Glen Greenwald is no Marxist or has changed from my awareness from his previous holding reactionary
libertarian views.
He has a sordid history of interacting with fascists, such as his pro-bono defending
Matthew Hale and the National Alliance,
both who had funds for paid defense for their horrible activities.
Glen Greenwald's companion seems in political agreement more with us, than Greenwald. They are two different people.
Greenwald's association with fellow libertarians Assange, Snowden as with the libertarian and other right wingers Antiwar.com
(a compilation of John Birchers, LaRouchite "911 Truthers" and the historical right wing isolationists and nativists)
has some progressives confused and wrongly assuming these folks are "progressives". They are not. The Libertarians
are from the split within the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF Fascists) around a government military conscripted draft.
These antiwar isolationists and nativists, were the same politics as the American Firsters who did not want to fight the
fascists prior to the Pearl Harbor Attack.
Only Chelsea Manning who was with Assange, might be moving leftward from seeing a Emma Goldman poster
in their residence. But who knows for certain - time will tell. But Assange relations with Nigel Farage, are telling
to me.
I am no fan of Joe Biden or his son - both corrupt individuals.
My decision to encourage people to vote for Biden - is from my own perspective of needing to remove Trump
and halt and demoralize some of the religious based fascist forces, that are my historical enemy. I spent my
life opposed and fighting such right wing religious fanatics and understand their danger. And I understand
what political currents "world view" are and the corporate dems, who serve the capitalist class. Vote Biden!
on behalf of Tristan Sloughter <t@...>
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 9:16 AM Subject: Glenn Greenwald Throws a Fit | The New Republic
I found the argument that he fell afoul of liberal anxieties about a Trump victory rather convincing.
His piece was nonsense, why wouldn't an editor push back?
He was arguing that the Hunter Biden story was not reported on because of the vehement support for Biden in the media. What he leaves out in his article is any mention of Fox News passing on the story or reporter at the NY Post not putting his name on
it.
Greenwald twisted the facts to fit the right's narrative about "progressives" (Matt Taibbi used this term in his defense of Greenwald) controlling the "mainstream media", MSNBC, CNN, etc, and hiding anything that could hurt Biden or help Trump -- everything
from the extent of the covid-19 pandemic to satanic pedophile rings.
The bourgeois media is guided by ratings and profit, not some "progressive" alliance of the "enemy of the people".
If the average American was as smart and erudite as the anarchist John Zerzan in rejecting the ritual of electoral politics, alot of trouble could be avoided. As Zerzan recently said, it's a choice between death and death. The strategy of lesser evilism is not valid in case of death. And ask yourself, does the US today deserve better than Trump? No, not really. But that maybe my European bias... We all know this world is ending. Over here, another temperature record was broken today. Feliz dias de los Muertos!
At least you’re posting a link to the article & not insulting him him in such puerile ways as you do with Chomsky and Monthly Review. Specifically, what’s your disagreement with the following (taken from the article):
“If, prior to summer 2020, the impact of Bernie Sanders on Democratic discourse was cause for optimism, the efficacy with which centrist Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden used identity politics to dispatch Sanders was cause for alarm. Attacking Sanders from the right via rhetorically left, identity politics frameworks, centrist Democrats, and even some progressives, identified his platform as an anachronistic class agenda that deflected attention from white racism and its consequences for blacks.”
The Reeds might be wrong or they might be right, but they do publish serious criticism of “identitarianism.” Let’s engage w/ the arguments.
"The fact that former ALEC affiliates can “embrace” constructs like ... “systemic racism” tells us something vital about where this road will take us."
H-Net Review [HABSBURG]: Vari on Hakkarainen, 'Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna' and Hödl, 'Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna'
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...> Date: November 2, 2020 at 10:39:43 AM EST To: h-review@... Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...> Subject:H-Net Review [HABSBURG]: Vari on Hakkarainen, 'Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna' and Hödl, 'Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna' Reply-To: h-review@...
Heidi Hakkarainen. Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna. Austrian and Habsburg Studies Series. New York Berghahn Books, 2019. Illustrations. viii + 279 pp. $135.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-78920-273-1.
Klaus Hödl. Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna. Translated by Corey Twitchell. Austrian and Habsburg Studies Series. New York Berghahn Books, 2019. 194 pp. $135.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-78920-030-0.
Reviewed by Alexander Vari (Marywood University) Published on HABSBURG (November, 2020) Commissioned by Yasir Yilmaz
Humorous Magazines and Jewish/Non-Jewish Interactions in the Making of Viennese Popular Culture
Writing almost twenty years ago in the conclusion of the collective volume Rethinking Vienna 1900, historian Mary Gluck made the observation that due to the Schorskean paradigm becoming so successful in interpreting the meaning and legacy of the fin-de-siècle Habsburg capital, "older stereotypes of Vienna, the city of operettas, waltzes and coffeehouses, have given way to a new myth of Vienna, the habitat of aesthetes, connoisseurs and psychoanalysts."[1] Yet, as the other contributions to the same volume suggested, Carl Schorske's thesis, which related Viennese modernism to the death of historicism and the rise of an ahistorical culture--an explanation that during the 1980s served to connect Vienna with the rise of late twentieth-century postmodernism and to turn its intellectual milieu into the petri dish from which the ideas of the twentieth century were born--was already challenged by many scholars of the Habsburg monarchy.[2] Moreover, the period since then has also witnessed a more sustained scholarly examination of comic operas, operettas, waltzes, variety theaters, and coffeehouses in the rise of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century popular culture in Vienna, a cultural domain that--as Gluck had pointed out--the focus on high culture and politics specific to Schorske's academic legacy had obscured for so long.[3]
The two volumes under review here represent important contributions to this new wave of scholarship. They offer insights on the making of Viennese popular culture through the study of fin-de-siècle popular humor and, respectively, the world of Viennese _volkssänger_. Heidi Hakkarainen's study relies on research in humorous magazines like _Der Figaro_, _Der Floh_, and _Kikeriki_ between 1857 and 1890 to "explore ... popular humour in the nineteenth-century city both as a mode of lived experience and as a discourse on urban life" (p. 2). The author unfolds this topic thematically by analyzing humorous images of and commentaries on Vienna's rebuilding after the 1857 imperial decision to take down the old ramparts surrounding the city's medieval core (which led to the building of the modern Ringstrasse), including comical musings on the new rules and regulations that governed modern urban life. According to Hakkarainen, the urban chaos engendered by street traffic and the intermingling of different classes was another topic that amused the Viennese. Cartoonists also made humorous parallels between the sense of general disorder caused by the tearing down of old buildings and the presence of ubiquitous worksites in the city during the 1860s and 1870s, which reminded them of the political and social upheaval caused in Vienna by the 1848 revolution two decades earlier. Coupled with a rising sense of nostalgia for the refreshing shadow provided prior to 1857 by the trees and gardens covering the area of the Viennese glacis, for which--in the opinion of contemporaries--the drying tree saplings and the barren vistas of the modern city could not make up, the humorous magazines' exploration of the differences between the old and the new city was thus a constant source of popular humor.
Hakkarainen's study is grounded in a solid knowledge of the secondary literature on modernity and theories of humor. One of her important claims, which adds a new perspective to them, is that in Vienna "the 'modern' was encountered and processed through humour long before it became such a prominent feature in society and social debate" (p. 3). While humorists poked fun at various aspects of the Viennese urban modernity in the making, humor itself was a product of this early modernity.
Hakkarainen identifies two kinds of humor: "rebellious humour," which drew out "humour's creative and innovative potential," and "disciplinary humour," which had "suppressive and conservative tendencies" (p. 18). The first kind of humor was noticeable in the humorous magazines' comical renderings of Vienna's urban redevelopment plan, in their chastising of the incompetence of city authorities to quickly turn the Ringstrasse into a livable place, and in the ridiculing of the misplaced punctiliousness of the police. At the same time, however, the general attitude of the humorous magazines addressing a middle-class, and in some cases, a lower-middle-class audience, was one of conservative nostalgia for a past that was fast disappearing under the very eyes of the Viennese. By contrast to the certainties of that simpler past, the present made many experience a sense of confusion and visual deception when confronted with the sights of their new urban modernity.
According to Hakkarainen, even humor itself was seen by contemporaries as becoming deteriorated in the process, being transformed "from thought-provoking training of the mind into superficial and lifeless entertainment" (p. 151). Yet while providing entertainment, the numerous juxtapositions in the humorous press of representations of Alt- and Neu-Wien, also fed nostalgia for the former as a space of Viennese authenticity, with the Ringstrasse being depicted, by contrast, "as part of New Vienna, representing novelty, [and] not memory" (p. 156). The specific dynamic between the past and the present was not the only issue in focus in Viennese humor though, since the same humorous publications also offered their readers visions of Vienna from a distant future, embodied in dystopian visions of the city, which enabled them not just to react to how modern urban planning changed the city between 1857 and 1890 but also to "actively construct ... the experience and understanding of [Viennese] modernity" (p. 167).
The most exciting chapter of the book is the last one, in which Hakkarainen explores humoristic takes on gendered images of the city, female and male fashion, cross-dressing, women's involvement in the making of Viennese humor, and first-time encounters by foreigners, tourists, and non-German ethnic groups from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, with Vienna as a Weltstadt. While this chapter is quite crowded, since the author also looks at representations of Jewishness and the Viennese underclass with its various characters and types in the satirical press of the time, the richness of these topics is indicative of the multitude of research paths one can follow in the study of Viennese popular humor. At the same time, even though Hakkarainen's interpretations are based on a well-informed European-wide comparative frame throughout her book, it is especially in the case of this chapter that her references to developments in London, Paris, and Berlin would have also benefited from a more sustained analysis of the connections between Vienna and Budapest. With the latter city taking on at the time the dual role of Vienna's competitor and alter-ego as a Weltstadt, which also imagined itself in gendered terms as a young female metropolis, and a number of other rising urban centers within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, such as Prague, Trieste, Fiume/Rijeka, Zagreb, and Cracow, on the one hand, and cities located in the broader eastern European space like St. Petersburg, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Bucharest, on the other, bringing peripheral modernities in intense dialogue with the European urban core, such comparisons would have added other revealing findings to the book.[4]
Although Hakkarainen provides only a brief discussion of the connections between urbanity, Jewishness, and modernity in the constitution of fin-de-siècle Viennese popular culture, this brevity is compensated by Klaus Hödl's focus on that very connection in his _Entangled Entertainers_, the recent English translation of a book that was published originally in German as _Zwischen Wienerlied und Der Kleine Kohn: Juden in der Wiener populären Kultur um 1900 _(2017). Hödl's straightforward thesis is that long-term academic focus on Jews' cultural assimilation in middle- and upper-middle-class Viennese society and their participation in the making of fin-de-siècle high culture has obscured the fact that "Jews played a substantial role in the shaping of Viennese popular culture" (p. 7). As Hödl points out, unlike their more prominent and much better-studied counterparts in the sphere of high culture, Jews involved on the volkssänger scene or those who wrote or performed in the vaudeville (variety acts) of the time did not pursue a path of acculturation in a preexisting popular culture but actively shaped it as part of their interactions with Jews and non-Jews involved in the field of Viennese popular entertainment. At the same time, these Jewish artists have been less visible than other Jews in Viennese society because neither mainstream nor Jewish newspapers reported on popular culture, while, due to the artistic names that they took, Jewish variety theater authors and performers became harder to identify as such, and thus became less visible for scholars. However, cheap newspapers like the _Illustrirtes Wiener Extrablatt_ and _Das Variété_ (which in addition to the texts of a large corpus of variety theater plays are one of the main sources for Hödl's research) closely followed the Viennese variety theater scene and therefore hold a wealth of information that enable one to reconstruct the main developments in that world around 1900.
Entertainment venues located in Leopoldstadt along the Taborstrasse and Praterstrasse like the Etablissement Nestroy-Säle, the Edelhofer Leopoldtstadt Folk Orpheum, and the hotel Zum Schwarzen Adler, together with the Zum Marokkaner variety theater located in the Viennese Prater, served as venues for Jewish volkssängers and entertainment troupes like the Folies Comiques, the Lemberg Singspiel Society, the S. Fischer Society, the Hirsh and Kassina Ensembles, the Appolo and Danzer's Orpheum, and, the most well-known among all, the Budapest Orpheum Society. The most important thing about these ensembles, as Hödl emphasizes, was that they were made up of both Jewish and non-Jewish artists, an intermixing that also extended to their audiences in the aforementioned venues. Instead of staying separate and aloof from each other, as was the case among the Christian and Jewish members of Viennese middle- and upper-middle-class society, lower-middle and working-class milieus provided room for continuous everyday interaction between Jews and non-Jews, an interaction that was also prominent in the plays that their audiences watched in these locales.
At the same time, the plays by Jewish authors that were performed "portray[ed] Jewishness without reference to religion." As Hödl explains in a crucial passage of his text, in these plays "Jewishness is anything but clearly outlined: instead, it is fluid, multifaceted, and opaque." In the plays, "Jewishness is expressed in a form of performative difference: Jews distinguish themselves from non-Jews through activities to their effects, [which] means that Jewish difference, as constructed in these works, is time- and context-dependent." Moreover, "this concept of Jewish self-understanding is inclusive, in that even non-Jews can adopt their characteristics" (p. 69). To add further evidence to the validity of this point, the author uses the concept of the performative character of Jewishness to explain Albert Hirsch's, a notable author of popular variety theater plays, involvement in the so-called _Volkssänger_ Wars that shook the Viennese volkssänger scene in the early twentieth century. These "wars" that were triggered by different responses among Viennese artists to the question whether to allow a Budapest-based volkssänger troupe to permanently move to the city showed that there were no clear dividing lines between Jews and non-Jews in the world of Viennese variety theater and that Hirsch and other Jewish artists like him were neither prisoners of an essentialized view of their Jewishness nor motivated by a desire to acculturate to non-Jewish cultural norms and values. Instead, Jewish artists expressed their Jewishness performatively through Yiddish jargon or Jewish jokes, as members of a professional community of Viennese artists that included both Jews and non-Jews.
In Hödl's interpretation, however, performative Jewishness did not exclude Jewish difference. Jews could still be different from their non-Jewish peers depending on the context. In the last two chapters of his book, Hödl examines two such contexts: that of the relationship between the city's past and the present and of the dialectic play between similarity and difference. Just like the widespread nostalgia for the lost charms of Old Vienna that was so prominent in the humorous magazines analyzed by Hakkarainen in her book, the trope of Alt-Wien resurfaced at the turn of the century in the world of the Viennese popular entertainment as well. However, while in the non-Jewish humorous magazines examined by Hakkarainen references to the city's past often served as vehicles to cast a shadow on and poke fun at the ills of modernity, for Jews, as Hödl observes, "the embellishment of the city's recent history did not merely serve as a critique of the present. Rather, Old Vienna was a foil that allowed them to inscribe themselves into the history of the city. A Jewish presence in the past was meant to serve as a counterpoint to the widespread view that Jews were foreign immigrants, who did not truly belong to society" (p. 123). For instance, Jewish architect Oskar Marmorek, the builder in a composite and imaginative form of the plaster recreation of Old Vienna in the Viennese Prater in the 1890s, "included the medieval _Judengasse_ among the few side streets that led to his reconstruction of the Hoher Markt." Another way for Jews to inscribe their presence in the city's past was by "showing Jews [engaged] in peaceful interactions with non-Jews," especially on the outskirts of Vienna, an essential space in the contemporary nostalgia for Alt-Wien (p. 124). The latter was a plot component that many Jewish volkssänger authors, like Hirsch and others, commonly included in their variety theater plays.
By the turn of the century, however, rising anti-Semitism in Vienna's suburbs prompted Jewish authors active in popular journalism, such as Felix Salten and Stefan Zweig, to switch to the present and imagine, by contrast, Vienna's entertainment district, the Prater--a space from which anti-Semitism and nationalism were noticeably absent--as Vienna's "eternal periphery" (p. 132). Jewish vaudeville authors, too, turned their attention to the present as a newly relevant temporal location for their plots. They especially used two temporalities, those of the fleeting and the permanent present to imbue them with new meanings. For instance, in an attempt to address the contradictions of "a transitory present ... experienced as fleeting," which raised the specter of worsening relations between Jews and non-Jews, _Little Kohn_, a play by Caprice, performed by the Viennese Budapest Orpheum Society, used racist clichés embedded in the figure of the eponymous character, who--as the play unfolds--turns to be the opposite of what those clichés suggested, enabling its author to counter anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jews (p. 136). By contrast, in a variety play by Josef Armin titled _The Journey to Grosswardein_, it is a permanent present--depicted through the inability of several, both Jewish and non-Jewish, characters to depart the Viennese train station for their intended destination--that is featured. As Hödl argues, these plays prove "that Jews in Vienna around 1900 regimented time and space differently than Jews in other epochs and in different social contexts." Moreover, "in Vienna, this understanding appeared distinct, in a manner that replaced religion and other prevalent signifiers of Jewish difference, but without running the risk of being essentialized" (p. 142).
In the world of popular culture, Jewish difference became thus inclusive. In addition to inclusivity, and based on all the other variety plays that he examines in the book, Hödl identifies "individuality, interactionality [and] performance" as the other main markers of Jewish difference (p. 156). He concludes that Jewishness "as a form of difference based on inclusive qualities, which can also shape the identities of non-Jews" rather than being paradoxical, points to the fact that there was a similarity between Jews and non-Jews, a similarity that "does not resolve differences between them" but "indicates a gradual, rather than a fundamental difference" between the two groups (pp. 157, 158).
Overall, by focusing on interactions between Jews and non-Jews in the volkssänger milieu, _Entangled Entertainers _proves Gluck's claim--made earlier in her _The Invisible Jewish Budapest: Metropolitan Culture at the Fin-de-Siècle_ (2016)--that "the true context for modern Jewish identity lay not in the interior spaces of bourgeois domesticity nor in the official public realm of political life but in institutions of urban culture such as the coffee house, the boulevard, and the music hall, where a new world of personal significance and make-believe could be constructed," a claim that Hödl brilliantly explores and further nuances from the perspective of the Viennese context.[5]
Ultimately, both Hakkarainen's and Hödl's work reveal something new and important about fin-de-siècle Viennese popular culture, which appears in their analyses as a space of unexpected entanglements and complexity that belies the relevance of commercial and unreflective properties that were attached to it for so long. Works such as these make historical research in the field of European popular culture engaging and intriguing, bringing Vienna to the attention of a larger community of scholars once again.
Notes
[1]. Mary Gluck, "Afterthoughts about Fin-de-Siècle Vienna," in _Rethinking Vienna 1900_, ed._ _Steven Beller (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 265.
[2]. For a full exposition of Schorske's thesis, see Carl E. Schorske, _Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture_ (New York: Knopf, 1979).
[3]. See Ralph Köhnen, _Die Zauberflöte und das "Populäre": Eine kleine Mediologie der Unterhaltungskunst _(Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang, 2016); Ian Woodfield, _Cabals and Satires: Mozart's Comic Operas in Vienna_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Camille Crittenden, _Johann Strauss and Vienna: Operetta and the Politics of Popular Culture_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Derek B. Scott, _Sounds of the Metropolis: The 19th-Century Popular Music Revolution in London, New York, Paris, and Vienna_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Marion Linhardt, _Residenzstadt und Metropole: Zu Einer Kulturelle Topographie des Wiener Unterhaltungstheaters, 1858-1918_ (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006); and Charlotte Ashby, Tag Gronberg, and Simon Shaw-Miller, eds., _The Viennese Café and Fin-de-Siècle Culture_ (New York: Berghahn Books, 2013).
[4]. On Budapest, see especially the chapters by Péter Hanák, "Urbanization and Civilization: Vienna and Budapest in the Nineteenth Century," in _The Garden and the Workshop: Essays on the Cultural History of Vienna and Budapest _(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 3-43 ; and Gábor Gyáni, "A United City on the Danube," in _Identity and the Urban Experience: Fin-de-Siècle Budapest_" (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2004), 3-22. The secondary literature on the other cities is quite extensive.
[5]. Mary Gluck, _The Invisible Jewish Budapest: Metropolitan Culture at the Fin-de-Siècle_ (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2016), 171.
Citation: Alexander Vari. Review of Hakkarainen, Heidi, _Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna_ and Hödl, Klaus, _Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna_. HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews. November, 2020. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55290
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
A few weeks back Owen Jones wrote words to the
effect that
he would walk over broken glass to vote for Biden if it prevented
a Trump
second term.I sympathise
with this,
particularly because of the boost to the far right Trump's awful
presidency has
provided.And yet, i
think the 'lesser
evil' strategy in this case is also seriously flawed.
In 2015, in the UK, Ed Miliband (Labour
candidate) lost in a
General Election to David Cameron (Conservative). Miliband’s
politics were a
form of rehashed centrism with the odd slightly more radical
policy thrown in
but he was very much a candidate of the establishment (in as much
as he was
prepared to continue the economic policies of austerity). In the
weeks and
months before the election, the majority of the people on the left
used the
lesser evil stratagem – that is to say, they argued that, despite
his flaws,
Miliband was better than Cameron (certainly true) and if we voted
him into
power we might be able to pull him more to the left (debatable).
In the event
Milliband lost because of his lukewarm politics, because he simply
couldn’t
provide any kind of credible or definitive alternative to the
politics of the
status-quo.
But in the wake of that defeat, the space was
opened up for
something which broke with the political consensus and austerity
economics. The
Corbyn movement. In his early days, Jeremy Corbyn was everything
that Miliband
was not. Miliband had been an awkward speaker, a distinctive nasal
honk married
to the type of glib soundbite which was enough to make you cringe.
Corbyn, on
the other hand, was slower and more deliberate, but his words
carried the
weight of raw feeling, rather than the sense of having been
crafted by the
mechanics of a Public Relations team.
And Corbyn could speak with pathos and
authenticity,
precisely because what he was bringing to light were genuine
social truths; it
was true that the bankers had ravaged the economy in wolfish and
predatory
fashion, and it was also true that the poorest and most vulnerable
– the
immigrants, the disabled, public-sector workers and those who eked
out a living
in the precarious economy – had been demonized and decimated,
sacrificed at the
altar of high-finance and the power of privilege.
Corbyn for the first time, and on the back of a
growing
social movement, articulated a different political vision; one
which was about
recognising the essential labour which was provided by those at
the bottom, the
importance of immigration both economically and culturally, and
finally a sense
that perhaps the real parasites were not those claiming benefits
at the bottom,
but those looting the economy at the top via the billions and
billions which
were being syphoned through tax-havens.
Corbyn’s movement was closed down, in ways
which were both
brutal and insidious. But I think that had Miliband attained
victory in 2015,
had the ‘lesser evil’ tactic had succeeded – then the Corbyn
movement would
have never have been born in the first place. Instead the left
would have
mounted their energies getting behind a centre-ground candidate,
and their
radicalism would have been absorbed by the parliamentary machine,
rather than
being able to pose a significant challenge to business as usual.
Would they
have succeeded in pulling the Milliband administration radically
to the left?
If the five years of Milliband’s stewardship of the Labour Party
were anything
to go by, it seems unlikely to say the least.
And this brings us to the question of the
upcoming US
election. The argument against voting for Biden, against voting
for ‘the lesser
evil’ is not simply an argument in which the political differences
between
Trump and Biden are absolved, whereby one simply says that they
are both
establishment figures and therefore just as bad as each other. For
what it’s
worth, I think Trump is considerably worse than Biden – most
significantly in
as much as his presidency has helped mobilize far right groups
across the US,
groups such as the KKK and other fringe elements whose activities
have spilled
over into murderous violence on repeated occasions.
But the argument against ‘lesser evilism’ does
not depend on
affirming some kind of moral equivalence between Trump and Biden.
Rather it depends
on showing that if we, on the left, push to channel our forces and
our support
into the Biden campaign, we simultaneously end up narrowing the
horizons of the
future; that is to say, we end up closing the space in which new
forms of
campaigning and political mobilisations can be created. We end up
reducing the
possibility of the type of genuine political alternative which
might really
challenge the Trumps of this world.
Of course, there is a sense in which the
Democratic Party
has always functioned this way. By situating itself as the only
possible
alternative to the worst corruptions of establishment power as
represented by
the Republican Party – it also became a conduit through which
building social
and political pressure in society at large could be diffused and
the
established order can be more effectively maintained. In the words
of Malcolm
X, this ostensible opposition between the two major parties
allowed the ruling
classes to show the voter a ‘growling wolf’ precisely so that ‘he
flees into
the open jaws of the smiling fox’.
Under the rubric of ‘moderation’, the
Democratic Party was
able to achieve the grisly honour of being the first political
regime in
history to have unleashed nuclear holocaust, bombing Japanese
cities and
annihilating the lives of hundreds of thousands. In that period
too, the party
was also responsible for organising concentration camps to intern
Japanese-US
citizens on US soil. In addition, the same ‘moderate’ organisation
was
responsible for escalating the conflict in Vietnam to a shrieking
apex, while
war in the time of Obama encompassed Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen,
Syria, Lydia,
Afghanistan and Iraq as the dronemiester extrodinaire brought
smooth, automated
death to thousands of men, women and children, courtesy of the
latest sleek,
gleaming military technology purring through the skies. When I
talk to ardent
Democrats who consider themselves progressives, who locate
themselves to the
left on the political spectrum, I am often tempted to ask them if
there is any
atrocity the Party could commit which might in some way stymy
their loyalty to
it. Based on its foreign policy record thus far, it is hard to
imagine.
Somehow, then, the party has managed to
maintain the façade
of progressivism, and it is this – one feels – which allows it to
absorb and
annul the possibilities of developing more radical political
alternatives. The
Party is ‘radical’ enough to allow the presence of an AOC or a
Bernie Sanders
in its ranks, i.e. someone with a somewhat more progressive agenda
– but at the
same time, the grinding internal mechanics of the party
bureaucracy means that
if such a candidate gets close to the leadership of the party they
will
automatically be closed down from above – by the superdelegates at
the top who
have the ability to nominate candidates irrespective of the way
voting patterns
on the ground dictate. In practise such an elite layer is
naturally calibrated
to secure the interests of the elite candidate over and against
the political
outsider; in 2016, for example, ‘many superdelegates came out
early in support
of Hillary Clinton, a fact that caused Sanders to claim that the
Democratic
Party powers-that-be were manipulating the system… Sanders and his
supporters
thought her early endorsements from so many superdelegates might
have swayed
primary voters.’
But it is not just the radicalism of
individuals which the
mechanics of the party machine have evolved to quash. In the
depression era,
the US Communist Party – no doubts driven by the same lesser evil
stratagem –
worked to weld the support of the most militant workers to the
Democratic
Party, and in so doing thwarted the development of an independent
labour party
which could have emerged on a mass basis and with genuine social
roots in the
working classes. A generation before, at the end of the nineteenth
century, a
radical party had indeed emerged (the Populist Party) with a
left-wing agrarian
programme which clamoured for a more democratic political system
in and through
the direct election of senators, restrictions on the railway
barons through
federal regulation, aid to small farmers and labourers along with
legal
measures to protect them from rapacious corporate interests.
Ultimately, however, the growth of the party
was stunted,
first by its support for the Democratic nominee William Jennings
Bryan in the
election of 1896, and then by its assimilation into the Democratic
Party more
broadly; a fusion which extinguished the radical flame of the
party, and left
its more militant members beached in terms of an isolated rump.
But there is yet another way in which the
‘lesser evilism’
argument in favour of a vote for the Democrats is problematic. It
posits a
rather mechanical opposition between the Biden-led Democratic
Party and Trump’s
Republicans – the only expedient and realistic way to defeat the
latter is to
back the former. But in so doing, such an argument fails to stress
the
symbiotic connection which exists between the two political
parties. Trump did
not win in 2016 because he came to power on the back of a broad
right-wing social
movement which was then translated into a vast hike in the number
of votes in
the electoral ballet. In actual fact, in as much as Trump ‘won’ at
all, he only
did marginally better than McCain – the Republican nominee – had
done almost a
decade before. Trump won 46.1% percent of the popular vote, while
McCain, for
his part, had won 45.7% in 2008. The real difference was on the
side of the
Democrats themselves: in 2008 Obama had won 52.9% of the popular
vote, while in
2016 Clinton only managed to procure 48.2%. In other words, the
Democrat’s vote
share had fallen by almost four million votes (and that is before
we take into
account the increase in population between 2008 and 2016).
To say the same – Trump won because the
Democrats ended up
haemorrhaging votes. And the reason for this is little difficult
to surmise.
The eight years of Democrat administration which preceded the
Trump victory
were the years in which Obama’s abstract and facile exhortations
toward ‘hope’
and ‘change’ were extinguished in the fiery wastelands of the
battle-scarred
Middle East, while at home Obama had time and time again confirmed
himself as
Wall Street’s man and a fervent friend to big business – whether
it meant
shoring up the commitment to bail out the banks, or a very public
PR stunt in
which he took a sip from a (filtered) glass of Flint water in an
attempt to
advertise the benevolence of the private company that had been
poisoning
Flint’s water supply through the lead contamination which was
leaking out of
substandard piping. The sheer, sleek corporate quality to Obama’s
neoliberalism
and its utter indifference to the lives of the poor now left a
bitter taste in
the mouth, the type of which Flint’s population were all too
familiar with.
More broadly speaking, however, the political
system itself
has narrowed down; the ability of the party in opposition to offer
up a genuine
economic alternative to the economics of neoliberalism is almost
non-existent,
such has the Democratic political machine been saturated by the
campaign
donations of big business. Indeed Biden himself, at the halfway
point of 2020,
boasted 106 billionaire donors to Trump’s 93. As absurd as it is,
Trump is able
to advertise himself as a political outsider, as an
anti-establishment figure
for precisely this reason – precisely because the Democrats are
more and more
seen to have been bought and paid for by Wall Street. Trump’s own
rapacious
brand of neoliberalism is packaged in a right-wing
authoritarianism promoting
the politics of the ‘strong leader’ and a state which draws upon
the more
antiquated and organic values of a religious nationalism which
nostalgically
looks back to the spirit of a ‘founding people’ (read white
Protestants).
This, in turn, acts as a dog-whistle to
mobilize the more
rabid and racist sections of the lower-middle classes along with
considerable
sections of the financial elite who appreciate the more prosaic
economic
motivations of Trumpism in terms of tax relief for the most
wealthy. In the
words of the philosopher Katie Terezakis, Trumpism represents a
form of
‘romantic anti-capitalist ideology’ which, in reality, ‘only
further privileges
the capitalist elite it degrades in oratory alone.’
A
similar trajectory
has been achieved elsewhere; the most infamous examples being
Bolsonaro in
Brazil and Orbán in Hungary. In these cases too, we are made
witness to a
creeping authoritarianism which is registered in and through the
appeal to a
religious-nationalism with a pronounced racial inflection, one
which privileges
white skin at the expense of the ‘outsider’. And in these cases
too, the right
wing administration has come into power – not on the back of a
powerful
far-right social movement which developed along fascist lines
(despite
ideological pretentions to the contrary) – but rather by having
stepped into
the void left by the previous administration, the so called ‘left’
or
‘alternative’ major party in the Democrat mold which had
nevertheless signed up
to years of neoliberal, austerity economics.
What has been termed the ‘mounting tide of
authoritarian
neoliberalism’, then, is only conceivable in as much as the
mainstream parties
of ‘the left’ or ‘centre-ground’ – the alternative which
parliamentary
democracy has come to pose – have rendered themselves almost
completely defunct
in terms of providing any kind of political or economic programme
which helps
facilitate the interests of the poor majority. When one insists on
a voting
tactic which consistently privileges the ‘lesser evil’ at a time
when liberal
democracy on a world scale appears to be entering into a terminal
crisis – one
fails to go to the root of the matter; i.e. to understand that the
rise of a
figure like Trump is symbiotically connected to the failure of the
Democrats to
provide any type of credible opposition in the context of the
crisis of
parliamentary democracy which has played out against the backdrop
of a global
neoliberalism.
Or to put it in another way – trying to get the
left to
arshal its forces behind the Democrats and Biden, not only narrows
the
prospects of developing genuinely left forms of political
organisation –
moreover, such a strategy actively works to create the perfect
conditions in
which Trumpism itself can metastasize. Yes, Biden can prevent
Trump from
gaining a second term, but in so doing he merely prepares the
ground for next
time – another Trump, Trump mark II, a more effective, younger
model.
Ultimately, there is little to be gained for
the left in
encouraging the vote for the late-Joe Biden and his zombified
brand of
corporate politics, his stale empty slogans, the stench of blood
and oil
wafting in from distant, decimated lands. You needn’t attach
yourself to these
kinds of politics and policies – however indirectly, however much
you are
holding your nose. To paraphrase a great revolutionist, isn’t it
time we let
the dead bury the dead?
I found the argument that he fell afoul of liberal anxieties about a Trump victory rather convincing.
His piece was nonsense, why wouldn't an editor push back?
He was arguing that the Hunter Biden story was not reported on because of the vehement support for Biden in the media. What he leaves out in his article is any mention of Fox News passing on the story or reporter at the NY Post not putting his name on it.
Greenwald twisted the facts to fit the right's narrative about "progressives" (Matt Taibbi used this term in his defense of Greenwald) controlling the "mainstream media", MSNBC, CNN, etc, and hiding anything that could hurt Biden or help Trump -- everything from the extent of the covid-19 pandemic to satanic pedophile rings.
The bourgeois media is guided by ratings and profit, not some "progressive" alliance of the "enemy of the people".
Come on ROGER --- Noam Chomsky (was Chompsky a pun attempting to call him a "chump" --- if so, very clever!) has been a fierce critic of American Imperialism since at least 1964 ---- I have read loads of things he has written --- have seen him speak many times --- have been in his company ---- he is an independent thinker with a strong commitment to basic democratic forms and a strong opponent of all forms of private property and private power ---- if I were to characterize his political-economic pedigree it would be as an anarchist --- or PERHAPS, a libertarian socialist --
His tactical argument that one must support BIden against Trump does not make him an apologist for the Dems or US imperialism --- it makes him an individual who believes Trump is an existential threat to life on the planet and that the American system is TOO WEAK to rein him in!
During Obama's two terms, Chomsky was very critical of Obama --- emphasizing his use of drone strikes and his failed economic policies. He would probably totally agree that the Democrats (particularly Obama's failed policies) gave us Trump --- he may have even said it explicitly ....
(by the way, Chomsky is never afraid to change his mind --- at the onset of the Trump presidency he actually said he doubted Trump could accomplish much because he was lazy and stupid ....obviously if Trump has been ineffectual in making things much worse than they had been, Chomsky would NOT be worried about his re-election ....)
By the way -- Chomsky is NOT a Marxist --- I believe he thought Bakunin had the better of the arguments!!
I am also glad to see the admission that the Democrats gave us Trump. We in the PSL have been saying this all along ,as have people like Jimmy Dore. You would never hear this admission from someone like Chompsky ,who I see as an outright apologist for both the Democratic Party ,and US imperialism ,much in the same way Bernie Sanders is. Many on the left have been saying all along if Biden wins, someone even worse than Trump will come along in 2024, or 2028, so we are screwed either way. The only solution is not to support ,or vote for ,any Democrat ,ever.
In a photo from
early October, Orthodox Jewish residents of Borough
Park, Brooklyn, protest against new restrictions
intended to combat the coronavirus.Photograph
by Michael Nagle / Redux
Jacob
Kornbluh, a Hasidic journalist, has lived in Borough
Park, in southwest Brooklyn, for eighteen years. He has
written on local and national politics from the
neighborhood—which is home to one of the largest Haredi,
or traditional Orthodox, communities in the city—for
twelve. “Pre-pandemic, if you walked into any major
Jewish event in New York City, you’d undoubtedly see
him,” Avital Chizhik-Goldschmidt recentlywrote for theForward, where she is an editor.
Last month, mid-pandemic, hundreds of Haredi Jews took
to the streets in protest of a new set ofcoronavirusrestrictions
on Borough Park. Kornbluh was there to report the story;
he watched as the protesters—mostly young men and
boys—tossed their masks into a makeshift bonfire in the
middle of Thirteenth Avenue. The crowd was densely
packed into a single street block, but it would
occasionally part ways for one man, a big guy in a
wrinkled suit, who commandeered a police megaphone. He
spoke with a throaty, Brooklyn drawl, all “W”s and no
“R”s. “You are my soldiers!” he bellowed. “We are at
war!”
The man was Heshy
Tischler, a local talk-radio host and a candidate for
City Council. Kornbluh had covered Tischler before: in
2017, when the radio host had launched an earlier bid
for City Council (and lost, having received just four
per cent of the vote), and more recently, as Tischler
had emerged as the leader of a local uprising against
governmentcovidmeasures.
Lately, Tischler had begun accusing members of the
community of being so-called government informants. The
crowd noticed one such man filming their protest; he
tried to run, but the protesters set upon him and beat
him unconscious. Kornbluh left the scene when the
violence began. There was a chance that it might turn on
him next.
When the pandemic hit,
in March, the coronavirus eviscerated Haredi communities
like the one in Borough Park. Large families, crowded
neighborhoods, and communal life and prayer functioned
as preëxisting conditions. Entire communities across
Brooklyn decided, by consensus, to shut themselves down,
even as schools and restaurants throughout the city
remained open.
But it’s hard to put
faith on pause. Some Haredi Jews don’t watch television,
and many keep “kosher” phones that filter or block the
Internet; virtual worship isn’t possible when
electronics are forbidden on holidays. There were
scattered reports of congregations illicitly gathering
throughout Brooklyn. When a prominent Hasidic rabbi in
Williamsburg died in late April, the funeral procession
drew thousands of mourners. The ceremony was outdoors
and masked, and the N.Y.P.D. barricaded the streets, but
at that point in the pandemic—the number ofcovidcases
had reached a new peak just two weeks before—it was
perceived as a serious violation. Mayor Bill de Blasio
ordered that the event be broken up and tweeted a
“message to the Jewish community” that “the time for
warnings has passed.” Many Jews felt that the tweet was
a crude generalization; the head of the Anti-Defamation
League called it “scapegoating.” The Orthodox Jewish
Public Affairs Council, an organization meant to counter
discrimination against the Orthodox Jewish community,
pointed out that thousands of New Yorkers had gathered
the same day to watch the Blue Angels and Thunderbirds
do a flyby. Where had the Mayor been then? And what
about all the other Jewish communities whowerefollowing
the rules?
Kornbluh documented the
tensions in Borough Park. Among the city’s political
press, he’s known as a reporter’s reporter—a news junkie
who wears a yarmulke and speaks with a Yiddish-inflected
British accent. Kornbluh grew up in London’s Stamford
Hill, where his father started an emergency medical
service. At a young age, he developed a fascination with
journalism. “I knew probably the names of all the
Knesset members,” he said, referring to Israel’s
parliament. Kornbluh went to yeshiva but never finished
high school. In 2001, he moved to Brooklyn, the center
of the Hasidic world in the United States, and worked at
a kosher deli; later, he opened a kosher pizza place. He
had eclectic tastes for a member of his community, which
tends to be highly insular: he taught himself to write
by studying biographies of famous Americans; he read theTimes.He
started a blog, and began showing up at major city
events to write about them. He covered theAnthony Weiner frenzyandDonald Trump’s
fateful escalator ride. At such events, he would often
run into Ben Smith, then a reporter at Politico, who is
now theTimes’media
columnist. Smith encouraged Kornbluh to pursue
journalism full time. Kornbluh took the advice, selling
off his pizzeria.
In 2015, he was hired
by Jewish Insider, a daily news outlet that reports on
political and business news from a Jewish angle. (Two of
its recent headlines are “Twitter CEO Dismisses
Ayatollah’s Threats to Israel as ‘Saber-Rattling’ ” and
“Congressional Dems Urge Biden to Continue Campus
Antisemitism Protections.”) With his tireless reporting
on local and national politics, and on happenings within
his own community, Kornbluh became well known to his
readers and a rare channel through which they could hold
their local elected officials accountable. He can ask
the types of questions that don’t typically come up in a
debate or press conference. Chizhik-Goldschmidt
described him in theForwardarticle
as “the most famous Hasidic journalist in America.”
One of Kornbluh’s most
distinctive qualities as a journalist is his closeness
to the community. When he covers local news, he is
hardly an outsider “parachuting in” to get some quotes
from a seemingly opaque group of people. “Political
reporters sometimes don’t realize how real the stakes
are and don’t have to live with them,” Smith told me. He
added that Kornbluh “is writing about these
life-or-death issues in this community, whose divisions
mirror the country but where passions are really, really
high.”
Borough Park tolerated
Kornbluh’s feel for the divisions in the community when
the subject was politics, less so when he began writing
about the pandemic. In April, during Passover, as most
of Borough Park remained on lockdown, Kornbluh began
outing rule-breakers. He tweeted a video of a man
exiting a synagogue that should have been closed. He
called in a complaint to a government hotline about a
synagogue that was flouting city restrictions. A digital
flyer circulated on WhatsApp calling him an informer. “I
lost some friends,” Kornbluh told me. His reporting for
Jewish Insider and his posts on social media had been
critical of both the restrictions and his neighborhood’s
response to those restrictions, but only one aspect of
his coverage had stuck. One day in April, a crowd of
about a hundred Haredim, noticing Kornbluh walking
nearby, chased him down the street, chanting insults.
By June, the weather
had warmed and the curve had flattened. It was no longer
just a small group ignoring public-health guidelines. In
Borough Park, the rhythms of life returned to
near-normal. Revellers packed wedding halls. (Tischler
claims to have attended seventeen weddings in one
month.) “The few who were wearing masks—people looked at
them a little funny,” Yochonon Donn, a resident of the
neighborhood and a writer forMishpacha(Family),
a popular Haredi weekly, told me. The number of new
cases stayed relatively low over the summer, but, in
August, de Blasio noted an uptick in Borough Park. He
warned of harsh measures if behavior didn’t change. On
went the masks. Then, de Blasio, noting the
still-worrying numbers, imposed closures anyway. People
felt lied to, betrayed by the city. The masks came off.
Governor Andrew Cuomo developed his own plan. On October
6th, he set up a call with Haredi leaders and urged them
to limit their synagogues to half capacity. Later that
day, he announced a plan publicly. He’d scrapped the
fifty-per-cent idea. The new limit was ten worshippers
for each shul, no exceptions.
That night, protesters
filled the streets. The man caught filming it was
beaten. Kornbluh, taking on a more activist role,
messaged Tischler urging him to apologize for inciting
violence. But the following evening, at a second
demonstration, the vitriol only increased. Back on the
scene, Kornbluh took notes from a distance, watching as
the crowd pulsed with energy. Tischler noticed Kornbluh
and shouted at him: “You’re a pig!” A group of
protesters swarmed Kornbluh and cornered him against a
wall. The police had to rescue him.
Kornbluh said afterward
that he had been hit in the head and kicked. (Tischler
has denied this.) What set the crowd into a frenzy was
when Tischler, inches from Kornbluh’s face, called the
reporter amoser, a
Hebrew word for a traitor—a Jew who informs on a Jew.
Tischler had encouraged the rest of the mob to chant it,
too: “Everybody scream ‘moser!’ ” Some
interpretations of religious law, including that of
Maimonides, the hugely influential twelfth-century
Jewish philosopher, dictate that amosermust
be stopped before he informs again—even if it means
killing him.
For
most of New York’s Haredi Jews, demonstrating in the
street is a rarity. (“We don’t protest,” one of them
told me, while protesting.) Counterparts in Israel
frequently stage demonstrations—usually in response to
things that they perceive as existential threats, such
as conscription in the Army—and, more recently, in
response to Prime MinisterBenjamin Netanyahu’s
coronavirus restrictions, calling themanti-Semitic. Many of
the young men in Borough Park have taken their cues from
what they’d seen of Black Lives Matter protests.
(“Jewish lives matter!” has become a common refrain.)
But videos of looting and violence had circulated on
WhatsApp, and Haredi protesters were eager to draw a
contrast, to show that their demonstrations were more
peaceful and more proper. “We come out to protest
something, there’s music playing, we’re not looting,
we’re not rioting,” one Haredi protester told me. This
was after the counter-protester had been beaten.
On October 11th, after
the first two demonstrations in Borough Park, Tischler
was arrested by the N.Y.P.D. for “inciting to riot and
unlawful imprisonment in connection with an assault of a
journalist.” (He pleaded not guilty.) Soon after, a
Tischler fan tweeted out Kornbluh’s address, and a mob
of roughly two hundred people—mostly Yeshiva-age boys,
but a few families with young kids—gathered outside his
home at midnight. (Someone had brought a bullhorn: “Good
morning, Jacob! We’re all waiting for you!”) A man in
his thirties, who said that his name was Mendel, argued
that Kornbluh had become a tool of an oppressive
governor by outing Haredi rule-breakers. “Do you think
that we were so dumb and stupid, that we paid such a
heavy price, so many lives taken away from us, and we
wouldn’t do everything to protect us?” he asked. “I
prayed on my porch not for one month—four months!” Now,
he said, everyone had antibodies. (The antibody rate in
Borough Park is estimated to beforty-three per cent—below
the theoretical threshold for herd immunity.) Mendel
dismissed the new restrictions as theatre. He’d heard
rumors that the local testing books were cooked.
Secular, right-wing
symbols dominated the event.magaparaphernalia
was everywhere; at a previous demonstration, people
waved “Don’t Tread on Me” flags, and Tischler wore a
Trump sticker on his chest. The rhetoric was familiar,
too. One boy told me, “It’s not about corona anymore.
It’s about fake news.” Mendel said, “When Trump blames
the ‘China Virus,’ liberals say, ‘You can’t say that,
that’s racist!’ But when it comes to us, it’s not
racist!” Then he cited Tucker Carlson.
The demonstrators’
resistance to public-health measures may be better
understood as part of the larger far-right coronavirus
denialism, albeit spiced with a set of anxieties
particular to the Haredi community. In the Presidential
election, Joe Biden, like many Democrats before him, is
likely to win an overwhelming majority of the American
Jewish vote. Polls have long shown that the secular and
less observant American Jewish community is distinctly
liberal on a range of social, economic, and political
issues. Trump, however, is wildly popular in the Haredi
community; in a recent poll of Haredi voters, Trump led
Biden by seventy points. “What we are seeing is the
evangelicalization of Orthodox Judaism—at a time when
evangelicalism is more about an idolatrous nationalism
than about Jesus Christ,” Joshua Shanes, a professor of
Jewish studies at the College of Charleston,wroterecently
inTabletmagazine.
The animating political forces for Haredim are
conservative Justices, school choice, “law and order,”
and opposition to same-sex marriage. Support for Israel,
particularly conservative leaders like Netanyahu, is
paramount. With television and Internet access limited
in the community, radio is unusually important. Many
Haredim listen to Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Ben
Shapiro. Nathaniel Deutsch, the director of the Center
for Jewish Studies at the University of California,
Santa Cruz, characterizes Hasidic political preferences
as those of “working-class white ethnics” anywhere else.
In Borough Park,
Tischler has become the leader of this movement. He has
posted hundreds of videos on social media, in which
you’ll find him using bolt cutters to break into a
locked playground or harassing local health inspectors.
In each video, he also plugs his weekly radio program,
“The Just Enough Heshy Show,” where he reflects on
topics such as whether he should apologize for calling a
young Muslim girl a terrorist (initially yes; later no),
and the intellectual capacity of women (“not as smart as
men”). The other day, on the air, he challenged the
Mayor to a fight on his deck, “man to man, because I
think he’s not a man.”
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“If
you want to look at this from a Jewish literary
perspective, every shtetl had their ownmeshuggener,”
a prominent member of the Hasidic movement, in Brooklyn,
told me, meaning that every village has its nut, its
clown. “The kids would follow him around and laugh at
him, but also laugh with him sometimes.”
However, some in
Borough Park view Tischler as not just a clown or a
provocateur but as a kind of guardian of the community.
The son of Holocaust survivors, Tischler has a
reputation for altruism, taking in kids who come from
broken homes or have drug problems. He feeds the hungry,
visits the sick. Asher Lovy, a twenty-eight-year-old man
who runs an advocacy group for Orthodox survivors of
sexual abuse, was one of the children whom Tischler
mentored. He told me that Tischler was generous and
affable. But then, about ten years ago, something
changed. Tischler grew bitter. He went to prison for a
year, after having been implicated in an
immigration-fraud scheme. Lovy said that Tischler became
obsessed with his real-estate businesses. “It’s not that
I don’t think that there are very many issues that he’s
a true believer in,” Lovy said, “but if he can insert
himself into an issue that’s controversial and get
himself attention for it, then he’s going to do it.”
Borough Park, Lovy went on, was split between those in
Tischler’s thrall and those “disgusted by him, who think
that he’s a loudmouth bombast idiot who misrepresents
the community.”
When police came to
apprehend Tischler, the radio host filmed his own
arrest. He did not exercise his right to remain silent;
rather, he badgered the officers and complained loudly
of his treatment at their hands. At one point, he stared
straight at the camera and declared, “My name is Heshy!”
Despite the bluster, his expression betrayed fear. He
had vowed, earlier, to turn himself in the following
morning, and the arrest galvanized some Borough Park
residents who’d initially dismissed him. For a community
on edge about persecution, the late-night perp walk was
bad optics.
Tischler was released
the following day. When I spoke to him, he sounded
chastened—his lawyers had suggested that he quit talking
so much, he said. (“They’re trying to control my mouth,
my son, but I don’t think they can do that,” he told
me.) At his most serious, Tischler says that he stands
against governmental double standards and inconsistent
enforcement. He stands for the well-being of children
and the sanctity of the right to worship. He insists
that he represents the will of the people—in his case,
the purported will of the Haredi community. “They are
not my soldiers,” he told me. “They’re my constituents.
They’re the people I love and care for. I’m here to
support them, not them to support me.”
Tischler also offered
many arguments that seemed transparently false. He
claimed that he hadn’t evenwantedto
go to the first protest; he’d been picking up something
at the store when he noticed people gathering. “I got
out of my car,” he said. “ I spoke to a small crowd.
Then I said goodbye.”
I pointed out that his
political message, as it were, was often subsumed by a
compulsion toward self-promotion, a desire to further
his own interests: the radio show, the run for City
Council.
“You want me to deny
that?” Tischler asked.
In the
hours after Tischler’s arrest, Kornbluh texted me an
apology. We had scheduled a time to meet the following
morning, but now he had to cancel. “Dunno where I will
be in the am,” he wrote. “I have to be somewhere safe.”
Through the middle of
October, Tischler’s followers circulated misinformation
about Kornbluh on WhatsApp—that he had suffered a heart
attack, that he’d committed suicide. They continued to
protest; a small gathering made its way to midtown
Manhattan. Meanwhile, a significant portion of New
York’s Haredim have condemned Tischler’s movement. Part
of what angers them about de Blasio’s and Cuomo’s
admonishments of “the Orthodox community” is that
adherence to public-health guidelines varies greatly.
Avi Shafran, the spokesperson for Agudath Israel (Union
of Israel), an organization that represents Haredi Jews,
said that the group had distributed almost half a
million masks in Borough Park. (“All we did was announce
that they’re available, and people came,” Shafran told
me.) One local rabbi dispensed blessings before Yom
Kippur from his porch; recipients were gloved and masked
and stayed far away from the rabbi and one another. Bad
actors also abound. Three weeks ago, on the final night
of Sukkot, a weeklong celebration of the harvest and the
exodus from Egypt, a rabbi who’d recently tested
positive forcovid-19held a five-hour service,
indoors, for three hundred congregants in Borough Park.
No one wore masks. The rabbi merely set up a Plexiglas
shield. Samuel Heilman, an emeritus professor at Queens
College and a preëminent scholar of Hasidic society,
noted that Haredi culture, at its core, stands in
opposition to solitary life. “It’s the absolute opposite
to social distancing,” he told me. “Since they were old
enough to pray, they’ve done it together.”
The day of the maskless
service, I attended a socially distanced celebration
hosted by a Hasidic family on the other side of the
borough. There was Purell at the sukkah’s entrance, and
taco salad and gefilte fish in takeout containers; the
attendees, who wore masks and sat far apart, drank rosé
out of cans. That Sunday was Simchat Torah, a holiday
that usually culminates in raucous dancing and singing.
My hosts were planning a more muted evening, with a
synagogue service outside. They’d been careful
throughout, but they knew that they couldn’t stopeveryonefrom
partying that weekend. They told me that they were
worried about the younger men in their community.
“College students are going to be college students,
whether it’s rabbinical students or what,” Chana
Lightstone, one of the hosts, said. “It is imperative
that we always recognize others as individual human
beings,” Motti Seligson, a spokesman for the
Chabad-Lubavitch movement, told me that same day, “and
not lump them together and treat them as a monolithic
blob.”
In that regard, both de
Blasio and Cuomo have failed. As of September, the city
employedzero Yiddish-speakingcontact
tracers. Yiddish was used for a recent public-health
campaign in Haredi communities across Brooklyn and
Queens—trucks went around blaring reminders about
getting tested and wearing masks—but this was useless
for many of the Jews in Queens, who speak Russian.
Meanwhile, the Governor has alienated even those
inclined to ally with him by placing harsh restrictions
on communal prayer. “Ten people is laughable,” Kornbluh
said, of the synagogue-capacity limit. (Borough Park has
synagogues that can accommodate several thousand
worshippers.) “Even if you wanted to comply, even if you
are wearing masks and keeping social distance, the
Governor said, ‘No, that’s not good enough.’ Did the
Governor come up with solutions, like street closures,
so the congregations can actually do the services
outside? No.” Several synagogues were fined as much as
fifteen thousand dollars for holding services for
Simchat Torah. They paid the fine, and continued
praying.
It can be difficult to
determine what proportion of the community wants to
behave responsibly. Kornbluh explained that Tischler and
his followers represented a small part of the community,
while those like Kornbluh, who advocated vocally for
more masks and social distancing, were also in the
minority. The majority, he said, were those “who won’t
protest, who are silent, who want to deal with a
problem, but are sometimes either uneducated,
misinformed, or just want to go on with their religious
practices.” Heilman, the Queens College professor, noted
that many local rabbis have endorsed public-health
measures, but typically not too strenuously. “Why aren’t
most rabbis taking a strong position?” Heilman asked.
“Because the truth is that they can’t really get too far
ahead of their people. This is an old principle of
Jewish life, that you can’t do what the people are not
willing to do. And so these rabbis, even when they will
say something that’s in line with what they should be
saying, namely, put on masks, distancing, and so on,
they say it with sort of a wink and a nod.” In an
argument (and a culture) dominated by men, what do the
women think? Dr. Leslie Ginsparg Klein, a dean of the
Women’s Institute of Torah Seminary and College, in
Baltimore, recentlywrotein
theTimes of Israelthat
some concessions to safety during holidays—more
distance, more spectating, less participation—is the
experience of many women, all the time.
ADVERTISEMENT
I met
Kornbluh a day later than we’d initially planned. He
wore a surgical mask, which fogged his glasses. He said
that he’d been receiving hate mail—“You remind me of the
Jews that tried saving themselves by coöperating with
Nazis”; “When you die, we will put the mask in your
grave”—but he had continued to do his job. “I feel that
I’m the right person to actually report the facts on the
ground, what is really happening, but also what the
government is doing,” he told me. “I’m not a scooper on
Orthodox Jewish violations. I am a politics reporter who
happens to be a member of the Hasidic community.”
We met in Madison
Square Park. I assumed he was staying in Manhattan until
things calmed down, but I was mistaken. His office was
nearby. After work, he would be returning home to
Borough Park.
I agree completely with what Mark wrote. When Obama visited South Africa couple of years ago, I wrote a commentary in a popular Sunday newspaper showing up our duplicity and insincerity, how he accepted him as "one of us" without reflecting on things like his targeted assassinations and bailing out banks etc.
In fact, I warned, in the run up to his first presidency, that we were fooling ourselves to think that he would be better, just because he was "one of us". During his presidency his pretentious populist perfomativity (fist-pumping, basket ball playing etc) was truly offensive.
Anyway, those of you who can vote, just get that so and so out of office tomorrow. Or batten down the hatches.
On Monday, 2 November 2020, 17:43:04 GMT+2, Michael Meeropol <mameerop@...> wrote:
Totally agree Mark that that's what the ruling class wants --- they actually hope to unite around a government of national unity.
The problem for the Democrats inclined to acquiesce is that the Democrats (as Democrats, not pro-ruling class politicians) know they were really beaten down by the Republican "resistance" in 2009 and 2010 --- leading to many state houses flipping, making the fancy drawing of districts to ensure Republican legislative majorities even without vote majorities in many states, leading to the House flipping in 2010 and the Senate flipping in 2014 --- all of which really cut back on opportunities for Democrats and Democrats ---
THUS -- the self interest of Democrats as Democrats requires them to take steps to pre-emptively fight back against Republican efforts to stymie them (again!) ---- that's why they are working so hard to flip the Senate ---
THUS --- the "government of national unity" will have to utilize progressives within the Democratic Party to erect a firewall to protect Democrats for 2022 and beyond --- thus --- the John Lewis voting rights act, the effort to "get around" citizens united, "reforms" of law enforcement --- whether real or fake to try and respond to the black lives matter movement =--, a new Dream Act and a new immigration reform bill to capture the revulsion people felt about separating children from their families and putting them in cages, DC statehood and maybe even Puerto Rican Statehood (depending on the outcome of a referendum on the Island)k, and Judicial Reform ---
In addition --- finally (FINALLY) putting to bed the demonization of deficits --- the only way for Biden not to lose Congress in 2022 is to strongly support a Keynesian style economic recovery where deficits mean NOTHING until the economy is back to "full employment" --- and, maybe it's a sop maybe it's real --- lots of the infrastructure spending will be in the direction of slowing the mad dash towards climate catastrophe (hoping that we're not already past the point of no return).
NOW --- this actually depends on the progressive wing of the Dems (Sander, AOC, etc.) and the left such as it is does have a potential role to play as a pressure group.
SO YES --- Mark is right that the establishment would LOVE to hit the reset button and re-create Obama 2.0 ---- but first they have to innoculate themselves against losing everything in 2022 and THAT requires at least gives SOMETHINGS to the people who put them in office ...
A review of Marxist Literary Criticism Today by Barbara Foley.
"In its prologue and throughout many offset explanatory text boxes, Marxist Literary Criticism Today puts forth a coherent political position, representing a valid entry into discourse surrounding the continued relevance of Marxist theory."
The article raises some good points, but I don't believe it goes far enough in denouncing the DSA tactic of working within the Democratic Party,to "push it to the left".
As someone not in the DSA ,but watching their actions as an outside observer ,I see this tactic as both the DSA's number one flaw ,and the biggest source of division within the organization.
It may be the best criticism of the Democrats I have read to date ,from someone within the DSA. It is not too far off from the PSL's position on the Democratic Party.
The collective American memory is very short ,many of the evils purpetrated by the George W Bush Administration are largely forgotten. I do believe they dwarf anything done by the Trump Administration. I believe the same can be said of Obama ,Clinton, and Reagan. To say nothing of the unnessicary war on SE asia,that began in the 1950s, the internment of Japanese Americans, the Chinese Exclusion act, ad nauseum. Trump is by no means any unique evil.
I am also glad to see the admission that the Democrats gave us Trump. We in the PSL have been saying this all along ,as have people like Jimmy Dore. You would never hear this admission from someone like Chompsky ,who I see as an outright apologist for both the Democratic Party ,and US imperialism ,much in the same way Bernie Sanders is. Many on the left have been saying all along if Biden wins, someone even worse than Trump will come along in 2024, or 2028, so we are screwed either way. The only solution is not to support ,or vote for ,any Democrat ,ever.
I like what this guy wrote here. I only wish more DSA members felt like this ,and were willing to build alliances with the socialist parties that already exist. One blind spot I see from the DSA, is their seeming unwillingness to recognize ,and build, alliances with parties like the WWP, and the PSL
Totally agree Mark that that's what the ruling class wants --- they actually hope to unite around a government of national unity.
The problem for the Democrats inclined to acquiesce is that the Democrats (as Democrats, not pro-ruling class politicians) know they were really beaten down by the Republican "resistance" in 2009 and 2010 --- leading to many state houses flipping, making the fancy drawing of districts to ensure Republican legislative majorities even without vote majorities in many states, leading to the House flipping in 2010 and the Senate flipping in 2014 --- all of which really cut back on opportunities for Democrats and Democrats ---
THUS -- the self interest of Democrats as Democrats requires them to take steps to pre-emptively fight back against Republican efforts to stymie them (again!) ---- that's why they are working so hard to flip the Senate ---
THUS --- the "government of national unity" will have to utilize progressives within the Democratic Party to erect a firewall to protect Democrats for 2022 and beyond --- thus --- the John Lewis voting rights act, the effort to "get around" citizens united, "reforms" of law enforcement --- whether real or fake to try and respond to the black lives matter movement =--, a new Dream Act and a new immigration reform bill to capture the revulsion people felt about separating children from their families and putting them in cages, DC statehood and maybe even Puerto Rican Statehood (depending on the outcome of a referendum on the Island)k, and Judicial Reform ---
In addition --- finally (FINALLY) putting to bed the demonization of deficits --- the only way for Biden not to lose Congress in 2022 is to strongly support a Keynesian style economic recovery where deficits mean NOTHING until the economy is back to "full employment" --- and, maybe it's a sop maybe it's real --- lots of the infrastructure spending will be in the direction of slowing the mad dash towards climate catastrophe (hoping that we're not already past the point of no return).
NOW --- this actually depends on the progressive wing of the Dems (Sander, AOC, etc.) and the left such as it is does have a potential role to play as a pressure group.
SO YES --- Mark is right that the establishment would LOVE to hit the reset button and re-create Obama 2.0 ---- but first they have to innoculate themselves against losing everything in 2022 and THAT requires at least gives SOMETHINGS to the people who put them in office ...
Again, as with other media projects on other issues, we should probably not draw too heavily on anything corporate media is peddling. What "liberal" and "conservative" mean has always been a bit arbitrary, deliberately so, and the media is the major vehicle for smudging everything. They even use "conservative" regularly as a synonym for "Republican" and "liberal" for "Democratic." What is "conservative" today amounts to a holy war on all things government. Anyone not on board for the whole jihad is likely to find themselves labeled "liberal."
And the trends in campaign "dark money" should be considered, particularly by the supporters of the candidate who has raised more money.
The ruling class will do peachy keen under either candidate. However, the bulk of it seems to understand that they do best with the one who will serve them best will not poke the masses with a pointy stick on such a regular basis.
It also seems clear that the ascendancy of truly stupidly dogmatic currents spearheaded by the Birther-in-Chief has seriously remade the Republican Party and that the current election has seen a fundamental remaking of the Democratic Party. In both cases, the parties are following trends that have been moving them since the 1970s and 1980s.
Keep an eye on the no-Trump Republicans. MSNBC is more a voice for them than the Democrats per se. The no-Trump Republicans are very analogous to the Mugwumps of the Gilded Age--old-fashioned Republicans were appalled by the uncouth machine politics and pandering they believed had come to dominate the party. In 1884, they helped the Democrats elect Grover Cleveland president. (I will avoid the comparisons of Biden to Cleveland, the most Republican-like Democrat of his day.) If Trump wins reelection, the no-Trumpers will have no future in the GOP. If he loses, they will still not be able to retake the leadership of the GOP as some of them imagine. (There were reasons they couldn't hang onto that leadership in 2015-16 and nothing essential will be changed after 2020.
Biden's goal is a government of national unity. His cabinet may well have no progressives in it (unless he and the media decide to redefine the term). Much of it will reflect the idiocy about bipartisanship and compromise. There will be no serious Federal accounting for the crimes of the Trump mob. I would expect some partial reversals of some of the Trump attacks on environmental regulation, and the protection of wildlife and nature, but we really shouldn't expect to get back to where we were. We have no reason to expect a reversal of the corporate giveway "tax reforms" under Trump.
We can expect Biden to follow through with his talk about more Federal funding for local police forces and a lot more common discouragements of "violent" mass demonstrations, for which they may compensate with more black faces in power to sell it.
Don't be too surprised if the Republican proposals for cuts in social security and pensions wind up splitting the difference with the Democrats. It is likely that the Democrats might wind up assimilating a lot of the no-Trump Republicans, which will provide even more of counter-balance to constituencies interested in anything progressive.
As we've seen in the Democratic (and Republican) initiatives to keep Greens off the ballot, this government of national unity sustained by a party of national unity will most certainly persist in measures to protect itself from any insurgent impulses from the Left.
Toure Reed writes the same exact article that his dad Adolph and Cedric Johnson write as if constant repetition will win people to their class-reductionism.
In her new
bookResource Radicals, Thea
Riofrancos analyzes the split in the left over the usage of
fossil fuels, tracing the historical arc of “anti-extractivism”
under the shadow of a left-wing government hell-bent on Black
Gold. She is generous toward both what she calls the
“Left-in-Power” and the “Left-in-Resistance,” understanding the
forces stacked against Correa’s project and not wanting to
diminish the tangible reductions in poverty his project yielded.
But it’s not hard to surmise, as the co-author of a book on the
Green New Deal, where her ultimate sympathies reside. By
examining how activists envisioned a post-petroleum future,
Riofrancos transcends the superficial debates on the legacy of
the Pink Tide and, in turn, helps chart a path forward for
creating a society as equitable as it is ecological.
What we do for those 3 minutes it takes us to fill out a ballot card should flow from what we do the other 525,597 minutes in the year. In Anthony Boynton's case, it has. He said he campaigned for Howie Hawkins. One commentator on Boynton's post congratulated him on his vote, which he says was wasted as the Greens are even more useless than the Democrats. I agree with that comment except that what was even more wasted was the time Anthony Boynton spent campaigning for the Greens, which was surely more than the time it took to fill out the ballot card. That was the true waste of time!
Nor does Anthony Boynton's comparison to other previous elections hold any validity. That's because there never has been a president like Trump at least since the US Civil War, meaning there has never been an election like this one. Trump's moves towards one man rule/Bonapartism are unprecedented. If he gets back in, it will be through a vast increase in this tendency, which will vastly strengthen his move in that direction. As others have pointed out, his form of Bonapartism - if it is consolidated - is similar to that of Victor Orban in Hungary. Here, it will be bolstered by the rise of the violent vigilante groups. To emphasize: If Trump is able to steal this election, it will vastly strengthen these tendencies.
Instead of focusing our efforts on building a useless Green Party, socialists should be spending their time campaigning for a mobilization in the streets to stop Trump and Trumpism, and for the unions to play a key role in that mobilization. That would give such a movement a definite working class "flavor" and within that, we should raise what a working class program and strategy should be.
But there is a logic to that. If we are campaigning to oust Trump through a working class mobilization in the streets (vs. campaigning for the Green Party), then how we vote should be in harmony with that effort. Unfortunately, there is only one way that Trump will leave office on January 20. That is if Biden takes his place. (There is a very slim chance - very, very slim - that there would be a deadlock and the Speaker of the House would replace Trump. However, there is no real political difference between Biden and Pelosi, so that is irrelevant to this discussion.) So, if we are campaigning for a working class movement to oust Trump, then we should vote accordingly - for Biden.
As to Anthony Boynton's argument about keeping alive some sort of independent socialist tendencies through voting Green Party: Any sort of real socialist tendencies and traditions must rest on some sort of significant layer of the working class - one that is conscious. courageous and active. Otherwise it is just hollow words. The Green Party does not rest on any section of the working class and I can't see how they ever will. As far as I can see, the only way they will ever become significant is if a real, working class movement to build a real working class party arises. In that case, some capitalists could throw support behind the Greens to divert the movement away from building a working class party. In other words, the working class would be better off if the Greens disappeared entirely. (By the way, Anthony Boynton says he votes here in California. In that case, if he wants to vote for a truly wasted party, why not vote for the Peace and Freedom Party? Like the Greens, to the extent anybody even knows about them, it would be better if they disappeared entirely.)
This is why I disagree with Anthony Boynton's entire direction - how he spent his time during this election campaign more so than what he wrote on a scrap of paper. Both were mistaken in my opinion.
John Reimann
--
“Science and socialism go hand-in-hand.” Felicity Dowling Check out:https:http://oaklandsocialist.com also on Facebook
So what? Was there a political point to Greenwald's resignation? I found the argument that he fell afoul of liberal anxieties about a Trump victory rather convincing. Robbie Mahood
An excellent analysis, but a bit one-sided. There is a difference between halting the count of mail-in ballots already received and refusing to count mail-in ballots received after November 3, even if the latter are postmarked Nov. 3 or earlier. I think it will be very difficult to get a halt to counting all mail in ballots after Nov. 3, including those already received. For that, major chaos would probably be necessary - something like the Brooks Brother riot in Florida in 2000, but repeated several times over and not just by lawyers in Brooks Brothers suits, but by armed thugs in camouflage. That may happen.
John Reimann
--
“Science and socialism go hand-in-hand.” Felicity Dowling Check out:https:http://oaklandsocialist.com also on Facebook