Date   

How the Strike for Equality Relaunched the Struggle for Women’s Liberation in the US

Louis Proyect
 

Interview with Ruthann Miller, ex-SWP, about her role in the The Women’s Strike for Equality in August 1970

https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/womens-strike-equality-liberation-betty-friedan


Re: Why I voted for Howie Hawkins

fkalosar101@...
 

I agree with much of what John Reimann says and admire Oakland Socialist..  It's certainly true that Trump will leave office, unless he dies, only if Biden (or conceivably the equivalent, Pelosi) replaces him.  I hope that happens, but am not hopeful about the outcome, for reasons similar to those Mark Lause has outlined elsewhere.

I disagree at least with the following:

  • Green Party no good because not working-class and therefore cannot be authentically socialist.  Since there is no clear working-class movement in the US we cannot know what sources a future WC movement might draw on.  Hawkins-Walker are socialist enough as compared with eg Bernie Sanders--who has at least temporarily made the word "socialist" acceptable in political discourse.  To that extent, even the renegade Sanders has contributed to the elevation of socialist potential in the US.  Why shouldn't Hawkins-Walker do the same since they are more socialist than Sanders is?  As to the working class, I don't know about Walker, but Hawkins spent decades as a Teamster humping boxes for UPS.  Might one argue that Hawkins isn't working-class because he wasn't directly generating surplus value for some factory owner?  Hmm. The larger point is that the critique of the Green Party as inherently bourgeois does not apply historically to the Camejo-Hawkins "wing" although it does to the outlier Nader and others.  I don't want to start a tailspin about whether the socialist Walker isn't really a socialist in the same way in which Hawkins isn't really a worker--or his being a worker if he is one doesn't define Green.  Many things can be argued here.
  • Trump a Bonapartist.  A lot of people are wasting a lot of effort as I see it arguing that the chaotic Trump is in reality a highly organized dictator. capable of ruling for years and years on the basis of a well-oiled machine.  I think he's a an anarch and a chaos-monger who rejects not only "government" in the two-faced, not-totally-serious way of a traditional American "rightist" of the Grover Norquist mold, but the very functions of governance itself.  He's a bust-out guy IMO who wants to smash things up and grab what he can steal, and that's the "vision" he's peddling to his followers.  It's profoundly decadent.  Bonapartism IMO would be a huge intellectual leap forward for this guy and for the assholes with the boats and the caravans.  This matters because Trump portends social collapse, not a long-lasting regime such as Louis Napoleon's, Pinochet's, Salazar's, or Franco's.  If some fellow rightist with an actual organizational plan bumps Trump off and succeeds him, of course, that could be another matter.   Even Don Jr. might be bright enough to pull this off.  But we're talking 11/3/20 and DT Sr. here.  
In the long run, I agree that Trump has to go and Biden is the way to make that happen.  But I think we all also realize what quicksand underlies the mirage of solid earth under Biden. He has all but vowed to stamp out "socialism" and I think we should take him at his word. Things will begin stinking to high heaven the minute he takes his hand off that Douai Bible if not before.  Biden is far too stupid to recognize a debt to anyone but the mythical "good Republicans" he worships.  Kissing rightwing ass is his whole idea of national unity, just as it was Obama's and Clinton's.  The difference is that Biden is a whole lot dumber than those two.


Glenn Greenwald Throws a Fit | The New Republic

John Obrien
 

Glen Greenwald is no Marxist or has changed from my awareness from his previous holding reactionary libertarian views.  
He has a sordid history of interacting with fascists, such as his pro-bono defending Matthew Hale and the National Alliance, 
both who had funds for paid defense for their horrible activities.

Glen Greenwald's companion seems in political agreement more with us, than Greenwald.  They are two different people.
Greenwald's association with fellow libertarians Assange, Snowden as with the libertarian and other right wingers Antiwar.com
(a compilation of John Birchers, LaRouchite "911 Truthers" and the historical right wing isolationists and nativists)
has some progressives confused and wrongly assuming these folks are "progressives".  They are not. The Libertarians
are from the split within the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF Fascists) around a government military conscripted draft. 
These antiwar isolationists and nativists, were the same politics as the American Firsters who did not want to fight the
fascists prior to the Pearl Harbor Attack.  

Only Chelsea Manning who was with Assange, might be moving leftward from seeing a Emma Goldman poster 
in their residence.  But who knows for certain - time will tell.   But Assange relations with Nigel Farage, are telling
to me.    

I am no fan of Joe Biden or his son - both corrupt individuals.
My decision to encourage people to vote for Biden - is from my own perspective of needing to remove Trump
and halt and demoralize some of the religious based fascist forces, that are my historical enemy.  I spent my
life opposed and fighting such right wing religious fanatics and understand their danger.   And I understand
what political currents "world view" are and the corporate dems, who serve the capitalist class.  Vote Biden! 



 on behalf of Tristan Sloughter <t@...>
Sent: Monday, November 2, 2020 9:16 AM
Subject: Glenn Greenwald Throws a Fit | The New Republic
 
I found the argument that he fell afoul of liberal anxieties about a Trump victory rather convincing.

His piece was nonsense, why wouldn't an editor push back?

He was arguing that the Hunter Biden story was not reported on because of the vehement support for Biden in the media. What he leaves out in his article is any mention of Fox News passing on the story or reporter at the NY Post not putting his name on it.

Greenwald twisted the facts to fit the right's narrative about "progressives" (Matt Taibbi used this term in his defense of Greenwald) controlling the "mainstream media", MSNBC, CNN, etc, and hiding anything that could hurt Biden or help Trump -- everything from the extent of the covid-19 pandemic to satanic pedophile rings.

The bourgeois media is guided by ratings and profit, not some "progressive" alliance of the "enemy of the people".


A note on US democracy

R.O.
 

If the average American was as smart and erudite as the anarchist John Zerzan in rejecting the ritual of electoral politics, alot of trouble could be avoided. As Zerzan recently said, it's a choice between death and death. The strategy of lesser evilism is not valid in case of death. And ask yourself, does the US today deserve better than Trump? No, not really. But that maybe my European bias... We all know this world is ending. Over here, another temperature record was broken today. Feliz dias de los Muertos!

R.O.


Re: A Liberal “Moral Reckoning” Can’t Solve the Problems That Plague Black Americans

Viejo Oso Gruñon
 

At least you’re posting a link to the article & not insulting him him in such puerile ways as you do with Chomsky and Monthly Review.
Specifically, what’s your disagreement with the following (taken from the article):

“If, prior to summer 2020, the impact of Bernie Sanders on Democratic discourse was cause for optimism, the efficacy with which centrist Democratic candidates Hillary Clinton and Joe Biden used identity politics to dispatch Sanders was cause for alarm. Attacking Sanders from the right via rhetorically left, identity politics frameworks, centrist Democrats, and even some progressives, identified his platform as an anachronistic class agenda that deflected attention from white racism and its consequences for blacks.”

The Reeds might be wrong or they might be right, but they do publish serious criticism of “identitarianism.”
Let’s engage w/ the arguments.


Re: A Liberal “Moral Reckoning” Can’t Solve the Problems That Plague Black Americans

Tristan Sloughter
 

"The fact that former ALEC affiliates can “embrace” constructs like ... “systemic racism” tells us something vital about where this road will take us."

Wow, what is this supposed to mean??


H-Net Review [HABSBURG]: Vari on Hakkarainen, 'Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna' and Hödl, 'Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna'

Andrew Stewart
 



Best regards,
Andrew Stewart 
- - -
Subscribe to the Washington Babylon newsletter via https://washingtonbabylon.com/newsletter/

Begin forwarded message:

From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...>
Date: November 2, 2020 at 10:39:43 AM EST
To: h-review@...
Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
Subject: H-Net Review [HABSBURG]:  Vari on Hakkarainen,  'Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna' and Hödl, 'Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna'
Reply-To: h-review@...

Heidi Hakkarainen.  Comical Modernity: Popular Humour and the
Transformation of Urban Space in Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna.  
Austrian and Habsburg Studies Series. New York  Berghahn Books, 2019.
Illustrations. viii + 279 pp.  $135.00 (cloth), ISBN
978-1-78920-273-1.

Klaus Hödl.  Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in
Fin-de-Siècle Vienna.  Translated by Corey Twitchell. Austrian and
Habsburg Studies Series. New York  Berghahn Books, 2019.  194 pp.  
$135.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-78920-030-0.

Reviewed by Alexander Vari (Marywood University)
Published on HABSBURG (November, 2020)
Commissioned by Yasir Yilmaz

Humorous Magazines and Jewish/Non-Jewish Interactions in the Making
of Viennese Popular Culture

Writing almost twenty years ago in the conclusion of the collective
volume Rethinking Vienna 1900, historian Mary Gluck made the
observation that due to the Schorskean paradigm becoming so
successful in interpreting the meaning and legacy of the
fin-de-siècle Habsburg capital, "older stereotypes of Vienna, the
city of operettas, waltzes and coffeehouses, have given way to a new
myth of Vienna, the habitat of aesthetes, connoisseurs and
psychoanalysts."[1] Yet, as the other contributions to the same
volume suggested, Carl Schorske's thesis, which related Viennese
modernism to the death of historicism and the rise of an ahistorical
culture--an explanation that during the 1980s served to connect
Vienna with the rise of late twentieth-century postmodernism and to
turn its intellectual milieu into the petri dish from which the ideas
of the twentieth century were born--was already challenged by many
scholars of the Habsburg monarchy.[2] Moreover, the period since then
has also witnessed a more sustained scholarly examination of comic
operas, operettas, waltzes, variety theaters, and coffeehouses in the
rise of late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century popular culture in
Vienna, a cultural domain that--as Gluck had pointed out--the focus
on high culture and politics specific to Schorske's academic legacy
had obscured for so long.[3]

The two volumes under review here represent important contributions
to this new wave of scholarship. They offer insights on the making of
Viennese popular culture through the study of fin-de-siècle popular
humor and, respectively, the world of Viennese _volkssänger_. Heidi
Hakkarainen's study relies on research in humorous magazines like
_Der Figaro_, _Der Floh_, and _Kikeriki_ between 1857 and 1890 to
"explore ... popular humour in the nineteenth-century city both as a
mode of lived experience and as a discourse on urban life" (p. 2).
The author unfolds this topic thematically by analyzing humorous
images of and commentaries on Vienna's rebuilding after the 1857
imperial decision to take down the old ramparts surrounding the
city's medieval core (which led to the building of the modern
Ringstrasse), including comical musings on the new rules and
regulations that governed modern urban life. According to
Hakkarainen, the urban chaos engendered by street traffic and the
intermingling of different classes was another topic that amused the
Viennese. Cartoonists also made humorous parallels between the sense
of general disorder caused by the tearing down of old buildings and
the presence of ubiquitous worksites in the city during the 1860s and
1870s, which reminded them of the political and social upheaval
caused in Vienna by the 1848 revolution two decades earlier. Coupled
with a rising sense of nostalgia for the refreshing shadow provided
prior to 1857 by the trees and gardens covering the area of the
Viennese glacis, for which--in the opinion of contemporaries--the
drying tree saplings and the barren vistas of the modern city could
not make up, the humorous magazines' exploration of the differences
between the old and the new city was thus a constant source of
popular humor.

Hakkarainen's study is grounded in a solid knowledge of the secondary
literature on modernity and theories of humor. One of her important
claims, which adds a new perspective to them, is that in Vienna "the
'modern' was encountered and processed through humour long before it
became such a prominent feature in society and social debate" (p. 3).
While humorists poked fun at various aspects of the Viennese urban
modernity in the making, humor itself was a product of this early
modernity.

Hakkarainen identifies two kinds of humor: "rebellious humour," which
drew out "humour's creative and innovative potential," and
"disciplinary humour," which had "suppressive and conservative
tendencies" (p. 18). The first kind of humor was noticeable in the
humorous magazines' comical renderings of Vienna's urban
redevelopment plan, in their chastising of the incompetence of city
authorities to quickly turn the Ringstrasse into a livable place, and
in the ridiculing of the misplaced punctiliousness of the police. At
the same time, however, the general attitude of the humorous
magazines addressing a middle-class, and in some cases, a
lower-middle-class audience, was one of conservative nostalgia for a
past that was fast disappearing under the very eyes of the Viennese.
By contrast to the certainties of that simpler past, the present made
many experience a sense of confusion and visual deception when
confronted with the sights of their new urban modernity.

According to Hakkarainen, even humor itself was seen by
contemporaries as becoming deteriorated in the process, being
transformed "from thought-provoking training of the mind into
superficial and lifeless entertainment" (p. 151). Yet while providing
entertainment, the numerous juxtapositions in the humorous press of
representations of Alt- and Neu-Wien, also fed nostalgia for the
former as a space of Viennese authenticity, with the Ringstrasse
being depicted, by contrast, "as part of New Vienna, representing
novelty, [and] not memory" (p. 156). The specific dynamic between the
past and the present was not the only issue in focus in Viennese
humor though, since the same humorous publications also offered their
readers visions of Vienna from a distant future, embodied in
dystopian visions of the city, which enabled them not just to react
to how modern urban planning changed the city between 1857 and 1890
but also to "actively construct ... the experience and understanding
of [Viennese] modernity" (p. 167).

The most exciting chapter of the book is the last one, in which
Hakkarainen explores humoristic takes on gendered images of the city,
female and male fashion, cross-dressing, women's involvement in the
making of Viennese humor, and first-time encounters by foreigners,
tourists, and non-German ethnic groups from the Austro-Hungarian
monarchy, with Vienna as a Weltstadt. While this chapter is quite
crowded, since the author also looks at representations of Jewishness
and the Viennese underclass with its various characters and types in
the satirical press of the time, the richness of these topics is
indicative of the multitude of research paths one can follow in the
study of Viennese popular humor. At the same time, even though
Hakkarainen's interpretations are based on a well-informed
European-wide comparative frame throughout her book, it is especially
in the case of this chapter that her references to developments in
London, Paris, and Berlin would have also benefited from a more
sustained analysis of the connections between Vienna and Budapest.
With the latter city taking on at the time the dual role of Vienna's
competitor and alter-ego as a Weltstadt, which also imagined itself
in gendered terms as a young female metropolis, and a number of other
rising urban centers within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, such as
Prague, Trieste, Fiume/Rijeka, Zagreb, and Cracow, on the one hand,
and cities located in the broader eastern European space like St.
Petersburg, Warsaw, Kiev, Odessa, and Bucharest, on the other,
bringing peripheral modernities in intense dialogue with the European
urban core, such comparisons would have added other revealing
findings to the book.[4]

Although Hakkarainen provides only a brief discussion of the
connections between urbanity, Jewishness, and modernity in the
constitution of fin-de-siècle Viennese popular culture, this brevity
is compensated by Klaus Hödl's focus on that very connection in his
_Entangled Entertainers_, the recent English translation of a book
that was published originally in German as _Zwischen Wienerlied und
Der Kleine Kohn: Juden in der Wiener populären Kultur um 1900
_(2017). Hödl's straightforward thesis is that long-term academic
focus on Jews' cultural assimilation in middle- and
upper-middle-class Viennese society and their participation in the
making of fin-de-siècle high culture has obscured the fact that
"Jews played a substantial role in the shaping of Viennese popular
culture" (p. 7). As Hödl points out, unlike their more prominent and
much better-studied counterparts in the sphere of high culture, Jews
involved on the volkssänger scene or those who wrote or performed in
the vaudeville (variety acts) of the time did not pursue a path of
acculturation in a preexisting popular culture but actively shaped it
as part of their interactions with Jews and non-Jews involved in the
field of Viennese popular entertainment. At the same time, these
Jewish artists have been less visible than other Jews in Viennese
society because neither mainstream nor Jewish newspapers reported on
popular culture, while, due to the artistic names that they took,
Jewish variety theater authors and performers became harder to
identify as such, and thus became less visible for scholars. However,
cheap newspapers like the _Illustrirtes Wiener Extrablatt_ and _Das
Variété_ (which in addition to the texts of a large corpus of
variety theater plays are one of the main sources for Hödl's
research) closely followed the Viennese variety theater scene and
therefore hold a wealth of information that enable one to reconstruct
the main developments in that world around 1900.

Entertainment venues located in Leopoldstadt along the Taborstrasse
and Praterstrasse like the Etablissement Nestroy-Säle, the Edelhofer
Leopoldtstadt Folk Orpheum, and the hotel Zum Schwarzen Adler,
together with the Zum Marokkaner variety theater located in the
Viennese Prater, served as venues for Jewish volkssängers and
entertainment troupes like the Folies Comiques, the Lemberg Singspiel
Society, the S. Fischer Society, the Hirsh and Kassina Ensembles, the
Appolo and Danzer's Orpheum, and, the most well-known among all, the
Budapest Orpheum Society. The most important thing about these
ensembles, as Hödl emphasizes, was that they were made up of both
Jewish and non-Jewish artists, an intermixing that also extended to
their audiences in the aforementioned venues. Instead of staying
separate and aloof from each other, as was the case among the
Christian and Jewish members of Viennese middle- and
upper-middle-class society, lower-middle and working-class milieus
provided room for continuous everyday interaction between Jews and
non-Jews, an interaction that was also prominent in the plays that
their audiences watched in these locales.

At the same time, the plays by Jewish authors that were performed
"portray[ed] Jewishness without reference to religion." As Hödl
explains in a crucial passage of his text, in these plays "Jewishness
is anything but clearly outlined: instead, it is fluid, multifaceted,
and opaque." In the plays, "Jewishness is expressed in a form of
performative difference: Jews distinguish themselves from non-Jews
through activities to their effects, [which] means that Jewish
difference, as constructed in these works, is time- and
context-dependent." Moreover, "this concept of Jewish
self-understanding is inclusive, in that even non-Jews can adopt
their characteristics" (p. 69). To add further evidence to the
validity of this point, the author uses the concept of the
performative character of Jewishness to explain Albert Hirsch's, a
notable author of popular variety theater plays, involvement in the
so-called _Volkssänger_ Wars that shook the Viennese volkssänger
scene in the early twentieth century. These "wars" that were
triggered by different responses among Viennese artists to the
question whether to allow a Budapest-based volkssänger troupe to
permanently move to the city showed that there were no clear dividing
lines between Jews and non-Jews in the world of Viennese variety
theater and that Hirsch and other Jewish artists like him were
neither prisoners of an essentialized view of their Jewishness nor
motivated by a desire to acculturate to non-Jewish cultural norms and
values. Instead, Jewish artists expressed their Jewishness
performatively through Yiddish jargon or Jewish jokes, as members of
a professional community of Viennese artists that included both Jews
and non-Jews.

In Hödl's interpretation, however, performative Jewishness did not
exclude Jewish difference. Jews could still be different from their
non-Jewish peers depending on the context. In the last two chapters
of his book, Hödl examines two such contexts: that of the
relationship between the city's past and the present and of the
dialectic play between similarity and difference. Just like the
widespread nostalgia for the lost charms of Old Vienna that was so
prominent in the humorous magazines analyzed by Hakkarainen in her
book, the trope of Alt-Wien resurfaced at the turn of the century in
the world of the Viennese popular entertainment as well. However,
while in the non-Jewish humorous magazines examined by Hakkarainen
references to the city's past often served as vehicles to cast a
shadow on and poke fun at the ills of modernity, for Jews, as Hödl
observes, "the embellishment of the city's recent history did not
merely serve as a critique of the present. Rather, Old Vienna was a
foil that allowed them to inscribe themselves into the history of the
city. A Jewish presence in the past was meant to serve as a
counterpoint to the widespread view that Jews were foreign
immigrants, who did not truly belong to society" (p. 123). For
instance, Jewish architect Oskar Marmorek, the builder in a composite
and imaginative form of the plaster recreation of Old Vienna in the
Viennese Prater in the 1890s, "included the medieval _Judengasse_
among the few side streets that led to his reconstruction of the
Hoher Markt." Another way for Jews to inscribe their presence in the
city's past was by "showing Jews [engaged] in peaceful interactions
with non-Jews," especially on the outskirts of Vienna, an essential
space in the contemporary nostalgia for Alt-Wien (p. 124). The latter
was a plot component that many Jewish volkssänger authors, like
Hirsch and others, commonly included in their variety theater plays.

By the turn of the century, however, rising anti-Semitism in Vienna's
suburbs prompted Jewish authors active in popular journalism, such as
Felix Salten and Stefan Zweig, to switch to the present and imagine,
by contrast, Vienna's entertainment district, the Prater--a space
from which anti-Semitism and nationalism were noticeably absent--as
Vienna's "eternal periphery" (p. 132). Jewish vaudeville authors,
too, turned their attention to the present as a newly relevant
temporal location for their plots. They especially used two
temporalities, those of the fleeting and the permanent present to
imbue them with new meanings. For instance, in an attempt to address
the contradictions of "a transitory present ... experienced as
fleeting," which raised the specter of worsening relations between
Jews and non-Jews, _Little Kohn_, a play by Caprice, performed by the
Viennese Budapest Orpheum Society, used racist clichés embedded in
the figure of the eponymous character, who--as the play
unfolds--turns to be the opposite of what those clichés suggested,
enabling its author to counter anti-Semitic stereotypes about Jews
(p. 136). By contrast, in a variety play by Josef Armin titled _The
Journey to Grosswardein_, it is a permanent present--depicted through
the inability of several, both Jewish and non-Jewish, characters to
depart the Viennese train station for their intended
destination--that is featured. As Hödl argues, these plays prove
"that Jews in Vienna around 1900 regimented time and space
differently than Jews in other epochs and in different social
contexts." Moreover, "in Vienna, this understanding appeared
distinct, in a manner that replaced religion and other prevalent
signifiers of Jewish difference, but without running the risk of
being essentialized" (p. 142).

In the world of popular culture, Jewish difference became thus
inclusive. In addition to inclusivity, and based on all the other
variety plays that he examines in the book, Hödl identifies
"individuality, interactionality [and] performance" as the other main
markers of Jewish difference (p. 156). He concludes that Jewishness
"as a form of difference based on inclusive qualities, which can also
shape the identities of non-Jews" rather than being paradoxical,
points to the fact that there was a similarity between Jews and
non-Jews, a similarity that "does not resolve differences between
them" but "indicates a gradual, rather than a fundamental difference"
between the two groups (pp. 157, 158).

Overall, by focusing on interactions between Jews and non-Jews in the
volkssänger milieu, _Entangled Entertainers _proves Gluck's
claim--made earlier in her _The Invisible Jewish Budapest:
Metropolitan Culture at the Fin-de-Siècle_ (2016)--that "the true
context for modern Jewish identity lay not in the interior spaces of
bourgeois domesticity nor in the official public realm of political
life but in institutions of urban culture such as the coffee house,
the boulevard, and the music hall, where a new world of personal
significance and make-believe could be constructed," a claim that
Hödl brilliantly explores and further nuances from the perspective
of the Viennese context.[5]


Ultimately, both Hakkarainen's and Hödl's work reveal something new
and important about fin-de-siècle Viennese popular culture, which
appears in their analyses as a space of unexpected entanglements and
complexity that belies the relevance of commercial and unreflective
properties that were attached to it for so long. Works such as these
make historical research in the field of European popular culture
engaging and intriguing, bringing Vienna to the attention of a larger
community of scholars once again.

Notes

[1]. Mary Gluck, "Afterthoughts about Fin-de-Siècle Vienna," in
_Rethinking Vienna 1900_, ed._ _Steven Beller (New York: Berghahn
Books, 2001), 265.

[2]. For a full exposition of Schorske's thesis, see Carl E.
Schorske, _Fin-de-Siècle Vienna: Politics and Culture_ (New York:
Knopf, 1979).

[3]. See Ralph Köhnen, _Die Zauberflöte und das "Populäre": Eine
kleine Mediologie der Unterhaltungskunst _(Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter
Lang, 2016); Ian Woodfield, _Cabals and Satires: Mozart's Comic
Operas in Vienna_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Camille
Crittenden, _Johann Strauss and Vienna: Operetta and the Politics of
Popular Culture_ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Derek
B. Scott, _Sounds of the Metropolis: The 19th-Century Popular Music
Revolution in London, New York, Paris, and Vienna_ (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008); Marion Linhardt, _Residenzstadt und
Metropole: Zu Einer Kulturelle Topographie des Wiener
Unterhaltungstheaters, 1858-1918_ (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006);
and Charlotte Ashby, Tag Gronberg, and Simon Shaw-Miller, eds., _The
Viennese Café and Fin-de-Siècle Culture_ (New York: Berghahn Books,
2013).

[4]. On Budapest, see especially the chapters by Péter Hanák,
"Urbanization and Civilization: Vienna and Budapest in the Nineteenth
Century," in _The Garden and the Workshop: Essays on the Cultural
History of Vienna and Budapest _(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1998), 3-43 ; and Gábor Gyáni, "A United City on the
Danube," in _Identity and the Urban Experience: Fin-de-Siècle
Budapest_" (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 2004), 3-22. The
secondary literature on the other cities is quite extensive.

[5]. Mary Gluck, _The Invisible Jewish Budapest: Metropolitan Culture
at the Fin-de-Siècle_ (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
2016), 171.

Citation: Alexander Vari. Review of Hakkarainen, Heidi, _Comical
Modernity: Popular Humour and the Transformation of Urban Space in
Late Nineteenth-Century Vienna_ and
Hödl, Klaus, _Entangled Entertainers: Jews and Popular Culture in
Fin-de-Siècle Vienna_. HABSBURG, H-Net Reviews. November, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55290

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.



Tony McKenna on lesser-evilism

Louis Proyect
 

(From FB)

A few weeks back Owen Jones wrote words to the effect that he would walk over broken glass to vote for Biden if it prevented a Trump second term.   I sympathise with this, particularly because of the boost to the far right Trump's awful presidency has provided.   And yet, i think the 'lesser evil' strategy in this case is also seriously flawed.

 

In 2015, in the UK, Ed Miliband (Labour candidate) lost in a General Election to David Cameron (Conservative). Miliband’s politics were a form of rehashed centrism with the odd slightly more radical policy thrown in but he was very much a candidate of the establishment (in as much as he was prepared to continue the economic policies of austerity). In the weeks and months before the election, the majority of the people on the left used the lesser evil stratagem – that is to say, they argued that, despite his flaws, Miliband was better than Cameron (certainly true) and if we voted him into power we might be able to pull him more to the left (debatable). In the event Milliband lost because of his lukewarm politics, because he simply couldn’t provide any kind of credible or definitive alternative to the politics of the status-quo.

 

But in the wake of that defeat, the space was opened up for something which broke with the political consensus and austerity economics. The Corbyn movement. In his early days, Jeremy Corbyn was everything that Miliband was not. Miliband had been an awkward speaker, a distinctive nasal honk married to the type of glib soundbite which was enough to make you cringe. Corbyn, on the other hand, was slower and more deliberate, but his words carried the weight of raw feeling, rather than the sense of having been crafted by the mechanics of a Public Relations team.

 

And Corbyn could speak with pathos and authenticity, precisely because what he was bringing to light were genuine social truths; it was true that the bankers had ravaged the economy in wolfish and predatory fashion, and it was also true that the poorest and most vulnerable – the immigrants, the disabled, public-sector workers and those who eked out a living in the precarious economy – had been demonized and decimated, sacrificed at the altar of high-finance and the power of privilege.                                         

 

Corbyn for the first time, and on the back of a growing social movement, articulated a different political vision; one which was about recognising the essential labour which was provided by those at the bottom, the importance of immigration both economically and culturally, and finally a sense that perhaps the real parasites were not those claiming benefits at the bottom, but those looting the economy at the top via the billions and billions which were being syphoned through tax-havens.

 

Corbyn’s movement was closed down, in ways which were both brutal and insidious. But I think that had Miliband attained victory in 2015, had the ‘lesser evil’ tactic had succeeded – then the Corbyn movement would have never have been born in the first place. Instead the left would have mounted their energies getting behind a centre-ground candidate, and their radicalism would have been absorbed by the parliamentary machine, rather than being able to pose a significant challenge to business as usual. Would they have succeeded in pulling the Milliband administration radically to the left? If the five years of Milliband’s stewardship of the Labour Party were anything to go by, it seems unlikely to say the least.

 

And this brings us to the question of the upcoming US election. The argument against voting for Biden, against voting for ‘the lesser evil’ is not simply an argument in which the political differences between Trump and Biden are absolved, whereby one simply says that they are both establishment figures and therefore just as bad as each other. For what it’s worth, I think Trump is considerably worse than Biden – most significantly in as much as his presidency has helped mobilize far right groups across the US, groups such as the KKK and other fringe elements whose activities have spilled over into murderous violence on repeated occasions.

 

But the argument against ‘lesser evilism’ does not depend on affirming some kind of moral equivalence between Trump and Biden. Rather it depends on showing that if we, on the left, push to channel our forces and our support into the Biden campaign, we simultaneously end up narrowing the horizons of the future; that is to say, we end up closing the space in which new forms of campaigning and political mobilisations can be created. We end up reducing the possibility of the type of genuine political alternative which might really challenge the Trumps of this world.

 

Of course, there is a sense in which the Democratic Party has always functioned this way. By situating itself as the only possible alternative to the worst corruptions of establishment power as represented by the Republican Party – it also became a conduit through which building social and political pressure in society at large could be diffused and the established order can be more effectively maintained. In the words of Malcolm X, this ostensible opposition between the two major parties allowed the ruling classes to show the voter a ‘growling wolf’ precisely so that ‘he flees into the open jaws of the smiling fox’.

 

Under the rubric of ‘moderation’, the Democratic Party was able to achieve the grisly honour of being the first political regime in history to have unleashed nuclear holocaust, bombing Japanese cities and annihilating the lives of hundreds of thousands. In that period too, the party was also responsible for organising concentration camps to intern Japanese-US citizens on US soil. In addition, the same ‘moderate’ organisation was responsible for escalating the conflict in Vietnam to a shrieking apex, while war in the time of Obama encompassed Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Lydia, Afghanistan and Iraq as the dronemiester extrodinaire brought smooth, automated death to thousands of men, women and children, courtesy of the latest sleek, gleaming military technology purring through the skies. When I talk to ardent Democrats who consider themselves progressives, who locate themselves to the left on the political spectrum, I am often tempted to ask them if there is any atrocity the Party could commit which might in some way stymy their loyalty to it. Based on its foreign policy record thus far, it is hard to imagine.

 

Somehow, then, the party has managed to maintain the façade of progressivism, and it is this – one feels – which allows it to absorb and annul the possibilities of developing more radical political alternatives. The Party is ‘radical’ enough to allow the presence of an AOC or a Bernie Sanders in its ranks, i.e. someone with a somewhat more progressive agenda – but at the same time, the grinding internal mechanics of the party bureaucracy means that if such a candidate gets close to the leadership of the party they will automatically be closed down from above – by the superdelegates at the top who have the ability to nominate candidates irrespective of the way voting patterns on the ground dictate. In practise such an elite layer is naturally calibrated to secure the interests of the elite candidate over and against the political outsider; in 2016, for example, ‘many superdelegates came out early in support of Hillary Clinton, a fact that caused Sanders to claim that the Democratic Party powers-that-be were manipulating the system… Sanders and his supporters thought her early endorsements from so many superdelegates might have swayed primary voters.’

 

But it is not just the radicalism of individuals which the mechanics of the party machine have evolved to quash. In the depression era, the US Communist Party – no doubts driven by the same lesser evil stratagem – worked to weld the support of the most militant workers to the Democratic Party, and in so doing thwarted the development of an independent labour party which could have emerged on a mass basis and with genuine social roots in the working classes. A generation before, at the end of the nineteenth century, a radical party had indeed emerged (the Populist Party) with a left-wing agrarian programme which clamoured for a more democratic political system in and through the direct election of senators, restrictions on the railway barons through federal regulation, aid to small farmers and labourers along with legal measures to protect them from rapacious corporate interests.

 

Ultimately, however, the growth of the party was stunted, first by its support for the Democratic nominee William Jennings Bryan in the election of 1896, and then by its assimilation into the Democratic Party more broadly; a fusion which extinguished the radical flame of the party, and left its more militant members beached in terms of an isolated rump.

 

But there is yet another way in which the ‘lesser evilism’ argument in favour of a vote for the Democrats is problematic. It posits a rather mechanical opposition between the Biden-led Democratic Party and Trump’s Republicans – the only expedient and realistic way to defeat the latter is to back the former. But in so doing, such an argument fails to stress the symbiotic connection which exists between the two political parties. Trump did not win in 2016 because he came to power on the back of a broad right-wing social movement which was then translated into a vast hike in the number of votes in the electoral ballet. In actual fact, in as much as Trump ‘won’ at all, he only did marginally better than McCain – the Republican nominee – had done almost a decade before. Trump won 46.1% percent of the popular vote, while McCain, for his part, had won 45.7% in 2008. The real difference was on the side of the Democrats themselves: in 2008 Obama had won 52.9% of the popular vote, while in 2016 Clinton only managed to procure 48.2%. In other words, the Democrat’s vote share had fallen by almost four million votes (and that is before we take into account the increase in population between 2008 and 2016).

 

To say the same – Trump won because the Democrats ended up haemorrhaging votes. And the reason for this is little difficult to surmise. The eight years of Democrat administration which preceded the Trump victory were the years in which Obama’s abstract and facile exhortations toward ‘hope’ and ‘change’ were extinguished in the fiery wastelands of the battle-scarred Middle East, while at home Obama had time and time again confirmed himself as Wall Street’s man and a fervent friend to big business – whether it meant shoring up the commitment to bail out the banks, or a very public PR stunt in which he took a sip from a (filtered) glass of Flint water in an attempt to advertise the benevolence of the private company that had been poisoning Flint’s water supply through the lead contamination which was leaking out of substandard piping. The sheer, sleek corporate quality to Obama’s neoliberalism and its utter indifference to the lives of the poor now left a bitter taste in the mouth, the type of which Flint’s population were all too familiar with.

 

More broadly speaking, however, the political system itself has narrowed down; the ability of the party in opposition to offer up a genuine economic alternative to the economics of neoliberalism is almost non-existent, such has the Democratic political machine been saturated by the campaign donations of big business. Indeed Biden himself, at the halfway point of 2020, boasted 106 billionaire donors to Trump’s 93. As absurd as it is, Trump is able to advertise himself as a political outsider, as an anti-establishment figure for precisely this reason – precisely because the Democrats are more and more seen to have been bought and paid for by Wall Street. Trump’s own rapacious brand of neoliberalism is packaged in a right-wing authoritarianism promoting the politics of the ‘strong leader’ and a state which draws upon the more antiquated and organic values of a religious nationalism which nostalgically looks back to the spirit of a ‘founding people’ (read white Protestants).

 

This, in turn, acts as a dog-whistle to mobilize the more rabid and racist sections of the lower-middle classes along with considerable sections of the financial elite who appreciate the more prosaic economic motivations of Trumpism in terms of tax relief for the most wealthy. In the words of the philosopher Katie Terezakis, Trumpism represents a form of ‘romantic anti-capitalist ideology’ which, in reality, ‘only further privileges the capitalist elite it degrades in oratory alone.’

 

 A similar trajectory has been achieved elsewhere; the most infamous examples being Bolsonaro in Brazil and Orbán in Hungary. In these cases too, we are made witness to a creeping authoritarianism which is registered in and through the appeal to a religious-nationalism with a pronounced racial inflection, one which privileges white skin at the expense of the ‘outsider’. And in these cases too, the right wing administration has come into power – not on the back of a powerful far-right social movement which developed along fascist lines (despite ideological pretentions to the contrary) – but rather by having stepped into the void left by the previous administration, the so called ‘left’ or ‘alternative’ major party in the Democrat mold which had nevertheless signed up to years of neoliberal, austerity economics.

 

What has been termed the ‘mounting tide of authoritarian neoliberalism’, then, is only conceivable in as much as the mainstream parties of ‘the left’ or ‘centre-ground’ – the alternative which parliamentary democracy has come to pose – have rendered themselves almost completely defunct in terms of providing any kind of political or economic programme which helps facilitate the interests of the poor majority. When one insists on a voting tactic which consistently privileges the ‘lesser evil’ at a time when liberal democracy on a world scale appears to be entering into a terminal crisis – one fails to go to the root of the matter; i.e. to understand that the rise of a figure like Trump is symbiotically connected to the failure of the Democrats to provide any type of credible opposition in the context of the crisis of parliamentary democracy which has played out against the backdrop of a global neoliberalism.

 

Or to put it in another way – trying to get the left to arshal its forces behind the Democrats and Biden, not only narrows the prospects of developing genuinely left forms of political organisation – moreover, such a strategy actively works to create the perfect conditions in which Trumpism itself can metastasize. Yes, Biden can prevent Trump from gaining a second term, but in so doing he merely prepares the ground for next time – another Trump, Trump mark II, a more effective, younger model.

 

Ultimately, there is little to be gained for the left in encouraging the vote for the late-Joe Biden and his zombified brand of corporate politics, his stale empty slogans, the stench of blood and oil wafting in from distant, decimated lands. You needn’t attach yourself to these kinds of politics and policies – however indirectly, however much you are holding your nose. To paraphrase a great revolutionist, isn’t it time we let the dead bury the dead?

 

 


Re: Glenn Greenwald Throws a Fit | The New Republic

Tristan Sloughter
 

I found the argument that he fell afoul of liberal anxieties about a Trump victory rather convincing.

His piece was nonsense, why wouldn't an editor push back?

He was arguing that the Hunter Biden story was not reported on because of the vehement support for Biden in the media. What he leaves out in his article is any mention of Fox News passing on the story or reporter at the NY Post not putting his name on it.

Greenwald twisted the facts to fit the right's narrative about "progressives" (Matt Taibbi used this term in his defense of Greenwald) controlling the "mainstream media", MSNBC, CNN, etc, and hiding anything that could hurt Biden or help Trump -- everything from the extent of the covid-19 pandemic to satanic pedophile rings.

The bourgeois media is guided by ratings and profit, not some "progressive" alliance of the "enemy of the people".


Re: It’s Good That DSA Didn’t Endorse Joe Biden – The Call

Michael Meeropol
 

Come on ROGER --- Noam Chomsky (was Chompsky a pun attempting to call him a "chump" --- if so, very clever!) has been a fierce critic of American Imperialism since at least 1964 ---- I have read loads of things he has written --- have seen him speak many times --- have been in his company ---- he is an independent thinker with a strong commitment to basic democratic forms and a strong opponent of all forms of private property and private power ---- if I were to characterize his political-economic pedigree it would be as an anarchist --- or PERHAPS, a libertarian socialist --

His tactical argument that one must support BIden against Trump does not make him an apologist for the Dems or US imperialism --- it makes him an individual who believes Trump is an existential threat to life on the planet and that the American system is TOO WEAK to rein him in!

During Obama's two terms, Chomsky was very critical of Obama --- emphasizing his use of drone strikes and his failed economic policies.  He would probably totally agree that the Democrats (particularly Obama's failed policies) gave us Trump --- he may have even said it explicitly ....

(by the way, Chomsky is never afraid to change his mind --- at the onset of the Trump presidency he actually said he doubted Trump could accomplish much because he was lazy and stupid ....obviously if Trump has been ineffectual in making things much worse than they had been, Chomsky would NOT be worried about his re-election ....)

By the way -- Chomsky is NOT a Marxist --- I believe he thought Bakunin had the better of the arguments!!



ROGER KULP wrote:

I am also glad to see the admission that  the Democrats gave us Trump. We in the PSL have been saying this all along ,as have people like Jimmy Dore. You would never hear this admission from someone like Chompsky ,who I see as an outright apologist for both the Democratic Party ,and US imperialism ,much in the same way Bernie Sanders is. Many on the left have been saying all along if Biden wins, someone even worse than Trump will come along in 2024, or 2028, so we are screwed either way. The only solution is not to support ,or vote for ,any Democrat ,ever.



“We Don’t Protest”: Borough Park’s Mask-Burning Orthodox Jewish Demonstrators

Louis Proyect
 

“We Don’t Protest”: Borough Park’s Mask-Burning Orthodox Jewish Demonstrators

Orthodox
                    Jewish protesters with Trump 2020 flags in the
                    streets of Borough Park
In a photo from early October, Orthodox Jewish residents of Borough Park, Brooklyn, protest against new restrictions intended to combat the coronavirus.Photograph by Michael Nagle / Redux

Jacob Kornbluh, a Hasidic journalist, has lived in Borough Park, in southwest Brooklyn, for eighteen years. He has written on local and national politics from the neighborhood—which is home to one of the largest Haredi, or traditional Orthodox, communities in the city—for twelve. “Pre-pandemic, if you walked into any major Jewish event in New York City, you’d undoubtedly see him,” Avital Chizhik-Goldschmidt recently wrote for the Forward, where she is an editor. Last month, mid-pandemic, hundreds of Haredi Jews took to the streets in protest of a new set of coronavirus restrictions on Borough Park. Kornbluh was there to report the story; he watched as the protesters—mostly young men and boys—tossed their masks into a makeshift bonfire in the middle of Thirteenth Avenue. The crowd was densely packed into a single street block, but it would occasionally part ways for one man, a big guy in a wrinkled suit, who commandeered a police megaphone. He spoke with a throaty, Brooklyn drawl, all “W”s and no “R”s. “You are my soldiers!” he bellowed. “We are at war!”

The man was Heshy Tischler, a local talk-radio host and a candidate for City Council. Kornbluh had covered Tischler before: in 2017, when the radio host had launched an earlier bid for City Council (and lost, having received just four per cent of the vote), and more recently, as Tischler had emerged as the leader of a local uprising against government covid measures. Lately, Tischler had begun accusing members of the community of being so-called government informants. The crowd noticed one such man filming their protest; he tried to run, but the protesters set upon him and beat him unconscious. Kornbluh left the scene when the violence began. There was a chance that it might turn on him next.

When the pandemic hit, in March, the coronavirus eviscerated Haredi communities like the one in Borough Park. Large families, crowded neighborhoods, and communal life and prayer functioned as preëxisting conditions. Entire communities across Brooklyn decided, by consensus, to shut themselves down, even as schools and restaurants throughout the city remained open.

But it’s hard to put faith on pause. Some Haredi Jews don’t watch television, and many keep “kosher” phones that filter or block the Internet; virtual worship isn’t possible when electronics are forbidden on holidays. There were scattered reports of congregations illicitly gathering throughout Brooklyn. When a prominent Hasidic rabbi in Williamsburg died in late April, the funeral procession drew thousands of mourners. The ceremony was outdoors and masked, and the N.Y.P.D. barricaded the streets, but at that point in the pandemic—the number of covid cases had reached a new peak just two weeks before—it was perceived as a serious violation. Mayor Bill de Blasio ordered that the event be broken up and tweeted a “message to the Jewish community” that “the time for warnings has passed.” Many Jews felt that the tweet was a crude generalization; the head of the Anti-Defamation League called it “scapegoating.” The Orthodox Jewish Public Affairs Council, an organization meant to counter discrimination against the Orthodox Jewish community, pointed out that thousands of New Yorkers had gathered the same day to watch the Blue Angels and Thunderbirds do a flyby. Where had the Mayor been then? And what about all the other Jewish communities who were following the rules?

Kornbluh documented the tensions in Borough Park. Among the city’s political press, he’s known as a reporter’s reporter—a news junkie who wears a yarmulke and speaks with a Yiddish-inflected British accent. Kornbluh grew up in London’s Stamford Hill, where his father started an emergency medical service. At a young age, he developed a fascination with journalism. “I knew probably the names of all the Knesset members,” he said, referring to Israel’s parliament. Kornbluh went to yeshiva but never finished high school. In 2001, he moved to Brooklyn, the center of the Hasidic world in the United States, and worked at a kosher deli; later, he opened a kosher pizza place. He had eclectic tastes for a member of his community, which tends to be highly insular: he taught himself to write by studying biographies of famous Americans; he read the Times. He started a blog, and began showing up at major city events to write about them. He covered the Anthony Weiner frenzy and Donald Trump’s fateful escalator ride. At such events, he would often run into Ben Smith, then a reporter at Politico, who is now the Times’ media columnist. Smith encouraged Kornbluh to pursue journalism full time. Kornbluh took the advice, selling off his pizzeria.

In 2015, he was hired by Jewish Insider, a daily news outlet that reports on political and business news from a Jewish angle. (Two of its recent headlines are “Twitter CEO Dismisses Ayatollah’s Threats to Israel as ‘Saber-Rattling’ ” and “Congressional Dems Urge Biden to Continue Campus Antisemitism Protections.”) With his tireless reporting on local and national politics, and on happenings within his own community, Kornbluh became well known to his readers and a rare channel through which they could hold their local elected officials accountable. He can ask the types of questions that don’t typically come up in a debate or press conference. Chizhik-Goldschmidt described him in the Forward article as “the most famous Hasidic journalist in America.”

One of Kornbluh’s most distinctive qualities as a journalist is his closeness to the community. When he covers local news, he is hardly an outsider “parachuting in” to get some quotes from a seemingly opaque group of people. “Political reporters sometimes don’t realize how real the stakes are and don’t have to live with them,” Smith told me. He added that Kornbluh “is writing about these life-or-death issues in this community, whose divisions mirror the country but where passions are really, really high.”

Borough Park tolerated Kornbluh’s feel for the divisions in the community when the subject was politics, less so when he began writing about the pandemic. In April, during Passover, as most of Borough Park remained on lockdown, Kornbluh began outing rule-breakers. He tweeted a video of a man exiting a synagogue that should have been closed. He called in a complaint to a government hotline about a synagogue that was flouting city restrictions. A digital flyer circulated on WhatsApp calling him an informer. “I lost some friends,” Kornbluh told me. His reporting for Jewish Insider and his posts on social media had been critical of both the restrictions and his neighborhood’s response to those restrictions, but only one aspect of his coverage had stuck. One day in April, a crowd of about a hundred Haredim, noticing Kornbluh walking nearby, chased him down the street, chanting insults.

By June, the weather had warmed and the curve had flattened. It was no longer just a small group ignoring public-health guidelines. In Borough Park, the rhythms of life returned to near-normal. Revellers packed wedding halls. (Tischler claims to have attended seventeen weddings in one month.) “The few who were wearing masks—people looked at them a little funny,” Yochonon Donn, a resident of the neighborhood and a writer for Mishpacha (Family), a popular Haredi weekly, told me. The number of new cases stayed relatively low over the summer, but, in August, de Blasio noted an uptick in Borough Park. He warned of harsh measures if behavior didn’t change. On went the masks. Then, de Blasio, noting the still-worrying numbers, imposed closures anyway. People felt lied to, betrayed by the city. The masks came off. Governor Andrew Cuomo developed his own plan. On October 6th, he set up a call with Haredi leaders and urged them to limit their synagogues to half capacity. Later that day, he announced a plan publicly. He’d scrapped the fifty-per-cent idea. The new limit was ten worshippers for each shul, no exceptions.

That night, protesters filled the streets. The man caught filming it was beaten. Kornbluh, taking on a more activist role, messaged Tischler urging him to apologize for inciting violence. But the following evening, at a second demonstration, the vitriol only increased. Back on the scene, Kornbluh took notes from a distance, watching as the crowd pulsed with energy. Tischler noticed Kornbluh and shouted at him: “You’re a pig!” A group of protesters swarmed Kornbluh and cornered him against a wall. The police had to rescue him.

Kornbluh said afterward that he had been hit in the head and kicked. (Tischler has denied this.) What set the crowd into a frenzy was when Tischler, inches from Kornbluh’s face, called the reporter a moser, a Hebrew word for a traitor—a Jew who informs on a Jew. Tischler had encouraged the rest of the mob to chant it, too: “Everybody scream ‘moser!’ ” Some interpretations of religious law, including that of Maimonides, the hugely influential twelfth-century Jewish philosopher, dictate that a moser must be stopped before he informs again—even if it means killing him.

For most of New York’s Haredi Jews, demonstrating in the street is a rarity. (“We don’t protest,” one of them told me, while protesting.) Counterparts in Israel frequently stage demonstrations—usually in response to things that they perceive as existential threats, such as conscription in the Army—and, more recently, in response to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coronavirus restrictions, calling them anti-Semitic. Many of the young men in Borough Park have taken their cues from what they’d seen of Black Lives Matter protests. (“Jewish lives matter!” has become a common refrain.) But videos of looting and violence had circulated on WhatsApp, and Haredi protesters were eager to draw a contrast, to show that their demonstrations were more peaceful and more proper. “We come out to protest something, there’s music playing, we’re not looting, we’re not rioting,” one Haredi protester told me. This was after the counter-protester had been beaten.

On October 11th, after the first two demonstrations in Borough Park, Tischler was arrested by the N.Y.P.D. for “inciting to riot and unlawful imprisonment in connection with an assault of a journalist.” (He pleaded not guilty.) Soon after, a Tischler fan tweeted out Kornbluh’s address, and a mob of roughly two hundred people—mostly Yeshiva-age boys, but a few families with young kids—gathered outside his home at midnight. (Someone had brought a bullhorn: “Good morning, Jacob! We’re all waiting for you!”) A man in his thirties, who said that his name was Mendel, argued that Kornbluh had become a tool of an oppressive governor by outing Haredi rule-breakers. “Do you think that we were so dumb and stupid, that we paid such a heavy price, so many lives taken away from us, and we wouldn’t do everything to protect us?” he asked. “I prayed on my porch not for one month—four months!” Now, he said, everyone had antibodies. (The antibody rate in Borough Park is estimated to be forty-three per cent—below the theoretical threshold for herd immunity.) Mendel dismissed the new restrictions as theatre. He’d heard rumors that the local testing books were cooked.

Secular, right-wing symbols dominated the event. maga paraphernalia was everywhere; at a previous demonstration, people waved “Don’t Tread on Me” flags, and Tischler wore a Trump sticker on his chest. The rhetoric was familiar, too. One boy told me, “It’s not about corona anymore. It’s about fake news.” Mendel said, “When Trump blames the ‘China Virus,’ liberals say, ‘You can’t say that, that’s racist!’ But when it comes to us, it’s not racist!” Then he cited Tucker Carlson.

The demonstrators’ resistance to public-health measures may be better understood as part of the larger far-right coronavirus denialism, albeit spiced with a set of anxieties particular to the Haredi community. In the Presidential election, Joe Biden, like many Democrats before him, is likely to win an overwhelming majority of the American Jewish vote. Polls have long shown that the secular and less observant American Jewish community is distinctly liberal on a range of social, economic, and political issues. Trump, however, is wildly popular in the Haredi community; in a recent poll of Haredi voters, Trump led Biden by seventy points. “What we are seeing is the evangelicalization of Orthodox Judaism—at a time when evangelicalism is more about an idolatrous nationalism than about Jesus Christ,” Joshua Shanes, a professor of Jewish studies at the College of Charleston, wrote recently in Tablet magazine. The animating political forces for Haredim are conservative Justices, school choice, “law and order,” and opposition to same-sex marriage. Support for Israel, particularly conservative leaders like Netanyahu, is paramount. With television and Internet access limited in the community, radio is unusually important. Many Haredim listen to Rush Limbaugh, Sean Hannity, and Ben Shapiro. Nathaniel Deutsch, the director of the Center for Jewish Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz, characterizes Hasidic political preferences as those of “working-class white ethnics” anywhere else.

In Borough Park, Tischler has become the leader of this movement. He has posted hundreds of videos on social media, in which you’ll find him using bolt cutters to break into a locked playground or harassing local health inspectors. In each video, he also plugs his weekly radio program, “The Just Enough Heshy Show,” where he reflects on topics such as whether he should apologize for calling a young Muslim girl a terrorist (initially yes; later no), and the intellectual capacity of women (“not as smart as men”). The other day, on the air, he challenged the Mayor to a fight on his deck, “man to man, because I think he’s not a man.”

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“If you want to look at this from a Jewish literary perspective, every shtetl had their own meshuggener,” a prominent member of the Hasidic movement, in Brooklyn, told me, meaning that every village has its nut, its clown. “The kids would follow him around and laugh at him, but also laugh with him sometimes.”

However, some in Borough Park view Tischler as not just a clown or a provocateur but as a kind of guardian of the community. The son of Holocaust survivors, Tischler has a reputation for altruism, taking in kids who come from broken homes or have drug problems. He feeds the hungry, visits the sick. Asher Lovy, a twenty-eight-year-old man who runs an advocacy group for Orthodox survivors of sexual abuse, was one of the children whom Tischler mentored. He told me that Tischler was generous and affable. But then, about ten years ago, something changed. Tischler grew bitter. He went to prison for a year, after having been implicated in an immigration-fraud scheme. Lovy said that Tischler became obsessed with his real-estate businesses. “It’s not that I don’t think that there are very many issues that he’s a true believer in,” Lovy said, “but if he can insert himself into an issue that’s controversial and get himself attention for it, then he’s going to do it.” Borough Park, Lovy went on, was split between those in Tischler’s thrall and those “disgusted by him, who think that he’s a loudmouth bombast idiot who misrepresents the community.”

When police came to apprehend Tischler, the radio host filmed his own arrest. He did not exercise his right to remain silent; rather, he badgered the officers and complained loudly of his treatment at their hands. At one point, he stared straight at the camera and declared, “My name is Heshy!” Despite the bluster, his expression betrayed fear. He had vowed, earlier, to turn himself in the following morning, and the arrest galvanized some Borough Park residents who’d initially dismissed him. For a community on edge about persecution, the late-night perp walk was bad optics.

Tischler was released the following day. When I spoke to him, he sounded chastened—his lawyers had suggested that he quit talking so much, he said. (“They’re trying to control my mouth, my son, but I don’t think they can do that,” he told me.) At his most serious, Tischler says that he stands against governmental double standards and inconsistent enforcement. He stands for the well-being of children and the sanctity of the right to worship. He insists that he represents the will of the people—in his case, the purported will of the Haredi community. “They are not my soldiers,” he told me. “They’re my constituents. They’re the people I love and care for. I’m here to support them, not them to support me.”

Tischler also offered many arguments that seemed transparently false. He claimed that he hadn’t even wanted to go to the first protest; he’d been picking up something at the store when he noticed people gathering. “I got out of my car,” he said. “ I spoke to a small crowd. Then I said goodbye.”

I pointed out that his political message, as it were, was often subsumed by a compulsion toward self-promotion, a desire to further his own interests: the radio show, the run for City Council.

“You want me to deny that?” Tischler asked.

In the hours after Tischler’s arrest, Kornbluh texted me an apology. We had scheduled a time to meet the following morning, but now he had to cancel. “Dunno where I will be in the am,” he wrote. “I have to be somewhere safe.”

Through the middle of October, Tischler’s followers circulated misinformation about Kornbluh on WhatsApp—that he had suffered a heart attack, that he’d committed suicide. They continued to protest; a small gathering made its way to midtown Manhattan. Meanwhile, a significant portion of New York’s Haredim have condemned Tischler’s movement. Part of what angers them about de Blasio’s and Cuomo’s admonishments of “the Orthodox community” is that adherence to public-health guidelines varies greatly. Avi Shafran, the spokesperson for Agudath Israel (Union of Israel), an organization that represents Haredi Jews, said that the group had distributed almost half a million masks in Borough Park. (“All we did was announce that they’re available, and people came,” Shafran told me.) One local rabbi dispensed blessings before Yom Kippur from his porch; recipients were gloved and masked and stayed far away from the rabbi and one another. Bad actors also abound. Three weeks ago, on the final night of Sukkot, a weeklong celebration of the harvest and the exodus from Egypt, a rabbi who’d recently tested positive for covid-19 held a five-hour service, indoors, for three hundred congregants in Borough Park. No one wore masks. The rabbi merely set up a Plexiglas shield. Samuel Heilman, an emeritus professor at Queens College and a preëminent scholar of Hasidic society, noted that Haredi culture, at its core, stands in opposition to solitary life. “It’s the absolute opposite to social distancing,” he told me. “Since they were old enough to pray, they’ve done it together.”

The day of the maskless service, I attended a socially distanced celebration hosted by a Hasidic family on the other side of the borough. There was Purell at the sukkah’s entrance, and taco salad and gefilte fish in takeout containers; the attendees, who wore masks and sat far apart, drank rosé out of cans. That Sunday was Simchat Torah, a holiday that usually culminates in raucous dancing and singing. My hosts were planning a more muted evening, with a synagogue service outside. They’d been careful throughout, but they knew that they couldn’t stop everyone from partying that weekend. They told me that they were worried about the younger men in their community. “College students are going to be college students, whether it’s rabbinical students or what,” Chana Lightstone, one of the hosts, said. “It is imperative that we always recognize others as individual human beings,” Motti Seligson, a spokesman for the Chabad-Lubavitch movement, told me that same day, “and not lump them together and treat them as a monolithic blob.”

In that regard, both de Blasio and Cuomo have failed. As of September, the city employed zero Yiddish-speaking contact tracers. Yiddish was used for a recent public-health campaign in Haredi communities across Brooklyn and Queens—trucks went around blaring reminders about getting tested and wearing masks—but this was useless for many of the Jews in Queens, who speak Russian. Meanwhile, the Governor has alienated even those inclined to ally with him by placing harsh restrictions on communal prayer. “Ten people is laughable,” Kornbluh said, of the synagogue-capacity limit. (Borough Park has synagogues that can accommodate several thousand worshippers.) “Even if you wanted to comply, even if you are wearing masks and keeping social distance, the Governor said, ‘No, that’s not good enough.’ Did the Governor come up with solutions, like street closures, so the congregations can actually do the services outside? No.” Several synagogues were fined as much as fifteen thousand dollars for holding services for Simchat Torah. They paid the fine, and continued praying.

It can be difficult to determine what proportion of the community wants to behave responsibly. Kornbluh explained that Tischler and his followers represented a small part of the community, while those like Kornbluh, who advocated vocally for more masks and social distancing, were also in the minority. The majority, he said, were those “who won’t protest, who are silent, who want to deal with a problem, but are sometimes either uneducated, misinformed, or just want to go on with their religious practices.” Heilman, the Queens College professor, noted that many local rabbis have endorsed public-health measures, but typically not too strenuously. “Why aren’t most rabbis taking a strong position?” Heilman asked. “Because the truth is that they can’t really get too far ahead of their people. This is an old principle of Jewish life, that you can’t do what the people are not willing to do. And so these rabbis, even when they will say something that’s in line with what they should be saying, namely, put on masks, distancing, and so on, they say it with sort of a wink and a nod.” In an argument (and a culture) dominated by men, what do the women think? Dr. Leslie Ginsparg Klein, a dean of the Women’s Institute of Torah Seminary and College, in Baltimore, recently wrote in the Times of Israel that some concessions to safety during holidays—more distance, more spectating, less participation—is the experience of many women, all the time.

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I met Kornbluh a day later than we’d initially planned. He wore a surgical mask, which fogged his glasses. He said that he’d been receiving hate mail—“You remind me of the Jews that tried saving themselves by coöperating with Nazis”; “When you die, we will put the mask in your grave”—but he had continued to do his job. “I feel that I’m the right person to actually report the facts on the ground, what is really happening, but also what the government is doing,” he told me. “I’m not a scooper on Orthodox Jewish violations. I am a politics reporter who happens to be a member of the Hasidic community.”

We met in Madison Square Park. I assumed he was staying in Manhattan until things calmed down, but I was mistaken. His office was nearby. After work, he would be returning home to Borough Park.


Re: NYT editors condemn entire Republican Party

Ismail Lagardien
 

I agree completely with what Mark wrote. When Obama visited South Africa couple of years ago, I wrote a commentary in a popular Sunday newspaper showing up our duplicity and insincerity, how he accepted him as "one of us" without reflecting on things like his targeted assassinations and bailing out banks etc. 

In fact, I warned, in the run up to his first presidency, that we were fooling ourselves to think that he would be better, just because he was "one of us". During his presidency his pretentious populist perfomativity (fist-pumping, basket ball playing etc) was truly offensive.

Anyway, those of you who can vote, just get that so and so out of office tomorrow. Or batten down the hatches. 

Stay safe and healthy

Ismail


Dr Ismail Lagardien
Visiting Professor
Wits University School of Governance

Nihil humani a me alienum puto



On Monday, 2 November 2020, 17:43:04 GMT+2, Michael Meeropol <mameerop@...> wrote:


Totally agree Mark that that's what the ruling class wants --- they actually hope to unite around a government of national unity.

The problem for the Democrats inclined to acquiesce is that the Democrats (as Democrats, not pro-ruling class politicians) know they were really beaten down by the Republican "resistance" in 2009 and 2010 --- leading to many state houses flipping, making the fancy drawing of districts to ensure Republican legislative majorities even without vote majorities in many states, leading to the House flipping in 2010 and the Senate flipping in 2014 --- all of which really cut back on opportunities for Democrats and Democrats ---

THUS -- the self interest of Democrats as Democrats requires them to take steps to pre-emptively fight back against Republican efforts to stymie them (again!) ---- that's why they are working so hard to flip the Senate ---

THUS --- the "government of national unity" will have to utilize progressives within the Democratic Party to erect a firewall to protect Democrats for 2022 and beyond --- thus --- the John Lewis voting rights act, the effort to "get around" citizens united, "reforms" of law enforcement --- whether real or fake to try and respond to the black lives matter movement =--, a new Dream Act and a new immigration reform bill to capture the revulsion people felt about separating children from their families and putting them in cages,  DC statehood and maybe even Puerto Rican Statehood (depending on the outcome of a referendum on the Island)k, and Judicial Reform ---

In addition --- finally (FINALLY) putting to bed the demonization of deficits --- the only way for Biden not to lose Congress in 2022 is to strongly support a Keynesian style economic recovery where deficits mean NOTHING until the economy is back to "full employment" --- and, maybe it's a sop maybe it's real --- lots of the infrastructure spending will be in the direction of slowing the mad dash towards climate catastrophe (hoping that we're not already past the point of no return).

NOW --- this actually depends on the progressive wing of the Dems (Sander, AOC, etc.) and the left such as it is does have a potential role to play as a pressure group.

SO YES --- Mark is right that the establishment would LOVE to hit the reset button and re-create Obama 2.0 ---- but first they have to innoculate themselves against losing everything in 2022 and THAT requires at least gives SOMETHINGS to the people who put them in office ...

(Mike Meeropol)



The Relevance of Marxist Critique

Richard Modiano
 

A review of  Marxist Literary Criticism Today by Barbara Foley.

"In its prologue and throughout many offset explanatory text boxes, Marxist Literary Criticism Today puts forth a coherent political position, representing a valid entry into discourse surrounding the continued relevance of Marxist theory."


Re: It’s Good That DSA Didn’t Endorse Joe Biden – The Call

Roger Kulp
 

The article raises some good points, but I don't believe it goes far enough in denouncing the DSA tactic of working within the Democratic Party,to  "push it  to the left".

As someone not in the DSA ,but watching their actions as an outside observer ,I see this tactic as both the DSA's number one flaw ,and the biggest source of division within the organization.

It may be the best criticism of the Democrats I have read to date ,from someone within the DSA. It is not too far off from the PSL's position on the Democratic Party.

The collective American memory is very short ,many of the evils purpetrated by the George W Bush Administration are largely forgotten. I do believe they dwarf anything done by the Trump Administration. I believe the same can be said of Obama ,Clinton, and Reagan. To say nothing of the unnessicary  war on SE asia,that began in the 1950s, the internment of Japanese Americans, the Chinese Exclusion act, ad nauseum. Trump is by no means any unique evil.


I am also glad to see the admission that  the Democrats gave us Trump. We in the PSL have been saying this all along ,as have people like Jimmy Dore. You would never hear this admission from someone like Chompsky ,who I see as an outright apologist for both the Democratic Party ,and US imperialism ,much in the same way Bernie Sanders is. Many on the left have been saying all along if Biden wins, someone even worse than Trump will come along in 2024, or 2028, so we are screwed either way. The only solution is not to support ,or vote for ,any Democrat ,ever.

I like what this guy wrote here. I only wish more DSA members felt like this ,and were  willing to build alliances with the socialist parties that already exist. One blind spot I see from the DSA, is their seeming unwillingness to recognize ,and build, alliances with parties like the WWP, and the PSL   


Re: NYT editors condemn entire Republican Party

Michael Meeropol
 

Totally agree Mark that that's what the ruling class wants --- they actually hope to unite around a government of national unity.

The problem for the Democrats inclined to acquiesce is that the Democrats (as Democrats, not pro-ruling class politicians) know they were really beaten down by the Republican "resistance" in 2009 and 2010 --- leading to many state houses flipping, making the fancy drawing of districts to ensure Republican legislative majorities even without vote majorities in many states, leading to the House flipping in 2010 and the Senate flipping in 2014 --- all of which really cut back on opportunities for Democrats and Democrats ---

THUS -- the self interest of Democrats as Democrats requires them to take steps to pre-emptively fight back against Republican efforts to stymie them (again!) ---- that's why they are working so hard to flip the Senate ---

THUS --- the "government of national unity" will have to utilize progressives within the Democratic Party to erect a firewall to protect Democrats for 2022 and beyond --- thus --- the John Lewis voting rights act, the effort to "get around" citizens united, "reforms" of law enforcement --- whether real or fake to try and respond to the black lives matter movement =--, a new Dream Act and a new immigration reform bill to capture the revulsion people felt about separating children from their families and putting them in cages,  DC statehood and maybe even Puerto Rican Statehood (depending on the outcome of a referendum on the Island)k, and Judicial Reform ---

In addition --- finally (FINALLY) putting to bed the demonization of deficits --- the only way for Biden not to lose Congress in 2022 is to strongly support a Keynesian style economic recovery where deficits mean NOTHING until the economy is back to "full employment" --- and, maybe it's a sop maybe it's real --- lots of the infrastructure spending will be in the direction of slowing the mad dash towards climate catastrophe (hoping that we're not already past the point of no return).

NOW --- this actually depends on the progressive wing of the Dems (Sander, AOC, etc.) and the left such as it is does have a potential role to play as a pressure group.

SO YES --- Mark is right that the establishment would LOVE to hit the reset button and re-create Obama 2.0 ---- but first they have to innoculate themselves against losing everything in 2022 and THAT requires at least gives SOMETHINGS to the people who put them in office ...

(Mike Meeropol)



Re: NYT editors condemn entire Republican Party

Mark Lause
 

Again, as with other media projects on other issues, we should probably not draw too heavily on anything corporate media is peddling.  What "liberal" and "conservative" mean has always been a bit arbitrary, deliberately so, and the media is the major vehicle for smudging everything.  They even use "conservative" regularly as a synonym for "Republican" and "liberal" for "Democratic."  What is "conservative" today amounts to a holy war on all things government.  Anyone not on board for the whole jihad is likely to find themselves labeled "liberal."

And the trends in campaign "dark money" should be considered, particularly by the supporters of the candidate who has raised more money. 

The ruling class will do peachy keen under either candidate.  However, the bulk of it seems to understand that they do best with the one who will serve them best will not poke the masses with a pointy stick on such a regular basis.

It also seems clear that the ascendancy of truly stupidly dogmatic currents spearheaded by the Birther-in-Chief has seriously remade the Republican Party and that the current election has seen a fundamental remaking of the Democratic Party.  In both cases, the parties are following trends that have been moving them since the 1970s and 1980s. 

Keep an eye on the no-Trump Republicans.  MSNBC is more a voice for them than the Democrats per se.  The no-Trump Republicans are very analogous to the Mugwumps of the Gilded Age--old-fashioned Republicans were appalled by the uncouth machine politics and pandering they believed had come to dominate the party.  In 1884, they helped the Democrats elect Grover Cleveland president. (I will avoid the comparisons of Biden to Cleveland, the most Republican-like Democrat of his day.)  If Trump wins reelection, the no-Trumpers will have no future in the GOP.  If he loses, they will still not be able to retake the leadership of the GOP as some of them imagine.  (There were reasons they couldn't hang onto that leadership in 2015-16 and nothing essential will be changed after 2020. 

Biden's goal is a government of national unity.  His cabinet may well have no progressives in it (unless he and the media decide to redefine the term).  Much of it will reflect the idiocy about bipartisanship and compromise.  There will be no serious Federal accounting for the crimes of the Trump mob.   I would expect some partial reversals of some of the Trump attacks on environmental regulation, and the protection of wildlife and nature, but we really shouldn't expect to get back to where we were.  We have no reason to expect a reversal of the corporate giveway "tax reforms" under Trump.  We can expect Biden to follow through with his talk about more Federal funding for local police forces and a lot more common discouragements of "violent" mass demonstrations, for which they may compensate with more black faces in power to sell it.  Don't be too surprised if the Republican proposals for cuts in social security and pensions wind up splitting the difference with the Democrats. It is likely that the Democrats might wind up assimilating a lot of the no-Trump Republicans, which will provide even more of counter-balance to constituencies interested in anything progressive.

As we've seen in the Democratic (and Republican) initiatives to keep Greens off the ballot, this government of national unity sustained by a party of national unity will most certainly persist in measures to protect itself from any insurgent impulses from the Left.

Cheers,
Mark L.



Revolutionary Parliamentarism with August Nimtz

Louis Proyect
 

I've already posted a link to this podcast. After listening to it myself, I have to recommend it a second time. August is brilliant.

https://cosmonaut.blog/tag/august-nimtz/


A Liberal “Moral Reckoning” Can’t Solve the Problems That Plague Black Americans

Louis Proyect
 

Toure Reed writes the same exact article that his dad Adolph and Cedric Johnson write as if constant repetition will win people to their class-reductionism.

https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/sanders-race-black-working-class-ta-nehisi-coates


Green Devolution - Los Angeles Review of Books

Louis Proyect
 

In her new book Resource Radicals, Thea Riofrancos analyzes the split in the left over the usage of fossil fuels, tracing the historical arc of “anti-extractivism” under the shadow of a left-wing government hell-bent on Black Gold. She is generous toward both what she calls the “Left-in-Power” and the “Left-in-Resistance,” understanding the forces stacked against Correa’s project and not wanting to diminish the tangible reductions in poverty his project yielded. But it’s not hard to surmise, as the co-author of a book on the Green New Deal, where her ultimate sympathies reside. By examining how activists envisioned a post-petroleum future, Riofrancos transcends the superficial debates on the legacy of the Pink Tide and, in turn, helps chart a path forward for creating a society as equitable as it is ecological.

https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/green-devolution/


Re: Why I voted for Howie Hawkins

John Reimann
 

What we do for those 3 minutes it takes us to fill out a ballot card should flow from what we do the other 525,597 minutes in the year. In Anthony Boynton's case, it has. He said he campaigned for Howie Hawkins. One commentator on Boynton's post congratulated him on his vote, which he says was wasted as the Greens are even more useless than the Democrats. I agree with that comment except that what was even more wasted was the time Anthony Boynton spent campaigning for the Greens, which was surely more than the time it took to fill out the ballot card. That was the true waste of time!

Nor does Anthony Boynton's comparison to other previous elections hold any validity. That's because there never has been a president like Trump at least since the US Civil War, meaning there has never been an election like this one. Trump's moves towards one man rule/Bonapartism are unprecedented. If he gets back in, it will be through a vast increase in this tendency, which will vastly strengthen his move in that direction. As others have pointed out, his form of Bonapartism - if it is consolidated - is similar to that of Victor Orban in Hungary. Here, it will be bolstered by the rise of the violent vigilante groups. To emphasize: If Trump is able to steal this election, it will vastly strengthen these tendencies.

Instead of focusing our efforts on building a useless Green Party, socialists should be spending their time campaigning for a mobilization in the streets to stop Trump and Trumpism, and for the unions to play a key role in that mobilization. That would give such a movement a definite working class "flavor" and within that, we should raise what a working class program and strategy should be.

But there is a logic to that. If we are campaigning to oust Trump through a working class mobilization in the streets (vs. campaigning for the Green Party), then how we vote should be in harmony with that effort. Unfortunately, there is only one way that Trump will leave office on January 20. That is if Biden takes his place. (There is a very slim chance - very, very slim - that there would be a deadlock and the Speaker of the House would replace Trump. However, there is no real political difference between Biden and Pelosi, so that is irrelevant to this discussion.) So, if we are campaigning for a working class movement to oust Trump, then we should vote accordingly - for Biden.

As to Anthony Boynton's argument about keeping alive some sort of independent socialist tendencies through voting Green Party: Any sort of real socialist tendencies and traditions must rest on some sort of significant layer of the working class - one that is conscious. courageous and active. Otherwise it is just hollow words. The Green Party does not rest on any section of the working class and I can't see how they ever will. As far as I can see, the only way they will ever become significant is if a real, working class movement to build a real working class party arises. In that case, some capitalists could throw support behind the Greens to divert the movement away from building a working class party. In other words, the working class would be better off if the Greens disappeared entirely. (By the way, Anthony Boynton says he votes here in California. In that case, if he wants to vote for a truly wasted party, why not vote for the Peace and Freedom Party? Like the Greens, to the extent anybody even knows about them, it would be better if they disappeared entirely.)

This is why I disagree with Anthony Boynton's entire direction - how he spent his time during this election campaign more so than what he wrote on a scrap of paper. Both were mistaken in my opinion.

John Reimann
--
“Science and socialism go hand-in-hand.” Felicity Dowling
Check out:https:http://oaklandsocialist.com also on Facebook