With a more than 30 point spread in Biden's favor in California I saw no need to vote for Biden/Harris so I voted for Hawkins/Walker. I could not bring myself to vote a ticket with Kamala Harris.
The most successful saga in postwar popular culture got
off to a conscientious start after breakfast on a tropical morning
in Jamaica early in 1952. Ian Fleming, forty-three years old and
ten weeks away from his first and last marriage, knocked out about
2,000 words on his Imperial portable claiming (falsely) that he
was just passing time while his bride elect, Anne Rothermere,
painted landscapes in the garden. In fact Fleming had been
planning to write a spy thriller for years and he kept up the
regimen of2,000 daily words until, two months later, he was done,
with Commander James Bond recovering from a near lethal attack on
his testicles from Le Chiffre’s carpet beater, Le Chiffre finished
off by a Russian, Vesper Lynd dead by her own hand, and a major
addition to the world’s cultural and political furniture under
way.
On 16 January, 1962, ten years to the day after Fleming
had typed those first words of Casino Royale (‘The scent and smoke
and sweat of a casino are nauseating at three in the morning’)
filming began on Dr No at Palisadoes airport in Jamaica, with the
British Secret Service and the CIA duly represented by Sean
Connery and Jack Lord. Fleming lived long enough to see only two
of the Bond films, Dr No and From Russia With Love, before dying
in August, 1964 of a heart attack helped along by his seventy or
so Morland’s Specials
He has much to answer for. Without Fleming we would have
had no OSS, hence no CIA. The cold war would have ended in the
early 1960s. We would have had no Vietnam, no Nixon, no Reagan and
no Star Wars.
Glenn Greenwald, as is Julian Assange and the CIA operative Edward Snowden - are libertarians and not socialists.
It is why they can interact with Nigel Farage and the Trumpsters.
It would be a new publication, he said, staffed by people from across the political spectrum who, according to a document that they’ve been working on, share a belief that “American media is gripped in a polarized culture war that is forcing journalism to conform
to tribal, groupthink narratives that are often divorced from the truth and cater to perspectives that are not reflective of the broader public but instead a minority of hyper-partisan elites.”
An informed media observer, or someone who spends too much time on Twitter, could come up with a list of who might be called to join such a publication: Greenwald, Matt Taibbi, Bari Weiss, Andrew Sullivan, Zaid Jilani, Thomas Chatterton Williams, Michael Tracey,
perhaps some podcasters notorious for straddling the left-right divide, and anyone else who thinks that threats to speech emanate from a censorious, liberal-dominated culture and not from Donald Trump, corporate power, or police brutalizing protesters in the
streets.
Forget Persuasion or Quillette or whatever free speech absolutist publication is currently fermenting in a billionaire’s petri dish. This will be a Voltron of some of the most insufferable people in American media, few of whom do any original reporting anymore,
decrying the cancellation of their friends at the hands of frigid elites. Funded by those same elites, it likely will be humorless and dull, hammering on the same tired culture war tropes until they are unrecognizable.
"After
50 years of never voting for any “lesser evil” Democrat, I voted
for Joe Biden the other day. I waited for weeks to fill in the
little circle by his name. I joked that I was hoping for an
earthquake that would destroy my home and bury my ballot in the
rubble so that I wouldn’t have to decide. But I finally did so.
After reading all the arguments on why I should not vote for the
“lesser evil” again this time, I’m more convinced than ever that
I did the right thing. Here’s why I think I’ve been right for
the last 50 years (including not supporting Bernie Sanders) and
why I think I was right this time..."
https://oaklandsocialist.com/2020/10/31/why-i-voted-for-the-lesser-evil-aka-joe-biden-this-time/
John Reimann
You forgot to quote Lenin on the need to bloc
with the Cadets in the second round of voting for Duma electors
in 1912.
"After 50 years of never voting for any “lesser evil” Democrat, I voted for Joe Biden the other day. I waited for weeks to fill in the little circle by his name. I joked that I was hoping for an earthquake that would destroy my home and bury my ballot in the rubble so that I wouldn’t have to decide. But I finally did so. After reading all the arguments on why I should not vote for the “lesser evil” again this time, I’m more convinced than ever that I did the right thing. Here’s why I think I’ve been right for the last 50 years (including not supporting Bernie Sanders) and why I think I was right this time..."
https://oaklandsocialist.com/2020/10/31/why-i-voted-for-the-lesser-evil-aka-joe-biden-this-time/
John Reimann
--
“Science and socialism go hand-in-hand.” Felicity Dowling Check out:https:http://oaklandsocialist.com also on Facebook
I am the book review editor for
the journal, Socialism and Democracy. I am looking for someone to review the
following book:
"Key Elements of Social Theory
Revolutionized by Marx" by Paul Zarembka.
Blurb on the book:
Marx's oeuvre is vast but there
are key elements of his ever evolving, class-based contribution to social
theory. His deepening confrontation with Ricardian political economy on
“value” and his introduction of the concept of “labor power” were important.
While the French edition of
Capital was the last and closest to Marx’s mature thought, Engels did not
understand how work on Russia
related to Marx’s evolution leading to separation of “primitive accumulation” in
a new Part VIII. Engels’ editing distorted the outcome, in other ways
also.
Accumulation of capital is
particularly difficult conceptually, including the pressure from bourgeois
economics to consider it as just more means of production. It is carefully
addressed, as is the technical issue of the composition of capital.
After Marx, Luxemburg is the most
significant contributor to Marxism and her works on advancing Marx’s political
economy and on the “national question” are highlighted here, both having been
distorted thereafter.
The modern topic of state
Machiavellian conspiracies , too often avoided or dismissed, concludes the book.
Troubling issues, however, remain.
***************
If you want to review this book,
write to me at george.snedeker@...
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...> Date: October 31, 2020 at 9:31:33 AM EDT To: h-review@... Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...> Subject:H-Net Review [H-TGS]: Frizzell on Fernandez, 'Zoar: The Story of an Intentional Community' Reply-To: h-review@...
Kathleen M. Fernandez. Zoar: The Story of an Intentional Community. Kent Kent State University Press, 2019. 313 pp. $29.95 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-63101-156-6.
Reviewed by Robert W. Frizzell (Independent Scholar) Published on H-TGS (October, 2020) Commissioned by Alison C. Efford
In 1817, in the southwest German kingdom of Württemberg, a group of some 150 radical pietist adults plus accompanying children from some 36 villages decided to emigrate to the United States. They had been persecuted for years for refusing to conform to the requirements of the state Lutheran Church. Some had endured prison. Soldiers had been quartered in their homes. Property had been confiscated. Receiving permission to emigrate, they were aided financially by Quakers in both England and America. On board ship and even more so in Philadelphia, they came under the leadership both spiritually and otherwise of a shoemaker named Joseph Bäumler who used the surname Bimeler in America. The group was offered a tract of more than 5,500 acres in northeastern Ohio, which Bimeler purchased in his name. They named the spot Zoar.
Kathleen M. Fernandez's book narrates the history of the utopian socialist community that survived until the end of the nineteenth century. New immigrants from Germany were admitted to membership until about 1850, but membership peaked just before the cholera outbreak of 1834. Originally each family had its own tract of land, but in April, 1819, after a hard winter, and having to support a number of older women, the group decided to pool its property and work under the direction of three elected leaders, or directors. Each person, male and female, was assigned a permanent task or work for the day. Buildings were built, land was cleared and cultivated, craft or industrial work was done. Each person was given food, clothing, and shelter. Much work was done for outsiders for money including the milling of grain. Departing members sometimes sued for what they felt they had contributed, but all such suits were rejected by the courts.
When the Ohio and Erie Canal was planned to come by Zoar, the community contracted with the state of Ohio to dig by hand several miles of canal along their property, by which they earned the money to retire their mortgage on the land. The canal allowed them to ship pig iron from their foundry as well as agricultural produce to Cleveland, from whence it could be shipped to New York City. Partly as an economic measure, the community practiced celibacy from 1822 to 1829. The community owned about one hundred horses, one hundred dairy cows, and even pigs, although they did not eat pork. Pork was served to visitors of the Zoar Hotel, popular with canal travelers. Much of the farm work was done by women while the men did more artisanal and industrial work. As the community became more prosperous, it hired outside agricultural laborers.
Bimeler read a sermon each Sunday at the Zoar Meeting House which kept alive the religious belief shared by community members. After he died in 1853, others read his old sermons to the faithful, but gradually the common beliefs that held the community together disappeared. Although the Separatists, as they called themselves, taught pacifism, when the Civil War came, some two dozen of their young men--some full members of the community and some only employees--joined the Union Army. One of the Zoar men, who all served in the 11th Corps, wrote home about dropping his pack and running at the Battle of Chancellorsville. Fernandez fails to note the historical controversy about the supposed flight of the mostly German 11th Corps at Chancellorsville and the disdain for Germans within the Union Army thus engendered.
Although the community had money to lend to Tuscarawas County and to buy exemptions for drafted men who chose not to serve, over the course of the late nineteenth century, it lost money in bad investments until it could not afford to keep its industrial enterprises technologically current. A turn toward tourism brought more strangers to Zoar, whose cash and tips to young people weakened members' desire to maintain their property in common. At last, in March 1898, a decision was made to divide the community's assets, including over seven thousand acres of farmland, among its members. Many stayed on for years farming their portion of land or running the craft shops.
The author, although not a fully trained professional historian and unable to read German, began working at the Zoar historical site in 1975 and served as site manager of the Zoar Village State Memorial from 1989 through 2004. Her book tries to answer the kinds of questions visitors asked. The reviewer suspects that the author has done about as good a job as could be done with the available English-language materials. Although she pays considerable attention to Zoar's relations with George Rapp's Harmony Society, and other utopian communities, the reviewer would have liked to read more about other radical pietists and others in Württemberg and their attempts to emigrate. Still, this is a book one is proud to recommend to any interested reader.
Citation: Robert W. Frizzell. Review of Fernandez, Kathleen M., _Zoar: The Story of an Intentional Community_. H-TGS, H-Net Reviews. October, 2020. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55431
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...> Date: October 31, 2020 at 11:16:59 AM EDT To: h-review@... Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...> Subject:H-Net Review [Jhistory]: Oromaner on Hanitzsch and Hanusch and Ramaprasad and De Beer, 'Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures around the Globe' Reply-To: h-review@...
Thomas Hanitzsch, Folker Hanusch, Jyotika Ramaprasad, A. S. De Beer, eds. Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures around the Globe. New York, 2019. 448 pp. $35.00 (paper), ISBN 978-0-231-54663-8.
Reviewed by Mark Oromaner (Independent Scholar) Published on Jhistory (October, 2020) Commissioned by Robert A. Rabe
_Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures around the Globe_ is an exemplar of large-scale, long-term, comparative survey research. More specifically, the book's editors and contributors successfully detail "how journalists in countries around the globe experience their profession in different ways, even as they retain a shared commitment to some basic, common, professional norms and practices" (p. 1). It therefore should be required reading for all scholars, practitioners, and graduate students of journalism. Readers will gain a better understanding of the diversity among journalists throughout the world, and will find enough data to explore their own hypotheses.
Any study of journalists must first define who qualifies as a journalist. Is the title limited to hard-news reporters? Are bloggers journalists? Are producers at media corporations and TV programs journalists? The editors take an operational approach and state that "journalists are individuals who contribute journalistic content to outlets as either employees or freelancers and who earn at least half their income from their work for news organizations" (pp. 9-10). In terms of the use of the nation-state as the case unit, they argue that "the forces of globalization notwithstanding, journalistic culture is still articulated and enacted within national spaces" (pp. 10-11). This is probably truer today than it was a few years ago when the survey was conducted and the forces of globalization were stronger.
Data collection and a description of the journalists who responded to the survey are presented in chapters 3 and 4. Although journalists were identified by field workers covering seven worldwide regions, the sampling prioritized regions that had been neglected in prior research--that is, the global South--in an attempt to balance the overrepresentation of European and North American nations. However, in general, the imbalance remained. Chapter 2 is highly recommended for readers who wish to understand the immense challenges and limitations of conducting cross-cultural studies. For example, think of the problem of ensuring that the questions have the same meaning in different cultures, or the posing of political or religious questions in a number of cultures. The survey instrument was administered through one or more of the following methods: face-to-face, phone, e-mail, online. In over half of the nations a response rate of 50 percent was achieved, while in approximately one-fifth of the nations the response rate was lower than 30 percent (table 3.1, pp. 55-57).
There is no room here to analyze the regional or national variations among journalists. However, the following statistics describe the sample: 57 percent male; mean age of 38; mean years of experience, 13; college degree, 56 percent; graduate degree, 29 percent; 61 percent specialized in journalism/communications at college; 62 percent identified as generalists and 23 percent as hard-news beat journalists; 47 percent were members of a professional association; 57 percent were rank and file; 80 percent worked full-time; and 50 percent worked in print, 23 percent in television, 17 percent in radio, and 16 percent online (table 4.1, pp. 73-74). Finally, although just under half of the journalists were union members, "it appears that union membership is declining around the world" (p. 74). I would suggest that this phenomenon is not unique to journalism and is related to technological changes and to the influence of neoliberal politics such as deregulation.
A comprehensive presentation of a large-scale (more than 27,500 journalists), multinational (67 countries), collaborative project such of this requires more than a traditional book structure. The editors prefer the term "edited research monograph." Although this monograph is composed of 434 pages, the text comprises only 307 pages. There are almost 50 pages of additional tables. The text can be thought of as comprising two sections: the first (chapters 1-3) provides the conceptual roadmap and methodological framework for the data, and the second (chapters 4-11) provides the results and interpretations. Given the wealth of data and the nuanced discussion of methodology and theory, it would be valuable for interested readers who are not research-oriented if a less technical version of this monograph were available.
The word "worlds" in the title is meant to challenge the assumption of a universal understanding of how journalism is practiced. The cultures of journalism must be understood within the context of the nation-state. For too long Western scholars, especially Americans, have taken an ethnocentric position and assumed that journalism as practiced in the West is the norm and the standard by which journalism as practiced in other societies is deemed defective or incomplete in some ways. Related to this is the fact that English-language scholarship, particularly American, occupies a commanding position in communications and media research, and in associated institutions. "Consequently," the editors write, "journalistic cultures in some, mostly developing and transitional, countries are sometimes portrayed as needing to 'catch up' with the norms and practices celebrated by the West" (p. 6). In addition, the political and economic conditions in the United States and the cultural history and mythology of American journalism "make the American media system very different, if not exceptional, when compared with media systems in other Western nations" (pp. 6-7). The book makes clear that one form of journalism is not better than another; they are merely different from one another.
Each journalistic culture contains flexible resources that journalists use as they make their work meaningful to themselves and to external stakeholders. An example would be the conception of their role as neutral disseminator, watchdog, or change agent. It is this ongoing process of fashioning a self-identity that makes for the existence of "worlds of journalism." These cultures may exist as subcultures, organizational cultures, or, as in this study, national cultures (see p. 34). On their understanding of the nature of journalistic cultures, the authors of chapter 2 identified five dimensions through which each culture is articulated and enacted. Two of these dimensions are perceived influences and editorial autonomy (extrinsic), and the remaining three are roles, ethics, and trust (intrinsic) (fig. 2.1, pp. 36-39). Relevant data concerning these dimensions form the core of the analysis and are presented in chapters 5-9. Ultimately, the journalistic cultures function within the broader political, socioeconomic, and value systems of the societies in which they exist.
The first extrinsic dimension, perceived influences, refers to subjective perceptions about external forces that shape the news production process. Five major areas of influence were identified: economic, political, organizational, procedural, and personal networks (chapter 5). While perceived influences differed across cultures, procedural and organizational influences are seen as the most significant. However, the editors are cautious about any suggestion that the economic and political forces are not significant. For instance, these may be mediated through management and transformed into organizational and procedural influences. The second extrinsic dimension, perceived editorial autonomy, needs little discussion here (see chapter 6). Journalists throughout the world express support "for editorial autonomy as a protection against state and other forms of outside intrusion or interference in the editorial news-making process" (p. 133). The major exceptions come from journalists in a small number of closed, authoritarian political systems, for example, China, Qatar, Tanzania. The two Koreas are interesting cases. North Korea is not represented in the survey, and South Korea is the fifth-lowest in terms of perceived autonomy. I wonder if, in a current survey, South Korea would move up in this ranking. Also. what impact have populists and authoritarian leaders in the United States and Europe had on perceptions about autonomy in those countries? It is good to read that the next wave of the study is in the planning stages.
The first intrinsic dimension, roles, is concerned with the ways in which journalists think about their societal roles. Although the monitorial role, reporting things as they are, is the most highly regarded by journalists worldwide, "even when confronted with similar challenges, journalists might think about their roles in ways that are situated within local, historical contexts" (p. 162). While the monitorial role has strong support in Western societies, the collaborative role, to help authorities bring about harmony and stability, is the least likely to be supported. This role is most likely to be valued in less developed and changing non-Western societies (chapter 7). The second intrinsic dimension, ethics, refers to a situation in which the actions could have potential harmful effects, for example, the public's right to know versus privacy, payment for confidential information, the public's right to know versus national security (chapter 8). Absolutism, adherence to ethical codes at all times, receives the greatest support, and subjectivism, the setting aside of ethics if extraordinary circumstances require it, the least support. In terms of cultural differences, in general, the United States, western Europe, and Australia showed the greatest support for absolutism, and countries of the Middle East and North Africa demonstrated the greatest support for subjectivism. The final intrinsic dimension is trust and concerns the expectations that institutions such as the government, the legislature, and the judiciary will meet expectations held by journalists (chapter 9). The erosion of trust in the US is a familiar topic; however, "the United States is a notable exception to the pattern of high levels of trust among developed nations" (p. 241). In terms of institutional trust, on a global basis more confidence is given to the judiciary, military, and police than to parliaments, governments, political parties, and politicians.
The authors of the penultimate chapter are concerned with the perceived impact of digitalization and the lack of a profitable business model on the work situation of journalists. These include cutbacks in editorial resources, increases in workloads, and greater emphasis on profit. This has often led to a "crisis in journalism" framework. While the perceived crisis is particularly prominent in the West and developed countries, at present, it is less prominent in other parts of the world. Another finding that reinforces the importance of "worlds" rather than "world" of journalism is that although globally the greatest perceived changes of influence on journalism were social media and user-generated content such as blogs (table 10.1, p. 265), "journalists in many African countries and in South Asia ... did not indicate as large an increase in the influence of these technologies as their Western counterparts" (p. 268). In the final chapter, "Modeling Journalistic Cultures," Folker Hanusch and Thomas Hanitzsch review broad similarities and differences found among journalistic cultures and propose four models of such cultures: monitorial, advocative, development, and collaborative (table 11.1, p. 296). These are ideal types; "in reality, a country may fit a given model more or less perfectly" (p. 304). Still, these and other typologies will aid in the systematic mapping of comparative data about journalistic cultures.
_Worlds of Journalism_ presents a sophisticated report on journalistic cultures. The contributors have done an excellent job of analyzing a massive amount of survey data and have stayed quite close to the data in these analyses. Whether they were involved with data collection, presentation, or interpretation, they always presented limitations of their work, and frequently presented ideas for future work. My only regret is that the authors have not written a less data-packed and less technical book for undergraduate students and for nontechnical readers interested in learning about the diverse "worlds of journalism."
Citation: Mark Oromaner. Review of Hanitzsch, Thomas; Hanusch, Folker; Ramaprasad, Jyotika; De Beer, A. S., eds., _Worlds of Journalism: Journalistic Cultures around the Globe_. Jhistory, H-Net Reviews. October, 2020. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55340
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
Cover of the 1982 novel, twice adapted for television, from which the title of this article comes
Could Trump steal the election? This is a fear that has circulated around both mainstream liberal circles and much of the Left as well. Some have warned of the threat of a coup in the event of a Biden victory. Others are preoccupied with visions of Trump manipulating the vote count and, abetted by loyal Republicans, stealing the Electoral College vote in order to gain a second term. Few, however, have explained a plausible path that Trump could follow that would allow him to overturn the results of the election after November 3 and hold onto the White House despite a Biden victory.
A military coup?
The threat of a military coup to prevent a Biden presidency seems to be the least likely of all imagined scenarios. There is simply little evidence to suggest that top military personnel are interested in shredding the constitutional system, nullifying the elections, and proclaiming Trump the president. Quite the contrary, a historic number of former military officers and intelligence leaders have been outspoken in their opposition to Trump, even branding him a threat to United States national security. There is even a large group of alumni from the George W. Bush cabinet that has endorsed Biden and is raising money for him. And there is no significant counter-trend: no group of former Clinton or Obama officials backing Trump, no group of alumni from the national security state warning that Biden represents a threat to the U.S.
Were serious preparations underway for a military coup one would expect to see federal officials arresting opposition politicians and media figures. Yet even Bill Barr’s Department of Justice declined to pursue the indictment Trump wanted against his predecessor and all Trump could do in response was tweet. Trump did use federal forces against protesters in Portland, Oregon. But it is noteworthy that he could not rely on the major branches of the U.S. military and had to depend on U.S. Marshalls, immigration officers, and Border Patrol agents.
An August 2020 poll for the Military Times showed that Biden led Trump among active duty members. The poll has been criticized for not making its methods public and because the readers of the Military Times are disproportionately officers rather than enlisted personnel. However, for Trump to carry out a military coup, officers are exactly who he would need. The fact that the major publication of military officers published such a poll should cast doubt on any thesis that they are planning to overturn the election on Trump’s behalf.
A quasi-legal theft?
Barton Gellman’s warning that Trump could manipulate the courts, state legislatures, and Congress to shift the electoral vote in his favor if the final results are close, appeared on The Atlantic’s site in late September. It was widely circulated throughout social media and Gellman appeared for numerous broadcast interviews the same day. Gellman argued that even in the event of an apparent Biden victory Trump would be unwilling to concede. He would challenge state results in court, and Republican legislatures might declare the results invalid and appoint their own slates of electors. “If Trump sheds all restraint, and if his Republican allies play the parts he assigns them, he could obstruct the emergence of a legally unambiguous victory for Biden in the Electoral College and then in Congress.” [emphasis mine]
However, Gellman’s hypothesis rests on a series of assumptions, all of which are at least dubious.
First, the whole project only makes sense if Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania prove to be “tipping point” states. However, that presumes that Trump has already won Florida, North Carolina, and Arizona, three states in which he trails Biden slightly (Biden’s lead in Arizona is a bit stronger). Those three states allow mail-in ballots to be counted before November 3 which means it is likely that the media will call those states on election night or early in the morning on November 4. If Biden wins Arizona the media narrative will be that Trump is facing an uphill battle, raising the risks for anyone who wants to collaborate with the president to steal the Midwest. If Biden wins Florida or North Carolina as well, Trump’s road to 270 electoral votes is almost completely cut off. The Midwest probably would not even be necessary for Biden anymore in that event. So the scenario depends on the polls being wrong in Florida, North Carolina, and Arizona and that Trump holds on to them and that he holds on to Georgia, Ohio, and Iowa as well. (Biden is now slightly behind in Texas, roughly tied in Georgia and Ohio, and gaining ground in Iowa).
Second, the project also depends on the assumption of the “red mirage” coming true. In this scenario Trump leads substantially on election night because of strong Republican in-person voting but then Democratic mail-in votes shift the three Midwestern states to Biden in subsequent days. The problem with this is that those Midwest states allow mail-in votes to be counted beginning at 7 a.m. on November 3 and the elections there will be run by Democratic secretaries of state. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court just upheld a Pennsylvania court ruling allowing ballots received by November 6 to be counted, even if the postmark is unclear. So for this to work, we would have to assume that no polling districts there look at mail-in ballots before the polls close and that they really only begin counting those ballots the next day. It is true that it will take days to count all the votes. It always does in every state. However, media typically call those states well before all the votes have been counted. If Biden is ahead with only mail-in votes remaining, it is likely that media outfits will call the state results for him. And, as of this writing, the polls predicting that Democrats would utilize various forms of early voting, including mail-in voting, at substantially higher rates than Republicans have been confirmed.
Third, the scheme depends on the collaboration of state Republican legislators “playing the parts [Trump] assigns them.” It is obvious why current Republican elected officials follow Trump today. It is in their self-interest to boost the candidate at the top of the ticket. Republican turnout in this year’s election depends on enthusiasm for the President. That will pull most down-ballot candidates across the finish line on November 3 or it will sink them. That is why embattled Maine Senator Susan Collins or struggling Iowa Senator Joni Ernst cannot afford to distance themselves from Trump. They need Trump supporters in their states to show up and vote and cannot risk dampening their enthusiasm. But all that ends once the votes have been cast. After November 3 none of these politicians will have much of a personal stake in Trump’s future. Legislators know that their prospects in the 2022 midterms will be better if the opposition party controls the White House and their fates will never again be linked to Trump’s. Besides, participating in a potentially illegal conspiracy carries great personal risk, especially given the fact that the leader of said conspiracy is completely incompetent and devoid of loyalty to those who serve him.
Fourth, the scheme also depends on the support of Congress, which has the power to certify electors sent by the governors rather than the legislatures. That means that another precondition for this whole project is that Republicans either flip the House (a probability FiveThirtyEight rates as 4%) or retain the Senate (27% chance, according to FiveThirtyEight). And again, after November 3 even Republican House and Senate members will have far weaker ties to Trump. House Republican leader Kevin McCarthy will know that his prospects of becoming Speaker are better under a Biden presidency, for example. Utah Senator Mitt Romney has already signaled he will not cooperate. And Nebraska Senator Ben Sasse has made it clear he wants his party rid of Trump. I suspect many more Republican Senators would secretly prefer Biden as president. They just cannot say so before November 3 because of the effects a Biden endorsement would have on down-ballot races. The likelihood, therefore, that they would certify slates of electors sent to them by Republican legislatures rather than duly-elected governors seems slim.
Finally, Trump would need a well-oiled executive branch fighting in the courts and in the media for him. Given that they all disparage him when he is out of the room that seems difficult to imagine. After November 3, even if Trump were to win, they would probably be looking to post-White House careers anyway. What will pad their resumes better: participating in a highly risky semi-coup attempt or standing up for the Constitution? Even Mike Pence will have to weigh that choice.
All five of these scenarios have to take place according to Trump’s design in order for any scheme to work. Most of them are possible on their own. But taken together they are highly improbable.
What does capital want?
It is a fool’s errand to attempt to identify a unified capitalist position in the coming election. Capitalists do not act as a united front and they have no secretive executive committee. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence that Biden is highly favored among U.S. capitalists. First, as is widely reported, he has a substantial fundraising advantage, indicating that wealthy donors are helping him, either because they prefer him to Trump, or because they expect him to win and want leverage. In fact, because of the Trump campaign’s financial difficulties, the president has had to cease advertising in Ohio and Iowa.
There is also evidence that key sectors of U.S. capital favor Biden. Goldman Sachs all but endorsed him recently and numerous leaks have come from the financial sector indicating that investors believe Biden will be good for markets. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, as per tradition, has not endorsed a presidential candidate. However, the group did make waves recently by deciding to support a large number of congressional Democrats. Turnout for those Democrats will aid and abet the Biden campaign.
The threat of a coup, or even a stolen election, rests on some dubious premises. There is no indication that any significant sector of the military is interested. And Republican loyalty to Trump is purely transactional and opportunistic. Finally, a coup would likely have little support among the capitalists. There are few actors left, therefore, who would carry it out. Jared and Don Jr. seem hardly up to the job.
There is a realistic threat of post-election violence from forces on the far right. They may well target leftists and various progressive activists. It is certainly wise to prepare for that. But their ability to impact the outcome of the election or preserve a Trump presidency even in the face of an electoral loss seems minimal. After all, more than fifty million people have already voted as of October 23 and the early voters skew Democratic. Yet there are no reports of right-wing violence at polling centers or drop boxes. If militant neo-fascists wait until November 3 to disrupt voting they will be mainly suppressing Trump votes.
It is understandable that those whose primary goal is to boost Democratic turnout, might want to circulate fears of a Trump coup. Their argument is that we need a blue tsunami to stop Trump in his tracks. On the Left there is debate about whether to support a clearly neoliberal candidate. However, that question should be debated on its merits. We should not discard our understanding of how the state works, or even our basic conception of how the government functions, in order to frighten the Left into supporting the Democrats in November.
The author would like to thank Mel Bienenfeld for assistance with some of the citations. This article appeared on the Tempest website on October 27, 2020 here.
It would be a new publication, he said,
staffed by people from across the political spectrum who,
according to a document that they’ve been working on, share a
belief that “American media is gripped in a polarized culture
war that is forcing journalism to conform to tribal,
groupthink narratives that are often divorced from the truth
and cater to perspectives that are not reflective of the
broader public but instead a minority of hyper-partisan
elites.”
An informed media observer, or someone
who spends too much time on Twitter, could come up with a list
of who might be called to join such a publication: Greenwald,
Matt Taibbi, Bari Weiss, Andrew Sullivan, Zaid Jilani, Thomas
Chatterton Williams, Michael Tracey, perhaps some podcasters
notorious for straddling the left-right divide, and anyone
else who thinks that threats to speech emanate from a
censorious, liberal-dominated culture and not from Donald
Trump, corporate power, or police brutalizing protesters in
the streets.
Forget Persuasion or Quillette or
whatever free speech absolutist publication is currently
fermenting in a billionaire’s petri dish. This will be a
Voltron of some of the most insufferable people in American
media, few of whom do any original reporting anymore, decrying
the cancellation of their friends at the hands of frigid
elites. Funded by those same elites, it likely will be
humorless and dull, hammering on the same tired culture war
tropes until they are unrecognizable.
"The convergence between center and left is not only the result of Washington's policies and the untold suffering they have inflicted on the Venezuelan people. It is
also the product of president Nicolás Maduro's adroit strategy of accepting some of the demands of the centrists while pursuing a hardline approach against the insurgent opposition. Carlos Ron, vice-minister for North America, told me 'Maduro has to be recognized
for achieving what appeared impossible: moving a big chunk of the opposition from insurgency to peace.'
"But the strategy has downsides. Concessions to business interests, which go hand in hand with Maduro's conciliatory strategy, have been criticized by a left faction of the governing Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV). In addition, the Communist Party
and several other parties and groups belonging to the ruling Polo Patriótico alliance have broken with Maduro and formed a rival slate for the upcoming elections.
"And despite their recent stands, it is clear that the centrists are far from stable allies for Maduro. Some are just biding their time — waiting for the right moment to attempt to force him out through a recall election."