding lawmakers in the
United States. Conversely, in Cuba by the 1850s, it was still
possible for free people of color to participate publicly in public
religious and social life and to possess honor and civic virtue in
the eyes of white governing officials. Cuban officials and
slaveholding elites still tried to regulate Black social mobility
during this period. During the 1830s, for example, slaveholding
elites in Havana segregated Havana's schools and eliminated Black
teachers from the education system. However, Cuban officials were
never able to restrict long-standing institutions of free Black
religious and social life to the degrees enacted in Louisiana and
Virginia.

_Becoming Free, Becoming Black_ is a formidable accomplishment. While
the book primarily speaks to historians of comparative race and the
law, its arguments will also interest social and cultural historians
of race and slavery in colonial Latin America, colonial North
America, and the US South. Scholars of gender, sexuality, and women's
history will find the text's emphasis on the critical importance of
Black motherhood and women's litigation strategies of interest.
Historians of post-emancipation race and Black belonging in the
Americas will also find the book of interest. 

The comparative study of race and the law has long lived in the
shadow of Tannenbaum's much-criticized _Slave &amp; Citizen_, a point
made by de la Fuente and Gross in a co-authored literature review
published a decade ago, but a claim that nonetheless remains true
today.[5] Like Tannenbaum, de la Fuente and Gross_ _ask fundamental
questions about how and why distinct racial regimes emerged in the
Americas. Unlike Tannenbaum, de la Fuente and Gross never allow legal
precedent or binary concepts of culture to stand in as explanations
for the messy, nonlinear, and contested processes of race-making on
the ground. Instead, legal and cultural precedents were two of
several important variables informing the legal practices governing
race, freedom, and the laws regulating free people of colors' lives.
The authors also pay special attention to how broader metapolitical
and economic transformations in the Atlantic world shape the laws of
race and freedom in Cuba, Louisiana, and Virginia to varying degrees
over time. This integrative approach allows the authors to_
_respectfully negotiate decades of debate concerning the origins of
distinct racial regimes in the Americas while offering a novel
assessment of which variables mattered most in this story.

Notes

[1]. Some examples of this tradition include Adriana Chira,
"Affective Debts: Manumission by Grace and the Making of Gradual
Emancipation laws in Cuba, 1817-68," _Law and History Review_ 36, no.
1 (2017): 1-33; Martha S. Jones, _Birthright Citizens: A History of
Race and Rights in Antebellum _America (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2018); Bianca Premo, _Enlightenment on Trial:
Ordinary Litigants and Colonialism in the Spanish Empire_ (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2017); Michelle A. McKinley, _Fractional
Freedoms: Slavery, Intimacy, and Legal Mobilization in Colonial Lima,
1600-_1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); and Rebecca
J. Scott and Jean M. Hébrard, _Freedom Papers: An Atlantic Odyssey
in the Age of Emancipation_ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2014).

[2]. For more on this principle in Virginia, see also Jennifer L.
Morgan, _"_Partus Sequitur Ventrum: Law, Race, and Reproduction in
Colonial Slavery," _Small Axe _22, no. 1 (March 2018): 1-17.

[3]. This argument is made by de la Fuente and Gross in distinction
to Edmund S. Morgan, who famously viewed Bacon's Rebellion as a
turning point in the history of race in colonial North America. See
_American Slavery, American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial Virginia_
(New York: W. W. Norton &amp; Company, Inc., 1975), esp. 250-70.

[4]. A subsequent law in 1807 "narrowed this window to 1682-1691," as
the authors show (95). 

[5]. Alejandro de la Fuente and Ariela J. Gross, "Comparative Studies
of Law, Slavery, and Race in the Americas," _Annual Review of Law and
Social Science _6 (2010): 469-85; helpful introductory essays on the
historiographical debates surrounding Tannenbaum's text include
George Reid Andrews, "Brazilian Racial Democracy, 1900-1990: An
American Counterpoint," _Journal of Contemporary History_ 31, no. 3
(1996): 483-507; and Alejandro de La Fuente, "From Slaves to
Citizens? Tannenbaum and the Debates on Slavery, Emancipation, and
Race Relations in Latin America," _International Labor and
Working-Class History_, no. 77 (2010): 154-73.

Citation: Patrick Barker. Review of Fuente, Alejandro de la; Gross,
Ariela Julie, _Becoming Free, Becoming Black: Race, Freedom, and Law
in Cuba, Virginia, and Louisiana_. H-Slavery, H-Net Reviews.
September, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55043

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart