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Maynard Solomon, Provocative Biographer of Composers, Dies at 90

Louis Proyect
 

Maynard Solomon, Provocative Biographer of Composers, Dies at 90

Mr. Solomon probed the psyches of Mozart and Beethoven in critically acclaimed works; he was also a co-founder of an adventurous Vanguard record label.

Maynard Solomon founded Vanguard records with his
                  brother and went on to write weighty biographies of
                  Beethoven and Mozart.
Maynard Solomon founded Vanguard records with his brother and went on to write weighty biographies of Beethoven and Mozart.Credit...Jerry Bauer/University of California Press

Maynard Solomon, a musicologist and record producer best known for his influential, lucidly written biographies of Beethoven and Mozart, as well as a hotly debated scholarly article on Schubert’s sexuality, died on Sept. 28 at his apartment in Manhattan. He was 90.

The cause was Lewy body dementia, his family said.

Reviewing Mr. Solomon’s 1988 book, “Beethoven Essays,” the New York Times music critic Donal Henahan described Mr. Solomon, who was also a co-founder of the influential record label Vanguard, as “one of the most persuasive voices on behalf of the perilous intellectual voyage known as psychobiography — or, less kindly, ‘psychobabblography.’” But in investigating the mysteries of creative energy, he wrote, Mr. Solomon “builds even his most speculative essays on musicological foundations, not moonbeams.”

Mr. Solomon’s compelling 1977 biography of Beethoven, later revised and reissued, offered fresh, meticulously researched accounts of his life and perceptive yet mostly nontechnical discussions of his compositions.

Going further, Mr. Solomon boldly framed the narrative with psychological speculations on the composer’s life, including the young Beethoven’s fraught relationship with his bullying, alcoholic father and his fantasies of having been born illegitimate and of having royal blood.

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Mr. Solomon was especially astute about Beethoven’s arduous, ultimately successful attempt later in life to wrest legal guardianship of his young nephew, Karl, from his widowed sister-in-law, a woman Beethoven thought immoral. Beethoven’s “obsessive entanglement with them,” Mr. Solomon wrote, “forcibly wrenched his emotional energies from their attachment to the outer world and focused them upon the still unresolved issues of his family constellation.”

For some readers, Mr. Solomon went too far in his books and numerous articles. He put the “stubborn, moody, withdrawn Ludwig on a psychoanalytic couch,” a review of the Beethoven biography in Kirkus said.

Image
Mr. Solomon’s biographies of Beethoven and Mozart resonated outside the realm of classical music.

Still, his approach resonated outside the realm of classical music. Mr. Solomon’s “Mozart: A Life” was a finalist for the 1996 Pulitzer Prize in biography. And he won wide respect among scholars. In a 2007 article for the Journal of the American Musicological Society, the music scholar Thomas S. Grey wrote that “no living writer, at least in English, has had a greater influence on our current perception of Beethoven as a creative personality than Maynard Solomon.”

His book “Late Beethoven: Music, Thought, Imagination” (2004) was also influential.

Maynard Elliott Solomon was born on Jan. 5, 1930, in Manhattan, the youngest of three children of Benjamin and Dora (Levinsky) Solomon. His father, who had a rabbinical education in Ukraine, immigrated to New York, where he worked as a typesetter, owned a candy store near Gracie Mansion and, after the family moved to Brooklyn, ran a successful art supply store, where young Maynard often worked. His mother, who immigrated from Lithuania, worked as a seamstress until her marriage.

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Attending the High School of Music and Art, as it was then called, in Manhattan, Mr. Solomon played the piano and studied cello. Recalling family music-making sessions for a Talk of the Town feature in The New Yorker in 1955, Mr. Solomon said that though neither of his parents was musical, his mother “always wanted, and got, a trio in the house”: He played cello, his brother violin and his sister piano.

He graduated from Brooklyn College in 1950 with a B.A. in music and English, and continued his studies at Columbia University. Unusually for someone who became a respected scholar, Mr. Solomon never completed an advanced degree.

In 1950, with a $10,000 loan from their father, Maynard and his brother, Seymour, founded Vanguard Records. The venture began after Seymour, who had studied musicology at New York University, took a tape recorder to Vienna to capture performances of Bach cantatas by the Vienna State Opera Orchestra and Chorus conducted by Felix Prohaska.

Over time Vanguard and its Bach Guild label released an impressively diverse catalog of valuable recordings, especially of overlooked works, and issued pivotal albums of folk music, blues and jazz. The classical repertory included English madrigals, overlooked Bach cantatas, masses by Haydn and a landmark survey of the complete Mahler symphonies with Maurice Abravanel conducting the Utah Symphony Orchestra.

During the height of McCarthyism in the mid-1950s, Vanguard signed blacklisted performers including the bass-baritone Paul Robeson and the Weavers, whose 1956 release “The Weavers at Carnegie Hall” helped spark a revival of folk music in America. Vanguard became one of the industry’s leading folk and blues labels, releasing important albums by Joan Baez, Buffy Sainte-Marie, Odetta, Mississippi John Hurt, the Jim Kweskin Jug Band and other acts. Jazz artists like Elvin Jones, Larry Coryell and Oregon also recorded for Vanguard, as did the rock group Country Joe and the Fish. The Solomon brothers sold the label in 1986.

In the 1970s, while maintaining a full-time job at Vanguard, Maynard Solomon had been drawn increasingly into research and writing, mostly working in the evenings and weekends. His political sympathies led to the publication in 1973 of “Marxism and Art: Essays Classic and Contemporary,” a collection of basic readings in Marxist criticism and aesthetics edited and introduced by Mr. Solomon. The sale of Vanguard allowed him to concentrate fully on research.

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He shook up musicology in 1989 with an article in the journal 19th-Century Music intriguingly titled “Franz Schubert and the Peacocks of Benvenuto Cellini.” Citing letters and written recollections from Schubert’s close male friends, accompanied by deep dives into the mores of the period, Mr. Solomon presented a case that the composer was primarily homosexual.

There was predictable pushback from some corners of the musicological establishment. Several scholars pointed to questionable readings of sources. And Mr. Solomon’s analysis of evidence that Schubert may have engaged in relations with adolescent men, referred to in coded references as “peacocks,” was seen as the most speculative leap in his argument.

Still, that Schubert had deep longings for men that filled him at once with sensual excitement and anguish comes through persuasively. Those emotions, some may feel, help explain the melancholy that can permeate even Schubert pieces that seem cheerful on the surface.

The most controversial element of Mr. Solomon’s absorbing biography of Mozart was his portrait of the composer’s father. Leopold Mozart “emerges as a possessive monster,” the New York Times book critic Michiko Kakutani wrote in a 1995 review, “obsessed with controlling his brilliant son’s entire life, as a means of financial aggrandizement, as a ratification of his own skills as a teacher and as an unconscious recapitulation with his own conflicts with his mother.”

Yet Edward W. Said, in an admiring review for The New Yorker, saw nuance in the book’s depiction of a father-son partnership. Mr. Solomon “shows how it imprisoned the young Wolfgang Mozart creatively and personally in the older man’s sphere as rebel and — here Solomon’s ingenuity gives an audacious edge to his interpretation — as willing captive,” Mr. Said wrote. Leopold’s feelings, he said, are seen as “predicated on love and admiration, not merely venality and greed.” He concluded that he “did not know a musician’s biography as satisfying and moving as this one.”

Mr. Solomon taught regularly in adjunct and visiting professor stints at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Columbia, Harvard and Yale, and joined the graduate faculty at the Juilliard School.

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His brother died in 2002, and his sister, Mildred Gelbloom, in 2015. Mr. Solomon is survived by his wife, Eva Tevan Solomon; his sons, Mark and Maury; his daughter, Nina Solomon; and five grandchildren.

He was well aware that some felt his speculations on composers were too Freudian. But, in the preface to the original edition of his Beethoven biography, he quoted Freud’s observation that “there is a grain of truth concealed in every delusion.”




Monica Roberts, Transgender Advocate and Journalist, Dies at 58

Louis Proyect
 

Monica Roberts, Transgender Advocate and Journalist, Dies at 58

Ms. Roberts started her blog, TransGriot, in 2006, at a time when coverage of transgender issues by the mainstream media was limited.

Monica Roberts, the founder of the blog TransGriot, speaking at a National L.G.B.T.Q. Task Force conference in Dallas this year. Credit...via National L.G.B.T.Q. Task Force

Monica Roberts, a transgender advocate and journalist who chronicled the lives, and sometimes the deaths, of transgender people through her blog, TransGriot, died on Oct. 5 at her home in Houston. She was 58.

Her mother, Mable Roberts, confirmed the death. She said that Ms. Roberts had complained of chest pains the day before her death and a medical examiner had found blood clots in her lungs.

In the West African tradition, a griot is a storyteller, and Ms. Roberts set out to tell the stories and history and lived experiences of the transgender community. She started her blog in 2006, at a time when coverage of transgender issues by the mainstream media was limited and often deemed offensive by those being covered.

“A proud unapologetic Black trans woman speaking truth to power and discussing the world around her” is how Ms. Roberts described her blog.

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On TransGriot, she celebrated Breanna Sinclairé, a transgender opera singer who performed the national anthem at baseball games, and wrote about Raquel Willis, the former executive editor of Out magazine. She covered issues surrounding transgender rights and, in a blog post one month before her death, expressed support for Mia Mason, a transgender woman who is running for Congress in Maryland’s First District against Andy Harris, the incumbent. In that article, Ms. Roberts offered a capsule history of the transgender community and the world of politics, compiling a list of every transgender person worldwide ever elected to serve in a national legislatures.

On other occasions, Ms. Roberts, a sports fan, gave her N.F.L. picks.

“Her blog was important because she was chronicling the transgender experience deeply in a way that many outlets just weren’t in the mid-2000s,” said Ms. Willis, herself a Black transgender activist, in a phone interview. “Often, she was the only one who noticed and sang our praises.”

Angelica Ross, an actress and the founder of TransTech Social Enterprises, an organization that works to give L.G.B.T.Q. people career opportunities in tech, said that transgender readers trusted Ms. Roberts to tell their stories in a way they didn’t trust journalists from mainstream outlets.

“Monica wrote about things when no one else would, and she wrote about them with care,” Ms. Ross said. “She showed attention to the details, such as pronouns or naming us how we were known.”

Ms. Roberts became especially admired for her tireless work to identify transgender murder victims, who are often described by the police and in local media by their birth names. She found that such misgendering known as deadnaming, can make it harder to solve the crime, in part because friends of the deceased often don’t know their given names and may not learn of a death for days or longer.

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Her sleuthing, which like her blog was largely self-funded, grew out of frustration, she told The Daily Beast in 2019 — particularly amid a rise in violence against transgender women that the American Medical Association declared an “epidemic.” “When you deliberately misgender a victim, then you’re delaying justice for that trans person who has been murdered,” Ms. Roberts said.

“I got tired of them being disrespected in death,” she added.

ImageAs her fame grew from
                her writing career, Ms. Roberts became an outspoken
                voice for transgender rights.
As her fame grew from her writing career, Ms. Roberts became an outspoken voice for transgender rights.Credit...via National LGBTQ Task Force

Monica Katrice Roberts was born on May 4, 1962, in Houston. Her father, Rick Roberts, was a local disc jockey and radio executive. Her mother was an elementary schoolteacher.

Ms. Roberts graduated from Jesse H. Jones High School (now Jones Futures Academy) in 1980 and went to work for Continental Airlines as a desk agent.

When Ms. Roberts began transitioning in the early 1990s and came to work dressed as a woman, she faced harassment from her co-workers and reprisals from her supervisors, Mable Roberts said.

Ms. Roberts moved to Louisville, Ky., and lived there for several years. She held various jobs, including security guard, before moving back to Houston and starting her career as a writer and advocate.

“There was something visionary about the work Monica Roberts was producing,” Ms. Willis said. “Her writing was the gateway for countless people’s journey to their gender identity.”

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She was a force to be reckoned with in the local politics of Houston and “a pioneer in every sense of the word,” the city’s mayor, Sylvester Turner, said in a statement after her death.

As her fame grew, Ms. Roberts became a source for national L.G.B.T.Q. advocacy organizations and news outlets, as well as an outspoken voice on the issue of violence committed against transgender people, and Black transgender people specifically, attending conferences, demonstrating outside state capitol buildings and maintaining a vigilant online presence.

TransGriot received the Glaad Media Award for outstanding blog in 2018 and was nominated four other times.

Ms. Roberts also wrote for Ebony.com, HuffPost, The Advocate and other publications.

In addition to her mother, Ms. Roberts is survived by a brother, Kevin Roberts, and two sisters, Kecia Roberts and Latoya Roberts.

Dee Dee Watters, a close friend of Ms. Roberts, said what motivated her in all her efforts was making the world a little easier for younger generations of transgender people.

“Monica really wanted to make sure that the younger kids coming up would have some kind of life — easier than what we went through when we transitioned. That was the real goal,” Ms. Watters said in a phone interview. “It brought her joy seeing younger trans people being able to exist in their whole selves.”


Poverty, racism, and inequality merge with COVID-19 to create ‘syndemic’ | W. T. Whitney Jr. | People's World

Kevin Lindemann and Cathy Campo
 

https://peoplesworld.org/article/poverty-racism-and-inequality-merge-with-covid-19-to-create-syndemic/

Poverty, racism, and inequality merge with COVID-19 to create ‘syndemic’

A soldier in protective gear amid the COVID-19 pandemic stands guard in Ciudad Bolivar, an area with high cases of coronavirus in Bogota, Colombia, July 13, 2020. A homeless man without even a mask to protect himself sits in the street nearby. | Fernando Vergara / AP

The writer is a retired pediatric physician.

It didn’t seem to fit. The website of the Colombian Communist Party on Oct. 5 published a medical doctor’s reflections on re-characterizing a disease. Félix León Martínez, MD, quoted extensively from an editorial appearing in the famous British medical journal Lancet. He and Lancet editor Richard Horton, MD, claim that COVID-19 is not a disease but rather what Horton calls a “syndemic.”

A disease manifests signs and symptoms, and its cause or causes and treatment methods are usually well known. The assumption of both writers is that for COVID-19, ideas of cause and treatment are less well established, so far. In his article, Martínez draws from Horton’s editorial to analyze the COVID-19 situation in Colombia. The present report aspires to do likewise in regard to the United States, expanding upon Horton’s remarks in regard to management.

Martínez’s title is “From Pandemic to Syndemic: Poor Prognosis.” He indicates that “the [COVID-19] pandemic, although in principle a phenomenon of biological origin, affects each nation differently, according to the political, economic, and social organization it has established.”

Martínez is associated with the National University of Colombia, where he studies and writes about social protection. He serves as president of Colombia’s Foundation for Research and Development in Health and Social Security.

Horton, whom Martínez quotes extensively, states that, “We have viewed the cause of this crisis as an infectious disease … But … the story of COVID-19 is not so simple. Two categories of disease are interacting within specific populations—infection with severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) and an array of non-communicable diseases (NCDs). These conditions are clustering within social groups according to patterns of inequality deeply embedded in our societies. The aggregation of these diseases on a background of social and economic disparity exacerbates the adverse effects of each separate disease.”

As described by Horton, “Syndemics are characterized by biological and social interactions between conditions and states, interactions that increase a person’s susceptibility to harm or worsen their health outcomes … The hallmark of a syndemic is the presence of two or more pathological states that interact adversely with each other, adversely affecting the mutual course of each disease trajectory.” COVID-19, therefore, is more than a pandemic.

Horton observes that, “For the world’s poorest billion people today, Noncommunicable Diseases (NCDs) account for more than one-third of their disease burden.” And, “The most important consequence of seeing COVID-19 as a syndemic is to highlight its social origins. The vulnerability of older citizens, black, Asian, and minority ethnic communities, and key workers, who are commonly underpaid and have fewer social protections, points to a hitherto barely recognized truth, namely that no matter how effective a treatment or protective vaccine is, the search for a purely biomedical solution to COVID-19 will fail.”

In his article, Martínez emphasizes Colombia’s extreme economic inequalities. For example, 10% of landholders own 82% of the productive land, and soon “three of every five persons in Colombia will be living in a state of precariousness or poverty,” and “24% of the vulnerable middle class will fall again into poverty.”

In Colombia, he notes, the rates of people dying from heart attacks, cerebrovascular illnesses, and hypertension—the three major causes of death—and from diabetes were increasing before COVID-19 appeared. Those conditions had become more prevalent too, along with obesity. For many Colombians, medical care for any illness is inaccessible and/or of poor quality. The burden of pre-existing illness on people infected with COVID-19, Martínez suggests, adds to the likelihood they will be terribly sick or die.

At this writing, nearly 29,000 Colombians have died from COVID-19. Colombia’s case fatality rate is 3.1%, the 10th highest in the world. Martínez cites a recent poll indicating that 16% of people in Bogota lack food and that 65% of households there include at least one person who is unemployed due to COVID-19.

The U.S. experience of COVID-19 also warrants taking a broad view of the situation. According to the CDC, Blacks, Indians, and Latinxs face at least 2.6 times the risk of being infected by COVID-19 as do white people. And COVID-19 death rates for Indians and Blacks are 1.4% and 2.1% greater, respectively, than the rate for white people.

Nancy Foster holds up a photo of Skylar Herbert, the 5-year-old daughter of Detroit first responders who died of COVID-19 related issues, outside of the James H. Cole Home for Funerals in Detroit, April 29, 2020. Studies have repeatedly shown that African-Americans, Latino populations, and Indigenous Americans already carry higher risk of having non-communicable diseases which put them at increased risk for COVID-19. | Mandi Wright / Detroit Free Press via AP

But according to epidemiologist Sharrelle Barber, writing in the Lancet, “Blacks comprise 13% of the U.S. population but roughly one quarter of COVID-19 deaths and are nearly four times more likely to die from COVID-19 compared to whites … Blacks across all age groups are nearly three times more likely than white people to contract COVID-19.”

Prior to the arrival of the virus, Black people and Latinxs were dying earlier from cancer, diabetes, hypertension, chronic respiratory disease, and other noncommunicable diseases than were whites. Their life expectancy at age 50 is significantly less than the life expectancy for U.S. whites. Their previous ill health spells extreme danger when they are infected with COVID-19. Multiple studies have highlighted racial discrimination and racist attitudes that accompany their healthcare experience. The result frequently is inferior quality of care and reduced access.

The average African-American family income in 2018 was $41,361; for white families, $70,642. The poverty rate for African Americans that year was 20.8%, more than twice that of whites. Indeed, poverty alone predisposes Blacks and Latinxs to becoming seriously ill or dying from COVID-19. Low income often means reduced access to healthcare through inability to pay or lack of insurance. The result often is:  no regular healthcare providers, nutritional problems, crowded housing, and work situations where virus exposure may be expected. Nevertheless, effects of low income and racism often merge, and are not easily separated for study.

Ideally, the practice of health care is collaborative. Physicians regularly seek help from colleagues who are knowledgeable about unfamiliar medical conditions or who offer special treatment skills. They seek consultation. Editor Richard Horton was advising infectious disease specialists to seek consultation in dealing with COVID-19. Specifically: “Limiting the harm caused by SARS-CoV-2 will demand far greater attention to NCDs and socioeconomic inequality than has hitherto been admitted [and] Unless governments design policies and programs to reverse the deep disparities, our societies will never be truly safe from COVID-19.”

Both Horton and Dr. Martínez in effect want political practitioners—politicians and the people’s movement—to take an active role in fashioning all-encompassing programs of prevention and treatment. They would be working toward a just society. When editors at pacocol.org publicized Martínez’s article, they were communicating that, in this case of a sick society, Colombian Communists would be joining the ranks of necessary consultants.




Canada’s last breeding pair of endangered spotted owls found in valley slated for imminent logging | The Narwhal

Louis Proyect
 


Re: Fascism, Trumpism, and the left | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

Mark Lause
 

They are rather classic "factions" in the sense that the Federalist papers discussed them.  They are self-interested cliques competing for control over the government for their own immediate interests. 

This is why those with a junior high sports understanding of American politics get confused.  They think that the same party label implies some consistency when the only real reliable consistency is that they'd like to get power and keep it.

Bernie surely knows better than to actually believe that supporting Democrats is a way to get a third party.

ML


Confirmation by the Class Enemy (IMF Report on Global Class Struggle and COVID-19 Crisis)

RKOB
 

Confirmation by the Class Enemy

A new IMF report discusses the global class struggle and its relationship to the COVID-19 crisis

By Michael Pröbsting, 14 October 2020

https://www.thecommunists.net/worldwide/global/confirmation-by-the-class-enemy-imf-report-on-global-class-struggle-and-covid-19-crisis/

-- 
Revolutionär-Kommunistische Organisation BEFREIUNG
(Österreichische Sektion der RCIT, www.thecommunists.net)
www.rkob.net
aktiv@...
Tel./SMS/WhatsApp/Telegram: +43-650-4068314

Virenfrei. www.avast.com


Re: Fascism, Trumpism, and the left | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

fkalosar101@...
 

I've always said that the Rethuglicans and the Demicraps are not parties but "anitparties"--based on all the Floundering Bothers horseshit about the "evils of party" or faction or whatever (not as unified a perspective as some want to see there).  Actual membership parties would be a step forward in the US context--especially if such parties had a broader activist and internationalist focus rather than existing merely as loose networks of committees (and conspiracies) to elect this or that Wonderbread man or woman.

But in the long run IMO all bourgeois democratic constitutions and party charters, etc., are fungible--as Tony Blah and New Labor and innumerable non-socialist Socialist coalitions also demonstrate, they are all capable of arriving pretty much at the same point with reference to the class system however they get there. 

The Bernie Sanders idea that you can create a virtual third party by caucusing within the nebulous confines of the "Democrats" isn't disproved primarily by his failure to bring this off.  He wasn't trying. Guys like that never do--and the Democrats wouldn't stand for it if they did.  But the main obstacle isn't party rules or formal structure, which can always be hacked--it's political.  


Re: Fascism, Trumpism, and the left | Louis Proyect: The Unrepentant Marxist

Andrew Stewart
 

Andrew, would you please list some of these major points of Marxist wisdom which Lenin 'outright rejected and repudiated'?
The received Marxist wisdom in 1917 at the time of the Russian revolution that Lenin acted contrary to:
1-Socialist revolution could not take place anywhere besides an advanced capitalist country such as Germany
2-Socialist revolution could only take place following a bourgeois democratic revolution
3-From an interview with Lukacs: It was Lenin who, for the first time since Marx, seriously raised the significance of the subjective factors in revolution. His definition of a revolutionary situation, when the ruling classes are no longer able to govern in the old sense, and the oppressed classes are no longer willing to live in the old way, is generally known. When his followers adopted this concept, some made a ‘slight’ difference in interpretation, saying that ‘not to want to live in the old way’ meant for them that economic development is automatically turning people into revolutionaries. Lenin knew that the problem of ‘not wanting to live in the old way’ has strong dialectical implications and is a manifold tendency of society.
4-Also consider the numerous criticisms that Kautsky raised (ones I do not agree with but that is besides the point). The whole Menshevik/West European Social Democratic indictment of the Bolshevik revolution, made manifest in the USA by the Socialist Party of America and later Michael Harrington, claimed a fundamental break with Marx's theory had occurred when the Bolsheviks took power.


A famed horror director mines Japan’s real-life atrocities

Dennis Brasky
 


H-Net Review [H-LatAm]: Fajardo on Offner, 'Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas'

Andrew Stewart
 



---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 9:25 AM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-LatAm]: Fajardo on Offner, 'Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas'
To: <h-review@...>
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>


Amy C. Offner.  Sorting Out the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of
Welfare and Developmental States in the Americas.  Princeton 
Princeton University Press, 2019.  xv + 381 pp.  $39.95 (cloth), ISBN
978-0-691-19262-8.

Reviewed by Margarita Fajardo (Sarah Lawrence College)
Published on H-LatAm (October, 2020)
Commissioned by Casey M. Lurtz

Neoliberalism occupies a prominent place in recent historical
scholarship. To explain the emergence of neoliberalism at the end of
the twentieth century, Amy Offner's _Sorting Out the Mixed Economy
_examines the making of the developmental and welfare states in
midcentury Colombia and the United States. The book argues that many
of the ideas, institutions, and policies classified under the epithet
of "neoliberalism" emerged in the process of the consolidation of
midcentury developmental and welfare states and were only later, in
the 1970s and 1980s, "sorted out," that is, redeployed, redefined, or
repurposed, to dismantle those states (p. 17). While the term
"developmental state" was initially used to explain East Asia's rapid
development and push back against those who attributed such phenomena
to the "market" rather than the "state," the author uses the term to
remind us that the midcentury project of economic development was as
much about private initiative as of state expansion. Offner shows
that the use of austere social policies, the privatization of public
services, and the delegation of public functions to autonomous or
decentralized agencies, cornerstones of the neoliberal turn, were
fundamental to the making of a previous era that both the
"triumphalist" narrative of the Right and the corresponding "dissent"
of the Left have conceived as radically distinct from contemporary
neoliberalism (p. 284). Rather than a complete break with the past,
_Sorting Out the Mixed Economy_ presents an argument about continuity
between past and present that invites the reader to rethink both the
development/welfare and neoliberal eras.

Methodologically and narratively, the book is an enlightening example
and useful model for writing connected and transnational histories.
With cogent prose, the book skillfully takes the reader from
midcentury Colombia to the United States's Great Society and back to
Colombia at the turn of the century. In the process, it examines
Colombia's Cauca River Valley and its regional development project,
Bogotá's higher education and housing programs, and the Navajo
Indian Reservation's education and housing experiments, among others.
Although David Lilienthal, a New Dealer, Third World development
expert, and pioneer of "social entrepreneurship" (p. 182) in the
United States, is the principal binding agent of the different
histories, the book has a wider set of lesser-known characters that
connects the Americas North and South. Recreating the "Americas" as a
shared rather than dichotomic space, Offner shows a set of
individuals, ideas, and institutions moving in both directions and
crafting a common discourse about the balance between public and
private, the formal and informal sectors in midcentury mixed
economies. Although economists and development experts as well as
landowners and businessmen are the most prominent characters in a
story about the fall of developmental/welfare states and the rise of
neoliberalism, the book also gives voice to _campesinos,_ community
organizers, factory workers, and other important groups and classes
that embraced or contested those development and welfare projects. By
decentering the narrative from Washington, DC, as well as from
Bogotá, the book shows not only the expansion in the reach of the
midcentury states but also the alternative avenues through which
influence and power flowed across the Americas.

_Sorting Out the Mixed Economy_ makes important contributions in
several fields, too many to cover in depth in this review. By
focusing on the establishment of economics and business
administration departments at Universidad de los Andes and
Universidad del Valle respectively and on the tension between
economists and managers, the book informs the debate about the rise
of economists and economics. In so doing, Offner contributes to the
history of the discipline and the sociology of professionalization.
By focusing on self-housing projects in Bogotá, California, and
Mississippi among other "austere forms of social welfare provision"
(pp. 17 and 278), the book sharpens our understanding of the
dismantling of welfare and development states through
developmentalist and welfare strategies designed to strengthen those
very same states. In so doing, it recasts the bourgeoning history of
neoliberalism, making a very important intervention in an already
growing and fast-moving field. In this review, my focus will be on
the book's contributions and the questions it opens with regard to
the history of US-Latin American relations and the history of the
region during its development era. 

In terms of the history of relations between the United States and
Latin America, Offner inverts one of the field's most important
narratives. The book has a set of characters traditional in the
postwar-era histories in the field: large North American
corporations, US bankers and philanthropic foundations, foreign aid
institutions like Point IV and the World Bank, US university
professors, and development experts. Yet these actors play secondary,
not primary, roles and follow more than lead local actors. Rather
than portraying the "southward projection of power" of the United
States in Latin America (pp. 15 and 289), the book foregrounds the
stories of the Cauca Valley landowners, aspiring professional
economists and managers in Bogotá and Cali, and promoters of
community action programs that in turn "enlisted" US institutions,
ideas, and individuals (pp. 18 and 289). Rather than bringing
innovative advice or alien projects, those experts and institutions
supported an existing agenda and as such, inserted themselves in
local or domestic power struggles.   

Furthermore, the book explains how participation in those local
political struggles transformed New Dealers like Lilienthal into
"Third World Veterans" who, upon migrating back north, mobilized the
lessons learned with Colombian entrepreneurs to develop the notion of
the social responsibility of corporations through which "businessmen
made inroads into the welfare state" (p. 209). Other Third World
Veterans legitimized policy options such as self-help housing,
previously considered inadmissible for the First World welfare state,
and such policy became the foundation for a "nationwide anti-poverty
policy" in the United States (p. 215).   

Therefore, _Sorting Out the Mixed Economy _shows the "entwined
histories" of United States and Latin America beyond imposition and
domination. Offner illustrates the not-often-recognized policy
influence of Latin America in the United States. Given that the
directionality of influence is generally shown to flow from north to
south, especially when it comes to austere economic measures and
structural adjustment programs, the trajectory of Colombian economist
Eduardo Wiesner discussed in the book opens up new avenues for
research. Although he was a high-level International Monetary Fund
official, staff member of the World Bank in the 1980s and 1990s, and
bearer of the structural adjustment bandwagon, his ideas about fiscal
decentralization and austerity, Offner argues, were not the product
of intellectual brainwashing but of years of thinking of and
participating in the developmental and decentralized Colombian state.
His story suggests the need to explore the "Bogotá"--or perhaps the
Mexico City or São Paulo--and not just the "Washington Consensus."

With regard to Latin American history, the book raises important
questions. _Sorting Out the Mixed Economy _eschews, for
understandable reasons, the question of Colombian exceptionalism.
Latin America has had a wide variety of experiences, trends and
patterns are always somewhat artificial, and Colombia, as the book
rightly contends, merits attention "on its own right" (p. 9).
However, some of the arguments upon which the book rests are perhaps
due to that "exceptionalism" and therefore would have merited more
discussion of the place of Colombia in the regional context. By
looking at Colombia, the book attempts to disrupt the "common
association between development and centralized power" (p. 10) that
reduces development to national, centralizing statism and which
certainly prevailed in the development narratives of the time and
still looms large today.   

Yet the Colombian case might be an exception more than a rule, a
question that requires further research. Although regional
development corporations and autonomous development agencies that the
book discusses emerged throughout Latin America, the effects varied
across the region. While in the Colombian case, as the book shows,
regional development corporations strengthened local economic elites
vis-à-vis the central state in Bogotá, in countries like Chile and
Brazil for instance, regional development corporations or autonomous
agencies either deepened "centralized state developmentalism" or were
"deeply tied to the Executive power," continuing a trend of
centralization of state power that began in the 1930s.[1]  Similarly,
while the US-sponsored Alliance for Progress funded self-help housing
programs in Bogotá, it supported publicly subsidized low- and
middle-income housing projects in Chile, both of which became models
for the Alliance.

As _Sorting Out the Mixed Economy _rightly indicates, both "impulses"
for the expansion of the public and private sectors, of
centralization and decentralization, appeared together in the
"developmental state" in Latin America. However, Colombia opted for
the short end of the stick, or rather for "cheap" or austere
measures. Although the book argues that those strategies were later
used to dismantle the state in the neoliberal era, sometimes it seems
that, as private interests "captured" public policy or "assumed
public functions" (p. 287), the state was either dismantled from the
start or the developmental state was, like any other state in a
capitalist economy, negotiating the balance between private and
public.   

Perhaps Colombia and the United States, the two national cases that
_Sorting Out the Mixed Economy_ is built upon, lend themselves to
illustrating continuities between the development and welfare era and
the neoliberal era because they have, for good reason, not been what
we traditionally think of as developmental states in Latin America or
welfare states in the global North. These countries traditionally
have also had less contentious foreign relations between them than
other countries in the region, facilitating the creation of
crossroads and policy, ideological and institutional
cross-fertilization between the two Americas.

Despite, or rather, because it raises fundamental questions about two
historical eras in the Americas North and South, _Sorting Out the
Mixed Econom_y is an ambitious and thought-provoking study that
reframes our understanding of both development and neoliberalism and
will shape research in many scholarly fields. With a captivating and
empirically rich narrative and a lucid interpretation, the book is a
well-crafted and thoughtful work of scholarship. Often, I found that
the questions raised as I read were shortly after answered "con
creces," showing the careful and methodical craft of the argument and
the narrative. The book speaks in many more registers than I was able
to capture in this review and therefore deserves an old-style
sit-down read to catch the multiple insights and provocations in what
is already a provocative and insightful book at its core. Explaining
the dismantling of the midcentury state, _Sorting Out the Mixed
Economy_ sharpens our understanding of the development/welfare and
neoliberal eras while opening new lenses for reading US-Latin
American relations.

Note

[1]. See for instance, José Orihuela and Luciana Leão's articles in
Agustín Ferraro and Miguel Centeno, eds., _State and Nation-Making
in Latin America and Spain: The Rise and Fall of the Developmental
State_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

Citation: Margarita Fajardo. Review of Offner, Amy C., _Sorting Out
the Mixed Economy: The Rise and Fall of Welfare and Developmental
States in the Americas_. H-LatAm, H-Net Reviews. October, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55265

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart


H-Net Review [H-Atlantic]: Almeida on Gharala, 'Taxing Blackness: Free Afromexican Tribute in Bourbon New Spain'

Andrew Stewart
 



---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: Wed, Oct 14, 2020 at 11:20 AM
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Atlantic]: Almeida on Gharala, 'Taxing Blackness: Free Afromexican Tribute in Bourbon New Spain'
To: <h-review@...>
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>


Norah L. A. Gharala.  Taxing Blackness: Free Afromexican Tribute in
Bourbon New Spain.  Atlantic Crossings Series. Tuscaloosa  University
of Alabama Press, 2019.  Illustrations. xii + 292 pp.  $54.95
(cloth), ISBN 978-0-8173-2007-2.

Reviewed by James Almeida (Harvard University)
Published on H-Atlantic (October, 2020)
Commissioned by Bryan Rindfleisch

Unpacking the Economics of Racial Hierarchy in New Spain

Recent scholarship has turned a sharper eye on both race and imperial
rule in eighteenth-century North and South America, moving past
monolithic and top-down views to see what imperial policies looked
like at the grassroots level. Norah L. A. Gharala advances this work
by analyzing the contested domain of Afromexican tribute under
Spain's Bourbon monarchs, to argue that "blackness and tributary
status became increasingly synonymous in the second half of the
eighteenth century" (pp. 16-17). The author expertly defends her
argument by exploring the tools and dynamics of Bourbon tribute
expansion and the reactions of Afromexicans throughout the eighteenth
century.

_Taxing Blackness_ engages with the historiography of the Bourbon
Reforms and with debates about the development of race and the social
location of Afromexicans via the concepts of _casta _(caste) and
_calidad _(status). Drawing on a broad and diverse source base in
terms of chronology, geography, and level in the colonial bureaucracy
enables the author to make both qualitative and quantitative claims
and to analyze the changes in Afromexican tribute from both bottom-up
and top-down perspectives. Gharala does so to contribute an
understanding of not just what changed over time in terms of tribute
collection (an expansion based on registering people who had not paid
previously, rather than on demographic growth alone) but also _how_
it changed through new organizations and procedures. In the realm of
_casta_ and _calidad_, Gharala argues that neither was equivalent to
race nor represented steps in a linear progression toward a modern
racial system, but rather these were parallel systems mutually
related to the tributary status. Furthermore, she builds on the work
of scholars like María Elena Martínez (_Genealogical Fictions:
Limpieza De Sangre, Religion, and Gender in Colonial Mexico_ [2008])
and Ann Twinam (_Purchasing Whiteness: Pardos, Mulattos, and the
Quest for Social Mobility in the Spanish Indies_ [2015]) in
explaining the procedural modes of negotiating social status while
invoking a long debate about when and how these categories mattered.
_Taxing Blackness _also extends the work started by Ben Vinson in the
study of Afromexican tribute (_Bearing Arms for His Majesty: The
Free-Colored Militia in Colonial Mexico_ [2001]) by considering
exemption petitions based on changes to the petitioner's _calidad_. 

Gharala traces the developments in tribute administration and
Afromexican resistance to paying by dividing the study
chronologically around the Caroline Reforms (1700-63) and into
thematic chapters within each section. In the first half of the book,
the first three chapters consider the period before the reforms
(1700-63) to give an overview of tribute's history and importance
(chapter 1), to discuss how tributary status was determined and
enforced (chapter 2), and to demonstrate Afromexican efforts to
exempt themselves from payment (chapter 3). The second half of the
book also uses this structure to deal with the post-Caroline Reform
period (1763-1800), tackling the expansion of tribute and its
economic impact (chapter 4), changing procedures used to identify
tributaries (chapter 5), and new efforts at exemption (chapter 6).

The most important conclusion that the author draws is that Bourbon
administrators successfully and significantly expanded crown income
from Afromexican tribute during the eighteenth century and
particularly after 1763. This was not simply a product of the natural
growth of the Afromexican population. Rather, Gharala forcefully
demonstrates that increased standardization and enforcement in
collection practices are what led to the expansion. Despite the
centralization efforts of Bourbon administrators, expanding the
tribute registers required deputization of and negotiation with local
officials who created the registers. The recording process took the
married Afromexican couple as the base unit for registration and
reformers looked for shortcuts--particularly physiognomy--to identify
tributaries, but ultimately they had to accept genealogy as the
basis. Genealogy was the preferred method of determining tributary
status for most local officials and for potential Afromexican
tributaries, because it offered a means of both assigning
(descendance from Africans) and evading (descendance from
conquistadors or providers of other important and recognized services
to the crown) tribute. Genealogical claims involved communal
knowledge about current and past residents and could be substantiated
via documents or testimony.

This finding that genealogy substantiated identifications of
tributaries points to Gharala's second important contribution: an
understanding of the complex relationship between process and social
identification. Here, she demonstrates how the process of expanding
tribute influenced perception and vocabulary about social
positioning. Changing tribute registers had a mutually constitutive
relationship with categories of _casta _and _calidad. _Gharala
observes that the implementation of new registers using a centralized
model flattened differences between different Afromexican _castas_
(_negros_,_ mulatos_,_ pardos_, etc.) and even between indigenous
Mexicans and Afromexicans, who had previously been listed separately
but were now combined. This made tributary status itself an important
social marker. She makes these conclusions by an extensive and
well-documented explanation of the changing procedures for
determining tributary status and collecting tribute. The author's
extensive knowledge of this process altogether lends ample support to
her claims throughout her work.

These contributions make _Taxing Blackness_ an important source for
specialists in Afromexican history and economic or institutional
history of the colonial regime in New Spain. For Atlantic scholars,
Gharala provides comparative context by discussing tribute (and
tribute-adjacent) practices and demographics of people of African
descent elsewhere in Spanish America but also in British and
Portuguese imperial possessions. These references are interspersed
throughout the text.

What might limit the book's appeal to nonspecialists or
undergraduates is the way Gharala sidesteps fruitful debates about
_casta_,_ calidad_, and race. The author declares a preference to
discuss "_calidad_, blackness, and tributary status" instead of
identity or race and proceeds to argue that these "ideas about social
difference did not take on a 'coherent ideology of race' that would
operate in the Spanish Atlantic" (p. 9). But this seems a curious
benchmark to set: was there ever a coherent ideology of race? As
support for this idea, she offers evidence that Afromexicans avoided
phenotypical or racial designations in their petitions. But a
different reading might see this as confirmation of the idea that
tributary identification of Afromexicans was building toward systemic
racism and that Afromexicans wanted to maximize their potential for
success by downplaying their blackness. I remain unconvinced by
Gharala's repeated insistence that _calidad_ is not race,
particularly when some of her evidence would suggest otherwise or at
least demand more thorough consideration. For example, a petitioner
justified his exemption by stating he was not a member of any
"tributary castes" and declaring himself "free of any bad race" (p.
43). While Gharala acknowledges that ideas about _calidad _and _casta
_contributed to the later development of race, this framing of the
problem has the effect of making _calidad_ (and more specifically,
tributary _calidad_) into something real and isolated from other
parts of social history in ways that it was likely not in practice.

This problem also exemplifies another limitation on the book's
usefulness to undergraduate readers and nonspecialists, though I
presume this to be an editorial practice rather than the fault of the
author. There are many uncontextualized quotes with simply an endnote
citation that minimize or disguise important points of
historiographic debate and make this text challenging for readers new
to its themes. Only in the endnote does one find that "coherent
ideology of race" is Matthew Restall's phrase from his study of
Afromexicans in the Yucatan, _The Black Middle: Africans, Mayas, and
Spaniards in Colonial Yucatan_ (2009). For readers unfamiliar with or
who have a different viewpoint on the historiography of race,
_casta_, and _calidad_, this inhibits understanding of the important
contention that Gharala is making within a broader conversation.

On the balance, though, this is a very welcome and important work of
both qualitative and quantitative significance for the study of
tribute and Afromexican socioeconomic positioning within colonial New
Spain. And for H-Atlantic's readers, Gharala has provided one more
piece of the financial and racial puzzle of the early modern Atlantic
World.

Citation: James Almeida. Review of Gharala, Norah L. A., _Taxing
Blackness: Free Afromexican Tribute in Bourbon New Spain_.
H-Atlantic, H-Net Reviews. October, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55338

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.




--
Best regards,

Andrew Stewart


H-Net Review [H-Asia]: Khazanov on Man, 'Empire of Horses: The First Nomadic Civilization and the Making of China'

Andrew Stewart
 



Best regards,
Andrew Stewart 
- - -
Subscribe to the Washington Babylon newsletter via https://washingtonbabylon.com/newsletter/

Begin forwarded message:

From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: October 14, 2020 at 10:47:31 AM EDT
To: h-review@...
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Subject: H-Net Review [H-Asia]:  Khazanov on Man, 'Empire of Horses: The First Nomadic Civilization and the Making of China'
Reply-To: h-review@...

John Man.  Empire of Horses: The First Nomadic Civilization and the
Making of China.  New York  Pegasus Books, 2020.  336 pp.  $27.95
(cloth), ISBN 978-1-64313-327-0.

Reviewed by Anatoly Khazanov (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Published on H-Asia (October, 2020)
Commissioned by Sumit Guha

Khazanov on _First Nomadic Civilization_

John Man is a popular author of many successful history books for the
general public. They are based not only on his extensive reading of
scholarly publications but also on his personal travel experience. He
is by no means a professional historian. But his engaging style and
straightforward assertions that, as a rule, eschew presentation and
discussion of alternative views make his books bestsellers. They are
translated into over twenty languages and are published around the
world. Among many quite different subjects, Chinese and Inner Asian
history are of particular interest to Man. A history of Inner Asian
nomads, with an exception of the Mongols, remains rather obscure even
to educated nonprofessionals. Whether Man uncovers new evidence that
will transform our understanding of the profound mark that the
Xiongnu (= Hsiung-nu) left on half the globe, as the book's blurb
boldly claims, is another matter. But after all, a main goal of
blurbs is advertising.

In fact, the book does not contribute anything new to our
understanding of the Xiongnu political history or to their
interrelations with China. But I would by no means hold this against
the author. This should never be a goal of books aimed at the general
public. It is more than enough if they adequately convey the current
state of the art. In this respect I have only one critical remark.
The author sometimes resorts to such terms and notions as "nations,"
"nation-states," "classes," and the like. They are not applicable to
the premodern periods, and I assume that as an experienced author,
Man knows this himself.

In my opinion, the book's deficiencies are of a quite different
order. Man is a very good storyteller, but sometimes his stories (the
author calls them "diversions") deviate too far from his main
subject. More than half of the book is devoted not to the Xiongnu and
even not to the Chinese-Xiongnu interrelations but to a political
history of China. But even the latter is often related in an
inconsistent and, not infrequently, quite repetitive way.

I wonder if the author really needs to describe in such details the
court intrigues and the fight for succession in China during the Qin
and Han periods of its history. For the history of Xiongnu they are
irrelevant. Likewise, I am puzzled what connection a story of a
painter and poet, Zhao Mengfu, have to the history of Xiongnu. He
lived in the thirteenth century, around one thousand years after
these people had left the historical arena. Or, to provide another
example, why does Man convey at such length a story of Zhaojin, who
had to marry Xiongnu chanyu Huhanyu? Apparently, just because it is a
good story, since the author admits that to a large extent it has a
legendary character. And I can ask many similar questions.

The book's composition also has many deficiencies. The author too
often mentions historical personalities and events to whom and to
which he promises to return in later chapters. This is a common
tactic in writing detective stories and mystery books. But history
does not need it. It is an exciting and engaging subject by itself
and it is full of mysteries, unsolved questions, crimes, plots, and
intrigues. Sometimes, the author conveys them in an engaging way.
This is why I wonder if a biography of Suma Qiian and the composition
of his _magnum __opus _should be repeated several times in different
chapters of the book. Perhaps, its original manuscript did not
undergo good editing.

As a result of these shortcomings, the book does not convey either
the Chinese or even the Xiongnu histories, or even their
interrelations in any systematic way. Even the Xiongnu political
history is not related consistently enough. As for their
sociopolitical organization, economy, culture, and religion, the
author devotes to them only a few brief comments, sometimes correct
but sometimes wrong.

The bibliography of the book indicates that Man is acquainted with
almost all major publications on the Xiongnu, except those in
Russian. Unfortunately, the book still has many factual and other
mistakes. Some of them are almost inevitable in books of this genre.
But others could and should have been avoided considering the
author's good acquaintance with scholarly publications in the field.
In this brief review I will mention only some of those mistakes with
the pages on which they occur.

In the very beginning of his book, Man makes a very strange statement
that he later repeats several times (pp. 2, 143, 291). He insists
that the Xiongnu Empire was the third largest empire in history
before the rise of modern superstates. (The first and second ones
were the Mongol Empire and the medieval Muslim Empire.) I am puzzled.
Did he forget about the Roman Empire or even about the Byzantine one
before the advent of Islam? I cannot believe that he does know that
at one time, the Türk qaghanate(s) stretched from the Korean
borderland to the Crimea.

Starting on page 12, Man claims that pastoralism in the Eurasian
steppes had first emerged among the farmers living in the oases that
dot the deserts and grassland of Inner Asia. He also follows an
outdated view that Owen Lattimore expressed in the book _Inner Asian
Frontiers of China_. When the book was first published in 1940, it
was a seminal study that influenced many scholars. But at present, it
is already completely outdated both in theoretical and factual
respects. Thus, Lattimore thought that in the second millennium BCE,
marginalized groups of agriculturalists in the borderlands of China
were pushed to the grasslands of Inner Asia and had to turn to
pastoralism. This hypothesis is wrong. Already in the Bronze Age and
even earlier, the whole Eurasian steppe belt was occupied by various
groups that practiced mobile pastoralism combined, though in
different proportions, with agriculture as a secondary economic
activity. Moreover, growing data indicate that mobile pastoralism was
brought to Inner Asia by groups migrating from the West, or at least
under their influence.

On page 17, Man attributes to Herodotus a claim that he never made:
that the European Scythians traded across all Inner Asia. The Greek
historian described a trade route that went from Scythia only to
Central Asia, or more probably, to the Ural Mountains, but in any
case, no further to the East. Otherwise his informants would not tell
him that those Eastern lands were populated by peoples with goat's
feet, those who slept for six months a year, and those who had only
one eye. Until the first century BCE, the Greeks did not know about
the very existence of China on the far eastern side of Asia.

Man boldly claims that Tuva was the heartland from which the
Scythians originally came (p. 18). Does he really mean that all
Scythians, that is, the ancient Iranian-speaking nomads who occupied
vast territories from the Danube River to Inner Asia, came from such
a small region? This is impossible.

Most scholars consider the Yuezhi (= Yueh-chih) to be not
Türkic-speaking but Iranian-speaking people (p. 81). Some equate
them with the Tokhars. At that time, the Türks lived far to the
East.

A suggestion that the Xiongnu borrowed their decimal military system
from Achaemenid Iran, with word passing from group to group across
Eurasia, is absolutely groundless (p. 92). Rumors do not create
military organizations; social, economic, and political conditions
do. Besides, only one regiment in the Achaemenid army, the so-called
immortals, consisted of a permanent number of ten thousand soldiers.

People who are still involved in mobile pastoralism in contemporary
Mongolia are by no means ignoring their relatives who have turned to
the sedentary urban life (p. 123). They are maintaining with them
close reciprocal ties. And by the way, nowadays, mobile phones are
quite common even among the Mongol mobile pastoralists.

The Romans never settled in China, as Man states starting on page
199. Actually, in the Han period, China and Rome did not know
anything substantial about each other. The Romans did not have any
connection to the history of Xiongnu as well. The author's reference
to an "eccentric" Professor Dubs does not change these firmly
established facts. This is what Man admits himself. Then why does he
describe those false conjectures at such length? The author honestly
explains his reason: just because it is a good story. No further
questions or comments are necessary.

Man claims that the Xiongnu who migrated to Central Asia turned from
being pastoral nomads into a robber band (p. 269). Does this imply
that they had abandoned pastoral nomadism? I wonder where he got this
information. Finally, in political terms, the Sarmatians never
constituted a single confederation, whether loose or not.

Still, I would not blame Man alone for these mistakes. I assume that
his publishers followed a usual practice and sent his manuscript for
internal reviews. Alas, his reviewers either were not competent
enough or simply did not do their work well. Otherwise, they would
have noticed these mistakes and the author could have corrected them.

One may wonder whether these mistakes, and I have mentioned only some
of them, do really matter in a book aimed at the general public.
Perhaps my critical comments and remarks are no more than the cavils
of a professional scholar. I think that they do matter. The general
public deserves to be provided with accurate and up-to-date knowledge
even more than do professionals who know it for themselves. However,
after all, such books are aimed at commercial success above all other
considerations. Man's name has become almost a brand. I will not be
surprised if this book is as successful as his previous twenty.

Citation: Anatoly Khazanov. Review of Man, John, _Empire of Horses:
The First Nomadic Civilization and the Making of China_. H-Asia,
H-Net Reviews. October, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55308

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.



The Eighteenth Brumaire of Donald J. Trump: A Response to Bryan Palmer - The Bullet

Louis Proyect
 

Bryan Palmer’s recent contribution to The Bullet (September 28, 2020) offers an interpretation of Donald Trump’s class politics, which purports to challenge my comparison of Donald Trump and Louis Napoleon III as Emperors of the Lumpenproletariat (August 30, 2020). Palmer argues that Trump is better understood as the Stalin of Capitalist Counter-Revolution. Despite our different choice of dictators as competing points of comparison, Palmer agrees that “there is much in The Eighteenth Brumaire, as Barrow insists insightfully, that translates easily into an assessment of Donald Trump.” Nevertheless, he is “not convinced that presenting Trump, as Marx does Louis Philippe Bonaparte, as the chief of a déclassé lumpen proletariat, their Emperor brought to power and domination, is useful.”

https://socialistproject.ca/2020/10/eighteenth-brumaire-of-donald-trump-response-to-bryan-palmer/


Fighting for the air we breathe – Tempest

Louis Proyect
 

California wildfires, climate cascades and ecosocialism



https://www.tempestmag.org/2020/10/fighting-for-the-air-we-breathe/


Democracy Is on the Ballot | Boston Review

Louis Proyect
 

With the presidential election just twenty-one days away, many look ahead with apprehension. Donald Trump has yet to agree to a peaceful transfer of power, and he and his administration have been actively working to undermine the legitimacy of the electoral process. Joshua Cohen spoke with Reed Hundt to discuss Trump’s strategy for winning. Hundt is chair and CEO of Making Every Vote Count, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization dedicated to electing the president by a national popular vote. He was chair of the Federal Communications Commission from 1993 until 1997.

http://bostonreview.net/politics-law-justice/reed-hundt-joshua-cohen-democracy-ballot


Red Pill, Blue Pill, James Meek on the conspiracist mind

Louis Proyect
 

LRB, Vol. 42 No. 20 · 22 October 2020

Red Pill, Blue Pill

James Meek on the conspiracist mind

7611 words

In the spring​ of 2020, while the world stayed indoors to suppress Covid-19, arsonists attacked mobile phone masts in Britain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand. They set fire to nearly a hundred masts in the UK, or tried to; there were twenty attacks over the Easter weekend alone, including one on a mast serving a Birmingham hospital. The arsonists believed that the latest mobile phone technology, 5G, was the real cause of the pandemic. They imagined a worldwide conspiracy: either the unexpectedly genocidal effects of the 5G rollout were being covered up by faking a pandemic, or 5G was being used deliberately to kill huge numbers of people and help enslave whoever was left. In the actual world, 5G’s feeble radio waves aren’t capable of any of this – you’d get more radiation standing near a baby monitor – but the fire-setters are unheedful of that world.

As well as the anti-5G insurgency, the conspiracist assault on the mainstream approach to coronavirus takes the form of a suspicion of vaccination, an older concern than 5G-phobia and more of an obstacle to governments’ plans to contain the virus. But the encounter between conspiracy theory and Covid-19 isn’t as clear-cut as that. When the pandemic hit, social media, hyper-partisan broadcasters, Trump-era populism and conspiracy theory were already creating a self-contained alternative political thought space conducive to the cross-fertilisation of conspiracist ideas. Covid-19 and government efforts to control it – an extreme event, accompanied by what can seem baffling and intrusive restrictions – appear, in the conspiracist mind, as the most open moves yet by a secret group of sadistic tyrants who want to reduce the human population and enslave those who remain. The pandemic and official countermeasures are interpreted as proof, and Covid becomes the string on which any and all conspiracy theories may be threaded. Seen through the conspiracist filter, by forcing us to wear masks, by closing bars and isolating the frail elderly, by trying to terrify us over, as they see it, a dose of flu, or by microwaving us with 5G, the secret elite has shown its hand.

Now that its existence, nature and power have been proved to us, why shouldn’t we believe that the members of this group arranged 9/11? Or that Bill Gates is planning to kill us with vaccines, or inject us with nanochips hidden in vaccines, or both? Why shouldn’t the entire course of world events have been planned by a group of elite families hundreds, even thousands, of years ago? Why shouldn’t there be a link between the bounds to individual freedoms that governments have drawn up to slow climate change and the restrictions they’re carrying out in the name of beating Covid? Surely these two hoaxes are cooked up by the same firm, with the same agenda? Why, as followers of the American conspiracy theory known as QAnon insist, shouldn’t a group of politicians, tycoons and celebrities be kidnapping and torturing children on a massive scale?

A large survey in May conducted by researchers in Oxford found that only about half of English adults were free of what they termed ‘conspiracy thinking.’ Three-quarters of the population have doubts about the official explanations of the cause of the pandemic; most people think there’s at least a chance it was man-made. Almost half think it may have been deliberately engineered by China against ‘the West’. Between a fifth and a quarter are ready to blame Jews, Muslims or Bill Gates, or to give credence to the idea that ‘the elite have created the virus in order to establish a one-world government’; 21 per cent believe – a little, moderately, a lot or definitely – that 5G is to blame, about the same number who think it is ‘an alien weapon to destroy humanity’. Conspiracy beliefs, the researchers concluded, were ‘likely to be both indexes and drivers of societal corrosion ... Fringe beliefs may now be mainstream. A previously defining element that the beliefs are typically only held by a minority may require revision ... Healthy scepticism may have tipped over into a breakdown of trust.’

A friend, a BBC journalist, told me about a conversation he’d had with an acquaintance who began talking about the dangers of 5G and claimed that ‘every time a new kind of electromagnetic energy is invented, it causes a new kind of disease, like the invention of radar caused Spanish flu.’

‘But Spanish flu happened in 1918, and radar wasn’t invented till the 1930s,’ my friend said.

‘You would say that, wouldn’t you?’ This was uttered without a trace of a smile.

One​ Saturday afternoon in August, during the deceptive summer lull in coronavirus cases in England, I went to an anti-lockdown rally in Trafalgar Square. I heard about it from a Facebook group I’d joined. The group has a strong conspiracist slant, but most of its nearly 13,000 members (there are many similar groups) prefer to think of what they’re doing as ‘truth seeking’, hence the group’s name, Truth Seekers UK. Polls suggest that most people feel the blunt instrument of lockdown works, in the sense that it stops hospitals being overwhelmed, but it would be a weak society where nobody challenged new restrictions on individual freedom. Some enforcement of the rules, like police drones tracking hikers on moorland, has been overzealous. But the protesters at this rally weren’t interested in arguments about whether lockdowns are a mistake, or whether the enforcement of mask-wearing is pointless, or over the balance between protecting livelihoods and protecting lives. The people here believed in a malignant hidden hand behind everything that was happening and everything that has ever happened. They denied that the virus was real. For many non-conspiracists, the sight of upwards of five thousand people from all over southern England crammed together shoulder to shoulder without face masks in Central London, in defiance of the rules against large gatherings, would seem a display of selfishness provocative enough to justify its being broken up by the police. But what is democracy without political protest? And it was a genuine political protest. It was an anti-government demonstration, and the participants had sincerely held convictions. And yet the star speaker at this rally, supposedly organised to fly the flag of resistance to state oppression, was David Icke.

Icke was a BBC sports presenter in the 1980s, smooth, bland and remarkable only for a certain glassy coldness of manner. Before that he’d been a professional footballer. At a time when Britain had a handful of TV channels, everyone knew his face. Shortly before he left the BBC in 1990 he experienced a metaphysical epiphany in a newsagent’s on the Isle of Wight. Not long afterwards, via sessions with the late Betty Shine, a self-proclaimed psychic and bestselling writer of New Age books, and a transcendental episode in a storm on a hilltop in Peru, he declared he’d been chosen by a benign godlike agency as a vehicle for the revelation of truths essential to the survival of Earth and humanity. In an appearance on Terry Wogan’s chat show – notorious for Icke’s turquoise tracksuit and Wogan’s observation to his guest, about the sniggering audience, ‘They’re laughing at you, they’re not laughing with you’ – he denied claiming to be Jesus Christ, insisting he was merely the latest in a line of prophets that numbered Jesus as one of its more distinguished old boys.

That was in 1991. Since then, Icke has worked on his material and his brand, developing his following, writing books, and giving lectures and interviews around the world. Last year he was banned from entering Australia but in 2018 he was still welcomed by large audiences in municipal venues in English towns, where his fans sat peaceably as slides showed George Soros with reptilian eyes, in a corona of hellfire, with the caption: ‘George Soros: Personification of Evil.’ Covid-19 has boosted his profile. In May, following an appeal from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate, which pointed out that millions of people had been exposed to online material in which he blamed Jews for the pandemic, denied the reality of Covid-19, played down the infectiousness of viruses in general and lent support to 5G conspiracists, both Facebook and YouTube – though not Twitter – took down Icke’s pages. The action had no appreciable effect on his profile, except perhaps to give him the lustre of the martyr. YouTube, and YouTube wannabes like BrandNewTube, are still thick with Icke interviews by small-time videocasters. Google will point you to them. And although he has been banned from Facebook, his fans haven’t, nor have links to his material. The first thing I saw when I last checked the TruthSeekers UK Facebook group was a video interview with him. Amazon still distributes his books.

The conspiracy narrative Icke began to weave in the early 1990s is a sprawling affair that changes to follow the headlines, veers off on tangents and is full of internal inconsistencies, but some core elements remain. Icke’s story bears similarities to the influential American conspiracist text Behold a Pale Horse by William Cooper (which was published at about the time Icke reinvented himself as a prophet), and to the pseudo-leaks that drive QAnon, though QAnon tends to avoid the extraterrestrial. A cursory and much rationalised summary of Icke’s conspiracy theory goes like this: thousands of years ago, a race of reptilian beings from another world drew up a marvellously slow plan for the enslavement of humanity, to be carried out by a tiny elite of either – the exact mechanism varies – human proxies of surpassing wickedness, or reptiles in human form. (‘I once had an extraordinary experience with former prime minister Ted Heath,’ Icke told the Guardian in 2006. ‘Both of his eyes, including the whites, turned jet black.’)

The plan continues to unfold, regularly missing prophesied deadlines. Only an awakening of ordinary humans from the slumber of ignorance, prompted by heeding the truths revealed by Icke and his ilk, can save humanity. Many of the elite, according to Icke, are Jewish, and his conspiracy theory, like so many conspiracy theories, has a strongly antisemitic slant. (The word cabal, which I found myself using in the first draft of this piece, is from the classical Hebrew word qabbalah, ‘tradition’.) In his book And the Truth Shall Set You Free he says we don’t really know what happened in the Holocaust, and that ‘a small Jewish clique which has contempt for the mass of Jewish people worked with non-Jews to create the First World War, the Russian Revolution, and the Second World War.’

There was no sign of Icke when I arrived in Trafalgar Square. Piers Corbyn, whose brother, the former Labour leader, can’t be held responsible for him, was speaking. Piers Corbyn is a physicist and one-time commercial meteorologist who believes that man-made climate change is a hoax. His new cause is the iniquity of lockdown. He had already been arrested several times; before the day was out he would be arrested again for helping organise the demonstration (he was later fined). He told the crowd through a scratchy sound system that Covid-19 was no worse than the flu, and was killing fewer people than lockdown. ‘Whether you believe the virus is a hoax or not, there is no justification in any terms for the Covid lockdown rules,’ he declared. The crowd had no doubt where they stood. They began to chant the title of a pseudo-documentary called Plandemic, massively popular online, in which an American scientist called Judy Mikovits tells a string of fluent lies about the pandemic: that the virus was artificially made infectious to humans in a joint effort by labs in Wuhan, North Carolina and Maryland; that Anthony Fauci, America’s Covid-19 point man, was hiding the fact that it was virtually harmless for his own financial benefit. ‘Plan-demic!’ yelled thousands in unison. ‘Plan-demic! Plan-demic!’

After Corbyn had finished, one of the organisers of the event, a suspended nurse called Kate Shemirani (she also believes Covid-19 is a hoax, but thinks its symptoms were deliberately triggered by 5G to provide the elite with an excuse to vaccinate the population with a mind-control vaccine), introduced Mark Steele, a former bouncer from Gateshead who heads an anti-5G organisation called Save Us Now. Steele told the crowd of his concerns about the harmful effects of 5G radiation, particularly on young people. In 1994, Steele was sentenced to eight years in prison for accidentally shooting a 19-year-old woman in the head, leaving her disabled, when he drunkenly fired shots from a pistol outside a pub in Newcastle.

I moved closer to the stage, feeling I stuck out. I was the only person wearing a mask. I ended up close to one of the plinths supporting the great bronze Landseer lions at the base of Nelson’s column. The stage stood between two of the lions and a group of people had climbed onto the plinth for a better view. A couple of dozen police, wearing surgical masks but no riot gear, stood a few yards from the edge of the crowd. A group of them moved towards us and began to nudge their way towards the stage. Could they be planning to shut the demo down, I wondered? They were heavily outnumbered. From the plinth, a middle-aged man with a Mohican and a T-shirt that made a reference to sex with sheep, wearing a coat tied across his chest like a Highlander’s plaid, raised his fist and began leading the crowd in a chant of ‘Shame on you!’ The police stopped. A candyfloss plume of white hair appeared and began to move past them. The crowd’s anger turned to joy. ‘David!’ came the cries. ‘David, we love you!’ The police hadn’t been getting ready to shut the demo down. They had been forming a cordon to ensure the safe delivery to the stage of David Icke.

Later,​ I emailed Dominic, a conspiracist acquaintance, to tell him I’d been at the rally. Although he knew I thought he was wrong about almost everything relating to Covid-19, he was pleased to hear I’d been in Trafalgar Square. ‘It is awesome to hear you went to the rally last week, you’ve just made me very happy!’ he wrote back. ‘So what did you think of the rally and David Icke’s speech? I regard it as a historic speech that equals many others from the past. What he says in it does actually answer a lot of the questions you have asked in your previous email.’

Icke’s speech fell far short of historic. He dwelled on his own prophetic powers and in the only memorable segment mocked the ‘fascism’ of the present moment:

Fascism justified by the illusion pandemic of Covid-19. A virus, I must give it credit, that is so well equipped for every eventuality. ‘You must not go nearer than six feet to another person to protect you from the virus.’ So now it’s got a bloody tape measure! [Applause.] ‘You must not stay with anyone outside your bubble for more than 15 minutes.’ Now it’s got a bloody watch! [Laughter.] ‘We are going to make masks mandatory but not until the end of next week.’ Now it’s got a bloody calendar! [Laughter and cheers.] Why can anyone with half a brain cell ... see that it’s a nonsense? Because they are making it up!

I knew I might scare Dominic off if I pointed out the weaknesses of Icke’s rhetoric, even if I didn’t mention antisemitism or shape-shifting lizards. But I didn’t want to patronise him by pretending to give his conspiracy theories credence. After all, he was pretty rude about people who accept the reality of Covid-19. I wrote back to him about the difference between safe distances and sell-by dates, and how needing to be a safe distance from an explosive charge doesn’t mean the charge has a measuring tape, and having to eat chicken by a certain day to avoid illness doesn’t mean the chicken has a timer. I asked him if he fancied a coffee. I haven’t heard from him since.

Earlier this year the young German journalist Alexander Eydlin wrote an article for Die Zeit about how he became a conspiracy theorist, and how he stopped being one. The latest survey by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation suggests that in Germany, as in Britain, as in the US, about half the population tends to the view that malign secret organisations are directing events. Eydlin, who describes himself as ‘a politically left-leaning secular Jew from the upper middle class with educated parents and a healthy social network’, said he had been looking for something to believe in, and was enchanted by the explicatory beauty and alternative value system outlined by his conspiracist friends. ‘Before the Enlightenment, evil was clearly located,’ he writes. ‘In the form of the devil, the satanic, it took on an understandable form and could be fought. Now we suspect that we cannot know what evil is or whether it even exists. Not everyone can bear the idea of a life that cannot be defined as unilaterally good or even just.’

Eydlin counsels against treating conspiracy theorists as political extremists: that will only make them see the concept of extremism itself as another of the lies told by the evil conspirators. Nor is there any point in trying to tear down their ideas with factual arguments, because the belief system being attacked is also an identity. ‘In the end,’ Eydlin writes, ‘I wasn’t convinced by the stubborn arguments of people who wanted to prove to me that I was wrong. Instead it was the lasting friendships with people who didn’t share my strange ideas and yet saw me as something more than just a nutcase. They argued with me, but only after they had taken the time to understand my crude ideas.’

I first met Dominic on Rye Common in Peckham, this summer. I was lounging on the grass with my family when a young man dressed neatly in jeans and a shirt, with a round, pleasant face and sleepy eyes, came up to us with a stack of leaflets. ‘Would you like to read something I’ve written?’ he asked, putting one of them into my hand, and walked off. The way he said it made me think he was handing out poetry, but when I looked at the piece of paper – four pages printed on both sides of a single sheet of A5 – I saw it was a conspiracist tract. ‘Think For Yourself ... Question “authority”’ it was headed, in red letters. On the first page was a cartoon labelled ‘LOCKDOWN’, showing Boris Johnson in a white coat, holding a syringe, standing over two masked policemen wrestling to the ground a dreadlocked protestor who’d been holding a placard reading ‘GOVERNMENT LIES’.

I skimmed the contents of the leaflet. It seemed a combination of falsehoods, misunderstandings, exaggerations and out of context snippets supporting the evil plan theory of events, all culled without attribution from the internet. I can’t remember exactly what triggered me. Was it the comparative table of deaths in different countries accompanied by the phrase ‘the media will never show you a comparison like this,’ when there can hardly be a news website, newspaper, magazine or TV news show in the world that hasn’t published multiple versions? Was it the notion that a pandemic preparedness exercise run in the US before the pandemic began was evidence that Covid-19 was planned by the evil elite, even though the organisers had issued press releases about it? Or was it that Dominic had gone to the trouble to make the misinformation pouring in from the internet seem more real by getting it printed up and hand-delivering it to us in the park, where we’d come to enjoy the simple, uncontested truth of sunshine on grass? Or was it that a close old friend had recently revealed to me his conspiracist view of the virus?

I somehow felt I had to intervene, not to change Dominic’s mind or to stop him handing out the leaflets, but simply to make him register that there was resistance to the falsehoods he was spreading. I went over to him – he was handing out his material to a large group of young people sitting on the grass – and told him off. I wasn’t eloquent. I said his leaflets were full of rubbish, and that he should destroy them. He said I should destroy my mask (nobody there was wearing one). I walked away. It was the kind of futile encounter between the self-appointed rationalist and the self-declared bearer of esoteric truths that happens online all the time, and it was no more satisfactory in the flesh. As soon as I opened my mouth I realised it was pointless to pick out this untruth or that misunderstanding in his leaflet. To treat it as amenable to critique was a category error, like scolding Ayn Rand for bad dialogue or calling out Trump for being unpresidential. I was reminded of one of the reasons it’s so difficult to argue with conspiracy theorists: you’re faced with a choice between challenging limitless errors one by one, or denouncing an entire edifice of belief, which usually means calling the conspiracy theorist mad or stupid, at which point conspiracy theory has won. It’s like a forest fire that can only be put out one square inch at a time, or all at once, and so can never be put out.

I read Dominic’s leaflet a little more carefully. It seemed even more fantastical than before, but my visceral indignation had faded. In the Trump-Brexit era the time between hearing of some new shame and accepting it has shortened. It used to take me days to work through the Kübler-Ross model over each small death of truth and honour in the public square, but I’ve got it down to half an hour now. When we bumped into Dominic by the lake I apologised for losing my temper. I told him I was thinking of writing an article about people who thought as he did. He was wary. I got his first name and an email address linked to an account on a website, lbry.tv, that he calls ‘my channel’, a collection of bootleg conspiracist books and videos with titles like ‘Your Government Wants You Dead’ and ‘The Real Science of Germs – Do Viruses Cause Disease?’ I remember naively suggesting that he read some books instead of spending so much time on the internet. What books was I thinking of? Maybe Icke’s Children of the Matrix: How an Interdimensional Race Has Controlled the Planet for Thousands of Years – And Still Does? Or the anonymously authored QAnon: An Invitation to the Great Awakening. Free delivery with Amazon Prime.

Dominic, who I guess is in his late twenties, once read better books. In our email exchanges he told me he had a degree in psychology and a social work diploma. He never told me whether he had a day job. He dated the origin of his current state of mind to his late teens and early twenties when he had been troubled by the world’s problems and looked for their root causes. He took out a subscription to New Internationalist. He read Noam Chomsky, John Pilger, Greg Palast. ‘It slowly dawned on me,’ he wrote, ‘that there could be a hidden hand behind seemingly random, unconnected events. I came to this realisation myself, long before hearing of the term “conspiracy theory” or “new world order” etc.’ He read George Monbiot and Mark Curtis and took away the lesson that whoever is in power in the US and Britain carries out the same policies.

Cooper’s Behold a Pale Horse was his gateway to another world. To me – and I would have imagined before this to anyone – the works of radical social critics like Chomsky and Monbiot, eloquent, internationalist, hallowing the communal, have nothing in common with Cooper’s jittery libertarian screed, reeking of cordite and the Bible, infused with nationalist ideals of American individualism, packed with descriptions of UFOs and giving a detailed history of America’s secret dealings with alien races. And yet, to Dominic, it was ‘the missing piece of the puzzle’, introducing him to echt conspiracy totems like the New World Order, the Illuminati and the Freemasons. He was particularly taken with the chapter titled ‘Silent Weapons for Quiet Wars’. Cooper, who went on the lam to dodge tax and died in 2001 in a shoot-out with sheriff’s deputies in Apache County, Arizona, presents this as a secret Bilderberg Group policy document from 1954, outlining how the US was to be a test bed for the elite’s discovery that societies could be run like electrical networks. ‘It all made logical sense,’ Dominic wrote. ‘If you are the few and you want to control the many, you would need to form secret networks that are able to funnel down into society the agendas you formulate, which will then allow the gaining of greater power and control.’

This echoed a passage in Cooper’s book:

I cannot and will not accept the theory that long sequences of unrelated accidents determine world events. It is inconceivable that those with power and wealth would not band together with a common bond, a common interest, and a long-range plan to decide and direct the future of the world. For those with the resources, to do otherwise would be totally irresponsible. I know that I would be the first to organise a conspiracy to control the outcome of the future if I were such a person and a conspiracy did not yet exist.

The seer of conspiracies, in other words, identifies with the imaginary conspirator. The goals of the secret enslavement programme are crude because they reflect the limited imagination, and life experience, of the conspiracist. This goes against Eydlin’s claim that conspiracy theorists’ willingness to integrate contradictions disproves the notion that they’re trying to find easy explanations for complex events. ‘The contortions that many conspiracy theorists must accept in order to integrate events into their image of the world do not attest to a desire for simple explanations,’ he writes. But is this true? Conspiracists describe epiphanies where they start to see the big picture, the universal meta-conspiracy that explains and links everything. But the picture isn’t big. It’s small. It’s the result of an effort to shrink the answer to every mystery until it can fit whatever doll’s house furniture version of that answer the conspiracist is capable of holding in their head.

Maybe it’s better to see conspiracy theories as lots of small things, a box of McNuggets of folksy pseudo-information. The cure for any flaw in a conspiracy theory is to add to it. Conspiracy theories rely on sheer quantity, on feeding a limitless dole of small stimulations to whatever part of the brain hungers for secret knowledge. The appetite is never satisfied, but the plate is always full. The phrase Cooper uses to describe the conspirators’ silent weapon – ‘it shoots situations, instead of bullets’ – nicely describes conspiracist discourse, including his own. The decisive medium that feeds conspiracy theories is the shared online video clip or streamcast. Now more than ever, when mainstream broadcasters are working from home, the sprawling world of conspiracist TV is presentationally hard to distinguish from conventional TV. The archetypal conspiracist clip is more than an hour long and has an interviewer with a cheerful, reasonable-sounding manner who invites one of those with privileged access to the truth, such as David Icke, to hold forth as if he were the guest on a fawning version of a Sunday morning current affairs show.

The​ Icke style of conspiracist discourse is never lost for words or answers. It is mimicked by foot soldiers like Martin, whom I met in Trafalgar Square. Like Dominic, Martin didn’t match the cliché of conspiracy theorists as unkempt eccentrics, hippies, stoners, ragged and unbarbered and decked with badges. He was a graphic designer from Swindon, he had a degree, he was neatly and conventionally dressed; he’d recently lost his job when the pandemic forced his main client, P&O Cruises, to tie up its fleet. We spoke for about forty minutes. I peppered him with questions, but he never hesitated, acknowledged a non sequitur or expressed the slightest doubt that he saw the truth. Calmly, with a tone of stubborn and righteous annoyance such as an Englishman might use to complain about a neighbour’s plans for a new conservatory, he led me on. The New World Order planned to reduce the world population to 500 million slaves; the BBC reported the collapse of Building 7 of the World Trade Centre on 9/11 before it happened; the police helicopter overhead was an obvious tactic by the conspirators to drown out the rally speakers; Prescott Bush created communism and financed Nazism; apparent Covid deaths in China and Iran were organised attacks; Covid vaccines would sterilise recipients and implant tracking devices; soon everyone would be forced to have a chip implanted in their hand; the conspirators simultaneously wanted to keep their plans secret and let everyone know about them; central banks needed to be destroyed because they were creating money for themselves; the elite bloodlines of the Rothschilds and Rockefellers and a few others adopted Jewish personas so they couldn’t be criticised without their detractors being accused of antisemitism; these elite bloodlines were psychotic, psychopathic and Satan-worshipping; they went back to Babylon; it was all in scripture, not that he was religious, because all religions were run by the Synagogue of Satan; the conspirators want people to be left-wing because left-wing people liked controlling governments; the gender signs on the traffic lights at Trafalgar Square showed the hand of the Illuminati at work, as did mass immigration.

I apologised for taking up so much of his time.

Conspiracist discourse is an endless tease, always promising a new layer of revelation, or a new angle. The allure doesn’t only work on those who take the conspiracy theory seriously. The sceptic gets a twisted kick out of it: the sense of wonder as each pearl drops from the master conspiracist’s mouth that there are people who believe it. The thing is, it works; it has always worked, even before the internet came along to turn conspiracism into something awfully like an epidemic in its own right. When you watch the full interview with Icke on Wogan in 1991, sure, the audience laughs, when Wogan cues them. But in between there are long stretches of absolute silence in the studio as Icke weaves his fabulations, the camera locked on his face. No doubt many thought it comic, and others cruel, but there must have been many people convinced by the performance, by this man who knew the absolute Answer and was going to spend the rest of his life being five seconds away from giving it out.

Karl Popper​ coined the phrase ‘conspiracy theory’ in 1952, in his book The Open Society and Its Enemies. He framed it as something that would always be singular, like game theory or chaos theory: it was only later that people started talking about ‘conspiracy theories’. The change shifted the concept in the conspiracists’ favour. To speak of conspiracy theories in the plural anchors them in the concrete, even if the person speaking thinks they’re nonsense: they’re still theories about a particular thing. Popper’s notion of conspiracy theory referred to a personal predisposition that could attach itself to anything, precisely because it was nested in the holder’s brain.

Popper saw conspiracy theory as something very old, connected to the religious impulse. ‘The belief in the Homeric gods whose conspiracies explain the history of the Trojan War is gone,’ he writes. ‘The gods are abandoned. But their place is filled by powerful men or groups – sinister pressure groups whose wickedness is responsible for all the evils we suffer from – such as the Learned Elders of Zion, or the monopolists, or the capitalists, or the imperialists.’ At the same time he made clear that he wasn’t denying the existence of actual conspiracies:

On the contrary, they are typical social phenomena. They become important, for example, whenever people who believe in the conspiracy theory get into power. And people who sincerely believe that they know how to make heaven on earth are most likely to adopt the conspiracy theory, and to get involved in a counter-conspiracy against non-existing conspirators. For the only explanation of their failure to produce their heaven is the evil intention of the Devil, who has a vested interest in hell.

To some this will sound like what Trump is doing now, leading a more or less open Republican conspiracy to hamper the Democrat vote in November, using as his excuse a baseless conspiracy theory about ‘vote rigging’. The darker example is the rise of the Nazis, a movement that transmitted its conspiracism to the majority of the German population, then carried through the most hideous and complex real conspiracy in history, the murder of millions of Jews.

Conspiracy theory fixes on diverse manifestations of injustice, technology and strife, on anything that’s hard to explain. That’s not to say it doesn’t have a dominant key. The othering of ethnicities or particular groups and accusations of Satanism or child abuse are frequent markers of conspiracies, but they all have in common an anarchic, nihilistic libertarianism that takes government as its ultimate enemy – specifically the kind of social democratic or socialist government that shifts resources from the wealthiest to the less well off, that offers a trade-off between curtailments of personal freedom for the rich and greater equality. This might seem implausible, given how central the idea of a gang of super-rich families is to conspiracy theory. But only a few families are included; conspiracy theory tends to pass over the wealthy as a class. It’s striking that the two billionaires most often accused of being the chief New World Order Satanists – George Soros and Bill Gates – are the ones who have, if at times ham-fistedly, given away the largest chunks of their fortunes to worthy causes, one in support of the principle of democracy, the other in support of better health for the poorest. Gates is targeted because of the vast sums he gives to the World Health Organisation and for vaccine research, rather than for what one might assume enslavement-fearing conspiracy theorists would attack him for, the fact that the firm he used to run provides the software for most of their computers. It’s as if, to the conspiracists, Bill Gates of Microsoft is a perfectly respectable American tycoon and his philanthropic self a wicked alter ego. The grandest and most lasting conspiracy theories have swirled around great levelling projects: the French Revolution was a Masonic conspiracy, the Russian Revolution was a Jewish conspiracy, the WHO is a Chinese conspiracy, the British Labour Party and trade unions are a communist conspiracy, the EU is an anti-British conspiracy.

This isn’t a conspiracy theory about the origin of conspiracy theories. It’s an observation that the interests of conspiracy theorists and the interests of the selfish end of the plutocracy have a way of aligning. Both are cynical and mistrustful of institutions of authority, the courts, the media, the government, legislatures: the conspiracists because they think such bodies are malign agents of a secret elite, the plutocrats because they place limits on their wealth and power.

Trump was not the first conspiracy theorist to come to power. Orbán has been the leader of Hungary since 2010; Erdoğan became prime minister of Turkey in 2003. Trump’s election was unusual not just because the American establishment saw itself as immune to capture by a conspiracy theorist, but because he embodies in one person the two poles of hostility to liberal democratic institutions: the plutocrat who hates taxes, regulations and impertinent journalists, and the conspiracy theorist with paranoid delusions about a deep state plot against the people. Perhaps it was inevitable that he would become a character in a phenomenon like QAnon.

Some have described QAnon as more like a religion than a conspiracy theory, and it does stand out from the others in that it imagines two duelling conspiracies – an evil conspiracy, with Hillary Clinton, Hollywood celebs and a pack of evil Democrats running a gigantic operation to kidnap hundreds of thousands of children, keep them prisoner in underground tunnels, torture them, rape them, drink their blood and use them in satanic rituals; and a good conspiracy, led by Trump and a team of loyal heroes in the US military, whose members are preparing to burst out, break up the paedophile Satanist ring and save the children. In QAnon, Trump is portrayed as a cross between Jack Ryan, the tough, smart, patriotic family man played by Harrison Ford in the movies based on the Tom Clancy novels, and the archangel Michael.

There’s​ a danger that in writing about QAnon – a social phenomenon not just in the US but in Britain, Germany and many other countries, and endorsed by a number of Republican candidates – you make it sound more interesting and mysterious than it is. It is interesting, but in the way hitting yourself in the face with a hammer is interesting: novel, painful and incredibly stupid. It began in October 2017 as a series of posts on 4Chan, a bulletin board where lonely young men competed to amuse one another with sniggering memes, racist jokes and outré porn, in which an anonymous person or persons, signing themselves as Q, predicted the imminent arrest of Hillary Clinton. Since then, Q has posted almost five thousand times, reassuring followers of his/their identity by using a series of codes that only Q has the password to generate. Q has shifted from 4Chan to another bulletin board, 8chan, which later rebranded as 8kun, each incarnation more sniggering, racist and porny than the last (8chan was also used by the white supremacist terrorists responsible for killings in Christchurch, El Paso and Poway to post their hate manifestos).

Although Q watchers have noted changes of style over time, the basic elements of the conspiracist fantasy have stayed the same. A network of evil child-trafficking Satanists controls most of the country’s institutions, including the CIA and the FBI, but is strongest in the Democratic Party and Hollywood. Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama – usually referred to as ‘Hussein’ – are among the ringleaders. Concealing his true mission by disguising himself as an ordinary president of the United States, Trump is preparing to take them on. Most of the information given by Q comes in the form of cryptic hints, acronyms, code words and questions which followers are expected to interpret.

Although Q’s impact depends on followers believing that the posts come from a source at the heart of the American defence establishment, it seems unlikely that they would have found an audience without help. Obscure, dull, posted on websites with byzantine interfaces and repulsive content, they would have languished had it not been for two 4Chan moderators, Paul Furber and Coleman Rogers, who persuaded a struggling YouTuber called Tracy Diaz to start making videos interpreting and embroidering the posts. The videos were a hit. As outlined in a 2018 investigation by NBC News, which suggested that Diaz and Rogers themselves may be Q, the QAnon movement spread when people who would never have gone near 4Chan began dissecting and arguing over each post, first on YouTube and Reddit, then on Facebook. Sites sprang up to relay the posts in accessible formats. A hierarchy of ‘researchers’, sometimes called ‘bakers’, developed, from the obsessive to the casual, adding layer on layer of confabulation onto Q’s original inventions. Websites and internet entrepreneurs discovered they could increase traffic and make money by tapping into the interest in QAnon. Faded Instagram influencers and obscure wellness gurus found new audiences by pushing hard on the child abuse angle; when Jeffrey Epstein was arrested, then died, and Prince Andrew failed to account for his friendship with him, it was QAnon gold. In effect crowdsourced, the QAnon narrative broke free of Q’s plodding cryptograms, which still look to Trump to mount a military coup against the government he leads, and moved towards its dominant present form: an infinitely branching Satanist-paedophile plot, a preview of a future dystopia in which anyone may be accused on Facebook of the most ghastly crimes with all the due process of a medieval witch trial.

Opposing pandemic-justified social control doesn’t make you a conspiracy theorist, but among the anti-lockdown, anti-mask movement outside the US, signs of QAnon are ubiquitous. One of the prominent faces of Covid scepticism in the UK, Louise Hampton, presents herself in videos as an NHS call centre worker who found she was fielding calls from people in medical distress because they were terrified of going to hospital, but not from people with symptoms of Covid-19. This does not explain why her posts are tagged with the QAnon acronym #WWG1WGA, referring to the movement’s Three Musketeers-style slogan: ‘Where We Go One, We Go All.’ The charity Save the Children has been struggling to disassociate itself from another ubiquitous QAnon tag: #SaveTheChildren. At the rally I attended someone put their protest signs in the window of the Trafalgar Square branch of Pret A Manger. ‘Save Our Children – Stop Fucking Our Kids!!’ one sign read. Another: ‘#Revolution #GreatAwakening If dogs get put down for harming kids then so should NONCES!’ What, I wondered, did this have to do with the British government’s response to Covid-19? In the political arena of 2020, the concept of demonising your opponents has become literal.

There have been efforts to portray QAnon followers as directly dangerous: one article in the Financial Times warned that ‘QAnon has the makings of America’s al-Qaida.’ Few Q-adjacent conspiracists have gone as far as Edgar Welch, a North Carolinan who in 2016 marched into a pizza parlour in Washington DC with three loaded guns, intending to rescue the children he believed, under the influence of a QAnon precursor known as Pizzagate, were being kept prisoner there. But Q isn’t urging people to take direct action. He tells his followers – he refers to them as ‘patriots’ – to sit back, not worry, and enjoy the spectacle of Trump’s plan unfolding. ‘Get the popcorn, Friday and Sunday will deliver,’ he said in 2017 when making one abortive prediction. ‘Trust the plan. Step back,’ he told an impatient supporter in 2018. Q has told followers to ‘trust the plan’ 27 times – a plan they have no role in carrying out.

The danger of conspiracy theories is not that they promote action to tear down society but that they delegitimise, distract and divert: they divert large numbers of people from engaging in political action, leaving the field clear for the cynical, the greedy and the violently intolerant. They distract them from questioning authority about society’s real problems by promoting a gory soap opera as if it were real and the result of ‘research’. And they delegitimise the idea that institutions – courts, parliaments, the education system, the salaried media – can be anything other than malign.

To talk to conspiracy theorists like Dominic and Martin is to find yourself pitied as a credulous centrist, relegated to the world of ‘No, but ...’ ‘Do you think kidnapping, raping and murdering children and drinking their blood is OK?’ ‘No, but ...’ ‘Do you like the increasing control faceless corporations, unaccountable billionaires and remote authorities have over our lives?’ ‘No, but ...’ ‘Are you happy about the relentless spread of incomprehensible, intrusive technology?’ ‘No, but ...’ The Covid-19-is-fake movement is strongly opposed to Boris Johnson, who might have hoped for more sympathy as the midwife of the conspiracist project of Brexit. In their recent book about conspiracy, A Lot of People Are Saying, Russell Muirhead and Nancy Rosenblum have a way of characterising delegitimation – ‘The people associated with these institutions, it is believed, no longer have standing to persuade or legislate, to reason or coerce, to lay claim to our consent or at least compliance’ – which made me think: ‘That’s exactly the way I feel about Boris Johnson right now.’ But my scepticism doesn’t extend to complete cynicism about the institutions themselves. ‘It doesn’t matter who you vote for, it never did,’ Dominic writes in his leaflet. ‘Governments are criminal cartels for interconnected global elites who’ve an agenda ... complete enslavement of humanity by a small group of psychopaths.’

In a way the saddest aspect of the epidemic of conspiracism is not the delusions about conspiracy but the delusions about what it is to learn. As Muirhead and Rosenblum write, ‘knowledge does not demand certainty; it demands doubt.’ How did it get to the point where a smart young man like Dominic can believe in a binary, red pill-blue pill world of epistemics, in which there are only two hermetically distinct streams of knowledge to choose from, his preferred ‘truth’ and the other, ‘mainstream’, ‘official’ version, which all those who reject his truth believe without question? Where they can warn of the dangers of confirmation bias even as they practise it? These are questions that the community of conspiracy theorists can’t answer by themselves.


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'Look for Power in the Shadows': Watch Sheldon Whitehouse Shine Light on 'Dark Money Operation' Behind GOP Supreme Court Takeover | Common Dreams News

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Democratic Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse used his 30 minutes of allotted time during Tuesday's Senate Judiciary Committee hearing not to ask questions of President Donald Trump's Supreme Court nominee Amy Coney Barrett—who repeatedly dodged the straightforward questions of other lawmakers—but to deliver a detailed presentation on the sprawling "dark money operation" fueling the right-wing takeover of the U.S. judicial system.

Displaying a number of visuals and flow charts, the senator from Rhode Island traced the dizzying array of special interests and advocacy groups—from the Koch network to the Federalist Society to the Judicial Crisis Network to the Pacific Legal Foundation—coordinating and pouring money into the effort to confirm Barrett and other far-right, corporate-friendly judges committed to rolling back reproductive rights, voting rights, climate regulations, and more.

https://www.commondreams.org/news/2020/10/14/look-power-shadows-watch-sheldon-whitehouse-shine-light-dark-money-operation-behind