Date   

Framing the 2020 Election – Tempest

Louis Proyect
 


PBS documentary: "Driving While Black: Space, Race and Mobility in America"

Alan Ginsberg
 

This is airing in New York City tonight (Tues., Oct13) at 9PM. Don't know about PBS stations elsewhere.

 https://www.pbs.org/show/driving-while-black/

Chronicling the riveting history and personal experiences – at once liberating and challenging, harrowing and inspiring, deeply revealing and profoundly transforming – of African Americans on the road from the advent of the automobile through the seismic changes of the 1960s and beyond – "Driving While Black" explores the deep background of a recent phrase rooted in realities that have been an indelible part of the African American experience for hundreds of years – told in large part through the stories of the men, women and children who lived through it.

Drawing on a wealth of recent scholarship – and based on and inspired in large part by Gretchen Sorin’s recently published study of the way the automobile and highways transformed African American life across the 20th century ("Driving While Black: African American Travel and the Road to Civil Rights" (W.W. Norton, 2020)) – the film examines the history of African Americans on the road from the depths of the Depression to the height of the Civil Rights movement and beyond, exploring along the way the deeply embedded dynamics of race, space and mobility in America during one of the most turbulent and transformative periods in American history.


Socialists and Biden: an exchange | Red Flag

Louis Proyect
 


Re: "There will be no coup"

workerpoet
 
Edited

"That doesn't interest me half as much as what the bourgeoisie is up to. They are for Biden, not Trump."

i used to think they would always be for the candidate with which they're investments were safest. Trump proved that wrong. The bourgeoisie are not a solid block. it is important tor us to understand the schisms  that exist.  That is why I go to places like American Conservative. Certain industries like fossil fuels favor Trump. Others favor Biden, most hedge their bets supporting both wings. Then there are the vested billionaire cabals and the influential international players with agendas of their own. Capitalists win either way and many favor Biden for the stability he offers -- though not all.

As for the possibility of a coup, while i don't think that will happen, I respect the knowledgeable opinion of Larry Wilkerson whom I've had the pleasure of meeting and talking to on several occasions. This is a guy with deep contatcts who knows were the bodies are buried and has the integrity to speak out.


How the 1619 Project took over 2020

Louis Proyect
 

How the 1619 Project took over 2020

It’s a hashtag, a talking point, a journalism case study, a scholarly mission, the subject of academic screeds and Trump rally riffs. But the 1619 Project began as a special edition of the New York Times magazine. (Tony Cenicola/Courtesy of The New York Times)
Washington Post, Oct. 13, 2020 at 12:00 p.m. EDT
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One morning in mid-September, Nikole Hannah-Jones woke to a text message from a friend noting an unusual event on President Trump’s schedule: the first “White House Conference on American History.”

It might have sounded banal, but Hannah-Jones, a staff writer for the New York Times Magazine, sensed a subtext immediately: This was about her and the project she says is the most important work of her career.

Sure enough, that afternoon, Trump thundered from a lectern at the National Archives Museum that “the left has warped, distorted and defiled the American story with deceptions, falsehoods, and lies. There is no better example than the New York Times’ totally discredited 1619 Project.”

You’ve probably heard of it by now. The 1619 Project has emerged as a watchword for our era — a hashtag, a talking point, a journalism case study, a scholarly mission. It is the subject of dueling academic screeds, Fox News segments, publishers’ bidding wars and an upcoming series of Oprah-produced films. It is a Trump rally riff that reliably triggers an electric round of jeers.

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And now, at the nation’s most significant moment of racial reckoning since the 1960s, it’s become one of the hottest culture-war battlefields, where the combatants include turf-guarding academics, political ideologues angling for an election-year advantage — and the fearlessly spiky journalism superstar who willed the entire thing into existence.

All of this can make it easy to forget what the 1619 Project was — basically, a collection of smart, provocative magazine articles about the ways slavery shaped our nation. And by the time Hannah-Jones found her work under near-daily attack from brand-name intellectuals, the president of the United States and, as of this week, even the Times’s own opinion section, it was already more than a year old.

Nikole Hannah-Jones in 2017.
Nikole Hannah-Jones in 2017. (James Estrin/The New York Times)

In December 2018, Hannah-Jones was rushing to finish a book project before the end of a temporary leave from the Times — but another deadline kept nagging at her.

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She had been thinking about August 1619 ever since discovering the date in high school, on page 29 of Lerone Bennett’s “Before the Mayflower.” That was when the White Lion merchant ship brought more than 20 enslaved Africans to the shores of Virginia — a rarely noted milestone that probably marked the beginning of chattel slavery in the mainland English colonies.

Now the 400th anniversary loomed. “And I was wondering, what I should do with that?” Hannah-Jones said in a recent interview.

Back at work, she told her colleagues she wanted to mark the occasion with a special issue dedicated to slavery’s impact on modern society. “It didn’t take very much convincing,” said Jake Silverstein, the magazine’s editor in chief. Hannah-Jones convened a multidisciplinary group of scholars — Pulitzer winners and Ivy League stars among them — to steer her thinking and brainstorm topics.

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Seven months later, the 1619 Project had expanded to include a broadsheet section of the newspaper, a podcast series and a collaboration with the Pulitzer Center to develop a free school curriculum. Hundreds of thousands of extra copies were shipped to libraries and museums. The issue’s 10 essays about the legacy of slavery, most penned by Black writers, ranged energetically from sugar consumption in America and modern-day traffic patterns in Atlanta to the U.S. failure to guarantee health care to its citizens; they were interspersed with poems and short stories by artistic luminaries such as Jesmyn Ward, Barry Jenkins and Lynn Nottage.

The night before publication, a standing-room audience crowded into a 378-seat auditorium at the Times. “What if I told you,” Hannah-Jones began, “that the year 1619 is as important to the American story as the year 1776?”

Silverstein was no less bold in his editor’s note. The barbaric system that would endure in the U.S. for 250 years after the White Lion’s arrival “is sometimes referred to as the country’s original sin, but it is more than that,” he wrote. “It is the country’s very origin.”

The 1619 Project was an immediate sensation. Hannah-Jones, who would win a Pulitzer Prize for her introductory essay, needed an assistant to handle all the speaking requests. Silverstein recalls the rapturous crowds who would deliver a “laying on of hands” as she walked into their midst. Educators were thrilled by how their students connected with it, writing their own essays and creating art inspired by it.

“It resonated with many of our students that we are part of America, and instead of being ashamed of our history in this country, we can see our great contributions to it as African Americans,” said Janice Jackson, chief executive of Chicago Public Schools. “I was incredibly proud as a Black woman when I read that essay.”

Sean Wilentz in his Princeton University office
                    in 2005.
Sean Wilentz in his Princeton University office in 2005. (Mel Evans/AP)

Sean Wilentz remembers the Sunday morning in August when he walked down his driveway to pick up his Times. The Princeton historian was intrigued to see an issue of the magazine devoted to slavery; his most recent book, "No Property in Man," explored the antislavery instincts of the nation's founders. But then he started reading Hannah-Jones's essay.

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“I threw the thing across the room, I was so astounded,” he recalled recently, “because I ran across a paragraph on the American Revolution, and it was just factually wrong.”

Long before “1619” was vibrating on the lips of President Trump and leading GOP lawmakers, objections were brewing among serious liberal academics. Hannah-Jones’s 10,000-word essay opened with her father’s roots in a Mississippi sharecropping family before blossoming into a panoramic take on the nation’s history. In the passage that so enraged Wilentz, she asserted that “one of the primary reasons the colonists decided to declare their independence from Britain was because they wanted to protect the institution of slavery” at a time when “Britain had grown deeply conflicted over its role in the barbaric institution.”

This, Wilentz argues, is patently false: Other than a few lonely voices, England remained committed to the slave trade in 1776. The abolitionist movement didn’t take hold in London for more than a decade — and then it was inspired by anti-slavery opinions emerging from America.

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Wilentz was impressed by some of the 1619 Project’s essays, but in November, he critiqued Hannah-Jones's piece in a public speech. And he contacted other prominent academics, whose complaints about the project were chronicled by the World Socialist Web Site. Eventually, four agreed to join Wilentz in writing a letter to the Times, criticizing the project’s “displacement of historical understanding by ideology.”

It didn’t go over so well.

“We perceived it right away to be an attack on the project,” said Silverstein. He questioned why they didn’t just contact him or Hannah-Jones directly to offer thoughts on how to “strengthen this historical analysis” as he said other readers had.

Wilentz, in turn, was stunned by Silverstein’s response letter, which published alongside the scholars’ in December and was longer than their own — a major tell, in his view, that the Times knew it had gotten something very wrong even while it appeared to dismiss the complaint and avoided addressing many of its points. “Holy smokes,” he thought. “This is war!”

Wilentz, who is White, had not succeeded in getting any Black historians to sign on to his letter. But some shared his concerns. Leslie Harris, a history professor at Northwestern who has written extensively about colonial slavery, was contacted in 2019 by a Times fact-checker asking if preserving slavery was a cause of the Revolutionary War. “Immediately, I was like, no, no, that doesn’t sound right,” Harris recalled. She thought the issue was settled — until she was a guest on a radio show with Hannah-Jones and heard the journalist assert that the colonists launched the revolution to preserve slavery. Taken aback, she was unready to argue but retreated to her car nearly in tears: A fan of the 1619 Project’s mission, she knew the claim could be consequential. “Given how high-profile this was, if this was really wrong, it was —” she paused, punctuating each word. “Really. Going. To. Be. Wrong.”

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Wilentz pressed his case, publishing a 5,000-word essay in the Atlantic in January detailing the errors he saw in Hannah-Jones’s take on the revolution as well as her description of Abraham Lincoln as hesitant about emancipation. Harris took a different tack: Her March essay for Politico noted those points but also took a shot at the Wilentz letter-signers, arguing that their brand of scholarship had for too long overlooked the role of race and slavery in American history — a lapse the 1619 Project was compensating for.

None of this discussion eluded the Pulitzer judges. Historian Steven Hahn, who served as the board’s co-chair, told the Post he supported the main thrust of Hannah-Jones’s essay — that Black people have been at the forefront of fighting for true political democracy — but had reservations about how she put together her argument, particularly the passage about the Revolutionary War. He laid out his concerns to his fellow board members. The majority still voted to give her the prize.

“Any serious historian would have questions about some of the claims and how they were made,” Hahn said. He was “appalled,” though, by the Wilentz letter: “It was pedantic — a big-shot historian saying ‘Who the hell are you?’”

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Both Wilentz and Harris feared that this very public discussion had opened the door to a backlash. Wilentz said he warned Silverstein about this when they met for lunch in January to discuss their differences — that Republicans would run against the 1619 Project in the fall election.

Silverstein laughed it off. But within weeks, an attorney for the president was referencing the 1619 Project to attack House Democrats’ rationale for impeachment.

The New York Times building in New York.
The New York Times building in New York. (Julio Cortez/AP)

When she joined the New York Times in 2015 after working for Pro Publica and newspapers in Raleigh and Portland, Nikole Hannah-Jones was skeptical that she would fit in. Her hair is dyed firetruck red, her nails are long and acrylic, and she frequently wears a necklace that spells "Black girl magic" in script.

“This has been a conscious choice my entire career,” she explained. “I was not going to try to adapt my sense of style to mainstream expectations.”

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In fact, the Times has embraced her, and she is considered by colleagues and rivals to have influence beyond her title. In 2017, she received a coveted MacArthur Foundation “genius” grant for her work chronicling the persistence of racial segregation. “I’ve teased her that the New York Times has many people who think they are geniuses,” said Dean Baquet, the paper’s executive editor, but “she’s the only person who has been officially declared one.”

She was raised in Iowa by a Black father and White mother, a dynamic that inspired her to cover race as a journalist. When her grandparents learned their daughter was dating a Black man, “they initially disowned her, and did not re-own her until my older sister was born,” she said. “They loved us very deeply. But they were also prejudiced against other Black people who were not related to them.” Her choice, she realized, was to identify as mixed-race or Black. “Your mom is White, and I’m Black, but you’re Black,” her father told her. “Our country is going to treat you as Black and that’s who you are.” She embraced the identity, she says: “Why would I want to lay claim to people who wouldn’t lay claim to me?”

At the Times, she emerged as a prolific tweeter who has amassed nearly half a million followers, in part by sparring gleefully with critics. When the New York Post blasted protesters for toppling statues of Jefferson and Washington as well as Confederate generals, it used the headline “Call them the 1619 riots” — and Hannah-Jones tweeted, “It would be an honor. Thank you.” Her response spurred a half-dozen articles by conservative critics expressing outrage. This past summer, she retweeted a wild conspiracy theory suggesting that a spate of urban fireworks was part of a plot to destabilize the Black Lives Matter movement. She later deleted her tweet and called it irresponsible.

Baquet noted that her magazine role allows her to express “more opinions and have more edge” than most reporters. Yet he has counseled her to draw some lines and pick her battles on social media.

“Dean has never told me I cannot be on Twitter, but he has suggested that maybe I need to chill,” Hannah-Jones said. “I know that sometimes what I have tweeted has hurt the work I am trying to do.”

Sen. Tom Cotton on Capitol Hill in 2018.
Sen. Tom Cotton on Capitol Hill in 2018. (Melina Mara/The Washington Post)

After six months of defending the 1619 Project, Hannah-Jones and Silverstein received an email that convinced them that they had a problem.

Other scholars had weighed in since Wilentz — notably a group of Civil War historians who echoed his concerns about the description of Lincoln’s views and disputed another essay’s linkage of slavery with capitalism. Silverstein responded with a point-by-point dismissal. But the letter on Feb. 19 was from Danielle Allen, a prominent African American classicist and political theorist at Harvard, who also quarreled with the slavery-loving-colonists-spurred-to-war trope.

“If it instead said, ‘some colonists’ or ‘one of the primary reasons motivating influential factions among the colonists’ it would be correct,” she wrote. “But as it stands the sentence is false.” Allen — a former chair of the Pulitzer Prize board and a contributor to The Washington Post opinion page — warned that while she was now sharing her criticism privately, she might feel compelled to go public.

On March 11, the Times ran a “clarification” — a journalism term of art considered less grave than a correction — and added two words to the story specifying that slavery was a motivator for “some of” the colonists.

Hannah-Jones still sees no problem with her original text. She says she never intended to suggest that “every single colonist” was driven to preserve slavery. But “it became clear that if we didn’t clarify it in some way, it was going to dog us for eternity.”

But a clarification would hardly settle the controversy.

A conservative group called the National Association of Scholars had announced a “1620 Project” to highlight the contributions of the pilgrims who arrived in Plymouth Bay that year. And as the racial-justice protests of the summer renewed interest in the Times project — and the Pulitzer Center (no relation to the prizes) announced that 3,500 classrooms across the country were using its curriculum — it landed on the radar of Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.).

A rising-star conservative, Cotton had tangled with the Times earlier in the summer when his op-ed calling on the military to quell what he called “rioters” and “criminal elements” attached to the summer’s street protests triggered a mass uprising of Times staffers. (“As a Black woman, as a journalist, as an American, I am deeply ashamed that we ran this,” Hannah-Jones tweeted.) The opinions editor resigned amid the furor, and Cotton’s jabs at the paper helped his campaign raise$1.3 million.

In July, Cotton proposed a bill to bar federal funds from schools that used the 1619 curriculum — “a radical work of historical revisionism aiming to indoctrinate our kids to hate America,” he called it. “The entire premise” of the Times project, he told the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, “is that America is at root a systematically racist country to the core and irredeemable.”

In that interview, though, Cotton seemed to condone the Founding Fathers’ view of slavery as “the necessary evil upon which the union was built,” setting off a day-long news cycle in which he insisted his words were taken out of context and was pilloried by Twitter critics, including, yes, Hannah-Jones.

President Trump at his Sept. 17 speech at the
                    National Archives Museum where he blasted the 1619
                    Project.
President Trump at his Sept. 17 speech at the National Archives Museum where he blasted the 1619 Project. (Kevin Lamarque/Reuters)

And then, a couple weeks ago, Hannah-Jones deleted almost her entire Twitter feed.

The 1619 Project was no longer just a team of journalists’ attempt to grapple with uncomfortable history. By the time Trump had attacked it, it had become an historic controversy in its own right, subject to scholarly dispute and debate and small-bore analysis.

It didn’t help matters much when it began to appear that the Times was backing away from some of the project’s bolder claims.

It started when Hannah-Jones took to Twitter to scold conservatives for misrepresenting the 1619 Project — which, she insisted “does not argue that 1619 is our true founding.”

But . . . hadn’t she claimed exactly that?

A writer for the Atlantic launched a massive Twitter thread noting all the times when Hannah-Jones had said, in essence, that 1619 was the nation’s true founding. That’s what prompted her social media self-purge, she told The Post, so her tweets could not be “weaponized.” Meanwhile, the libertarian journal Quillette noticed that the Times had removed a phrase from the 1619 Project website describing the date as “our true founding.” But no clarification was issued, leading critics to suggest the Times was trying to wipe clean its history without owning up to its mistakes.

Silverstein explained that the altered words were from display text penned by a digital editor that they were “continually having to write and revise” for different platforms “to hone how we are rhetorically describing the project.”

He also acknowledged amending some of the prose in his own editor’s note: It had not initially appeared online, he said, and when they added it to the site in December, “we made a few small changes to improve it” — not to backpedal, but to thin out rhetoric that seemed in hindsight like “too much flourish.” The paper’s standards department agreed that no acknowledgement of the changes was necessary.

Hannah-Jones, meanwhile, protested that critics were taking her own flourishes too literally — why could she not speak metaphorically of 1619, in the same way that Barack Obama had eulogized John Lewis, the late congressman, as a “founding father”?

“Those who’ve wanted to act as if tweets/discussions about the project hold more weight than the actual words of the project cannot be taken in good faith,” she tweeted. “Those who point to edits of digital blurbs but ignore the unchanged text of the actual project cannot be taken in good faith.”

Last week, the National Association of Scholars doubled down by calling on the Pulitzer board to revoke Hannah-Jones’s prize, taking particular aim at “surreptitious efforts” to alter it post-publication. Then on Friday evening came the most stunning slam of all:

“For all its virtues, buzz, spinoffs and a Pulitzer Prize . . .” wrote the columnist Bret Stephens, “the 1619 Project has failed.”

What made this attack different? Stephens is a Pulitzer-winning columnist for the New York Times opinion section, where he published the piece.

He defended the project against critics who claimed it rejected American values. But he suggested its small errors had accumulated via the authors’ “monocausality” — an insistence of seeing everything through the lens of slavery. And he questioned Hannah-Jones’s elevation of 1619 even as a metaphor.

“1776 isn’t just our nation’s ‘official’ founding,” Stephens wrote. “It is our symbolic one, too. The metaphor of 1776 is more powerful than that of 1619 because what makes America most itself isn’t four centuries of racist subjugation. It’s 244 years of effort by Americans — sometimes halting, but often heroic — to live up to our greatest ideal.”

Times leadership took pains to praise the 1619 Project this weekend. They maintained that Stephens’s criticism represented not an institutional scolding of the project but commitment to thoughtful debate. “The Times’s openness to hear and tolerate criticism is the clearest sign in its confidence in the work,” acting opinions editor Kathleen Kingsbury said.

Hannah-Jones, though, was livid, and let Kingsbury and Stephens know it in emails ahead of publication. On the day the NAS called for the revocation of her Pulitzer, she tweeted that efforts to discredit her work “put me in a long tradition of [Black women] who failed to know their places.” She changed her Twitter bio to “slanderous and nasty-minded mulattress” — a tribute to the trailblazing journalist Ida B. Wells, whom the Times slurred with those same words in 1894.

On Tuesday morning, Baquet put out a public statement welcoming the opinion team’s right to challenge the newsroom’s work but pushed back on Stephens’s criticism of the project’s journalistic standards. “The project fell fully within our standards as a news organization,” he wrote. “In fact, 1619 — and especially the work of Nikole — fill me with pride.”

Hannah-Jones has fiercely defended the 1619 Project. But today, she acknowledges that for all the experts she consulted, she should have sat down with additional scholars with particular focus on colonial history, the Revolutionary War and the Civil War, to better reflect the contention in the field.

“I should have been more careful with how I wrote that,” she says, “because I don’t think that any other fact would have given people the fodder that this has, and I am tortured by it. I’m absolutely tortured by it.”

2 p.m.: This story has been updated.


Re: Sunday Night Riot, Vandalism of Oregon Historical Society Met With Widespread Condemnation, Criminal Charges - Willamette Week

Mark Lause
 

The targets make me suspicious.  There are as always a few young inexperienced idiots willing to follow something like this. But the initial targeting is idiotic. There are too many right-wingers explicitly oriented to this kind of misdirections.  

The problem is related to a larger one in the current movement related to the lack of a mass orientation, transparency, democratic structures, etc.

On Tue, Oct 13, 2020, 2:46 PM Louis Proyect <lnp3@...> wrote:
On 10/13/20 2:38 PM, Mark Lause wrote:
Again. I'd urge caution about who's actually doing this.

It just might be agent-provocateurs but the problem is the general tolerance for this kind of ultraleftism on the left. I posted this comment on Ahmed's post:

"Although I alienated a bunch of 23 year olds, I denounced the arson attack on a post office in Minneapolis early on in the George Floyd protests. The fire spread from the post office to an American Indian cultural and training center. Burned to the ground. The only other people determined to destroy the post office are in the Trump administration. In addition, they trashed a library not far away."

Ever since the Seattle anti-WTO protests, there's been a widespread belief that unless there is some kind of property damage, the protest is reformist. This creates a perfect environment for provocations.



Re: Sunday Night Riot, Vandalism of Oregon Historical Society Met With Widespread Condemnation, Criminal Charges - Willamette Week

Louis Proyect
 

On 10/13/20 2:38 PM, Mark Lause wrote:
Again. I'd urge caution about who's actually doing this.

It just might be agent-provocateurs but the problem is the general tolerance for this kind of ultraleftism on the left. I posted this comment on Ahmed's post:

"Although I alienated a bunch of 23 year olds, I denounced the arson attack on a post office in Minneapolis early on in the George Floyd protests. The fire spread from the post office to an American Indian cultural and training center. Burned to the ground. The only other people determined to destroy the post office are in the Trump administration. In addition, they trashed a library not far away."

Ever since the Seattle anti-WTO protests, there's been a widespread belief that unless there is some kind of property damage, the protest is reformist. This creates a perfect environment for provocations.



Re: Sunday Night Riot, Vandalism of Oregon Historical Society Met With Widespread Condemnation, Criminal Charges - Willamette Week

Mark Lause
 

Again. I'd urge caution about who's actually doing this.


On Tue, Oct 13, 2020, 2:30 PM Louis Proyect <lnp3@...> wrote:

Ahmed White, the African-American law professor and author of a great book on the Little Steel Strike, posted the link below with the following comment:

I spent some days at the Oregon Historical Society, a few years back, doing archival research on the Industrial Workers of the World. The union's members could have taught today's protesters a lot about what it means to be radical, and even more about exploitation and the state's capacity for repression. They had their grievances and a definite penchant for militancy, these "Wobblies," but they never tried to burn down a library.

https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/10/12/sunday-night-riot-vandalism-of-oregon-historical-society-met-with-widespread-condemnation-criminal-charges/


Re: "There will be no coup"

Louis Proyect
 

On 10/13/20 1:27 PM, John Obrien wrote:

Could you please share how you know what Trump is actually up too?
and that includes his supporters?     

That doesn't interest me half as much as what the bourgeoisie is up to. They are for Biden, not Trump.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/michelatindera/2020/08/08/biden-pulls-away-in-race-for-billionaire-donors/#1f4faafd3b62

Biden Pulls Away In Race For Billionaire Donors, With 131 To Trump’s 99




US-POLITICS-VOTE-DEMOCRATS-BIDEN

Joe Biden answers questions after speaking about the coronavirus pandemic and the economy on June 30 ... [+]

 PHOTO BY BRENDAN SMIALOWSKI/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES

The billionaires seem to love Joe Biden. With less than 100 days until the election, Joe Biden has received donations from 131 members of the upper crust, while Donald Trump has gotten donations from just 99 of his fellow tycoons, according to an analysis of Federal Election Commission filings.

Since May, Biden has added over two dozen new names to his roster of billionaire donors, while Trump has added just six. Biden’s newest supporters include political power players like George Soros. Soros gave $505,600 to Biden’s joint fundraising committee with the Democratic National Committee in May. Soros has spent over $8 million this election cycle on other causes so far.

Biden’s other new donors mostly made their money in tech. Facebook billionaires Sean Parker and Dustin Moskovitz made six-figure contributions, as did Twilio CEO Jeff Lawson, Twitter cofounder Ev Williams, and Zynga founder Mark Pincus. Nicole Systrom, who is married to Instagram cofounder Kevin Systrom, donated $250,000.


Sunday Night Riot, Vandalism of Oregon Historical Society Met With Widespread Condemnation, Criminal Charges - Willamette Week

Louis Proyect
 

Ahmed White, the African-American law professor and author of a great book on the Little Steel Strike, posted the link below with the following comment:

I spent some days at the Oregon Historical Society, a few years back, doing archival research on the Industrial Workers of the World. The union's members could have taught today's protesters a lot about what it means to be radical, and even more about exploitation and the state's capacity for repression. They had their grievances and a definite penchant for militancy, these "Wobblies," but they never tried to burn down a library.

https://www.wweek.com/news/2020/10/12/sunday-night-riot-vandalism-of-oregon-historical-society-met-with-widespread-condemnation-criminal-charges/


Re: Fascism, Trumpism, and the left | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

Andrew Stewart
 

Reimann writes
The issue is not fascism but Trump's very real steps towards bonapartism, meaning his bending various wings of the government to his personal rule. Anybody who follows the news will have to admit that that's what he's doing with the (in)Justice Department and the State Department as well as the CDC now. That is the real issue.
Explain how Obama (or Clinton) did not enact his own Bonapartist project? Part of the issue with these efforts to impose Trotsky's sclerotic, internecine schematics onto contemporary realities is how completely devoid of novelty they are. Trump's neo-Nazi cult following is certainly a moment of heightened contradiction, undeniably, but the reality is that the status quo of the neoliberal policy agenda has been faithfully observed.


"There will be no coup"

John Obrien
 

Louis,

Could you please share how you know what Trump is actually up too?
and that includes his supporters?      

Is your only sources U. S. corporate media, which have a poor record -
or do you review the assessments of other nations intelligence sources?

You seem so certain? 

Or should I assume it is your opinion and a assessment of your judgment
that is based on?   

Regularly the capitalists prefer the government they bought,  
They enjoy the benefits from and like the deceit game and the
promoting that there are fair elections and the U. S. is a democracy
with two political parties (while serving only the same ruling class).

But there are wealthy reactionaries who want something that
matches their ideology of Trump and the extreme right.  Do you
know what they are up too?

In the fable - the frog trusted the scorpion.  Are you doing the 
same reasoning?   Since a attempted coup might disrupt your
year end plans, that does not mean that one is not possible.
I hope it does not happen and why I am openly voting Biden,

Events create things unexpected, the thing is to be organized
to address them.  Sadly, from my opinion.  the U. S. left has so 
far shown it is either unwilling or not capable, to be serious.

 



From: marxmail@groups.io <marxmail@groups.io> on behalf of Louis Proyect <lnp3@...>
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2020 7:20 AM
To: marxmail@groups.io <marxmail@groups.io>
Subject: Re: [marxmail] "There will be no coup"
 

. All of this dwarfs anything Trump has been up to. 
_._,_._,_


Re: Fascism, Trumpism, and the left | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

fkalosar101@...
 

On Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 10:29 AM, John Reimann wrote:
The issue is not fascism but Trump's very real steps towards bonapartism, meaning his bending various wings of the government to his personal rule. Anybody who follows the news will have to admit that that's what he's doing with the (in)Justice Department and the State Department as well as the CDC now. That is the real issue.
 
Whether you call it fascism or Bonapartism makes relatively little difference at the point where "it" becomes victorious.  Were Salazar and Franco fascists or Bonapartists?  

There is IMO, however, an important difference between Trumpism and both B & F IMO: Trumpism is a new ideology which takes the old, half-serious Grover Norquist "drown the gov't" BS to a qualitatively new level: Trump and his baying nitwits are opposed not only to "the gub'mit" but to the very concept of governance itself--the Postal Service, accurate labor statistics, the CDS--these are all fluff to them. They don't even really care about the "fray morkit" worshipped by conventional Republicans. 

They are ecstatic mystics who in a way run in parallel to the vulgar Graeberites whose little Occupations are supposed to link up in one great revolutionary whole without anybody having to do much of anything "vertical" except set up little free cafes in occupation sites with some anarchist entrepreneur's name on them--ted's revolutionary diner or whatever, complete with whimsical  whiteboard menu.

The Pol-Pot-like ultraleft attack on "white collar" ""bullshit workers shares an ideological core with the irrational Trumpian anti-governance Bonapartism.

The ecstatic and contemptuous rejection of social infrastructure is common to both the ultraleft and the Trumpists.

And yet--somehow, story to be told--the Trumpies have paved the way (put the hacks in place) for a Bonapartist (or "fascist") takeover for a dictator (Trump) who clearly could not function adequately in the dictatorial role--as much because of his ideology as because of his character defects.

Where does this leave the USA?  Not IMO in a good place, but certainly not looking forward to decades of Louis Napoleon, Generalissimo Franco, or Salazar.  It's something in crucial ways new and nonetheless awful for not being one's grandfather's fascism or Louis Bonaparte's Bonapartism.  
 


Michael Perelman, ¡Presente! | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

Louis Proyect
 

Yesterday, the New Castle News in Pennsylvania reported on Michael Perelman’s death on September 21 at the age of 80. I would assume that Michael grew up in New Castle, a small town just across the border from Youngstown, Ohio—a scene of major labor battles in the 1930s.

Michael was the author of 19 books on economics written for a general audience. Despite his decades-long career at California State University, Chico, he could hardly be described as a mandarin. Like many economists who were radicalized in the 1960s, he saw his profession as a way to change society, not angle for awards that most academics covet. Today, the Nobel Prize in economics awarded to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson for auction theory. When I saw the news, I asked myself what the hell was auction theory and why would experts in the subject merit a Nobel Prize? It turns out to be a way of “scientifically” calculating how bidding works, etc. When the world is poised on the edge of a 1930s type depression because of the pandemic, how did they win out? It turns out that both teach at Stanford, a symbol of the academy’s incestuous relationship to capitalism second to none. I only wish that Michael had lived long enough to comment on such a bizarre Nobel Prize.

full: https://louisproyect.org/2020/10/13/michael-perelman-presente/


H-Net Review [H-Buddhism]: Yu on Zhang, 'Thriving in Crisis: Buddhism and Political Disruption in China, 1522-1620'

Andrew Stewart
 



---------- Forwarded message ---------
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Date: Tue, Oct 13, 2020 at 11:11 AM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Buddhism]: Yu on Zhang, 'Thriving in Crisis: Buddhism and Political Disruption in China, 1522-1620'
To: <h-review@...>
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>


Dewei Zhang.  Thriving in Crisis: Buddhism and Political Disruption
in China, 1522-1620.  The Sheng Yen Series in Chinese Buddhist
Studies. New York  Columbia University Press, 2020.  368 pp.  $65.00
(cloth), ISBN 978-0-231-19700-7.

Reviewed by Chun-fang Yu (Columbia University)
Published on H-Buddhism (October, 2020)
Commissioned by Jessica Zu

This book makes a major contribution to our understanding of the late
Ming Buddhist renewal. The author combines rigorous statistical
analysis with an engaging in-depth historical narrative. These
approaches are further enhanced by his skillful use of rich and
varied original sources. This book will become indispensable for
students of Ming Buddhism.

Dewei Zhang defines the renewal as "a strong, phenomenal, and
large-scale resurgence with monastic Buddhism that involves all walks
of society and that projects itself in the spiritual, intellectual,
and material forms with the sangha and beyond" (p. 5). Using case
studies and quantitative analysis, Zhang traces changes in
temple-building activities and activities of eminent monks through
the perspectives of time, region, and society. The time span, as the
subtitle indicates, is a hundred years, covering the reigns of
Jiajing and Wanli. The regions of focus are Beijing and Jiangnan.
Society refers to political-social forces. Instead of restricting his
discussion to the Wanli era alone, he starts the study with the
Jiajing era. This long view allows us to see the arc starting with
Buddhist decline under Jiajing, cresting with the renewal under
Wanli, and ending with another decline in the seventeenth century. He
asks what made the late Ming Buddhist renewal possible and how we
should understand it. He cites with approval Jiang Wu's thesis that
"the cycle of revival and decline, rather than being gauged by the
intensity of Buddhist activities, should be rephrased as expansion
beyond and retreat behind the boundaries set by the society."[1]
However, he wonders whether the expansion beyond or retreat behind
the boundary is more a result that requires explanation than a cause
that can determine the development of Buddhism. For this reason, it
is necessary to explore the causal relationship between the boundary
society set for Buddhism and its rise and fall.

Therefore, Zhang believes that a systematic and effective political
study, which has been lacking in previous scholarship, is essential.
The crucial role politics played is indicated by the two words
"crisis" and "thriving" in the title. Crisis refers to political
crises created by conflicts within the inner court and factionalism
among scholar-officials. Paradoxically, the political crises offered
opportunities for Buddhism to thrive.

The book has eight chapters in addition to the introduction and
conclusion. I will first describe them and then highlight some key
points for discussion. Chapter 1 provides the background for the late
Ming Buddhist renewal. It stresses the effect of the regulation of
Buddhism instituted in the early Ming period, which imposed
structural limitations on its role in society. The controversies of
the Great Rites (_daliy_i 大禮儀) under Jiajing and the
"Succession Issue" (_guoben zhizheng _國本之爭) of Wanli created
chaos and factionalism. These led to the disillusionment of
scholar-officials who sought refuge in the Neo-Confucian thought of
Wang Yangming (1472-1529) and Buddhism. The close relationship
between court politics and the fortune of Buddhism is a running theme
of the book. Zhang summarizes this central theme succinctly: "The
complex unfolding in the late-Ming Buddhist renewal was structurally
conditioned by politics in its direction and pace. In fact, the
turning points in the process corresponded precisely with major
political events, including Jiajing's enthronement as an emperor
hostile to Buddhism, the reversal of decades-long policy repressing
Buddhism after Jiajing's death, the timely entrance into the
political arena of Empress Dowager Cisheng as a successful
coordinator on behalf of Buddhism, and the heightened tensions
between Cisheng and Wanli that were exacerbated by court
factionalism" (p. 232).

The next six chapters examine the leading players in the late Ming
renewal: chapter 2 on Jiajing (r. 1522-66); chapter 3 on Empress
Cisheng (1545-1614); chapter 4 on eunuchs; chapter 5 on
scholar-officials; and chapter 6 on the three eminent monks, Hanshan
Deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623), Zibo Zhenke 紫柏真可
(1543-1604), and Miaofeng Fudeng 妙峰福登 (1540-1612). Chapter 7
turns to the case studies of five temples, two in Beijing and three
in Jiangnan. Their fluctuating fortunes were tied to the cooperation
and competition between the imperial court and local society. Since
the temples were subjected to external forces, they were unable to
control their own fates, reflecting the sangha's loss of autonomy.
With eight charts, chapter 8 offers a detailed quantitative analysis
of the movements of eminent monks and changes in temple-building
activities. By tracing the changes in these two indices, Zhang
provides a clear picture of the renewal and its eventual setback.

The book sheds new light on the late Ming Buddhist renewal on several
aspects. It not only examines how it happened but also asks why it
did not last beyond the Wanli era. While most scholars concentrated
on the patronage of Cisheng and Wanli, the literati's interest in
Buddhism, and the activities of eminent monks as contributing factors
in the renewal, Zhang makes the situation much more complicated.
Instead of starting with the patronage of Cisheng and Wanli, he
suggests that we should consider Jiajing's treatment of Buddhism
first. Zhang divides Jiajing's rule into two halves, twenty years
each. In the first twenty years he patronized Daoism and was hostile
toward Buddhism, symbolized by his closing of the ordination platform
at Tianningsi in 1566. But during the second twenty years, he relaxed
some restrictions and even restrained some overly zealous local
officials from carrying out large-scale destruction of temples. The
point Zhang makes here is that although Buddhism was in a depressed
state, it did survive and could be revived when the right opportunity
presented itself in the Wanli era.

When scholars speak of the late Ming Buddhist renewal, they usually
credit Cisheng with Wanli. But the chapter devoted to Cisheng makes
it abundantly clear that she was the real chief benefactor. Her son,
the Wanli emperor, sometimes worked with her, but other times worked
against her. Her success was due to the network she formed. It
included eunuchs, court women, scholar-officials, members of the
imperial household, and eminent monks. She patronized Buddhism with
financial backing of Buddhist temples, distribution of the Buddhist
canon, and promotion of eminent monks. Zhang divides her
forty-two-year patronage into four decades. During the first decade,
her interest was completely in Beijing-North China, while in the
second decade, her patronage began extending southward to central
China and Jiangnan. Using three charts, Zhang shows that the first
two phases account for 71 percent of the forty-nine monasteries that
she supported financially. The funding sharply declined after that.
The number of temples Cisheng sponsored in the next ten years dropped
by 71 percent from the previous eleven years, and then there was a
slight recovery in the final ten years of her life (p. 68). Zhang
concludes that the curve matches closely with the ups and downs in
the mother-son relationship, which lasted for a decade, from 1595 to
1604.

Cisheng's confrontation with Wanli over the issue of succession
soured their relationship. This mother-son conflict had far-reaching
consequences for Buddhism and played a key role in the moving of the
center of Buddhism from north to south. The succession issue refers
to their different preferences of Wanli's two sons to succeed him.
Cisheng supported Zhu Changluo (r. 1620), the son of the empress Lady
Wang, but Wanli wanted to install Zhu Changxun, the son of his
favorite, the imperial honored consort Lady Zheng. This conflict
between mother and son involved scholar-officials, eunuchs, and
eminent monks, such as Deqing and Zhenke. Deqing prayed for the birth
of Zhu Changluo on behalf of Cisheng at Mt. Wutai in 1581. Sometime
between the eleventh month of 1594 and the second month of 1595,
Cisheng became his disciple and even asked Wanli to pay homage to
Deqing's portrait. Deqing's close relationship with Cisheng alienated
Wanli who had him arrested in the second month of 1595, put in
prison, and exiled. Zhenke also died in prison because of his
involvement with court intrigue and factionalism connected with the
same succession issue. Eunuchs who were strong supporters of Buddhism
along with Cisheng became less active for fear of antagonizing Wanli.
Scholar-officials retired from public service and returned to
Jiangnan and started supporting local temples. This shift from the
court in Beijing as the center of Buddhism to Jiangnan would become
permanent.

Zhang raises a significant question about why the Buddhist renewal
did not last beyond the Wanli era. He points out that there are at
least two fundamental causes. One is the lack of autonomy and
economic security of the sangha and the other is the lack of
stability and reliability of the individuals and groups that
supported the sangha. The book opens with the sad story about monks
in the Da Baoensi in Nanjing having to sell part of their temple land
to pay debts incurred for the abbot's funeral. Zhang argues
convincingly that the decline or flourishing of Buddhism is
intimately connected with monastic economy in the form of land
holding. It is the decline of monastic economy caused by the
reduction of temple land that affected the health of the sangha in
the Ming. Buddhism enjoyed prosperity in the Yuan. For instance,
temple lands in the Yuan amounted to 300,000 _qing_ (4,941,000 acres)
and half came from the emperors. By contrast, Ming emperors were much
less generous in granting land to temples. The largest grant given to
Da Gongde si in Beijing was only 400 _qing_ (6,588 acres) and the
second largest was 250 _qing_ (4,118 acres) to Lingu si in Nanjing
(p. 25). The reduced monastic assets resulted from their taxation
status. We learn that monastic lands in the Ming fell into two
categories. While the lands of temples with plaques bestowed by the
emperor were exempt from paying land tax, the lands belonging to the
temples without imperial plaques were treated as private land and not
exempt from paying land tax. However, compared to public land, the
tax that a temple paid should take up a small portion of the rent
they would receive, and the surplus was intended for the monks'
livelihood. But this led to abuse during the Jiajing era. As one
scholar-official observed, "local powerful families treated the
sangha as if it were their inherited asset, raising its assigned land
tax quota but reducing its land rent" (p. 128). Some powerful
families in the Jiangnan area encroached on monastic lands or
confiscated them all together. Another reason why temple lands were
in short supply was due to donors' patronage choices. Zhang found
that the majority of resources channeled to the sangha in Suzhou,
Hongzhou, and Nanjing, all core regions and cities of Jiangnan, were
directed not to monastic lands but to such construction projects as
(re)building temples, renovating their halls, casting bells, and
erecting statues. This did not improve the temple's economic health.
A counter example is Tanzhesi in Beijing. It could remain
economically stable over centuries because it amassed huge amounts of
monastic lands.

Zhang's second explanation of why the renewal did not last beyond the
Wanli era is that the sangha could not rely on stable support from
individuals and groups. The changing patterns of patronage by eunuchs
and scholar-officials illustrated this. Next to Cisheng and the
imperial household, eunuchs constituted a major group patronizing
Buddhism in Beijing and nearby regions. But this could change with
the political situation. One table shows that eunuchs were the
largest group patronizing temple-building projects in both the
Jiajing and Wanli eras. "Together with members of the royal
household, they supported nearly three-quarters of the building
projects. In contrast, local people, monks, and scholar-officials
together accounted for about one-quarter" (p. 93). Why did they
support Buddhism? Zhang believes that their patronage could not be
explained by their religious faith alone. He thinks that a more
powerful motivation was the multiple functions Buddhism could serve
for their personal interests, both in life and after death. We learn
that eunuchs were affiliated with each of the twenty-four _yamens_
(bureaus) at court. Like the relationship between father and son,
there is a semi-lineage relationship between a senior eunuch and a
junior eunuch he trained. Charitable associations (_yihui_) were
usually formed by eunuchs who had this kind of relationship. Led by
senior eunuchs, the charitable associations would buy land, build a
temple, and hire monks to take care of it and the grave site that
would later become a cemetery for eunuchs. But the support was
unstable, for when an influential senior eunuch died or lost power,
it usually meant the end of the group and thus the _yihui_ built
around him. In the early Wanli period, eunuchs were a crucial force
to shape a religious environment most favorable for Beijing Buddhism.
It was the eunuch Xu Zhengguang who brought Zhenke to Cisheng's
attention. However, as the conflict between mother and son over the
succession became intense, eunuchs shied away from Buddhism and
turned to Daoism, which was patronized by Wanli's favorite, Lady
Zheng. Eunuchs' participation in Buddhist projects decreased by about
60 percent during the second two decades of Wanli. Cisheng's
patronage also dropped at the same time (p. 118).

Scholar-officials constituted another group that supported Buddhism
and contributed to its renewal. Zhang alerts us to the need to pay
attention to the "dark history" between literati and Buddhism, for
previous scholarship tended to concentrate only on the "cozy
relationship" between the two. Under Jiajing, since Buddhism lost
protection from the state and local lineages encroached on monastic
land, the sangha was almost bankrupt in Jiangnan. Feng Mengzhen
馮夢楨 (1548-1608) and Yuan Hongdao 袁宏道 (1568-1610) are
taken as two case studies of scholar-officials embracing Buddhism.
They received guidance from Buddhist masters in their religious life,
contributed to Buddhism in multiple ways, and enhanced the visibility
of Buddhism. But as Confucian officials serving the state and lay
Buddhist believers, they always faced the challenge of a dual
identity. Yuan described their situation aptly as "riding a
two-headed horse" (p. 144). Both Yuan and Feng tried to stay away
from politics at court, yet the desire for religious cultivation
could not overcome the need to serve the state, which, after all,
provided their livelihood. The fate of the Putao Association, active
from 1598 to 1560, is another example about the incursion of politics
into religion. It was founded by Yuan Hongdao and his older brother,
Zhongdao. Most of its members were high-profile scholar-officials in
Beijing. The end of the Putao Association was again connected with
the succession issue. Five chief members of the Putao Association
were Zhu Changluo's nine instructors, and Yuan Hongdao was one of
them. The association was thus a gathering place for court officials
who backed the crown prince. Their association with Zhu Changluo cast
the group into suspicion. When Deqing and Zhenke suffered
persecution, the association had to disband. Unlike local elites in
Jiangnan who were freer from court politics in their interaction with
Buddhism, officials in Beijing were much more restricted. This is one
of the reasons why the center of Buddhism moved to Jiangnan from
Beijing.               

Buddhist historiography has always credited the flourishing of
Buddhism to the activities of eminent monks. For Zhang, however, they
were no more central to the late Ming renewal than Cisheng and the
other players in the book. Zhenke, Deqing, and Fudeng were the three
eminent monks singled out as case studies. The three were close
friends within the same network. Each vowed to complete a major
Buddhist project: Deqing vowed to restore the Da Baoensi in Nanjing,
Zhenke the compiling of the Jiaxing Buddhist canon, and Fudeng the
casting of three bronze halls to be enshrined at Mt. Wutai, Mt. Emei,
and Baohuasi (changed from the originally planned Mt. Putuo due to
the threat from pirates). Compared with Deqing's sole dependence on
Cisheng and Zhenke's heavy reliance on scholar-officials, Fudeng kept
independence from both Cisheng and Wanli by making local society as
his base. Fudeng's casting of copper halls projects was a good
example. The project was supported by donations from both the inner
court and local societies. Fudeng was the only one who fulfilled his
vow, while Deqing failed to renovate Da Baoensi and Zhenke also did
not see the completion of the Jiaxing canon project. He was also the
only one who did not suffer from misfortune. Fudeng spent his life in
construction projects, building temples and bridges. He was known as
one of the best architects in Chinese history. Yet his fame did not
seem to have lasted after his death, while Deqing and Zhenke have
been celebrated as eminent monks.

By examining the lives of these three figures, Zhang also raises an
interesting question: "Who had the right, and by what standards, to
decide who constituted an eminent monk?" (p. 157). According to
Zhang, the elevation of Deqing and Zhenke to the status of eminent
monks was due to the promotion by Jiangnan scholar-officials who
"tended to laud political activism and encourage defiance of the
ruling emperor mostly because they had fostered a growing sense of
solidarity with Cisheng and monks in the fight against Wanli. Thus
they shaped Deqing and Zhenke as victims for the public interest,
whether it be monastic or political, and invented heroic stories to
enshrine their loss and to elevate them to such height of adulation"
(p. 196). Although this is an attractive theory, it does not bear
examination. In the biographies of eminent monks, there is always a
section called x_ingfu_ 興福 which is devoted to monks who gained
merit by performing deeds benefiting the world. Fudeng was this kind
of eminent monk. Such criterion was made by Buddhist historians and
not decided by politically motivated scholar-officials. Another
example is Zhuhong who never participated in politics and had nothing
to do with the court. He spent his entire monastic career in his
native Hangzhou. Yet he was without doubt an eminent monk.[2]

The book provides a trajectory of the late Ming Buddhist renewal.
Zhang uses the two indicators of the state of Buddhist institutions
and the retention of eminent monks in Beijing-North China and the
Jiangnan region during the mid- and late Wanli period to chart its
course. Two factors were central for the center of Buddhism moving
from north to south: patrons and monks. Inner court elites served as
major patrons of Buddhism in Beijing but scholar-officials played a
similar role in Jiangnan. During the Wanli era, Beijing attracted up
to one-third eminent monks, and the number was even higher in the
1580s and 1590s (p. 233). However, the majority of eminent monks in
Beijing were not natives and Beijing did not produce eminent monks
locally. Buddhism in Beijing-North China was also much more sensitive
to political changes than in Jiangnan. By contrast, Buddhism was more
successful in engaging local elites and could thus produce most of
its eminent monks locally in Jiangnan.

Zhang states explicitly that "what makes Buddhism a religion is not
emphasized in this study. It was court politics that ultimately
decided the direction and pace of the late-Ming Buddhist renewal. It
was politics that prove an overarching key variable, operating both
on the structural level of policy and on the level of real-life,
context-dependent interactions" (p. 244). Indeed, the entire book is
a successful proof of this thesis. It is curious therefore to read
when he says two pages later, "Despite a high degree of
correspondence, a simple relationship cannot be established between
politics as an influencing factor and the renewal as a resulting
phenomenon. The causality between politics and the Buddhist renewal
resists any simplistic reductionism. Although the renewal would never
have occurred without the political crisis, the crisis alone could
not entail the renewal or determine its complexities" (p. 246). Since
politics cannot account for the renewal, what else is needed to round
out the picture? This is a call for more scholars to venture into
this most interesting field of study. Zhang's book is certainly a
most felicitous beginning.

Notes

[1]. Jiang Wu, _Enlightenment in Dispute: The Reinvention of Chan
Buddhism in Seventeenth-Century China_ (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2008), 280.

[2]. Chün-fang Yü, _The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Zhuhong and
the Late Ming Synthesis_ (1981; repr., New York: Columbia University
Press, 2020).

Citation: Chun-fang Yu. Review of Zhang, Dewei, _Thriving in Crisis:
Buddhism and Political Disruption in China, 1522-1620_. H-Buddhism,
H-Net Reviews. October, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55481

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart


Re: Marxism and intersectionality

fkalosar101@...
 

The concept of intersectionality is IMO somewhat nebulous, but the idea of intersections such as, eg,  that of masculinism, racism, and settlerism creating something stronger and more self-reinforcing than any of the three alone seems a very fruitful way of approaching the unconscious semantics of ideologies, which permeate every aspect of social life. Perhaps another term for this would be the mechanics of false consciousness.

As a rule, intersectionalism has been advanced only as a framework for resistance to special oppressions, but it has broader analytical implications.


Re: "There will be no coup"

workerpoet
 

My point is that Trump's ascension was not the coup. That it was the empowerment of the national security state which was completed with its takeover of the Executive in 1980. Reagan was a demented puppet but Bush Sr. was a highly intelligent CIA operative. His influence on control and "embedding" of the media remains as does the Ayn Rand neolberal economic model adhered to by both wings of the corporate party. What the Germans learned along with the ruling class, is that the military is not necessary for conquest, much less coups. The corporate cabals that  that have come to control the state understand that economic influence and media control are even more efficient for seizing and maintaining control. Roger Ailes was also a big factor in cultivating division, tribalizing partisan politics and twisting the righteous anger of the lumpen working class against itself in support of reactionary corporate agendas. The extreme right also understands how to use culture in its own interests -- something that the left has missed since the devastating purges of McCarthyism.


Re: Fascism, Trumpism, and the left | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

John Reimann
 

First of all, the whole issue of fascism and Trump is really a straw man. There are some fascist vigilante gangs that support Trump, e.g. the Proud Boys. But while they are a threat to protesters, the idea that they are anywhere nearly large enough to pose the threat of an actual fascist takeover is ludicrous. 

Posing the matter as simply the threat of fascism enables many to then draw a line from those who said that every Republican from Nixon on down was a fascist. They thereby equate advocating voting for Biden with the entire history of voting for the Democrat on that basis. In effect, though, what they are doing is implying that there is nothing fundamentally different between Trump and other Republican presidents and would-be presidents.

The issue is not fascism but Trump's very real steps towards bonapartism, meaning his bending various wings of the government to his personal rule. Anybody who follows the news will have to admit that that's what he's doing with the (in)Justice Department and the State Department as well as the CDC now. That is the real issue.

John Reimann

--
“Science and socialism go hand-in-hand.” Felicity Dowling
Check out:https:http://oaklandsocialist.com also on Facebook


Re: "There will be no coup"

Louis Proyect
 

On 10/13/20 9:48 AM, workerpoet wrote:

Beyond and preceding Trump. the coup happened decades ago with the rise of CIA power, the ascension of Reagan/Bush and the implementation of "trickle-down" neoliberal economics. Corporate consortia like ALEC fund politicians and write legislation, the "Federalist Society" occupies the courts, the neocon CIA continues to guide foreign policy and the embedded corporate press feeds us the official narratives.

No, a coup is a military take-over. Like in Chile or Indonesia. What we are dealing with is instead a return to the 19th century. I think that although I disagree with Glen Ford's use of the term to describe the overturn of Reconstruction, it certainly signaled a most reactionary turn that included colonization of Cuba, the Philippines and Hawaii, as well as giving the KKK free rein--as symbolized by Wilson showing "Birth of a Nation" in the White House. The state was totally on the side of the bosses. In the Homestead strike of 1892, the militia broke the strike after Pinkerton's goons were beaten back. All of this dwarfs anything Trump has been up to.


Re: Don't Vote - The Bellows

workerpoet
 

I think displacing Trump is vital for ecological reasons. At the same time it is vital that we organize against Biden and corporate dictatorship shutting down the country if necessary. We are not organized or prepared as a people for the needed revolution. Dumping Trump will buy us a little time.