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Young Heroes of the Soviet Union: A Memoir and a Reckoningma

Louis Proyect
 

NY Review of Books, OCTOBER 22, 2020 ISSUE
Speak, Memory?
by Yuri Slezkine

Young Heroes of the Soviet Union: A Memoir and a Reckoning
by Alex Halberstadt
Random House, 289 pp., $28.00

One of the mythic hero’s most important tasks is to travel to a strange new land and come back enlightened or bewildered. One of the quest’s most familiar destinations is the world of ancestors. And one of the consequences of the post-1960s tribalization of America is the proliferation of “return narratives,” in which unfulfilled seekers travel to the old country in search of “race and inheritance,” as Barack Obama put it. “Would this trip to Kenya finally fill that emptiness?” he wonders as he sets off for his father’s birthplace. “The folks back in Chicago thought so.”

Africa is “a new promised land, full of ancient traditions and sweeping vistas.” The same is true of China, Korea, Ireland, Italy, Norway, and most other lost homes. Some pilgrims come back disappointed (“they come here looking for the authentic,” a Kenyan history professor tells Obama, and “that is bound to disappoint a person”), but most realize that disappointment is a path to wisdom. The land of forefathers contains many regions, and some are much darker than others. Only those traveling to the deepest pits of hell abandon all hope before entering.

Most American Jews who travel to Eastern Europe are in no doubt that they are heading for the inferno (“holocaust” means “burnt completely”). Their goal is to meet the ghosts of their slain ancestors and perhaps those of the executioners. Occasionally, they run into witting or unwitting fellow travelers whose ancestors are the executioners. The Chicago-born journalist Silvia Foti traveled to Lithuania to write an admiring biography of her grandfather, a war hero. The book she ended up writing is called The Nazi’s Granddaughter: How I Discovered My Grandfather Was a War Criminal (expected in 2021). The Lithuanian writer Rūta Vanagaitė and Efraim Zuroff, the director of the Jerusalem office of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, cowrote a book conceived as a collaboration between a relative of the perpetrators and a relative of the victims. It is called Our People.

Alex Halberstadt, born in Moscow in 1970, can do it all himself. His mother comes from a family of Lithuanian Jews; his paternal grandfather, an ethnic Ukrainian, was a bodyguard for Stalin. Young Heroes of the Soviet Union is a journey to the underworld posing as a memoir. The characters are real people; the narrator seems indistinguishable from the author; the countries he describes can be found on the map but not on earth.

Growing up, Alex suffered from recurrent nightmares. In 1979 he, his mother, and her parents emigrated from the USSR to the US and settled in New York City (his father stayed behind). The nightmares grew more insistent and began to invade his waking life. He became “obsessively fearful first of strangers’ footsteps in the hallway, then of noise coming through the bedroom walls from neighbors’ apartments, then of the neighbors themselves.” In 2004 his father phoned from Moscow and mentioned in passing that his own estranged father, Vassily Chernopisky, was still alive. Alex realized that his father’s call was a summons for the questing hero and that his grandfather’s existence was a thread that might lead him to the source of his curse. “Despite entirely reasonable doubts,” he contacted his grandfather and bought a ticket to Moscow. His mother had warned him that, for her, Moscow “signified little except state-sponsored discrimination against Jews, consumer deficits, appalling architecture, months-long stretches of uninterrupted sleet and snow, and an overabundance of synthetic fibers.” What he found proved more terrifying.

As the plane began to descend, Alex saw some “low cabins standing in puddles of pea-green grass, a pond and a sluiceway and some obsolete factory buildings dreaming in pastureland.” Suddenly, “fog rolled in from somewhere below,” and he found himself in hell’s imitation of an airport, “a linoleum labyrinth lit dimly by fluorescents.” Deprived of the liberties he “hadn’t questioned the previous morning,” Alex was gripped by the fear typical of “Soviet immigrants returning to the motherland: the worry that the gates won’t open again when it’s time to leave.” But it was too late to turn back: the demon wearing the uniform of a passport-control inspector contorted his face into “a foreshadowing of a grin” and welcomed him “home.”

In Moscow Alex has several awkward and inconclusive conversations with his father, watches a man sitting on the sidewalk eat out of a can of dog food, and attends a mass at the Cathedral of Christ the Savior. The singing is “almost unbearably beautiful,” but the mood is dark. A man in a patched suit jacket and felt boots, tears streaming down his face, gets off his knees and shouts, “The kikes trampled Russia!” Readers struck by the author’s good fortune in witnessing such a scene on a brief visit to Moscow should prepare themselves for more: Alex has Dante’s ability to be in the right place at the right time.

On the way to Vinnytsia, “a drab industrial city near Ukraine’s center,” Alex’s train stops at Sukhinichi, southwest of Moscow. The employees of the local toy factory have lined up along the platform, holding enormous stuffed animals, “their hard plastic eyes glittering in the moonlight.” The passengers file off the train to shop or marvel; Alex joins them but “decline[s] to buy a canoe-size panther” and hurries “past a mermaid and a leering humanoid mushroom to the train’s metal steps.” At the Ukrainian border a guard threatens to detain Alex in an unheated shed but is satisfied with a twenty-dollar bribe. Finally, the countryside

transform[ed] into the wreckage of a medium-size city. The train passed the shells of buildings of indeterminate age, warehouses and waterworks, their bricks scattered along the tracks; young, soot-darkened trees sprouted randomly among dandelions and crabgrass. The Vinnytsia train station, a concrete bunker under a corrugated-metal roof, waited amid the detritus.

Vassily, at ninety-three, proved welcoming but not forthcoming:

He answered questions about his time in the OGPU and NKVD [two incarnations of the secret police] in the middle and late 1930s by relating vague episodes about following foreigners to restaurants and eavesdropping on their conversations, about surveillance and stakeouts, about filing reports.

His account of his time as Stalin’s bodyguard is equally vague. Alex retells only two stories in some detail. On November 8, 1932, Vassily, a twenty-one-year-old cadet at the OGPU Academy, attended a post–Revolution Day dinner in Defense Commissar Kliment Voroshilov’s Kremlin apartment:

He was the youngest person in the room. He sat woodenly and studied the faces of the guests, some of whom he recognized from the pages of newspapers. The country’s leadership was gathered around the table: the squat, punctilious premier, Molotov; strapping Voroshilov in an ornate uniform; the old revolutionary cavalryman Budyonny, who twisted the ends of his walrus mustache with tobacco-stained fingers; and moonfaced Yagoda, soon to be OGPU chief and his boss.

Stalin drank to “the destruction of the enemies of the state” and flirted with “a slim young woman.” His wife got upset and stormed out. The next day she committed suicide.

On another occasion, “Vassily was riding in the back of a black limousine, one of the armored Packards that Stalin lavished on his deputies,” when the driver, in a colonel’s uniform, slowed down, leaned out of the window, and called to a girl of about sixteen or seventeen. She approached shyly and peered into the dark interior:

The man inside the car who studied her with the most interest was bald and pale; he wore a nondescript uniform and a pince-nez over acute, intelligent eyes. Not yet a full-fledged member of the Politburo, First Deputy Lavrenty Beria—commissar general of state security and warden of the prison system known by the acronym GULAG—was nonetheless the most feared person in the country.

As the girl backed away, “a three-hundred-pound Georgian who had gotten out of the limousine—a deputy of Beria’s named Kobulov—enfolded her. He lifted her off her feet and tossed her headfirst into the car as easily as if she were a bundle of firewood.” At a mansion on Malaya Nikitskaya Street, “servants had laid out a Georgian feast.” The girl was forced to do a striptease (“the Georgians jeering and laughing”) before being carried upstairs to Beria’s bedroom. “Vassily knew the girl wouldn’t return home or be seen again.”

Did he? In most accounts of Beria’s predations, the victim returns home. Was Vassily even there? Alex acknowledges that both scenes recall the most popular and frequently rehearsed episodes in Soviet history. So how much of this did Vassily witness and how much comes from newspaper stories he has seen? And how much does Alex add from his own imagination and the books he has read? The “squat, punctilious” Molotov? The “three-hundred-pound Georgian”? Alex does not trust Vassily, but can we trust Alex? “I’d traveled five thousand miles to meet this man,” he writes:

I imagined decoding his roles as perpetrator and victim, trying to piece together and weigh his motives, charting his involvement in decades-old events. I realized how naive I’d been. His culpability was an immense, unknowable continent filled with indecipherable ambiguities.

So he writes Vassily’s story as best he can, adding some background and filling the landscape with monsters of his own invention.

We almost never hear from Vassily directly. What we get is an omniscient narrator’s third-person account of what Vassily did or thought (or may have done or thought). The sole direct confession—about the deportation of the Crimean Tatars in 1944—gets the same treatment, with no follow-up questions:

Vassily described watching families beaten and turned out of their homes, watching a mass rape, then described how he himself herded women and children into unheated cattle cars and wrapped wire around the door handles.

Added to these stories of crimes real or inferred are third-person recollections of Vassily’s second wife and Alex’s grandmother, Tamara, who left Vassily because “his emptiness…occupied the apartment like an odor” and went on to marry “a taciturn, disapproving man who dressed cadavers at a morgue.”

Framing and supporting these accounts are historical facts of unknown provenance and questionable veracity. The “three-hundred-pound Georgian” was, in fact, an Armenian; the city of Ufa is in the southern Urals, not the Far East; and Alex’s great-grandfather Anany was not named “after Onan, the Old Testament masturbator” (Onan and Ananias/Hananiah have different Hebrew roots). Scholars use footnotes; newspapers and magazines employ fact-checkers; the author of Young Heroes of the Soviet Union moves from sheer nightmare to straightforward “history” in a way that makes the myth pedestrian and history suspect.

“Vassily’s name,” writes Alex, with the benefit of “weeks in libraries” after his return to New York, “appeared nowhere on lists of the NKVD’s top-ranking officers, nor of that organization’s recipients of important medals and orders, nor of its deputies to party conventions and congresses.” But why should a low-ranking bodyguard appear on lists of top-ranking officers or congress delegates?

A quick look at the database of Memorial (the Moscow-based human rights organization and archive) reveals the NKVD personnel record of Vassily Ananievich Chernopisky, including two decorations, the Order of the Red Star in February 1945 (“for serving at the Yalta Conference”) and the Order of the Patriotic War, Second Class, in September 1945 (“for successfully completing a special Government assignment,” probably work at the Potsdam Conference). There is plenty of archival information on both events, including, quite possibly, the special government assignment of Captain Vassily Chernopisky. But Alex does not go to the archives, has no clue about the time and place he dreams about, and does not ask Vassily any specific questions (from what we can tell).

Instead, we learn that “between 1935 and 1941, nineteen million Soviet citizens were arrested, and seven million executed, many by quota” (the actual numbers are approximately 2.3 million and 800,000, respectively); that every morning, lines formed outside local NKVD offices “as people waited patiently…to denounce neighbors, colleagues, family” (try to imagine large public gatherings of secret informers, some of them neighbors and friends chatting as they wait); and that in the late 1940s,

ninety percent of Moscow’s apartments had no heat, and nearly half had no plumbing or running water; in winter, people going out for water carried axes along with their buckets, to hack through the ice that grew around the public water pumps; workers stacked firewood brought from the countryside on street corners in piles that sometimes grew taller than a building; siblings went to school on alternate days because they shared a single pair of shoes.

Perhaps he meant Leningrad during the war, not Moscow several years later. And he forgot the bears. When a foreigner asks a Russian whether it is true that in Russia bears walk the streets, the Russian is supposed to respond, “What are ‘streets’?”

On his way back from the Underworld, Alex returns to Moscow, a city famous for its lack of a coherent design. “What distinguishes Moscow from other European cities,” he writes, “is the extent to which the needs of its residents didn’t figure in its design. More than any other place I’ve been to, it’s a city of monuments.” Perhaps he means St. Petersburg, or has never been to Washington, D.C. What is remarkable is that, as a New Yorker, he does not realize that “the apotheosis of Stalinist architecture,” the tower of the Moscow State University, was modeled on the Woolworth and the Manhattan Municipal Buildings in New York City. His mother languished in that tower as a student:

I thought of her stories about cramped dorm rooms where listening devices were hidden in the closets, about ventilation so bad that the smell of cabbage boiled on the floor below by exchange students from Ho Chi Minh’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam permeated her room, about the thirty-three kilometers of dark corridors, about unexplained sounds in the night, about suicides. Many believed the building was haunted.

Gothic tales are close relatives of mythic descents to the Underworld.

Alex’s last day in Russia provides a perfect bookend to the trip (which was paid for by GQ magazine). On his walk through the center of Moscow, he gets swept up in a march of mostly elderly people celebrating Revolution Day:

Under a granite monument to Karl Marx, a strikingly tall woman stood on another truck bed, her chest covered with gold- and silver-colored medals. In a booming voice, she intoned a speech about an empire that once blanketed half the globe, about squandered wealth and military might, about encroaching decadence and Westernization. “These criminals sold our nation!” a woman in a rabbit-fur hat shouted beside me, shaking her fist in the direction of the Kremlin’s tomato-soup-colored battlements.

It was time to flee.

Alex’s second journey is to Lithuania, the land of his mother’s family. The trajectory is similar: the growing anxiety, the irresistible urge to reenter the nightmare, the plunge (marked, in this case, by brief self-isolation in the “concrete bunker” of Vilnius’s municipal archive), and the subterranean journey consisting of a historical introduction, two meditative travelogues, and a family history centered on the attractive and vividly drawn character of Grandfather Semyon. The introduction is in Lonely Planet style, with an occasional detour into personal discovery:

The early Litvaks (as the Lithuanian Jews called themselves) whom I encountered in histories turned out to be unlike the famous secular Jews in Semyon’s stories: Horowitz, Wittgenstein, Freud and the Nobel laureates in chemistry and physics…. In their insularity from and apparent indifference to the gentile society in which they lived, these eastern European small-town Jews reminded me of the Lubavitcher Hasidim I came to know in Brooklyn.

The travelogues are mostly about Jewish homes occupied by oblivious strangers and crumbling tombstones with fading Hebrew letters. The family history culminates in the Holocaust and—once again—combines third-person biographical narratives with the macrohistorical summaries the reader has grown used to. But there is a difference. In the chapter on Vassily, the narrator is surrounded by “indecipherable ambiguities” and qualifies most statements with “Vassily described” and “Tamara said.” In the Lithuanian chapter, the inner state of the characters is entirely transparent to the narrator: “Semyon’s friends marveled at his absence of meanness and bitterness,” “he was lost in conflicted thoughts,” and “he dreamed most often about his mother and, especially, about his brother. Shy, dark-eyed Roma looked up at him accusingly, and Semyon woke with a start, his heart heaving in his chest.”

The unease the reader feels over such novelistic passages is made more acute by the obvious implausibility of some elements of the background. Did the Soviets really write “Traitors to the Homeland” in white paint on the sides of the train cars filled with deportees in June 1941 (it was a secret operation, and no such designation was used in deportation decrees)? Did Red Army soldiers in the streets of Kaunas really offer chocolate bars to children in return for promises to renounce parochial superstitions? (“‘Did Jesus give you this chocolate bar, or did I?’ they asked.”) In the flow of Semyon’s colorful and not always reliable reminiscence, such an episode might have made sense; as part of the historical narrative, it does not. When locating hell in countries with names, pasts, and flesh-and-blood inhabitants, writers—especially memoirists—are expected to set limits to their imagination.

The asymmetry between perpetrator and victim stories is perhaps understandable: one is about uncovering the truth, the other, preserving the memory. But what is the relationship between them? In what way are the two journeys and two families connected, other than by the figure of the troubled narrator? Whose nightmares has he inherited? Alex disapproves of the Lithuanians’ inability to come to terms with the legacy of the Holocaust, but what would he like to see them do, besides caring for graves and updating museum displays? On a visit to the Žaliakalnis Jewish cemetery in Kaunas, he spots a small group of neatly dressed teenagers:

A boy in a ski jacket read something in German from a handheld device, and when he finished, the others clapped. I walked over to ask who they were. The teacher, a tall, blondish man in clear-plastic spectacles, told me in English that they were a high school class on a field trip from Berlin. They came to the cemetery to “learn about the darker aspects of our country’s history.” These students chose to come here, the teacher assured me; the remainder of the class went to Morocco. I thanked him, and he shook my hand a touch too firmly, telegraphing his solidarity. Then he blinked away the tears in his eyes.

In his capacity as a descendant of the victims, Alex accepts—indeed, welcomes—an act of penance by a descendant of the perpetrators. So what should he do—he asks himself—as the grandson of a man “who took part in arrests, interrogations, disappearances and, in Crimea, what amounted to a genocide?”

The question turns out to be rhetorical. The idea of a pilgrimage to Crimea (where a memorial to the Tatar victims of the deportation is currently under construction) does not occur to the narrator. Instead, he brings his two halves together in a chapter about his parents’ courtship and his own unhappy childhood. Each unhappy childhood is unhappy in its own way. Here, the sickly, sensitive boy and his aloof father and sad, hard-working mother live in a ghostly city where the interiors of bakeries and furniture stores are “plastered ceiling to floor with identical group portraits of the Politburo,” the audiences at New Year’s variety shows on TV are “party nomenklatura in black suits and ties,” textbooks about young heroes instruct seven-year-olds “how to halt a train laden with Nazi munitions by throwing yourself under its wheels,” student rock bands are fronted “mainly by sons of party officials and diplomats,” and secret-police informers posing as neighbors

assume that where there was new children’s furniture, there must also be a stack of samizdat verse or a pornographic magazine or maybe even a shortwave radio used to tune in to the bourgeois propaganda on Voice of America.

Every one of these observations is inaccurate. Covering store walls with Politburo portraits would have been interpreted as subversion; party nomenklatura members would not have jeopardized their dignity at New Year’s variety shows (the guests—who drank champagne, sang songs, and told jokes—included actors, dancers, athletes, scientists, cosmonauts, and an occasional award-winning worker); no collection of stories about young heroes would have been assigned as a textbook (as opposed to extracurricular reading); no textbook would have instructed children how to throw themselves under trains (any more than children attending Catholic schools would be instructed to throw themselves to the lions); and some of my best nonparty friends in the 1970s played in rock bands (and bought beds for their children).

None of this would have mattered in a book called Alex in Wonderland, but the author claims to have written “a memoir and a reckoning,” and keeps making historical judgments. Or does he? “In Russia,” he declares, “appearances always mattered more than reality.” So perhaps he does describe a “curious dream” after all. Readers can make what they will of a “Moscow” without love, friendship, laughter, or engrossing conversations. “The bunker-like building” of Alex’s kindergarten “sat low in an earthen depression”; the grocery store next to his apartment was “a poured-concrete bunker that sold vodka and Moroccan port” (he means Algerian dry red); and next to a supermarket that may or may not have looked like a bunker, men in groups of three huddled around trash cans “passing around 750 milliliters of vodka” (they would have been sharing half a liter, a tradition that goes back to the days of my childhood when three rubles—one per person—could buy you a bottle). The attendance of Alex’s mother at the top school in Vilnius (“among children of local party officials and the well connected”) and Alex’s own at the best school in Moscow (“for the children of diplomats and the well connected”) are mentioned without comment. Perhaps they too are appearances, not reality.

Finally, the Halberstadts (Alex, his mother, Grandfather Semyon, and Grandmother Raisa) emigrated to New York City, and Alex found a home. Semyon died in August 2001. After seeing him for the last time, Alex hailed a cab and headed for the Brooklyn Bridge:

The city teemed with life and motion…. Semyon once told me that New York was the happy ending to the twentieth century, and it never looked more so than on that night, with Manhattan’s megawatt landscape set against a moonless sky. I took out my phone and called my boyfriend. “I’m coming home,” I said.

But he didn’t really. The nightmares continued, the bunkers beckoned, and T magazine was willing to pay. In 2007 Alex traveled to the confluence of the Volga and the Akhtuba near the Caspian Sea to join his father on one of his annual fishing expeditions. The train station “appeared to be sculpted out of mud. Several bulbs dangled from a wire, casting eerie aureoles on the packed dirt beside the train tracks.” Just beyond was “a row of single-story cinder-block bunkers.” Alex was back in the Underworld, armed with new questions, but his father would not respond. A short car trip to Old Sarai, the site of the vanished capital of the Golden Horde and Russia’s “formative trauma,” provided the explanation:

In psychic terms, nearly a millennium ago this place became the wellspring of an unstoppable chain reaction—a multigenerational transmission of fear, suspicion, grief, melancholy and rage that, in turn, curdled into new historical calamities, new traumas to pass on to the young.

Russian history, Alex decides, is “a cyclical drama of victimization and submission,” from the Mongols, who came like Gog and Magog, to the peasants, who “proudly showed off bumps on their foreheads that rose from bowing to their betters,” to the many “seemingly novel features of Soviet totalitarianism.”

The curse could not be lifted: “Some of the Russians’ peculiarities that gall and mystify Westerners also date back centuries, sometimes all the way back to the Tatar occupation.” One of them is

the conviction, voiced so often in Russia, that foreigners and certain internal outsiders schemed to undermine the country and were to blame for its problems. At various times, these foreign and domestic antagonists included Swedes, Lithuanians, Turks, Japanese, Germans, Masons, Jews, Chechens, Americans, Protestants and, more recently, Chinese, Estonians, Georgians, Ukrainians and LGBT people.

Even “the trope of ‘the decadent West,’” Alex claims, came to the Russians “from the Muslim culture of their conquerors” (not true, but that is not the point).

On the night Alex finally understood that his father “wouldn’t, or couldn’t, give me the answers I’d come for,” he had one of his recurring nightmares. When he woke “with a yell in his throat,” his father told him that Vassily used to scream in his sleep, too, and that Alex sounded just like him. He is not Orpheus, in other words, but Eurydice. He will never fully wake up, never escape the multigenerational transmission of fear, never return home to a happy land where people do not believe that foreigners and certain internal outsiders scheme to undermine their country.

The book begins with an account of a lab experiment in which a team of researchers at Emory University administered electric shocks to the feet of baby mice enjoying the scent of cherry blossoms. Eventually, the mice began to tremble with fear whenever they smelled cherry blossoms. “The surprising part, though, came after they had babies of their own. When exposed to the scent, the second generation also trembled, though they had never been shocked.” Studies of human subjects done by other researchers seemed to confirm these findings: the children of Holocaust survivors and of pregnant mothers who were near the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, “showed changes to the genes that determined how they responded to stress—changes identical to those found in their parents.”

But what constitutes trauma? Alex’s examples refer to cataclysmic public events, but his narrative suggests a broader definition. One interpretation he seems to favor is that Russia, perhaps uniquely, is “a nation of individuals fearful of foreigners, each other and the prospect of greater freedom, a people trembling seemingly without cause, like the lab mice at Emory.” Alex may be doomed by his connection to his grandfather (who is Ukrainian, but never mind) and a succession of peasants with bumps on their foreheads, but others might not be so unlucky. In Rome, his mother “caught the first glimpses of what felt to her like authentic freedom,” and in New York, “the tread of history pointed to the future instead of the past.” And the future, everyone knows, is above the past:

In Moscow, the metro ran below the streets, and the stations doubled as bomb shelters; in parts of New York, the subway ran on girders high above the sidewalks, up near the billboards, neon and postmodern pediments.

The other interpretation, inescapable in the book and in most of today’s America, is that trauma lurks behind every corner, history’s tread spares no one, and most subway tracks begin and end underground. Add to that the misadventures of our ancestors, and Alex can relax. We all live in hell


Katrina: A History, 1915–2015

Louis Proyect
 

NY Review of Books, OCTOBER 22, 2020 ISSUE
A Disaster 100 Years in the Making
by Eric Klinenberg

Katrina: A History, 1915–2015
by Andy Horowitz
Harvard University Press, 281 pp., $35.00


“I ain’t proud to be American no more,” Dean Blanchard, a shrimp distributor, told a reporter in 2015.1 Ten years earlier, his business was nearly ruined when Katrina, one of the most ferocious hurricanes in American history, pummeled New Orleans, killing at least 1,440 people and causing $150–$200 billion in economic damage, including nearly $1.5 billion to the local seafood industry. Five years later, BP’s Deepwater Horizon rig exploded off the coast of Louisiana, spewing more than 134 million gallons of oil into the Gulf of Mexico and its coastlands and decimating food populations. A lawsuit brought by the Southeast Louisiana Flood Protection Authority to hold oil companies responsible for the environmental damage they had caused was opposed by the governor, then dismissed by a federal court. Blanchard became convinced that nothing—not government, not infrastructure, not the courts—was protecting him or his neighbors, that no one was fighting on their behalf.

Blanchard was not alone in this view. As Andy Horowitz, a historian at Tulane University, shows in his new book, Katrina: A History, 1915–2015, “The experience of Katrina, compounded with the oil spill, increasingly served Louisianans as a metonym for federal illegitimacy.” He argues that while President Obama described the oil spill as “the worst environmental disaster America has ever faced,” and the media presented it as “an efficient drama” unfolding over the course of eighty-seven days, “few people on the coast experienced that tight narrative arc.”

Disaster histories are usually written for entertainment, not diagnosis. They tend to begin in a calm, tranquil moment. Suddenly, there is a disruption: water from a tsunami breaches the nuclear power plant; Patient Zero leaves the market; the levee breaks. When political leaders arrive on the scene, they attribute the damage to an “Act of God,” “Mother Nature,” an unforeseeable error. Horowitz argues that Hurricane Katrina obliterated this narrative. “The more I have thought about Katrina,” he writes, “the more uncomfortable I have become with the idea of ‘disaster’ altogether.” Disaster, Horowitz believes, is a political category—“at best an interpretive fiction, or at worst, an ideological script”—one that’s usually invoked to defend or maintain the status quo. His book asks a necessary question: What happens to the story of this one moment in time if we stretch it forward and back, looking for causes and consequences that reach beyond the storm?

New Orleans has always been a rich, divided, violent, and beautiful city. Set in a deep depression between the Mississippi River and the Gulf of Mexico, it is surrounded by water on three sides, including Lake Pontchartrain. It’s a hotspot for hurricanes and tropical storms, and climate change makes it hotter still. So, too, does the steady erosion of its marshes and wetlands, natural resources that are capable of absorbing storm surges, unless development destroys them.

Starting in the eighteenth century, fishermen and trappers of European origin laid claim to the area’s rich coastal and riverfront territories, attracted by its unique ecology, which nourished shrimp, oysters, muskrats, and other aquatic life, and by its unparalleled access to other markets along the river and the sea. New Orleans was the largest slave market in the United States during the antebellum period, a place where human beings were trafficked citywide, from public plazas to private homes, hotels, and commercial arcades. It was, and remains, the capital of Creole culture, a place where people, languages, and customs mix promiscuously, and sometimes violently—where norms change with the tides.

The oil industry arrived in the early twentieth century, and when it came it transformed the land, the sea, and the marshes, swamps, and bayous that were a little of both. Big business, and the people it attracted, required infrastructure—roads, rail lines, and bridges, as well as deeper, wider shipping channels and larger ports. For decades, Louisiana residents watched federal agencies, local officials, and industry leaders attempt to tame nature with expensive, highly engineered water management systems. Each new project arrived with a promise of increased ecological security and prosperity, but also set up those in low-lying areas for the next collapse.

In 2005 President George W. Bush had just begun an ambitious second term in the White House with hopes of expanding the “war on terror,” deregulating the oil and banking industries, and beefing up his enormous new federal agency, the Department of Homeland Security. Then, in late August of that year, New Orleans was inundated by Hurricane Katrina. On television, the world watched as residents, mainly Black, were stranded on their rooftops, pleading for rescue; thousands more, sick, hungry, and also mainly Black, crowded into a convention center that, as Jesse Jackson put it, looked “like the hull of a slave ship”; an inept president failed to deliver basic goods and services; and a city drowned, and with it, a fantasy about what America means.

This country’s great myths of exceptionalism have lost currency with many, and Americans who once viewed their homeland as “the shining city upon a hill” now feel themselves going under. This year, we are focused on the growing death count and economic crisis stemming from Covid-19 and the racially targeted police brutality that’s causing outrage and protest throughout the US. But at the dawn of the twenty-first century, the first wave of self-destruction that made people ask if this really was America had another name: Katrina. The catastrophe, Horowitz writes, “brings together several of the defining concerns of our time”: racial segregation, paramilitary governance, diminished public services, and indifference to the poor, among others.

Horowitz set out to tell a good story, but he also has another goal: to explain what made New Orleans so vulnerable before, during, and after Katrina. In the process, he calls attention to the policies that privileged economic development over human and environmental security; to the faith in the power of technology, engineering, and infrastructure to control nature, along with the failure to fully invest in the systems that experts designed; to a persistent commitment to racial segregation in city planning and a deep suspicion of federal authorities who challenged the established order; and to a local power elite that proved willing to tolerate and reproduce the everyday disasters—poverty, violence, insecurity of all kinds—that New Orleans generated, even on its finest days.

Horowitz’s account begins on September 29, 1915, when the most powerful American hurricane then recorded hit Louisiana, killing 275 and washing out entire settlements around New Orleans. Despite the damage, city leaders celebrated their resilience. “Storm proof!” the New Orleans Item proclaimed. The mayor rejected all outside offers of assistance. “It is safe to say that no city anywhere in the world could have withstood these conditions with less damage and less inconvenience,” boasted the New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board, which managed the city’s flood protection systems. It shared other good news, too. Since extreme weather is atypical, it reasoned, the recent hurricane “renders more remote the probability of a repetition of any of these things in the early future.” Such hubris was common in US cities at the time. But New Orleans was rising from an unusually precarious foundation, one where water and wetlands mingled freely with firm ground. It needed smart, careful planning. Instead, it expanded straight into harm’s way.

Horowitz does a masterful job of describing the public and private engineering projects that made possible real estate construction, oil exploration, and other forms of economic expansion in New Orleans during the twentieth century, building fortunes for a few while putting thousands in the path of the next big storm. Oil, the “black pearl in the oyster,” was first discovered over a salt dome in southwest Louisiana in 1901, and soon thereafter wildcatters rushed in to drill new wells. Suddenly, Horowitz writes, a booming market for Louisiana crude “transmuted worthless marsh into liquid wealth.” The state allowed local governments to lease land to fossil fuel companies, and they in turn reshaped marshes and wetlands, dredging new canals and developing “a massive new infrastructure for exploring, drilling, piping, shipping, and refining oil.” Roads, highways, housing, and power lines followed. Thousands of workers settled on the coastal floodplain. A sprawling urban agglomeration formed, and by the early 1930s the land began to sink.

Humanists often overlook the importance of infrastructure when they write social history, but Horowitz vividly illustrates how it shapes life and land around it, in both planned and unplanned ways. Consider canals: they are an essential means for transporting goods, equipment, and workers between inland areas and the coast. To enhance its industrial shipping system, New Orleans built the Industrial Canal through the Ninth Ward in 1923, and in 1933 the federal government linked it to the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which spanned the Gulf Coast. Horowitz documents the rapid construction of a dense network of smaller canals in the next three decades. Between 1939 and 1948, dredging companies dug out forty-six miles of canals in the Barataria, a land of bayous and swamps slightly south of the city, and another 156 miles of canals by 1962.

Canals are helpful to commerce but destructive to coastal ecosystems. They must be built by plowing, dredging, and moving massive quantities of earth, including in wetlands that provide habitats for a variety of animals and absorb salt water from the Gulf. Canals connected to the sea carry that salt water into the marshes, killing grasses, plants, and species of all kinds; they also allow sediment that formerly fed the swamplands and bayous to flow into the ocean basin, speeding coastal erosion. The first scientific study warning about the dangers of coastal erosion in Louisiana was published in 1936. Between 1932 and 1954, Horowitz reports, “the shoreline retreated an average of nearly nineteen feet per year.”

Instead of pausing to consider ways of restoring the wetlands, Louisiana’s growth machine—a network of builders, shippers, petrochemical businesses, and state officials aiming to boost the economy and increase tax revenues—advanced new development plans. The centerpiece, which Congress funded in 1956 and the Army Corps of Engineers began to build two years later, was the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet, or MRGO (later referred to colloquially as “Mister Go”), a seventy-six-mile deep-draft channel designed to

    enable ships to enter New Orleans without venturing into the Mississippi River or Lake Pontchartrain at all, but rather by cutting across the wetlands…[and] heading straight into the Industrial Canal.

Residents of St. Bernard Parish, home to an expanding, white, middle-class community, protested that MRGO would do little to help the economy but would surely destroy wetlands and increase their vulnerability to floods. The corps plowed forward anyway, building the channel and making everyone who lived near it more likely to be deluged in a storm.

Neither the corps nor Louisiana’s political leaders denied the threat of major flooding. After all, about half of New Orleans, including much of the Lower Ninth and St. Bernard Parish, is below sea level, and storms both strong and mild inundated them often. In 1955, Horowitz writes, the corps had been directed by Congress to “consider the problem of hurricane protection in metropolitan New Orleans.” In July 1965 the corps delivered plans for the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project (LPVHPP), which Horowitz calls “a concrete wall around the metropolis.” On September 9, before the plan was approved or construction begun, Hurricane Betsy hit New Orleans. “Looking back after Betsy,” Horowitz writes, the authors of the congressional report on the LPVHPP proposal

    asserted that the levee system the Corps had proposed “would have eliminated the flooding of developed areas in the city of New Orleans [and] the Chalmette area of St. Bernard,” decreasing the cost of damages by $85 million and “greatly reduc[ing] the number of deaths.”

“This is what happened during Hurricane Betsy,” Sarah Broom writes in The Yellow House, her extraordinary recent memoir of life in New Orleans East2:

    One-hundred-plus-mile-per-hour winds blew in from the east, pushing swollen Gulf waters across Lake Borgne, a vast lagoon surrounded by marshes and open to the Gulf. Water entered the funnel formed by the Intracoastal Waterway and MRGO. Within this network of man-made canals, the storm surge reached ten feet and topped the levees surrounding it, breaching some. This is how…water came to flood more than 160,000 homes, rising to eaves height in some.

It’s how New Orleans experienced $1.2 billion in damages, how more than 70,000 were left homeless, and how, according to Horowitz, at least fifty people drowned, many in the attics of their own homes.
People evacuating flooded areas after Hurricane Betsy, New Orleans
Bettmann/Getty Images
People evacuating flooded areas after Hurricane Betsy, New Orleans, September 1965

In Broom’s telling, locals believed that bad faith played as big a part as bad engineering in the destruction of poor sections of New Orleans. It’s an established fact that the federal government blew up levees to protect prosperous, mainly white neighborhoods during the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, even though that meant flooding Black and poor communities that otherwise would have stayed dry. “The levees were blown on purpose” during Betsy, too, Broom’s brother and many others in the deluged areas of the city say. They “knew the sound of dynamite” from when the government blew up marshes to dredge MRGO, and they insist they heard it again during the storm. Broom doesn’t take a position on whether it really happened, but she draws attention to the fact that her neighbors told the same story after Katrina, when they tried to explain why their neighborhoods got inundated, why the levees broke.

President Lyndon Johnson gave a different account after Betsy. He lamented the “injury that has been done by nature,” as did local leaders. This had a clear political purpose. If it’s “an act of God that government had no role in causing,” Horowitz writes, then it’s a problem that the government has “no obligation to fix.” In a fine chapter on Hurricane Betsy, Horowitz argues that New Orleans residents had come to see the welfare state as being “like a levee: politicians could make cuts for some to give security to others.” He tells the story of Lucille Duminy, a Black woman whose house was one of some six thousand to be flooded in the Lower Ninth, most owned by African-Americans. She and her neighbors applied for disaster relief, only to be offered small amounts of charity or government loans. For Duminy, Horowitz explains, “The policy seemed perverse. The loans forced people into debt to the same government they believed responsible for their losses in the first place.” Rather than accept loans, Black residents joined with civil rights organizations and placed posters claiming “FORTY YEARS OF DEBT IS NOT FREEDOM!” throughout the Lower Ninth.

In the late 1960s New Orleans communities made vulnerable by big engineering projects demanded better protection and more substantial relief. Instead, Congress gave them the LPVHPP, having approved it in October 1965, only after Hurricane Betsy. It was designed to keep more than 150 square miles of New Orleans dry in what the Weather Bureau referred to as a “Standard Project Hurricane” like the 1915 disaster, but not in a “Probable Maximum Hurricane.” The corps deemed this lower level of protection sufficient for the city, since a “maximum hurricane” seemed unlikely to arrive. It justified the federal investment with a controversial cost-benefit analysis that projected the population of the metropolitan area to double, economic activity to spike, and, because of its own engineering, flood damage to decline.

In 1968 Congress added one more layer of protection, the National Flood Insurance Program. Originally, this law provided subsidized insurance for homeowners living in identified flood-prone areas but not for new construction. Lobbyists pressured lawmakers to expand eligibility, however, and by the 1990s, Horowitz argues, the program became a system for encouraging and authorizing development in flood-prone areas, rather than preventing it. Americans, in Louisiana and beyond, settled where the water wanted to go.

In New Orleans, the most desirable land has always been on the higher elevations, and in the twentieth century the city’s mainly white economic elite established strongholds in dry neighborhoods, such as the Garden District and the French Quarter. Poor and working-class people were largely relegated to the swampy parts, including the Lower Ninth and Gentilly. As New Orleans expanded and more Black workers arrived for jobs in the booming oil and gas, shipping, and tourism industries, however, the pattern changed. Boosted by New Deal housing policies that subsidized new building projects and mortgages for people who lived in predominantly middle-class white communities (but not for those whose neighborhoods had been redlined), white residents began settling in flood-prone areas that had previously been undeveloped. Louisiana whites, Horowitz argues, were more concerned about racial integration than inundation.

When Hurricane Katrina arrives in August 2005, midway through Horowitz’s book, we see, as we did then, the city survive the initial downpour, only to drown when the floodwalls fail and the levees break. We see the abject suffering of thousands who were abandoned by government in the hour of their greatest need. We see battered Black people confined, without potable water, in the Superdome. We see dead Black bodies, face down, on water-logged streets. We see the media depict African-Americans as “looting” grocery stores and Whites “finding” food on the shelves. We see false reports of rampaging gangs, babies being raped, and, as The New York Times put it, “a total breakdown of organized society.” We see President Bush on Air Force One, flying over New Orleans for a photo op instead of sending millions of meals or hundreds of buses for evacuation. We see police and the National Guard treating city residents like refugees, criminals, animals, and worse. We see America as a failed state.

But Horowitz’s analysis of the storm’s impact also contains surprises. Were Black city residents more vulnerable to the hurricane? Yes, but not exactly as the early reporting suggested. Low-lying Black neighborhoods such as the Lower Ninth were eviscerated during Katrina, but so were flood-prone white neighborhoods, such as St. Bernard Parish, located in marshlands or near doomed levees and canals. According to state statistics, Blacks accounted for 67 percent of New Orleans’s population in 2005 and 67 percent of the city’s flood fatalities. At least 800,000 people across Louisiana were displaced by the storm. “It was not primarily poor New Orleans or rich New Orleans, nor was it white New Orleans or black New Orleans, that flooded during Katrina,” Horowitz writes. “It was twentieth-century New Orleans”—by which he means the fantasy of a magical place, charmed by culture, safeguarded by engineers, always able to bounce back. In the twenty-first century, that idea would drown.

Flooding, though, was just one of Katrina’s many plagues. The others—including illnesses (from interrupted cancer care to acute stress and PTSD), uninsured damage (at least $45 billion), economic losses (roughly $250 billion), missed education (in 2006 20 percent of New Orleans children either left school after the hurricane or missed more than ten days per month), and permanent displacement—took a greater toll on African-Americans.3

Most American disaster policies aim “to return things as they were before,” Horowitz writes, and in an unequal society, that means restoring inequalities—through disparate insurance payouts or medical care, for example—instead of alleviating them. Political opportunists, particularly libertarian champions of market-based programs, routinely exploit crises to advance their preexisting goals. After Katrina, critics of public housing successfully lobbied to demolish public housing stock that could have been restored quickly, effectively forcing thousands of residents out of the city for good; charter school advocates pushed to dissolve the Orleans Parish public school system, leading to privatization and the termination of unionized teachers; the state university system closed Charity Hospital, an essential public health facility in Mid-City that had served poor people in New Orleans since 1736.

The effects of these policy changes are fully apparent in contemporary New Orleans, where out-migration of Blacks and gentrification have made the city smaller, whiter, and durably unequal. “Katrina Washed Away New Orleans’s Black Middle Class,” the website FiveThirtyEight reported on the storm’s tenth anniversary. “More than 175,000 black residents left New Orleans in the year after the storm; more than 75,000 never came back.” Those who remain are far more likely than whites to say that their community has not yet recovered. In 2015, Horowitz notes, nearly 40 percent of the city’s children lived in poverty; 40 percent had witnessed a shooting, stabbing, or beating; 16 percent worried about having enough food to eat or a place to stay; and 12 percent were clinically depressed. That was a relatively prosperous time in New Orleans. Today, as the Covid-19 pandemic rages, these numbers are likely to get significantly worse.

Covid-19 and climate change are drastically intensifying insecurity in New Orleans. The “Great Wall”—the local name for the enormous, $14.5 billion “Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk-Reduction System” that the Army Corps of Engineers designed after Katrina and completed in 2018—is hardly sufficient to safeguard the city from future hurricanes. Despite warnings from climate scientists, urban planners, and anxious residents, the wall was built to protect New Orleans only from a “hundred year” flood event—a flood with a one percent chance of happening each year under climate conditions at the time of construction, but a higher chance as the planet warms. (For perspective, the Netherlands, where about half the land is below sea level, designs its flood protection systems for a ten-thousand-year storm event.) The corps has hardly hidden the shortcomings of its project: note that it calls the wall a “risk reduction system” rather than a flood protection project. Here, as in so many other fundamental areas of human security, the US government has considered the costs of protecting its citizens from twenty-first-century hazards, and decided against the investment.

This year is the fifteenth anniversary of Katrina, and we’re so immersed in the current disaster, a pandemic whose name, Covid-19, once again fixes our attention on an exogenous threat rather than on the true source of our fragility, that it’s hard to focus on what happened years ago. In New Orleans, the social fault lines that make hurricanes so unequal have shaped the course of Covid-19 as well. In June researchers at the Data Center reported that Blacks accounted for 77 percent of the city’s coronavirus deaths, and, even more disturbingly, 88 percent of deaths outside long-term care facilities.4 The authors of the study told the New Orleans Times-Picayune that the pattern “reveals that racial disparities are even greater than previously thought.”

Disasters have the power to reveal who we are, what we value, what we’re willing—and unwilling—to protect. They can shame us, incite outrage, inspire protest, and make transformation seem necessary, if not inevitable. It’s tempting to believe that the Covid-19 pandemic and the Trump administration’s complete failure to manage it have opened the country’s eyes to its own systemic vulnerabilities and to the urgency of what progressives call “structural change.” It’s possible that we’ll get it, but disaster guarantees nothing.

    1

    Julie Dermansky, “Five Years After the BP Oil Spill, Gulf Coast Residents Say ‘BP Hasn’t Made Things Right,’” DeSmog, April 21, 2015. ↩
    2

    Sarah M. Broom, The Yellow House (Grove, 2019).  ↩
    3

    See Lisa Wade, “The Devastating Effect Hurricane Katrina Had on Education,” The Pacific Standard, September 1, 2015. ↩
    4

    See Rachel Weinstein and Allison Plyer, “Detailed Data Sheds New Light on Racial Disparities in Covid-19 Deaths,” The Data Center, June 25, 2020. ↩


Rossana Rossanda and il manifesto

jenorem
 

The special chemistry of il manifesto -- its founders united but different is mainly due to Rossana Rossanda, who passed away on Sept. 20 at age 96. Her point of view placed Italian events within the broad perspective of a world in motion.




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Re: John Brown

Mark Lause
 

I think the most sympathetic portrayal was in _The Skin Game_, a rather clever piece in which James Garner did a reprise of his Bret Maverick TV character partnered with Louis Gossett Jr.   Garner would sell Gossett in the daytime and come back and rescue him at night, when they both make off with the cash.  However, in one of these transactions, John Brown comes through and makes off with a bunch of recently sold slaves, and the two rouges wind up having to take the whole thing much more seriously.  Light entertainment, perhaps, but a nice reflection of the mood of movie goers in 1971.


The Right in Germany

jenorem
 

BERLIN — They called him the “Führer of Berlin.”

Ingo Hasselbach had been a clandestine neo-Nazi in communist East Berlin, but the fall of the Berlin Wall brought him out of the shadows. He connected with western extremists in the unified city, organized far-right workshops, fought street battles with leftists and celebrated Hitler’s birthday. He dreamed of a far-right party in the parliament of a reunified Germany.

Today, the far-right party Alternative for Germany, known by its German initials, AfD, is the main opposition in Parliament. Its leaders march side by side with far-right extremists in street protests. And its power base is the former communist East.




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Grayzone’s latest pro-Assad propaganda | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

Louis Proyect
 

Unlike most people who were in solidarity with the Syrian revolution, Grayzone continues to act as if it were August 2013 and the only obstacle to Obama launching an invasion of Syria after the sarin gas attack in East Ghouta was their propaganda. Here we are 7 years later and the revolution lies in tatters, with Assad’s adversaries huddled in Idlib barely able to survive against hunger, COVID-19 and continued asymmetric warfare. Perhaps the only explanation for Grayzone’s assembly line of horseshit is someone paying handsomely for them to turn it out.

full: https://louisproyect.org/2020/10/03/grayzones-latest-pro-assad-propaganda/


Re: John Brown

Richard Modiano
 

The other Hollywood film about John Brown is "Seven Angry Men" (1955) with Raymond Massey playing Brown again. This movie covers Brown's career in Kansas through Harper's Ferry and is much better than "Santa Fe Trail" in its depiction of Brown, but he is still portrayed as a fanatic; James Edwards does not play his role as a stereotyped black laky, and is shown as fighting for the liberation of his people. Artistically the movie is not at all notable, and it is not particularly nuanced, but it's an improvement on "Santa Fe Trail."

Quentin Tarantino announced that he was going to make a pro John Brown movie after he got pushback for "Django Unchained" but never did, and Raoul Peck also announced that he was going to make a John Brown film. I hope that Peck follows through since "The Young Karl Marx" was a pretty good movie.


Re: John Brown

Louis Proyect
 

On 10/3/20 1:25 PM, Mark Lause wrote:
I think the strategic criticisms by other militant abolitionists made of John Brown's plan to raid the U.S. Arsenal at Harpers Ferry was well informed and Brown would have been well-advised to heed them, but he was not mad.

The more militant you were, the madder you were considered.


Rediker is to be hailed for rescuing Lay from obscurity. This was a freedom-fighter who lived a life that was strikingly in the spirit of contemporary radicalism even though he was born 335 years ago. Not only was he against slavery, he was also against cruelty to animals. A strict vegan, he shunned ostentation in keeping with his Quaker faith even as the bourgeois members of the faith were indistinguishable from other Protestant elites. Constantly being expelled from one Quaker congregation after another, he refused to keep his mouth shut about slavery. He saw his mission as one of comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable—to paraphrase how Finley Peter Dunne described the role of newspapers. Finally, anticipating the kind of guerilla theater Abbie Hoffman pulled off when he threw dollar bills into the trading floor of the NY Stock Exchange, Lay often adopted tactics that relied more on the daring deed than the spoken word.

He used to position himself in front of Quaker churches on a Sunday morning in the dead of winter and place his bare right leg on the snow. As the well-dressed and comfortable parishioners strode past him, they were taken aback by the sight. When asked whether he was risking frostbite, he’d reply, “Ah, you pretend compassion for me but you do not feel for the poor slaves in your fields, who go all winter half clad.”

https://www.counterpunch.org/2017/12/29/the-amazing-benjamin-lay-friend-of-animals-enemy-of-slavers/



Re: John Brown

Mark Lause
 

I think the strategic criticisms by other militant abolitionists made of John Brown's plan to raid the U.S. Arsenal at Harpers Ferry was well informed and Brown would have been well-advised to heed them, but he was not mad.  The proof of his madness as far as his prosecutors went was that he was white and risking everything to help African slaves gain their freedom. 

This portrayal sounds like a Confederate statue in film.


Italy's Colonial History in Africa Reframed | by Emmanuel Iduma | The New York Review of Books

Louis Proyect
 


The Great Anti-Left Show - Los Angeles Review of Books

Louis Proyect
 


John Brown

Ken Hiebert
 

I was struck to learn that racists attacking Chinese people in Vancouver were singing John Brown’ Body during their attack.  I don’t blame John Brown for this.  I regard him as a hero.

ken h

Remembering Vancouver’s First Race Riot



Re: John Brown

Louis Proyect
 

This trailer convinced me to avoid it like the plague.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H-Tm63y-S4s


Re: John Brown

Peter Rachleff
 

As an historian of race and racism in this country, I was appalled and infuriated by THE GOOD LORD BIRD.  Not only is the humor disturbing (and I am capable of laughing at some situations in life), but McBride suggests that John Brown is a pedophile, for which there is NO historical evidence.  No way is this TV-flick going to be productive.  At a time when BLM and other BIPOC-led movements are wrestling with issues of white "allyship," "accompliceship," and solidarity, this project is poison.
Peter Rachleff
East Side Freedom Library
St. Paul, Minnesota


On Sat, Oct 3, 2020 at 9:20 AM Louis Proyect <lnp3@...> wrote:
On 10/3/20 9:44 AM, Michael Meeropol wrote:
Louis, that blurb you quoted sounds like a reference to DEACON KING KONG, McBride's most recent novel -- WHICH IS FABULOUS ....


Yes, my mistake. But I still have big problems with:

"Henry Shackleford is a young slave living in the Kansas Territory in 1857, when the region is a battleground between anti- and pro-slavery forces. When John Brown, the legendary abolitionist, arrives in the area, an argument between Brown and Henry’s master quickly turns violent. Henry is forced to leave town—with Brown, who believes he’s a girl."

John Brown believes that he is a girl? Really? This review persuades me that McBride should have left John Brown alone:

https://theconversation.com/in-the-good-lord-bird-a-new-version-of-john-brown-rides-in-at-a-crucial-moment-in-us-history-146653

John Brown the … clown?

Which brings us to McBride’s novel, the inspiration for Showtime’s miniseries.

Among the most distinctive features of McBride’s novel is its bizarre humor. Americans have seen a devout John Brown, a vengeful John Brown and an inspirational John Brown. But before “The Good Lord Bird,” Americans had never seen a clownish John Brown.

McBride’s Brown is a tattered, scatterbrained and deeply religious monomaniac. In his ragged clothes, with his toes bursting out of his boots, Brown intones lengthy, discursive prayers and offers obtuse interpretations of Scripture that leave his men befuddled.

We learn all of this from Onion, the narrator, a former slave whom Brown “rescues” from one of the families living on Pottawatomie Creek. At first, all Onion wants is to get back home to his owner – a detail that speaks volumes about the novel’s twisted humor. Eventually, Onion embraces his new role as Brown’s mascot, although he continues to mock Brown’s ridiculously erratic behavior all the way to Harpers Ferry.

Like many reviewers – and apparently Ethan Hawke, who plays Brown in the Showtime series – I laughed loud and hard when I read “The Good Lord Bird.”

That said, the laughter was a bit unsettling. How and why would someone make this story funny?

At the Atlantic Festival, McBride noted that humor could open the way for “hard conversations” about America’s racial history. And Hawke’s hilarious portrayal of Brown, along with his commentary about the joys of playing this character, suggests he shares McBride’s belief that humor is a useful mechanism for fostering discussions about both slavery and contemporary race relations.

While one might reasonably say that the history of American race relations is so horrific that laughter is an inappropriate response, I think Hawke and McBride may be on to something.





Re: John Brown

Louis Proyect
 

On 10/3/20 9:44 AM, Michael Meeropol wrote:
Louis, that blurb you quoted sounds like a reference to DEACON KING KONG, McBride's most recent novel -- WHICH IS FABULOUS ....


Yes, my mistake. But I still have big problems with:

"Henry Shackleford is a young slave living in the Kansas Territory in 1857, when the region is a battleground between anti- and pro-slavery forces. When John Brown, the legendary abolitionist, arrives in the area, an argument between Brown and Henry’s master quickly turns violent. Henry is forced to leave town—with Brown, who believes he’s a girl."

John Brown believes that he is a girl? Really? This review persuades me that McBride should have left John Brown alone:

https://theconversation.com/in-the-good-lord-bird-a-new-version-of-john-brown-rides-in-at-a-crucial-moment-in-us-history-146653

John Brown the … clown?

Which brings us to McBride’s novel, the inspiration for Showtime’s miniseries.

Among the most distinctive features of McBride’s novel is its bizarre humor. Americans have seen a devout John Brown, a vengeful John Brown and an inspirational John Brown. But before “The Good Lord Bird,” Americans had never seen a clownish John Brown.

McBride’s Brown is a tattered, scatterbrained and deeply religious monomaniac. In his ragged clothes, with his toes bursting out of his boots, Brown intones lengthy, discursive prayers and offers obtuse interpretations of Scripture that leave his men befuddled.

We learn all of this from Onion, the narrator, a former slave whom Brown “rescues” from one of the families living on Pottawatomie Creek. At first, all Onion wants is to get back home to his owner – a detail that speaks volumes about the novel’s twisted humor. Eventually, Onion embraces his new role as Brown’s mascot, although he continues to mock Brown’s ridiculously erratic behavior all the way to Harpers Ferry.

Like many reviewers – and apparently Ethan Hawke, who plays Brown in the Showtime series – I laughed loud and hard when I read “The Good Lord Bird.”

That said, the laughter was a bit unsettling. How and why would someone make this story funny?

At the Atlantic Festival, McBride noted that humor could open the way for “hard conversations” about America’s racial history. And Hawke’s hilarious portrayal of Brown, along with his commentary about the joys of playing this character, suggests he shares McBride’s belief that humor is a useful mechanism for fostering discussions about both slavery and contemporary race relations.

While one might reasonably say that the history of American race relations is so horrific that laughter is an inappropriate response, I think Hawke and McBride may be on to something.





Re: John Brown

Michael Meeropol
 

Louis, that blurb you quoted sounds like a reference to DEACON KING KONG, McBride's most recent novel -- WHICH IS FABULOUS ....

On Sat, Oct 3, 2020 at 9:11 AM Louis Proyect <lnp3@...> wrote:
On 10/3/20 8:34 AM, jenorem via groups.io wrote:

The answer depends on whom you ask, and when.

The long-awaited premiere of Showtime’s “The Good Lord Bird,” based on James McBride’s novel of the same name, comes at a time when evolving popular perceptions of Brown have once again gotten people thinking and talking about him.

What the fuck? A TV series about John Brown based on a novel described in the link above as:

"In September 1969, a fumbling, cranky old church deacon known as Sportcoat shuffles into the courtyard of the Cause Houses housing project in south Brooklyn, pulls a .38 from his pocket, and in front of everybody shoots the project’s drug dealer at point-blank range."

What in god's name does that have to do with John Brown? I watched just 30 seconds of a trailer for the Showtime "adaptation" and found it utterly disgusting, with Ethan Hawke coming across as a psycho. Sounds even worse than this:

Last night at 6pm when I was surfing through my Verizon TV “favorites”, I noticed that the Turner Classic Movie (TCM) network was airing “Santa Fe Trail”, a 1940 movie that was described in the following terms: “Romantic rivals get caught in the battle to stop abolitionist John Brown.” What the fuck? The battle to stop John Brown? This I had to see.

Although the film is a reactionary and racist piece of trash, I urge my readers to watch it online through Youtube since it is an essential cultural artifact of the New Deal. The writer/director team consisted of Robert Buckner and Michael Curtiz, the same people who brought you “Mission to Moscow”.

Despite the title, the movie has nothing to do with wagon trains or fighting off Indians. It is, as stated in the TCM blurb, an account of the military campaign against John Brown led by J.E.B. “Jeb” Stuart that climaxed with the raid on Harper’s Ferry, John Brown’s capture and eventual hanging. The opening caption says it all:

1854 – The United States Military Academy – West Point. When the gray cradle of the American army was only a small garrison with few cadets, but under a brilliant Commandant, named Robert E. Lee it was already building for the defense of a newly won nation in a new world.

https://louisproyect.org/2012/04/10/santa-fe-trail/


Re: John Brown

Louis Proyect
 

On 10/3/20 8:34 AM, jenorem via groups.io wrote:

The answer depends on whom you ask, and when.

The long-awaited premiere of Showtime’s “The Good Lord Bird,” based on James McBride’s novel of the same name, comes at a time when evolving popular perceptions of Brown have once again gotten people thinking and talking about him.

What the fuck? A TV series about John Brown based on a novel described in the link above as:

"In September 1969, a fumbling, cranky old church deacon known as Sportcoat shuffles into the courtyard of the Cause Houses housing project in south Brooklyn, pulls a .38 from his pocket, and in front of everybody shoots the project’s drug dealer at point-blank range."

What in god's name does that have to do with John Brown? I watched just 30 seconds of a trailer for the Showtime "adaptation" and found it utterly disgusting, with Ethan Hawke coming across as a psycho. Sounds even worse than this:

Last night at 6pm when I was surfing through my Verizon TV “favorites”, I noticed that the Turner Classic Movie (TCM) network was airing “Santa Fe Trail”, a 1940 movie that was described in the following terms: “Romantic rivals get caught in the battle to stop abolitionist John Brown.” What the fuck? The battle to stop John Brown? This I had to see.

Although the film is a reactionary and racist piece of trash, I urge my readers to watch it online through Youtube since it is an essential cultural artifact of the New Deal. The writer/director team consisted of Robert Buckner and Michael Curtiz, the same people who brought you “Mission to Moscow”.

Despite the title, the movie has nothing to do with wagon trains or fighting off Indians. It is, as stated in the TCM blurb, an account of the military campaign against John Brown led by J.E.B. “Jeb” Stuart that climaxed with the raid on Harper’s Ferry, John Brown’s capture and eventual hanging. The opening caption says it all:

1854 – The United States Military Academy – West Point. When the gray cradle of the American army was only a small garrison with few cadets, but under a brilliant Commandant, named Robert E. Lee it was already building for the defense of a newly won nation in a new world.

https://louisproyect.org/2012/04/10/santa-fe-trail/


John Brown

jenorem
 


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Re: Koba: An Excerpt from Ronald Grigor Suny’s “Stalin: Passage to Revolution” - Los Angeles Review of Books

Dayne Goodwin
 

On Sat, Oct 3, 2020 at 2:10 AM Vladimiro Giacche' <vladimiro.giacche@...> wrote:
Couldn‘t be Marx‘ Critique of GOTHA Program (1875, Published by Engels in 1891) instead  ?

Could be, Vladimiro.  Of course i don't KNOW.  Maybe Ronald Suny has the sources and resources to eventually be able to definitely answer.  There might be useful evidence in other Stalin biographies.

Apparently Stalin and his comrades were reading their first basic socialist texts.  In the same paragraph i quoted from initially, Suny mentions that they were soon also reading the first volume of Capital along with "The Communist Manifesto, Marx’s The Erfurt Program, and Engels’s The Development of Scientific Socialism."
If "Engels's The Development of Scientific Socialism" was their translation of "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific" these are all well known and widely studied basic works of socialism - with the exception of the mysterious "Marx’s The Erfurt Program." 

My conjecture is that they were reading Kautsky's "The Erfurt Program" misidentified as being Marx's.  "The Erfurt Program" was being spread widely throughout the socialist movement as the model contemporary Marxist program.  It seems to fit well with their other basic reading on marxist socialism.

I see The Critique of the Gotha Program as more of an insider document initially written as a private letter in 1875 for discussion among leaders and not published during Marx's lifetime.  Engels published it in Die Neue Zeit in 1891 as a contribution to SPD preparation of a new program for the Erfurt Congress (which would replace the Gotha Program of 1875).  I'm guessing that Stalin and his young friends were more likely to be reading Kautsky's The Erfurt Program than Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program in 1896-97 in Tbilisi (aka Tiflis w/in Russian empire).