A video frame captured in Hong Kong in August 2019 shows a group of pro-democracy protesters, smoke pluming toward them, racing to place an orange traffic cone over a tear-gas canister. A video taken nine months later and 7,000 miles away, at a Black Lives Matter protest in Minneapolis, shows another small group using the same maneuver. Two moments, two continents, two cone placers, their postures nearly identical.
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Hong Kong, August 2019.Credit...Getty Images
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Washington, D.C., May 2020.Credit...Getty Images
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Hong Kong, August 2019.Credit...Vincent Thian/Associated Press
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Portland, Ore., July 2020.Credit...David Swanson/EPA, via Shutterstock
Images of protest spread on social media reveal many other matching moments from opposite sides of the world, and they often feature everyday objects wielded ingeniously.
Leaf blowers are used to diffuse clouds of tear gas; hockey sticks and tennis rackets are brandished to bat canisters back toward authorities; high-power laser pointers are used to thwart surveillance cameras; and plywood, boogie boards, umbrellas and more have served as shields to protect protesters from projectiles and create barricades.
An Xiao Mina, a researcher at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University, has studied these echoes. In the summer of 2014, when the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Black Lives Matter protests in the United States that followed the police killing of Michael Brown were taking place, she noted that the protesters spoke a common language, even sharing the same hand gesture characterized by the chant “Hands up, don’t shoot.”
Occasionally, there was even direct acknowledgment between the disparate groups, “as when Ferguson protesters donned umbrellas against the rain and cheekily thanked protesters in Hong Kong for the idea,” Ms. Mina wrote in her 2018 book, “Memes to Movements.”
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Demosisto via Twitter, Associated Press, ReutersCredit
But often, she noted, the images’ similarity was unwitting. In their spread, their simultaneity and their indirect influence on each other, the protest videos had all the characteristics of memes, those units of culture and behavior that spread rapidly online. The same cultural transfer that gives us uncanny cake-slicing memes and viral challenges also advances the language of protest.
“We live in this world of attention dynamics so it makes sense that tactics start to converge,” Ms. Mina said. She called the images’ tendency to build on each other “memetic piggybacking,” and noted that everyday items that are subverted into objects of protest are “inherently charismatic.”
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Hong Kong, November 2019.Credit...Getty Images
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Portland, Ore., July 2020.Credit...Marcio Jose Sanchez/Associated Press
Franklin López, a founder and former member of Sub.media, an anarchist video collective that has filmed dozens of protests, said that “videos shared through social media and mainstream media reports become rough ‘how-to guides’ on protest tactics.”
“You see peeps in Hong Kong using umbrellas as countersurveillance tools and folks over here will say, ‘hey, brilliant idea!’ and you’ll see umbrellas at the next militant protests,” he said.
Of course, it’s not just social media mimicry. Ms. Mina pointed out that “activists from around the world do actively learn from each other and exchange tactical tips.”
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The New York Times, @gravemorgan via Twitter via StoryfulCredit
On the topic of direct communication between groups in Hong Kong and the United States, Mr. López said: “Texts outlining not only tactics and strategies but reports of what worked and what didn’t are shared and translated, but also talked about in in-person events, film screenings and internet talks.”
In June, for example, Lausan, a group that formed during the Hong Kong protests that seeks to connect leftist movements in various countries, was a host of a webinar. It provided a forum for Hong Kong and American activists to share strategies.
Katharin Tai, a doctoral candidate in political science at M.I.T. who studies Chinese foreign policy and the intersection of international politics and the internet, separated information sharing between Hong Kong and the United States into two categories.
One was group-to-group sharing of tactics between the sets of protesters, though she noted that because both protest efforts were non-hierarchical, they were not necessarily organized from above.
The second, she said, included the translation of helpful graphics and information — say, which sort of gas masks best protect against tear gas — that are then posted online. “That’s the less organized way, where they’re just kind of pushing it out into the ether,” she said.
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Hong Kong, September 2019.Credit...Getty Images
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Portland, Ore., July 2020.Credit...Associated Press
The social internet has sped up a long history of direct and indirect dialogue between protest movements around the world.
Mark Bray, an organizer of Occupy Wall Street and a lecturer at Rutgers University, said that sharing or imitating protest strategies and tactics is “as old as protest strategies and tactics are,” but that social media “has exposed people to more different tactics.”
“In that sense, like all kinds of new communications technologies, it has shortened the perceived distance between movements around the world,” said Mr. Bray, who is the author of “Antifa: The Anti-Fascist Handbook,” a history of that movement.
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The New York Times, Mike Baker for The New York TimesCredit
Anastasia Veneti, who teaches at Bournemouth University in England and specializes in media coverage of protest movements, said that photographs and video that have been produced and circulated by the protesters “have influenced professional photographers who have begun to produce similar images.”
“With this global wave of post-2010 activism, we’ve seen that this paradigm or media framing has started to change and to a great extent, this change is to be credited to the fact that protesters themselves are better organized thanks to the use of new media technologies,” she said.
Matching protest images are not only found between Hong Kong and the United States. They crop up in Mexico and Greece, Kurdistan and Catalonia.
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Nantes, France, June 2016.Credit...Stephane Mahe/Reuters
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Notre-Dame-des-Landes, France, April 2018.Credit...Getty Images
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Hong Kong, August 2019.Credit...Tyrone Siu/Reuters
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Hong Kong, November 2019.Credit...Fazry Ismail/EPA, via Shutterstock
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Beirut, Lebanon, June 2020.Credit...Bilal Hussein/Associated Press
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Santiago, Chile, January 2020.Credit...Getty Images
But Hong Kong does play a central role in the activist imagination, scholars and activists said, thanks both to the tactical ingenuity of protesters there, as well as Western media’s willingness to cover pro-democracy demonstrations extensively.
Gabriella Coleman, a professor at McGill University who studies digital activism, noted that even nonpolitical publications were moved to cover the Hong Kong protests. “Because Hong Kong is seen as a Western-style democracy that’s being eaten up by its authoritarian parent, there’s no controversy in reporting on it,” she said.
Asked whether Hong Kong loomed particularly large in the eyes of experienced protesters, Mr. López answered emphatically: “Hell yeah!” He called the protests in Hong Kong “epic.”
“More than anything the discipline, organization and persistence of these folks has been awe inspiring,” Mr. López said, adding that the people of Hong Kong “are showing us what is possible.”
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Hong Kong, December 2019.Credit...Danish Siddiqui/Reuters
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Portland, Ore., July 2020.Credit...Caitlin Ochs/Reuters
Marxism is the completion of the Radical Enlightenment projec
Enlightenment and the Young Marx
For Jonathan Israel, Marx’s status as a Radical Enlightenment figure ended prematurely in 1844. According to this interpretation, Marx was a Spinozistic liberal until he discovered the proletariat and converted to communism.1 But this sharp break that Israel assumes in Marx’s thinking did not occur. Israel provides only a cursory treatment of Marx’s writings after 1844 and never shows how Marx broke with the Enlightenment. This stark division between Enlightenment ideas and communism is arguably the worst part of his latest book, The Enlightenment That Failed. Israel implies that if only Marx had not collaborated with the bad Engels, but had stuck with the liberal Young Hegelians, he would have been saved from the economic “determinism” and “authoritarianism” that marred his later political career. Israel’s case for a counter-Enlightenment Marx ignores how earlier “Spinozistic” concerns and themes were integrated into his theory of communist revolution. Neither the “young Marx” nor the “old Marx” renounced humanism, naturalism, and the progressive ideas of Radical Enlightenment.
Continued at: https://www.leftvoice.org/marx-and-the-communist-enlightenment?fbclid=IwAR3eIUVRNFRNj6dZOuwA1XzDNn8VgcRQUz7EjkscB2_cITGBQUKaK3xjQvw
---------- Forwarded message --------- From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW<h-review@...> Date: Sun, Aug 2, 2020 at 2:42 PM Subject: H-Net Review [H-Diplo]: Park on McKay, 'Pacific Apostle: The 1920-21 Diary of David O. McKay in the Latter-Day Saint Island Missions' To: <h-review@...> Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...>
David O. McKay. Pacific Apostle: The 1920-21 Diary of David O. McKay
in the Latter-Day Saint Island Missions. Edited by Reid L. Neilson
and Carson V. Teuscher. Champaign University of Illinois Press,
2020. Illustrations. xlvi + 314 pp. $14.95 (e-book), ISBN
978-0-252-05171-5; $110.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-252-04285-0; $27.95
(paper), ISBN 978-0-252-08467-6.
Reviewed by Benjamin E. Park (Sam Houston State University)
Published on H-Diplo (August, 2020)
Commissioned by Seth Offenbach
In October 1920, David O. McKay, then a forty-seven-year-old apostle
for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), received
an audacious assignment: he was to travel the Pacific world and
investigate the status of the church in Japan, Hawaii, New Zealand,
Australia, Samoa, Tonga, Tahiti, and potentially even South Africa.
Though the faith had sent missionaries to all these regions over the
past half-century, McKay would be the highest authority in the LDS
institution to ever visit these far-flung congregations, and his
mission represented the faith's growing concern with its global
reach. The trip ended up taking an entire year, and McKay's
experience influenced the rest of his leadership career, most notably
when he became president of the church three decades later.
Accompanying McKay was Hugh J. Cannon, an ecclesiastical leader from
Salt Lake City who was assigned to serve as a secretary. Among
Cannon's duties was to keep McKay's diary, which he did along his own
record. (Cannon was particularly interested in keeping a good account
because he hoped to write and sell a narrative of the historic trip
upon his return.) _Pacific Apostle_, edited by LDS Church employees
Reid L. Neilson and Carson V. Teuscher, reproduces McKay's official
diary, as kept by Cannon, and it provides an important insight not
only to one of twentieth century's most important Mormon figures but
also to a number of poignant international tensions in an age of
American Christian imperialism.
At the time of McKay's call, the LDS Church had a half-million
members, with a large majority of them residing in the Mountain West.
Yet they also had a growing international population, and leaders had
recently decided to cease their practice of "gathering" all believers
to America, instead urging them to build the church in their own
regions. They had even recently completed a temple in the Pacific,
located in La'ie, Hawaii, the year before, in 1919. They were also
dedicating considerable resources to educational programs across the
globe, which necessitated this voyage.
McKay and Cannon first arrived in Asia, and immediately developed
firm racial opinions. "Our first impression is that the Japanese are
a far superior people to the Koreans," McKay stated at one point (p.
42). "Poor old China! She is most certainly in a senile condition,"
he mused at another (p. 53). He was especially dour about the
church's prospects in China, where he felt the people were too
devoted to money and superstition to be receptive to their message.
He did, however, enjoy learning more about Confucius.
Though the editorial introduction and footnotes do not say so, these
reflections of Asian residents are indicative of a broader American
suspicion toward what they believed to be "heathens" outside the
Christian fold. Confronting these peoples and their beliefs, an
increasing fascination during this age of imperialism, did much to
reaffirm, challenge, and expand American religious organizations,
including their humanitarian impulses. Scholars on this topic will
find considerable material in this volume to digest within such a
framework.
Though McKay's impressions were much more positive when they made it
to the Polynesian islands--no doubt, in part, due to the church being
more entrenched there--they still reflected a staunch imperialist
mindset. "America and the Church of Christ will truly make all
nations one blood," he prophesied after one patriotic gathering in
Hawaii; "may God hasten the day when this is accomplished" (p. 80).
Even as he described the Hawaiian people as "a lovable, kind-hearted,
hospitable race," he emphasized that they were "greatly in need of
the Gospel." He was also concerned that their "pure-bred Hawaiian
[race] is being replaced by other more vigorous nations, particularly
by the Japanese" (p. 101). Nation, race, and imperialism framed much
of his reflections.
As he toured New Zealand, Samoa, Tonga, and other nations, McKay
continued his themes of racial humanitarianism, though he was
frequently confronted with a series of issues. On some islands he was
upset to encounter missionaries from the Reorganized Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, a domestic rival; on others, he was
forced to deal with legal issues from governments rightly worried
about the encroaching American missionaries. At the conclusion of the
voyage, McKay urged church leaders to plan "more frequent visits" to
all these remote locations (p. 278).
A crucial lesson from McKay's mission concerned priesthood
governance. The LDS Church had recently formalized a racial
restriction in the early twentieth century that did not allow men
with any African ancestry to hold the priesthood or women with the
same genealogical marker to receive temple ordinances. Decades later,
when he was prophet of the church, McKay recalled being first alerted
to the problems with this policy while on this global mission, as he
encountered faithful men and women who were, due to their race,
relegated to a subordinate position.
Neilson and Teuscher's editorial introductions and footnotes do a lot
to add background to many individuals and events detailed in the
diaries. They do have limits, though. Though there is extensive
literature on America's missionary efforts during this period, this
volume neither references nor engages theories of imperialism or
multiculturalism, instead presenting McKay's trip in a parochial
framework only relevant to Mormon historians. Further, editorial
interpretations often verge toward devotion and hagiography, as when
they say that it was "easy to overlook the fact that it was precisely
in these meetings that McKay fulfilled his apostolic duty to serve as
a special witness of Jesus Christ--listening, loving, testifying, and
blessing audiences crammed into humble structures" (p. xxxviii).
Readers should also know that there is already another published
volume that details McKay's mission, also edited by Neilson: _To the
Peripheries of Mormondom: The Apostolic Around-the-World Journey of
David O. McKay_ (2011), which is the account Cannon wrote upon the
return of their trip but never published. Cannon's account is far
more polished than McKay's diaries, though it lacks the private
reflections and personal insight.
_Pacific Apostle_ is a fascinating record that should prove quite
useful to scholars of religious imperialism during the era, as well
as historians of Mormonism seeking to trace some of the early seeds
of the modern church's most pressing issues of race and globalism.
_Benjamin E. Park__ teaches American religious history at Sam Houston
State University. He is the co-editor of _Mormon Studies Review_ and
author of, among other works, _Kingdom of Nauvoo: The Rise and Fall
of a Religious Empire on the American Frontier_ (2020)._
Citation: Benjamin E. Park. Review of McKay, David O., _Pacific
Apostle: The 1920-21 Diary of David O. McKay in the Latter-Day Saint
Island Missions_. H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews. August, 2020.
URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55275
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons
Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States
License.
November 28, 2020, marks the 200th birthday of Friedrich Engels. The journal tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critque (http://www.triple-c.at) celebrates Engels’ birthday with a special issue, in which critical theorists reflect on the relevance of Engels’ works for the analysis of digital and communicative capitalism.
The special issue’s contributions shall provide perspectives that address the question: How do Friedrich Engels’ works matter for the critical analysis of digital and communicative capitalism?
Contributions focus on single or several of Friedrich Engels’ works.
Example questions that can, based on Engels, be treated in contributions include but are not limited to: - How do the digital conditions of the working class look like today? - What are digital working class struggles and how do they operate? - What is the role of reproductive labour, including digital housework and digital housewifisation, in digital capitalism? - What are Engels’ contributions to a Marxist-humanist critique of digital capitalism? - What is digital scientific socialism? - How can we make sense of digital utopias today?
The contributions in this special issue will shed light on the relevance of Engels today for the critique of the political economy of communication and digital media, critical digital research, and critical media and communication studies.
Schedule:
Deadline for abstract submission: August 7, 2020 250 words, per e-mail to christian.fuchs@..., please include a submission/article title, your name and contact, a 100-word short bio, and an abstract of 250 words and send the submission in a Word- or text-file.
Acceptance decisions: until August 31, 2020
Submission of full reflection articles (maximum of 8,000 words, including all references, footnotes and tables): October 12, 2020
Online publication of the special issue: November 28, 2020 (= Friedrich Engels’ 200th birthday).
Recommended Readings: Engels’ original works plus: Paul Blackledge. 2019. Friedrich Engels and Modern Social and Political Theory. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Gustav Mayer. 1935. Friedrich Engels. A Biography. London: Chapman & Hall. Janet Sayers, Mary Evans and Nanneke Redclift, eds. 1987. Engels Revisited. New Feminist Essays, eds. 37-56. London: Tavistock. Christopher J. Arthur, ed. 1996. Engels Today. A Centenary Appreciation. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...> Date: August 3, 2020 at 6:01:14 AM EDT To: h-review@... Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...> Subject:H-Net Review [H-Judaic]: Kita on Cypess and Sinkoff, 'Sara Levy's World: Gender, Judaism, and the Bach Tradition in Enlightenment Berlin' Reply-To: h-review@...
Rebecca Cypess, Nancy Sinkoff, eds. Sara Levy's World: Gender, Judaism, and the Bach Tradition in Enlightenment Berlin. Rochester University of Rochester Press, 2018. x + 292 pp. $99.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-1-58046-921-0.
Reviewed by Caroline A. Kita (Washington University in St. Louis) Published on H-Judaic (August, 2020) Commissioned by Barbara Krawcowicz
Sara Levy's World: Gender, Judaism, and the Bach Tradition in Enlightenment Berlin, edited by Rebecca Cypess and Nancy Sinkoff, brings much-needed attention to the life of a remarkable German Jewish musician and patron who helped to shape German musical heritage as we know it today. Born in Berlin to the prominent Itzig family, Sara Levy's (1761-1854) appreciation of music was fostered from a young age. She took piano and harpsichord lessons from Wilhelm Friedemann Bach (1710-1784), the eldest son of Johann Sebastian Bach, and later served as a patron of Wilhelm and his brother Carl Philipp Emmanuel (1714-1788). Her music salon was renowned and many of the works she commissioned from the Bach family were first performed there. In addition to these commissioned works, Levy amassed an impressive collection of musical manuscripts during her lifetime, which she later donated to the Sing-Akademie zu Berlin. However, while her musical archive may have sparked initial interest in Levy, this volume probes far beyond the "Bach Tradition" she fostered. Emerging from an international and interdisciplinary symposium held at Rutgers University in 2014, this rich collection of essays takes Levy's life as a springboard to rethink the role of elite Jewish women in the Jewish and German Enlightenments, and, more broadly, to reconsider assumptions about the Jewish co-constitution of German culture at the turn of the eighteenth century [1].
Nancy Sinkoff's introduction situates Levy in the scholarship of Jewish studies, German studies, music history, and women's history. As a Jewish _salonnière_ who did not convert to Christianity; as a woman participating in the Haskalah; as a Jewish woman who helped to preserve and promote the music of a canonical German composing family; and finally, as a female musician who performed publicly, Levy was exceptional on many fronts. Sinkoff also articulates the stakes of bringing Levy to the forefront of scholarship--neglecting the stories and contributions of individuals like Levy, she argues, leads to a "distortion" of our understanding of a number of key aspects of life in Enlightenment Berlin, from the "Court Jewish phenomenon" to the role of Jews in "cultivating musical historicism" to the engagement of enlightened Jews with music and musical aesthetics (p. 8).
The rest of the volume is organized into three sections. The first focuses on Levy as a _salonnière_, a patron, a Jew, and a musician; the second reflects on art and aesthetics as a reflection of Jewish-Christian relations in Levy's time; and the final section analyzes the musical manuscripts in Levy's collection, using these documents as a lens to understand the dynamics of the social world in which Levy moved. The epilogue offers a documentary analysis of selections of Levy's correspondence. Thus, the first and third sections and the epilogue speak to Levy's own life and influence, whereas the essays in the second section reflect more broadly on ideas about art, gender, and religious-cultural identity circulating in Levy's time.
The first section begins in a space familiar to those studying the role of elite German Jewish women in eighteenth-century culture: the salon. Marjanne E. Goozé's essay, "What was the Berlin Jewish Salon around 1800?" offers an overview of this cultural establishment and an insight into its reception history. Goozé also notes how recent scholarship has challenged assumptions about the salon, in particular, the idea that these were necessarily spaces of Jewish "integration" into German society, leading to religious conversion. This context is helpful for understanding the significance of this space for Levy; the salon allowed her to showcase her prodigious musical talent and her patronage of talented artists, such as the Bach sons, and it also created a "liminal space" where she might engage with others of different faiths without the need to abandon her own (p. 29).
Christoph Wolff's essay, "Sara Levy's Musical Salon and Her Bach Collection," focuses on Levy's own relationship to the Bach family and to the Sing-Akademie. According to Wolff, Levy's collection of music manuscripts reveals "a scope and character without parallel elsewhere" (pp. 44-45) in that it includes not only the scores of significant works by J. S. Bach and his sons but also individual instrument parts, likely performed by Levy and her friends. In his reflection on the chamber works that Levy commissioned from C. P. E. Bach, Wolff remarks on the unique orchestration of these works, which call for dialogue between woodwinds and string instruments, and in particular the use of a viola rather than a violin to acoustically draw attention to the "middle ground" of the score (p. 45). Wolff likens this arrangement to the ideal of a balanced conversation between opposing viewpoints fostered at Levy's own salon. This essay concludes with a brief synopsis of the history of the Sing-Akademie archive, which disappeared after the Second World War. Only with its recovery in Kiev in 1999 were Levy and her music collection finally made known to a wider public.
Natalie Naimark-Goldman's essay, "Remaining Within the Fold," highlights Levy's support of leading _maskilim_ in the Haskalah. While the Jewish Enlightenment has traditionally been read as a movement "created primarily by and for men" (p. 58), Levy's subscriptions to Hebrew books and the financial assistance she provided to Jewish writers and intellectuals demonstrates the active role that women played in promoting education and modern ideas in the Jewish community at this time. Moreover, they offer further evidence of Levy's public commitment to Jewish culture and institutions, even as she performed at the Berliner Sing-Akademie and donated to this Christian organization her considerable manuscript collection. These actions, Naimark-Goldman notes, point toward Levy's ambiguous position in between the Jewish and Christian worlds that she navigated daily.
George B. Stauffer's contribution, "Women's Voices in Bach's Musical World," turns back in time, focusing on the careers of two female performers of J. S. Bach's works in the generation preceding Levy: Christiane Mariane von Ziegler (1695-1760) and Faustina Borndoni (1697-1781). Stauffer's essay reveals how these vocalists paved the way for Levy to perform Bach's music in public at a time when such opportunities for women were rare.
The second section address how Jewish-Christian relations in Levy's time resonated in the realm of aesthetics. Essays by Martha B. Helfer and Elias Sacks focus on two of the most prominent thinkers of the Jewish and German Enlightenments who were contemporaries of Levy--Gotthold Ephraim Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn. Helfer's essay, "Lessing and the Limits of Enlightenment," complicates the image of Lessing the philo-Semite, highlighting the latent anti-Semitism in popular dramatic works such as _The Jews_ (1749). Turning from drama to other aesthetic forms, Elias Sack's essay, "Poetry, Music and the Limits of Harmony," examines Moses Mendelssohn's translation of the Psalms and his "aesthetic critique" of Christianity. Mendelssohn's critique is grounded in music, which he links to the ethical life. He suggests that with its neglect of the musical recitation of biblical text, the Christian tradition "lost a critical tool for moral formation and human flourishing" (p. 135). Sack's analysis of this argument reveals how Mendelssohn's aesthetic writings stood at times in contrast to the larger Enlightenment project of identifying uniform and universal values. For Mendelssohn, a study of musical practices reveals not commonalities between the two religious, but rather a central flaw in Christianity.
While Helfer and Sack's readings focus on the works of canonical male Enlightenment writers, Yael Sela's essay, "Longing for the Sublime: Jewish Self-Consciousness and the _St. Matthew Passion_ in Biedermeier Berlin," centers on the writings of Jewish women for evidence of how the tensions between Jewish and Christian culture played out in aesthetic debates. Sela suggests music can be read as a "distinct topos" in the epistolary and autobiographical texts written by women; she defines this topos as "a literary strategy of critical reflection, self-fashioning and cultural negotiation through learned scrutiny and sensual contemplation" (p. 148). In her essay, Sela focuses on the revival of Bach's _St. Matthew Passion_ by Felix Mendelssohn in 1829 and the reception of this performance by Levy's contemporary, Rahel Varnhagen. A number of other contributions to this volume draw attention to Sara Levy's personal connection to this event: Felix Mendelssohn was Levy's grand-nephew; the manuscript of the _Passion_ was gifted to Mendelssohn by Levy's sister, Bella Salomon; and Mendelssohn's teacher, Carl Friedrich Zelter, who likely fostered the young composer's fascination for Bach, was the caretaker of Levy's musical estate at the Sing-Akademie. As Bach was the composer who for many defined the German Protestant music tradition, the revival of this work by a Jewish composer has been viewed as a great German-Jewish collaboration, and arguably as one of the most significant musical events in nineteenth-century German history [2]. In her essay, however, Sela highlights Varnhagen's ambivalent review of the work, which the _salonnière_ believed failed to achieve the sublime--the "expressive marriage between music and words that brings out the deepest, most primal sentiments of all human existence" (p. 164). Instead, Varnhagen expresses a preference for oratorical texts that recognize the sublimity of the Hebrew scriptures (such as Handel's _Judas Maccabeus_) and for Bach's instrumental works. This essay reveals how the writings of Jewish women highlight key moments of Jewish estrangement from the project of building the German _Kulturnation_ through music.
The third section of _Sara Levy's World_ brings us back to the salon to examine the chamber music manuscripts found in Levy's musical collection for insights into the cultural norms and debates of elite Prussian Enlightenment society. Rebecca Cypess reads Levy's duets as expressions of contemporary aesthetic and religious philosophy, in particular, Moses Mendelssohn's idea of "Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit" (Unity in Multiplicity), his model for a "tolerant society in which Jews and Christians could co-exist in perpetuity" (p. 182). Steven Zohn turns to more recent studies of musical sociability and Edward Klormann's idea of "multiple agency" (p. 215) to demonstrate how the salon's ideals of dialogue and conversation shaped the quartets by C. P. E. Bach that Levy commissioned and performed in this space. These essays are supplemented by audio recordings of works by Bach and his sons found in Levy's collection. Performed by the Raritan Players, these excellent recordings are accessible on the website of Acis Productions and offer a unique experiential component to the volume. Not only do these recordings allow readers to follow along with the musical examples cited in the text, but they also provide the opportunity to "listen in" to Levy's salon as it might have sounded in her own day.
Finally, Barbara Hahn's epilogue, which features four letters sent by Levy to the Swedish diplomat to Prussia, Karl Gustav von Brinckmann, highlights how correspondence allowed for sociable and intellectual exchange between Jewish women and Christian men. For Hahn, Levy's correspondence might be read as a "stage" upon which she "presented to her addressee ... a world created by Jewish women" (p. 252). These personal notes illuminate Levy's personality and wit as well as offer documentary evidence of the individuals with whom she regularly interacted. While the relationships fostered through correspondence, like those in the salon, may not have been sustainable outside of these spaces, these institutions and practices nonetheless reveal significant interactions that took place between individuals of different genders, cultural backgrounds, and religious faiths during the Enlightenment.
_Sara Levy's World_ offers a compelling portrait of a woman who shaped the musical and intellectual landscape of her time. In fact, it was so successful in piquing my curiosity about Levy that I must confess to disappointment that not all of the essays link their arguments back to Levy and her life in a substantial way. As a result, one at times loses the "red thread" tracing Levy's unique position that Sinkoff sets up so convincingly in the introduction. Nevertheless, with its contributions from scholars of Jewish studies, German studies, and musicology, this volume speaks to a broad, interdisciplinary readership and offers diverse readings of eighteenth-century German and Jewish culture. Its essays challenge familiar narratives about the salon as an institution, about gender roles in the Jewish Enlightenment, and about Jewish "acculturation" and the Enlightenment credo of religious tolerance. They also invite us once again to rethink the role that music played for German Jews as a foundational aspect of _Bildung_--education and self-fashioning of character--believed to be a necessary step to becoming a fully engaged member of modern culture. The contributors to this volume reflect critically on what it meant for Jews such as Levy and her contemporaries to build and sustain a German musical tradition grounded in a faith that was not their own. Scholars such as Ruth HaCohen, Leon Botstein, and Philip Bohlmann have identified the Enlightenment as a crucial moment in the development of narratives surrounding Jewish otherness in music; HaCohen reminds us in particular how the Enlightenment search for a "normative aesthetics," revived long-standing stereotypes of Jews as "noisy" and "unmusical"--the antithesis of Christian harmony.[3] Although Levy's archive does not appear to contain any specific documentation articulating her position on these issues, she was likely aware of these articulations of cultural difference. Moreover, reading Levy's life and musical archive through this lens reminds us once again that Jewish engagements with German culture during the Enlightenment were often quite contradictory, and that categories of belonging must be understood as dynamic and fluid, always developing in response to shifting social landscapes.
This introduction to Levy's world thus offers further evidence of the unique cultural entanglements between Germans and Jews during the Berlin Enlightenment that created the German musical tradition we celebrate today. It serves as a model for interdisciplinary, collaborative scholarship and is an important contribution to the ongoing work of moving Jewish female artists and intellectuals from the margins of German Enlightenment history to the center.
_Caroline A. Kita is Associate Professor of German and Comparative Literature at Washington University in St. Louis and the author of _Jewish Difference and the Arts in Vienna: Composing Compassion in Music and Biblical Drama.
Notes
[1]. For more on the idea of "co-constitution" see Steven E. Aschheim, _In Times of Crisis: Essays on European Culture, Germans and Jews_ (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001).
[2]. A significant study of this history is Celia Applegate's _Bach in Berlin: Nation and Culture in Mendelssohn's Revival of the "St. Matthew Passion"_ (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).
[3]. Ruth HaCohen, _The Musical Libel Against the Jews_ (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011); Philipp Vilas Bohlman, _Jewish Musical and Modernity_ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); and Leon Botstein, "The Jewish Question in Music," _Musical Quarterly_ 94, no. 4 (2011): 439-53.
Citation: Caroline A. Kita. Review of Cypess, Rebecca; Sinkoff, Nancy, eds., _Sara Levy's World: Gender, Judaism, and the Bach Tradition in Enlightenment Berlin_. H-Judaic, H-Net Reviews. August, 2020. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=54709
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
While many activists and organizers participated, the reality is that this rebellion was not organized by the small revolutionary left, neither by the so-called progressive NGOs. The rebellion was informal and organic, originating directly from working class black people’s frustration with bourgeois society, particularly the police.
While many activists and organizers participated, the reality is that this rebellion was not organized by the small revolutionary left, neither by the so-called progressive NGOs. The rebellion was informal and organic, originating directly from working class black people’s frustration with bourgeois society, particularly the police. https://illwilleditions.com/theses-on-the-george-floyd-rebellion/ _._,_._,_
A FB friend named Shemon Salam is probably the Shemon who states that the theses were sent to him and his co-editor by people from NY. Generally, I look askance at articles, websites, etc. that do not provide the identity of who is responsible. As far as the article goes, it is pure bullshit when it says:
"Aside from the police, military, and vigilante crackdown, the uprising was politically repressed by elements of the left, which reacted to the riots by blaming them on outside agitators. In some places, “good protesters” went so far as to detain “bad protesters” and hand them over to the police."
In fact, the "uprising" evolved into mass demonstrations that involved people never expected to support BLM like the people who lived in a small town in upstate NY near where I grew up. Like 10 percent of the town protested. That protest reverberated through the region much more than any puerile rioting.
The Donald Trump administration uses every mechanism to cut China out of the global supply chain, but nothing seems to be working as a resolute China is unwilling to back down and dismantle its technological gains.
Not a day goes by without a strong statement against China from the Donald Trump administration. United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has been particularly blustery. On June 19, he addressed the Copenhagen Democracy Summit, a platform set up by the Alliance of Democracies (created in 2017 by Ander Fogh Rasmussen, former head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, or NATO). China, Pompeo said, had become a “rogue actor” and Europeans must join the U.S. in a grand alliance against it.
I’ve seen tyranny first-hand’, Pompeo said. ‘And I’ve dealt with all manner of unfree regimes in my previous role as Director of the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and now in my current role as Secretary of State of the United States of America. The choice isn’t between the United States and China, but it is between freedom and tyranny.
Such is the old Cold War language, the cliches of freedom and authoritarianism, that the State Department had deployed against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Underneath the use of the word “freedom” sits uncomfortable facts, such as that the U.S. has the largest prison population in the world and that it has been the primary instigator of bloody wars across the planet. Such facts are brushed aside. Pompeo can even bring up the CIA to establish the essential “freedom” of the West against China. No eyebrows were raised at the Copenhagen summit.
At an earlier time, China would have ignored these statements. But not now. Wang Wenbin, spokesperson for China’s Foreign Ministry, called Pompeo’s statements about China and COVID-19 “groundless”; he accused Pompeo of lying to the public. Xu Bu, China’s ambassador to Chile, has been outspoken in his criticism of Pompeo and the anti-China rhetoric that the U.S. has tried to spawn across Latin America. In the Chilean newspaper La Tercera, Xu Bu called Pompeo a “liar”. That both Wang Wenbin and Xu Bu have accused Pompeo of lying suggests a new attitude from Beijing; these are strong words in the world of diplomacy. Chinese diplomats have been making the case from Chile to Iran that their country has been actively engaged to the mutual advantage of both China and the individual countries; this, they say, is the opposite of the U.S. position, which facilitates agreements to the advantage of multinational corporations and not to the various countries of the world.
Matters have escalated rapidly. In late July, the U.S. told the Chinese Foreign Ministry that its consulate in Houston must be closed in a few days. No specific allegations were made against this consulate, but the general tenor is that this is part of a U.S. government attack on Chinese espionage against U.S. businesses. The Chinese Foreign Ministry said that this was a “political provocation unilaterally launched by the U.S. side, which seriously violates international law, basic norms governing international relations, and the bilateral consular agreement between China and the United States”.
These diplomatic spats came after Pompeo made a tough statement saying that the U.S. would contest China in the entire territory of the South China Sea. This has already been U.S. policy for decades, but the mere statement of it in such a brusque manner and the deployment of the two U.S. aircraft carriers—the USS Nimitz and the USS Ronald Reagan—into the region significantly raised the stakes. China responded by sending forces onto two islands in the Paracel Archipelago to conduct live-fire drills. The Chinese government has said that it is responding to U.S. intervention, which “is the real pusher of militarisation in the South China Sea”.
Wrapped up in this war of words are a range of issues that the U.S. raises punctually to intimidate China: allegations of industrial espionage, allegations of currency manipulation, allegations around the coronavirus pandemic, allegations of human rights abuses in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Each issue is not taken seriously by itself, but the group of issues together are utilised to paint a portrait of China as either dangerous or unreliable, and—as the rhetoric gathers force—that the Chinese government must be changed. There is no doubt that behind the U.S. policy since 1949 has been a desire to overthrow the Communist government in Beijing; no doubt yet that the rapprochement in 1972 when President Richard Nixon went to China was merely a wedge in the Cold War and not a true reconciliation with the Chinese government; no doubt either that the current heightened tension is not merely about currency manipulation or Hong Kong, but about the desire to damage China’s rise in the world and change the political situation within China.
Flashpoint
On April 1, Admiral Philip Davidson—the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command—told Congress that he would like $20 billion to create a robust military cordon that runs from California to Japan and down the Pacific Rim of Asia. His proposal, titled Regain the Advantage,pointed to the “renewed threat we face from Great Power Competition. … Without a valid and convincing conventional deterrent, China and Russia will be emboldened to take action in the region to supplant U.S. interests”. In January 2019, Acting Defence Secretary Patrick Shanahan told U.S. military officials that the problem was “China, China, China”. This has been the key focus of all Trump nominees for the Defence Department, whether it be Shanahan or the current chief Mark Esper. Esper cannot open his mouth without blaming China. He told the Italian paper La Stampathat China was using the coronavirus emergency to push its advantage through “malign” forces such as Huawei and by sending aid to Italy. As far as Trump and Esper are concerned, China and to a lesser extent Russia are to be contained by the U.S. with armed force.
Missile gap in China’s favour
Senator Tom Cotton (Republican from Arkansas) has pushed the view that China’s military modernisation programme has created a missile gap in its favour. In March 2018, Cotton asked Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command (now U.S. Ambassador to South Korea), about China’s missiles. “We are at a disadvantage with regard to China today in the sense that China has ground-based ballistic missiles that threaten our basing in the western Pacific and our ships,” Harris told Congress. To remedy this, Harris suggested that the U.S. exit from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which Trump did in early 2019 (Trump blamed Russian non-compliance, but it was clear that the real target was this fear of a Chinese missile advantage). In August 2019, the U.S. tested an intermediate-range missile, signalling that its intentions long preceded its withdrawal from the INF.
In March 2019, Cotton went to the Heritage Foundation to say that the U.S. should start production of medium-range ballistic missiles, which should be deployed at bases on the U.S. territory of Guam and on the territories of its allies; these missiles should directly threaten China. “Beijing has stockpiled thousands of missiles that can target our allies, our bases, our ships, and our citizens throughout the Pacific,” Cotton said in characteristic hyperbole. Exaggeration is central to people like Cotton. For them, fear-mongering is the way to produce policy, and facts are inconvenient.
In November 2018, before the U.S. left the INF, Admiral Davidson spoke at a think tank in Washington on “China’s Power”. In 2015, Davidson said his predecessor Harry Harris had joked that the islands off the coast of the People’s Republic of China were a “Great Wall of Sand”. Now, he said, these had become a “Great Wall of SAMs”, referring to surface-to-air missiles. Davidson, from the military side, and Cotton, from the civilian side, began to say repeatedly that China had a military advantage by the “missile gap”, a concept that required no careful investigation.
The U.S. has the largest military force in the world. In April, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute found that the U.S. military budget rose by 5.3 per cent over the previous year to total $732 billion; the increase over one year was by itself the entire military budget of Germany. China, meanwhile, spent $261 billion on its military, lifting its budget by 5.1 per cent. The U.S. has 6,185 nuclear warheads, while China has 290. Only five countries have missiles that can strike anywhere on earth: the U.S., Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France. Be in terms of intercontinental weapons orair power, China simply does not possess a military advantage over the U.S.
Every known inventory of weapons shows that the U.S. has a much greater capacity to wreak havoc in a military confrontation against any country, including China, but the U.S. understands that while it can blasta country, it can no longer subjugate all countries. Chillingly, the U.S’ allies are now moving their own forward policy: Japan has indicated that it will develop a “first-strike” position. India, however, has been aggressively joining U.S.-driven naval exercises in the Indian Ocean.
Admiral Davidson’s April report calls for “forward-based, rotational joint forces” as the “most credible way to demonstrate U.S. commitment and resolve to potential adversaries”. What the Indo-Pacific Command means is that rather than have a fixed base that is vulnerable to attack, the U.S. will fly its bombers into bases on the soil of its allies in the Indo-Pacific network (Australia, India, and Japan) as well as others in the region (South Korea, for instance); the bombers, he suggests, will be better protected there. China will still be threatened, but Chinese missiles will—so the theory goes—find it more difficult to threaten mobile U.S. assets. Davidson’s report has a stunning science fiction quality to it. There is a desire for the creation of “highly survivable, precision-strike networks” that run along the Pacific Rim, including missiles of various kinds and radars in Palau, Hawaii, and in space. He asks for vast amounts of money to develop a military that is already verypowerful. Furthermore, the U.S. is committed to the development of anti-space weapons, autonomous weapons, glide vehicles, hypersonic missiles, and offensive cyber weapons—all meant to destabilise missile defence techniques and to overpower any adversary. Such developments presage a new arms race that will be very expensive and further destabilise the world order.
Trump’s trade war has oscillated between blunt statements about cutting out China from the global supply chain and sanctioning Chinese Communist Party members to being concillatory to Chinese production and to China’s role as the supplier of goods and credit to the world. Reality is hard to stomach, and the trade war itself seems grounded in enormous doses of unreality. Tariffs on Chinese goods assume that these goods do not already have inputs from the U.S. in them (which they do have) and they assume that the goods are not being produced on behalf of U.S. multinationals (which they are); Trump’s trade war hurt Chinese exports, certainly, but they also damaged the global economy considerably. Latitude for a scorched earth policy against China’s trade is simply not available.
Australia, a loyal U.S. ally, for instance, was partly shielded from the coronavirus recession by its trade with China. Keith Pitt, Australia’s Minister for Resources, said in late July, “Resources have been a shining light of Australia’s economic story. The sector has managed to keep pretty much all its people employed and engaged, that is over 240,000 direct jobs. If you look at iron ore specifically, 62 per cent of China’s iron ore imports came from Australia in 2019-20.” Any escalation of trade wars between China and Australia will hurt the latter’s economyfatally. India decided to ban Chinese-made apps, which account for a large percentage of apps, but found it impossible to substitute them with apps made elsewhere, which is why clones of these apps have now returned to Indian phones. Any attempt to cut China out of the global supply chain in general—a stated U.S. policy—will simply not be possible in the short or medium term. Reliance on China for its industrial production—not only of the extraction of raw materials but of the production of high-tech commodities—is almost total for all countries in the world; it will be expensive, in the midst of the coronavirus recession, to pivot on such an enormous scale.
Hong Kong and Xinjiang
Neither the issue of Hong Kong nor the issue of Xinjiang is important for themselves. To imagine that Western governments, which had no problem with the destruction of Iraq and Libya and the archipelago of “dark sites” for torture (including the U.S. base at Guantanamo), now have a special concern for Muslims is to bedevil the imagination; accusations about human rights violations in Xinjiang are being made for political and commercial ends not on strictly human rights grounds. Certainly, the new laws over Hong Kong’s security, minor compared to the lack of any political freedoms in Saudi Arabia, can hardly be the actual issue that detains the British government; as it seeks to sanction China, it increases arms deals to Saudi Arabia. These issues—Hong Kong and Xinjiang—are part of a wider assault on China’s role in the world, to weaken China in the public imagination since China cannot be easily weakened economically.
5G Technology
It is one thing for China to be the workshop of the world, to deliver its workers for multinational corporations. It is another for China to become a key technological producer in the world. That is the reason why the U.S. government—pushed by Silicon Valley—has gone after the technology company Huawei. The next generation of high-speed wireless technology, 5G, is currently being dominated by Huawei, with Sweden’s Ericsson and Finland’s Nokia far behind. No U.S. firm is near these three in the production of 5G technology.
In April 2019, the U.S. government’s Defence Innovation Board released a report that noted: “The leader of 5G stands to gain hundreds of billions of dollars in revenue over the next decade, with widespread job creation across the wireless technology sector. 5G has the potential to revolutionise other industries as well, as technologies like autonomous vehicles will gain huge benefits from the faster, larger data transfer. 5G will also enhance the Internet of Things by increasing the amount and speed of data flowing between multiple devices and may even replace the fibre-optic backbone relied upon by so many households. The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world. For the reasons that follow, that country is currently not likely to be the United States.” Since U.S. firms are unable to manufacture the equipment currently made by Huawei and others, only 11.6 per cent of the U.S. population is covered by 5G. There is no indication that AT&T and Verizon will be able to manufacture fast enough the kind of transmitters needed for the new technological system.
The erosion of U.S. firms in the telecommunications industry can be directly attributed to the deregulation of industry by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Many firms fought to gain market share, with different mobile standards and carrier plans with different configurations that made it hard for consumers to switch companies. This fragmented market meant that no firm made the necessary investments towards the next generation. It has meant that U.S. firms are at a grave disadvantage when it comes to the next generation of technology.
The rapid advance of Huawei and European firms threatens both U.S. technology firms and the U.S. economy in general. Over the past few decades, the U.S. technology firms have become the main investors in the U.S. economy and are the engines of its growth. If these firms falter before companies such as Huawei, then the U.S. economy will begin to splutter on fumes. Trump’s war against Huawei is not as irrational as it seems. His administration—like others before it—has used as much political pressure as possible to constrain the growth of technology in China. Accusations of theft of intellectual property and of close ties between the firms and the Chinese military are meant to deter customers for Chinese products. These accusations have certainly dented Huawei’s brand, but they are unlikely to destroy Huawei’s ability to expand around the world.
The attack on Huawei, with the U.K. now agreeing with the U.S. that it will not use its products, is a centerpiece of the anxiety over China. Mexico’s candidate for the post of chief of the World Trade Organisation, Jesus Seade, said that he would like to use his job to ease the tension between the U.S. and China. He would like to create a robust “dispute resolution mechanism [which] could help settle U.S.-China trade tensions”. But this misses the point. The tension is not over a lack of mechanisms to settle the dispute, since China and the U.S. have repeatedly spoken together about the differences. The problem is that the U.S. acknowledges that China’s rapid technological growth is a generational threat to the main advantage that the U.S. has had for the past decades, namely its technological superiority. It is to prevent China’s technological ascent that the U.S. has used every mechanism—from diplomatic pressure to military pressure; but none of these seem to be working. China, for now, is resolute. It is unwilling to back down and dismantle its technological gains. No resolution is possible unless there is an acknowledgment of reality: that China is equal to if not more advanced in terms of its technological production than the West, and that is not something that needs to be reversed by warfare.
Tomorrow, a digitally restored version of the 1995 “Shanghai Triad” will be available on Virtual Cinema. For a $10 rental, you get a chance to see a film directed by Zhang Yimou, widely regarded as China’s greatest director.
Set in Shanghai in 1930 and within the triad milieu (drug gangs originating in the Boxer Rebellion), this is not a genre film of the kind that Hong Kong studios routinely churned out in the 60s and 70s. Instead, it is about two characters who have only a tangential relation to the largely secondary gangster characters. One is a 14-year old boy named Shuisheng, whose uncle has brought to Shanghai for a job with the Tang clan. Unlike most mafia movies, the boy is not being trained to be a hitman. Instead, he is a servant to the boss’s mistress Bijou, who treats him like dirt. The gang’s godfather is a Tang, just like Shuisheng and his uncle. Like the Sicilian mafia, family ties go a long way in guaranteeing loyalty.
From: H-Net Staff via H-REVIEW <h-review@...> Date: August 3, 2020 at 1:52:27 PM EDT To: h-review@... Cc: H-Net Staff <revhelp@...> Subject:H-Net Review [H-Buddhism]: Kotyk on Goble, 'Chinese Esoteric Buddhism: Amoghavajra, the Ruling Elite, and the Emergence of a Tradition' Reply-To: h-review@...
Geoffrey C. Goble. Chinese Esoteric Buddhism: Amoghavajra, the Ruling Elite, and the Emergence of a Tradition. The Sheng Yen Series in Chinese Buddhist Studies. New York Columbia University Press, 2019. 336 pp. $69.99 (e-book), ISBN 978-0-231-55064-2; $70.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-231-19408-2.
Reviewed by Jeffrey Kotyk (McMaster University) Published on H-Buddhism (August, 2020) Commissioned by Jessica Zu
In recent years we have seen increasing publications on the topic of Japanese Mikkyō in the English language, but attention to its predecessor in Tang China is especially welcome.[1] The title of Geoffrey C. Goble's book, Chinese Esoteric Buddhism: Amoghavajra, the Ruling Elite, and the Emergence of a Tradition, immediately sparks interest, given the absence of a dedicated monograph on the influential court cleric Amoghavajra from the mid-Tang. Upon reading Chinese Esoteric Buddhism, however, I concluded that it contains a number of indefensible claims and theories that render the main arguments in the book difficult to accept, although at the same time I have to commend the author for his extensive excavation of primary sources in classical Chinese, ranging from Buddhist texts to state chronicles. Many of the problems I will point out below could have been avoided had the author consulted more secondary sources, particularly in Japanese, but the book's bibliography only lists a handful of studies in Japanese and Mandarin Chinese.
One of the key concerns of the book is defining "Esoteric Buddhism." In the synopsis, Goble writes, "The first step in this project is to provide evidence of local recognition of Esoteric Buddhism as a new teaching and to delineate as clearly as possible what that teaching was. This is the subject of the first chapter. We have no evidence that Śubhākarasiṃha was seen as presenting a new teaching and no reliable way of knowing how he presented himself and his Buddhism" (p. 9). This is one of the key arguments of _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_, but one can summon counter evidence against it (see below). Chapter 1 defines "Esoteric Buddhism" as separate from an "esoteric Buddhism" (uppercase versus lowercase _e_), the latter being _dha__̄__raṇi__̄_s (incantations) and spells, while the former is understood as something new to China and in particular established by Amoghavajra.
Does Goble's key apparatus for defining Esoteric Buddhism hold up? I do not believe it does. Contrary to what Goble claims, we actually do have evidence that a Mantric tradition was, in fact, regarded as a new and innovative teaching even before Śubhākarasiṃha. Several of the following points were already explained in Yoritomi Motohiro's work, which does not appear in Goble's bibliography.[2]
The _Tuoluoni ji jing_ 陀羅尼集經, translated by Atikūṭa 阿地瞿多 in 654, describes the consecration of a ritual space and the initiation of disciples in the "Secret Dharma Depository of the Buddhas" (_zhufo mimi fazang_ 諸佛祕密法藏). This would refer to a _ma__ṇḍ__ala_ (sacred ritual space) and the accompanying _abhi__ṣ__eka _(consecration). The ritual process uses a _vajra_ (T 901, 18: 813c19-814c23). Moreover, Zhisheng 智昇 (669-740) in 730 reported that Atikūṭa "established a Universal Altar for Dhāraṇīs 建陀羅尼普集會壇" (T 2154, 55: 562c15). This was, I believe, unprecedented in Chinese history and would have been recognized as a new model of Buddhist practice.
Moving ahead a few decades, Chinese monks in India were exposed to the new Mantric practices. Although on page 19, Goble notes that the Chinese monk Wuxing 無行 (b. 630) had been responsible for the transmission of several key texts back to China, another essential item of interest related to Wuxing is the letter he sent to the Chinese court, which Goble does not mention. The letter was brought to Japan by Ennin 圓仁 (794-864) (南荊州沙門無行在天竺國致於唐國書一卷; T 2167, 55: 1086c22). Only a few lines of this letter are extant. One important line is preserved in the _Shingon shūkyō jigi_ 眞言宗教時義 by Annen 安然 (841-915?). The extant line from Wuxing's letter reads, "Recently the new Mantra teachings have become revered in the country [India] 近者新有眞言教法擧國崇仰" (T 2396, 75: 421a11). Yijing 義淨 (635-713), who visited Southeast Asia and India between 671 and 695, also reported that the Vidyādharapiṭaka (_zhou zang_ 呪藏), in other words, the canon of _dhāra__ṇ__ī_s or _mantra_s, had not yet spread eastward to China (呪藏東夏未流). Yijing himself had repeatedly entered the _tanchang_ 壇場 (here referring to the ritual space or _ma__ṇḍ__ala_) at Nālanda intent on acquiring this practice, but his merit was insufficient (淨於那爛陀亦屢入壇場希心此要而為功不並就; T 2066, 51: 7a9-12). These accounts prove that the Chinese were already aware of an innovative new _approach_ to Buddhist practice centered on _mantra_s, which clearly required some sort of authorization or initiation.
An important part of _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_ is its treatment of Amoghavajra's predecessors. Goble addresses the careers and roles of Śubhākarasiṃha, Yixing, and Vajrabodhi in the introduction. Goble argues, with regard to Śubhākarasiṃha, that we have "no reliable way of knowing how he presented himself and his Buddhism. We only have access to others' representations. In sources produced prior to 755, Śubhākarasiṃha is identified as transmitting the _dhāra__ṇ__ī_ teaching rather than something new in his scriptural translations" (p. 9). This is an erroneous assertion for the simple fact that we have the commentary to the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_, which was compiled and expanded on by Yixing based on the oral testimony of Śubhākarasiṃha. Goble, however, rejects this authorship: "All told, evidence suggests that the _Commentary_ postdates the lives of Śubhākarasiṃha and Yixing and is possibly a Japanese product" (pp. 19-20).
Some remarks about the authorship of the commentary were voiced by Osabe Kazuo 長部和雄 (b. 1907) as early as 1944. He also wrote an article in 1954 expressing doubts about Yixing's involvement in the text in question (this does not mean it was a Japanese composition however). Osabe should have been cited (especially his monograph on Yixing) but was not, although later scholars in Japan have generally _not_ accepted Osabe's proposal. Excellent recent studies on the commentary in its various recensions include those by Kameyama Takahiko, Shimizu Akisumi, and Mano Shinya.[3] These scholars discuss the complex factors underlying the production and transmission of multiple recensions of the commentary (the two main versions in use by scholars are T 1796 and X 438).
Goble's argument against the traditionally attributed authorship of the commentary is easily refuted with reference to the commentary itself and other Chinese and Japanese sources. I present five points that contest Goble's argument. First, the sub-commentary in the _Yiqie jing yinyi_ 一切經音義 by Amoghavajra's disciple Huilin 慧琳 (737-820), produced in 807, cites the commentary with the abbreviated title _Yiji _義記, noting it was produced by Yixing. This abbreviated title likely stems from _Dapiluzhena jing yiji_ 大毘盧遮那經義記, which is an attested title in Annen's catalog, the _Sho ajari shingon mikkyō burui sōroku_ 諸阿闍梨眞言密教部類總録 (T 2756, 55: 1114c24-26) from the year 902. Annen also noted this work was "expounded by Śubhākarasiṃha and recorded by Yixing 無畏釋一行記" (T 2176, 55: 1114c24). This only demonstrates the traditional position that this commentary was orally explained by Śubhākarasiṃha at first and then Yixing added further material on the basis of this. Huilin's definition of the term _mānava_ 摩納婆 was clearly derived from the commentary (compare T 2128, 54: 353b23-c1 and T 1796, 39: 594a27-b5). Huilin clearly had the commentary in his possession in the year 807 in China.
Second, Yixing's own theory of fixed and averaged New Moons is actually incorporated into the commentary in the section on astrology and calendrical conventions. I have discussed this section of the commentary and Yixing's theory in a past study.[4] If the commentary were a Japanese composition, as Goble suggests it could be, the author(s) would have had to be familiar with the astronomical theory of Yixing. This seems unlikely because his calendar, the _Dayan li_ 大衍暦, would _not_ have been accessible to monastics in China and Japan. Furthermore, the commentary translates twelve zodiacs as _shi'er fang_ 十二房 (twelve chambers) (T 1796, 39: 618a8). If the commentary were produced during or after Amoghavajra's time, especially by a Japanese hand, we would expect to see the more conventionally established terms _shi'er gong_ 十二宮 (twelve palaces) or _sh'er wei_ 十二位 (twelve places).
Third, the _Taizō engi_ 胎藏緣起, which is attributed to Saichō 最澄 (767-822), mentions the production of the commentary: Yixing "frequently consulted with Tripiṭaka Master Śubhākarasiṃha. [They] translated the Sanskrit of the _Vairocana-sūtra_ into a Chinese text, altogether seven fascicles, which was then transmitted into the world, while also producing a commentary on the meanings [of the text] 每於無畏三藏所諮, 毗盧遮那經, 自譯梵文以爲漢典凡七卷, 見傳於世,兼為疏義." The _Ryaku fuhō den_ 略付法傳 by Kūkai 空海 (774-835), however, only mentions the translation but not the commentary.[5]
Fourth, the _Liangbu dafa xiangcheng shizi fufa ji_ 兩部大法相承師資付法記 by Haiyun 海雲 in 834 records that Yixing produced a commentary to the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ in seven fascicles, which later were arranged as fourteen (T 2081, 51: 786c17-18). Fifth, Annen (T 2176, 55: 1114c24) recorded that a commentary to the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ (大毘盧遮那經義記十卷) was brought to Japan by Genbō 玄昉 (d. 746). Genbō stayed in China between 716 and 735. Unless Annen's records were fraudulent, it is clear that Genbō returned with one version of the commentary. Genbō's dates in China overlap with the careers of Śubhākarasiṃha and Yixing in the capital. Genbō was actually in China when the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ and its commentary were produced.
As the research of various Japanese scholars shows, there were some emendations and edits to the commentary in China after Yixing's time, but the bulk of the work dates back to Yixing and Śubhākarasiṃha.[6] Moreover, looking at the two main recensions of this commentary that are commonly used today (T 1796 and X 438), we see lines that commence with "the _ācārya_ states ..." (阿闍梨云; T 1796, 39: 579c10), which is likely Śubhākarasiṃha's own voice, albeit translated into Chinese. In fact, although Yixing is normally credited with the authorship of the commentary, and indeed it is a fact he clearly edited and added material, it seems that Yixing built up from Śubhākarasiṃha's oral commentary. An item listed in the _Gishaku mokuroku_ 義釋目錄 by the Japanese monk Enchin 圓珍 (814-91) includes a certain _Fanben Piluzhena chengfo jing chaoji_ 梵本毗盧遮那成佛經抄記 (X 438, 23: 299b21), which is not extant, but this appears to have been notes for the Sanskrit _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_. Yixing and Śubhākarasiṃha had together translated said text in 724, so undoubtedly these notes were likely recorded from Śubhākarasiṃha. Yixing, we can imagine, incorporated these into the commentary, as seems to have been the case. Furthermore, the commentary on the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ deals with many more topics than only the _dhāra__ṇ__ī_ teachings--in fact, it explains _abhi__ṣ__eka_ and the creation of a _ma__ṇḍ__ala_, which leads me to wonder why Goble claims that "in sources produced prior to 755, Śubhākarasiṃha is identified as transmitting the _dhāra__ṇ__ī_ teaching rather than something new in his scriptural translations" (p. 9).
The above points can only lead one to conclude that Goble's challenge to the traditionally attributed authorship of the commentary to the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ is indefensible and moreover constitutes a fatal flaw in his analysis of Śubhākarasiṃha and Yixing. To suggest that the commentary "is possibly a Japanese product" is misleading and wrong. I shared Goble's idea with Shingon and Tendai monks, who agreed that such a proposal was unreasonable. One remarked that Kūkai brought back a copy of the commentary in 806, which in Kūkai's catalog is also attributed to Yixing (T 2161, 55: 1064a8). My colleague further noted that Kūkai repeatedly quoted from the commentary throughout his writings.
Moving on, Goble argues, "In China, Śubhākarasiṃha's texts were not conceived as a distinct or new teaching during his own lifetime" (p. 20). The _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_, however, explains that attainment of full awakening is possible within a single life, which is entirely unlike earlier Mahāyāna texts, in which the path to full buddhahood takes immeasurable lifetimes along the ten _bhūmi_s of a bodhisattva's career. The relevant line in the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ reads, "Moreover, he manifested the appearances of _vajradharas_, and the bodhisattvas Samantabhadra and Padmapāṇi, and proclaimed throughout the ten directions the pure-worded Dharma of the Mantra path: that the stages from the first generation of [_bodhi_-]_citta_ up to tenth [can be] progressively fulfilled in this lifetime 又現執金剛普賢蓮華手菩薩等像貌, 普於十方, 宣說真言道清淨句法, 所謂初發心乃至十地, 次第此生滿足" (T 848, 18: 1b2-4).
This idea is further elaborated in the commentary as follows: "The gate into the entry of Mantra generally includes three items. The first is the gate related to the mysteries of body. The second is the gate related to mysteries of speech. The third is the gate related to mysteries of mind. These matters will be broadly discussed below. The practitioner purifies their three karmas through these three means. It is by being empowered [*_adhi__ṣṭ__h__ā__na_] with the three mysteries of the Tathāgata that it is possible to fulfill the _bhūmi_s and _pāramitā_s in this lifetime, and not further pass through numbers of kalpas 入真言門略有三事, 一者身密門, 二者語密門, 三者心密門. 是事下當廣說. 行者以此三方便, 自淨三業, 即為如來三密之所加持, 乃至能於此生滿足地波羅密, 不復經歷劫數" (T 1796, 39: 579b27-c2).[7] This would have been a revolutionary new concept to Chinese Buddhists, especially when it was linked to the mysteries of body, speech, and mind. Śubhākarasiṃha's translation was arguably novel in China, since it explained this concept of buddhahood within one lifetime.
I am compelled to challenge Goble's claim that Śubhākarasiṃha and Vajrabodhi "seem to have had little if any effect on the conception of Buddhism in China, likely due to the relative paucity of their scriptural contributions to the Chinese Buddhist canon" (p. 29). The foundations of Buddhist Mantrayāna in East Asia were, in reality, established by these two monks and then further developed by Amoghavajra. Śubhākarasiṃha and Vajrabodhi introduced lineages of _abhi__ṣ__eka_ (initiations) and also new iconographical forms via _ma__ṇḍ__ala_s. These two practices alone altered the face of Chinese Buddhism. The pantheon of deities and other figures who accompanied the _ma__ṇḍ__ala_s were greatly influential within Chinese Buddhist art history. The iconography these two monks introduced ought to also have been addressed by Goble. These icons were preserved in Japan in various documents, such as the _Taizō zuzō_ 胎藏圖象 (_Taishō zuzō_ vol. 2: 191-328) and _Taizō kuzuyō_ 胎藏舊圖樣 (_Taishō zuzō_ vol. 2: 477-566), for example. From the perspective of art history, it is unreasonable to argue that Śubhākarasiṃha or Vajrabodhi had "little if any effect on the conception of Buddhism in China," since from the extant literature and iconography, it is patently clear that this is untrue.
Moving further into the study, Goble suggests that "it is difficult not to see Emperor Xuanzong's interest in Vajrabodhi--like Emperor Taizong's interest in Xuanzang--as predicated on the intelligence concerning foreign kingdoms that the monk could provide" (p. 29). Taizong's interest in Xuanzang was complex and not limited to an interest in Xuanzang's knowledge of foreign countries. The utility of gaining popular Buddhist support through sponsoring translations during a critical time in his reign was more likely Taizong's actual interest. A lot of the assumptions about Taizong's relationship to Xuanzang are based on questionable hagiographical evidence.[8] Similarly, in my opinion, it is more reasonable to argue that Vajrabodhi and his monastic contemporaries were regarded by Xuanzong's court as valuable members of the sangha. There would have been far superior methods to acquire intelligence on foreign powers than relying on foreign monks, and a survey of the dynastic histories and various state compendia show that; in fact, state authors seldom seriously consulted Buddhist sources. For instance, the encyclopedic _Tong dian_ 通典 (fasc. 193) compiled in 801 by Du You 杜佑 (735-812) has a line in the sub-commentary on the section on India that states, "Authors record the affairs of India, with many records of monks. One suspects that the popular records of Faming and Dao'an are all fantastical and unreliable, so they are not recompiled [here] 諸家紀天竺國事, 多錄諸僧, 法明道安之流傳記, 疑皆恢誕不經, 不復悉纂也." For these reasons, I think the statement that Amoghavajra acted as an unofficial intelligence agent "according to an established role for Buddhist monks in the Tang period" is also problematic (p. 37).
On page 45, Goble argues, "Although the _Account of Conduct_ passage suggests that Vajrabodhi possessed and transmitted the _Great Vairocana Scripture _to Amoghavajra, there is no other evidence that Vajrabodhi emphasized or was aware of this text." This is another puzzling statement, since Japanese Buddhism traditionally teaches otherwise. Haiyun explained that Vajrabodhi knew that Śubhākarasiṃha understood the teachings of Mahāvairocana and subsequently sought teachings from him (T 2081, 51: 784a5-10). There is clearly evidence to support the idea that Vajrabodhi was aware of the _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_ and was initiated into it. If Goble disputes this, then he ought to have provided reasoning why.
_Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_ is primarily concerned with Amoghavajra. The background biographical information is sufficient but could have included a critical discussion of the Buddhist sources that we possess to reconstruct the life of Amoghavajra, as well as their potential shortcomings as hagiographies but such philological excavations of primary sources are not a feature in the book.
Buddhist hagiographies and state records can be at odds with each other in Chinese history, so reconstructing the life of a monk is no simple task. One can also carefully use Japanese materials as additional references, such as the aforementioned _Ryaku fuhō den_ in the case of Amoghavajra. Fascicle 52 of the _Cefu yuangui_ 冊府元龜--completed in 1013 by Wang Qinruo 王欽若 (962-1025) and Yang Yi 楊億 (974-1020)--is another important source. In this voluminous work, which is now digitized and searchable on CTEXT and Wikisource, we see some references to Amoghavajra. This fascicle in particular includes a memorial penned by Amoghavajra in which he reviews his own long career. A eulogy of Amoghavajra is also included in this fascicle. These documents would have been worth bringing into the wider study.
Chapter 2 discusses Amoghavajra's rise to influence in relation to the rites of the Tang "imperial religion." This is not an emic category (that is, Chinese did not have an equivalent term such as this, nor did they think of their country as an "empire"). As part of this discussion, Goble introduces the specific ritual for the winter solstice, citing the _Jiu Tang shu _舊唐書 (JTS 21.820). He states that "the twelve zodiacal constellations" were enshrined on the altar, which sparked my interest, since I did not think that the zodiacal deities were incorporated into the state rituals at this point in Chinese history (the zodiac signs--Aries, Taurus, etc.--originated in Mesopotamia and were initially transmitted into China via Buddhism) (p. 62). However, upon reading the original source, I did not see any reference to zodiacal signs or constellations but only to the twenty-eight lunar stations (_ershiba xiu_ 二十八宿). Goble also mentions Tianyi 天一 and Taiyi 太一, but I do not see these in the original Chinese text. This sort of imaginative or otherwise defective interpretation of the primary source is misleading.
Chapter 3 discusses Esoteric Buddhism and warfare, topics with which Amoghavajra was evidently familiar. Here we find extensive documentation of ritual forms used in the Tang military, including Buddhist and Daoist sources that are connected to Amoghavajra. Extensive details are provided for this topic. Goble argues that "Amoghavajra's meteoric ascent was largely the result of two essential and related factors" (p. 95). He cites the An Lushan rebellion and Amoghavajra's subjugation rituals with which he was believed to subdue and kill enemies. Although many details are given to argue for these two points, I would argue that it was not strictly Amoghavajra's abilities in spellcraft that facilitated his rise in elite society. Amoghavajra's career during this period included other activities, most notable was his compilation and formulation of Indian astrology for implementation within a Chinese environment. The relevant text in question is listed in the bibliography of _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_ as _Wenshushili pusa jizhu xiansuo shuo jixiong shiri shan'e suyao jing_ 文殊師利菩薩及諸仙所說吉凶時日善惡宿曜經 (T 1299), but 宿 (lunar lodge or constellation) is _xiu_ and not _su_ (in other words, _Xiuyao jing_, not _Suyao jing_). Goble does not seem to discuss this text in his book, despite its professional and political significance in Amoghavajra's life. This text was first drafted in 759, with a subsequent revision in 764. These were the years that Amoghavajra's career as a court cleric flourished. We should note that the edition of the _Xiuyao jing_ in the Taishō canon is not the original version produced by Amoghavajra. The main body of the text also defers to Indian or Sino-Indian astronomers resident in the capital, namely, the Kāśyapa and Gautama families, and the monk Kumāra[9]. In light of these facts, to suggest Amoghavajra rose to prominence on a wave of violent magic unduly modifies his image toward that angle. Amoghavajra was also involved in astrology and astronomy to some extent.
Goble argues that "in Esoteric Buddhism, standard ethical proscriptions and prescriptions for both monastic Buddhists and lay practitioners were effectively subordinated to an ethic of power" (p. 128). This ethical flexibility described here was not necessarily an innovation of Amoghavajra. We can point to the work of the Huayan patriarch Fazang 法藏 (643-712), namely, his commentary on the bodhisattva precepts: _Fanwangjing pusa jieben shu_ 梵網經菩薩戒本疏 (T 1813). Fazang often cited the _Yogācārabhūmi_ 瑜伽論 (T 1579), which gives the bodhisattva a great deal of ethical flexibility to carry out acts of theft and even homicide if circumstances permit. Such acts performed out of compassion generate merit according to said text (T 1579, 30: 517b6-17). Fazang's commentary allows for the production of weapons and subduing of unruly sentient beings (T 1813, 40: 639b5-9). In light of this, the argument that Amoghavajra's system of Buddhism was subordinated to an ethic of power appears overstated and not entirely justified.
This sets the stage for chapter 4, which deals with Amoghavajra's relationships with various elite figures, including the emperors and other prominent men. Goble goes into great detail about the changes the Tang government saw during the years of Amoghavajra's career. He also outlines biographical details of the people with whom Amoghavajra interacted, with reference to the dynastic histories and other sources. Chapter 5 addresses the institutional establishment of Esoteric Buddhism. Goble asserts an argument made throughout earlier chapters, that "Amoghavajra represented his teaching as a new teaching, one that was not known in China until he transmitted what he had received in southern India" (p. 174). Chapter 6 of _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_ explores the legacy of Amoghavajra. This chapter also extends into discussions of how Zanning 贊寧 (920-1001) in particular shaped contemporary and also modern understandings of Amoghavajra and his Esoteric Buddhism.
Goble gives different titles of texts in translation. For instance, _Great Vairocana_ (p. 2), _Mahāvairocana_ (p. 3), and _Great Vairocana Scripture_ (p. 18) for _Dari jing _大日經 (on page 45 this is literally translated as _Great Sun Scripture_), but a more sensible approach would be to consistently use an attested Sanskrit title of the work in question, such as that given in the fragments explored by Matsunaga Yūkei in 1966, and also recently used by Kanō Kazuo: namely, _Vairocanābhisa__ṃ__bodhi_.[10] We also see typographical errors throughout the book, which are too numerous to list here. Goble mentions in passing "the deity Vinayaka (_pinayajia tian_ 毘那夜迦天) or Vinayaka Gānapati (_pinayajia enabodi_ 毘那夜迦誐那缽底), the esoteric Gaṇeśa" (p. 186). It should be Vināyaka and Gaṇapati respectively. More care with Sanskrit names would have been desirable (especially now that Monier-Williams is digitized).
To sum up, I believe that _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_ offers extensive biographical details regarding Amoghavajra's life and career, as well as those religiously or professionally connected to him, and all this is indeed valuable, but this monograph suffers from a number of problems. In light of what I have outlined above, I cannot recommend _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism_. The definitive study on Amoghavajra remains to be written.
Notes
[1]. I must thank Joseph P. Elacqua and Jayarava Attwood for their comments regarding this review. I must also thank my colleagues from Shingon and Tendai who shared their views.
[2]. Yoritomi Motohiro 頼富本宏, "Mikkyō no kakuritsu" 密教の確立, in _Indo mikkyō_ インド密教, ed. Tachikawa Musashi 立川武蔵 and Yoritomi Motohiro (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1999), 32-56.
[3]. Osabe Kazuo 長部和雄, "Ichigyō Zenji no kenkyū" 一行禪師の研究, _Mikkyō kenkyū_ 密教研究 87 (1944): 21-39; Osabe Kazuo, "_Dainichikyō_ _sho_ no sensha to _Gishaku_ no zaijisha ni kansuru gimon" 大日經疏の撰者と義釋の再治者に關する疑問, _Mikkyō bunka_ 密教文化 27 (1954): 40-47; Osabe Kazuo, _Ichigyō Zenji no kenkyū_ 一行禪師の研究 (Kobe: Kōbe Shōka Daigaku Keizai Kenkyūsho, 1963); Kameyama Takahiko 龜山隆彦, "_Dainichikyō sho_ ni okeru senryakushaku shinpishaku ni tsuite"『大日經疏』における淺略釋・深秘釋について, _Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū_ 印度學佛教學研究 56, no. 1 (2007): 169-72; Shimizu Akisumi 清水明澄, "Tōdo ni okeru _Dainichikyō_ chūshakusho no seiritsu katei: Onkojo wo chūshin toshite" 唐土における『大日經』注釋書の成立過程:『温古序』を中心として, _Mikkyō bunka_ 密教文化 221 (2008): 49-72; and Mano Shinya 真野新也, "Kanyaku _Dainichi-kyō_ chūshakusho no seiritsu ni kansuru kōsatsu: Kyōten kanyaku tono kankei kara" 漢訳『大日経』註釈書の成立に関する考察 : 経典漢訳との関係から, _Ronsō Ajia no bunka to shisō_ 論叢アジアの文化と思想 25 (2016): 34-121.
[4]. Jeffrey Kotyk, "Early Tantric Hemerology in Chinese Buddhism: Timing of Rituals according to Śubhakarasiṃha and Yixing," _Canadian Journal of Buddhist Studies_ 13 (2018): 12-13.
[6]. See discussion of extant texts in Shimizu, "Tōdo ni okeru _Dainichikyō_ chūshakusho no seiritsu katei," 55.
[7]. Quoted from Kotyk, "Early Tantric Hemerology in Chinese Buddhism," 2n1.
[8]. I critically discuss Xuanzang's relationship with Taizong in my recent study: Jeffrey Kotyk, "Chinese State and Buddhist Historical Sources on Xuanzang: Historicity and the _Daci'en si sanzang fashi zhuan_ 大慈恩寺三藏法師傳," _T'oung Pao_ 通報 105 (2019): 531-35.
[10]. Matsunaga Yūkei 松長有慶, "_Dainichi-kyō_ no bonbun danpen ni tsuite" 大日經の梵文斷編について, _Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū_ 印度學佛教學研究 14, no. 2 (1966): 855; and Kanō Kazuo, "Vairocanābhisaṃbodhi," in _Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism_, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan A. Silk (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 382-89.
Citation: Jeffrey Kotyk. Review of Goble, Geoffrey C., _Chinese Esoteric Buddhism: Amoghavajra, the Ruling Elite, and the Emergence of a Tradition_. H-Buddhism, H-Net Reviews. August, 2020. URL: https://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=55284
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.
NY Times, August 3, 2020 These Remarks Might Get a Police Chief Fired. Not in New York.
The police commissioner’s pointed criticism — and the fact that he still has his job — speaks to the mayor’s fraught relationship with the Police Department.
Police Commissioner Dermot F. Shea, right, shown with a Brooklyn church leader in early June, was selected, the mayor said, because he is a “proven change agent.”Credit...Demetrius Freeman for The New York Times
The criticism of Mayor Bill de Blasio’s law enforcement policies was stinging.
A law banning the use of chokeholds and similar types of restraints by police officers was “insane.” Agreeing to cut the Police Department budget was a “bow to mob rule.” Those who failed to “stand up for what’s right” were “cowards.”
But the outspoken critic was not a rival of the mayor’s or one of the candidates vying to succeed him. It was Dermot F. Shea, Mr. de Blasio’s own police commissioner, a trusted ally who went rogue in media interviews and in a private address to police brass.
The commissioner’s comments — and the fact that he still has his job — speak to the deeply fraught relationship that Mr. de Blasio has maintained with the Police Department throughout his tenure.
Mr. de Blasio has made racial justice and an overhaul of police practices central to his political brand, from his initial mayoral campaign in 2013 to his brief candidacy for president last year.But as mayor, Mr. de Blasio has often shown surprising deference to his police commissioners — three Irish-American veterans of the department — adopting a hands-off approach that affords the commissioners an unusual amount of leeway.The mayor’s approach has frustrated advocacy groups that favor broad changes to policing in New York and that contend he is not doing enough to hold the police accountable, especially after a wave of Black Lives Matter protests. Some are calling for Commissioner Shea to resign or be removed, but the mayor has dismissed those suggestions amid a recentspike in violence in the city.A video that surfaced last week that showed officers pulling a protester into an unmarked van — evoking the practices of aggressive federal agents in Portland, Ore. — intensified the backlash against the police.
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After a video depicted New York police officers arresting a protester and throwing her in an unmarked van on Tuesday, Mayor Bill de Blasio said it was the “wrong time and the wrong place” to make such an arrest.Credit...@Naddleez on Twitter via Reuters
The Police Department said in a statement that the protester had been taken into custody by officers from the warrant squad in connection with “damaging police cameras during five separate criminal incidents in and around City Hall Park.”
Mr. de Blasio said that it was “the wrong time and the wrong place” to make that arrest, and that any scenes similar to Portland were “troubling.” The mayor said he would talk to Commissioner Shea about “a better way to get that done,” though he said destroying police property was not acceptable.
In cities like Atlanta and Louisville, Ky., police chiefs have lost their jobs after episodes of police violence in the wake of protests over the death of George Floyd in Minneapolis. But Commissioner Shea’s job security seems far more assured.
“I’ve been very clear about my faith in Commissioner Shea,” Mr. de Blasio said at a recent news conference. “I have known him over these whole seven years of the administration, and I’ve seen what he can do.”
On Monday, the mayor again praised Commissioner Shea after a violent weekend in the city, saying: “There’s no doubt in my mind he will succeed” in bringing crime down.
All of Mr. de Blasio’s police chiefs have been acolytes of his first commissioner, William J. Bratton, who became a policing celebrity in the 1990s for his “broken windows” approach to fighting crime. The second commissioner, James P. O’Neill, was a protégé of Mr. Bratton’s, and offered continuity, as has Commissioner Shea, known for overseeing the data-driven Compstat program.
Mr. de Blasio kept going back to the Bratton orbit because the results were good, said Chuck Wexler, executive director of the Police Executive Research Forum, a law enforcement policy nonprofit.
“Crime has continued to go down, and people were generally satisfied,” Mr. Wexler said. “If you’re de Blasio, you’re like, ‘Why would I make a dramatic change?’”
Still, the mayor’s opponents say it took far too long to fire Daniel Pantaleo, the officer whose chokehold led to Eric Garner’s death in 2014, and argue that the mayor was too slow to fix a process that allowed officers’ disciplinary records to remain secret under a state measure known as 50-a.
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The mayor has been criticized for not taking a more active stance against Daniel Pantaleo, the police officer whose chokehold led to the death of Eric Garner in 2014.Credit...Byron Smith for The New York Times
Policing has been a persistently thorny issue for Mr. de Blasio, emerging early in his tenure. His election in 2013 was fueled in part by his opposition to the stop-and-frisk policies under Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, along with a television ad starring Mr. de Blasio’s son, Dante, who is Black and pledged that his father would end the discriminatory policing practice.
Late in Mr. de Blasio’s first year as mayor, a Staten Island grand jury refused to bring charges against Mr. Pantaleo. The mayor chose not to criticize the decision, disappointing many of his supporters. But in his response, he also angered the police rank and file when he disclosed that he had urged his son to take special precautions when dealing with police officers.
The police unions accused Mr. de Blasio of creating an anti-police environment, which they said contributed to the fatal shootings of two police officers in December 2014. Officers turned their backs on the mayor at the men’s funerals.
Since then, the mayor has been careful in trying not to alienate the police, and that could be one reason he gives so much independence to his police commissioners.
Black leaders have repeatedly called on Mr. de Blasio to select a commissioner who is a person of color. Yet last year, he passed over Benjamin Tucker, who was the second-highest-ranking police leader and is Black, in favor of Commissioner Shea.
This brings to mind Alex Cockburn's review of Perlstein's earlier book NIXONLAND in New Left Review 53, Sept-Oct 2008:
The purpose of Rick Perlstein’s insufferably long book is laid out on its first page: to explain how ‘the battle lines that define our culture and politics’ were set between Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory of 1964 and Richard Nixon’s mirror victory in 1972. Across its 800-plus pages, it pro- vides a ponderous chronicle of the eight years supposedly responsible for today’s Red–Blue polarization, with Nixon appearing as both emblem of the transformation and chief culprit. ‘What Richard Nixon left behind was the very terms of our national self-image: a notion that there are two kinds of Americans’—on the one hand the ‘Silent Majority . . . the middle-class, middle American, suburban, exurban and rural coalition’, designated by Perlstein in the end as Republicans; on the other ‘the “liberals”, the “cosmopolitans”, the “intellectuals”, the “professionals”—“Democrats”’. Perlstein is frequently cited these days by middlebrow political commentators in the US as someone with his finger supposedly on the pulse of history... Perlstein reserves his own rhetorical venom for radicals, portrayed as the inspirational villains who enabled the creation of Nixonland. The book displays a consistent dislike of leftists, casting them as culpable provocateurs of right-wing backlash or scooting past them with a quick glance, when not omitting them altogether.
A determination to drop them down history’s oubliette would explain Perlstein’s extraordinary and otherwise baffling omission from his vast bibliography of Andrew Kopkind, by far the best journalist the American left produced in the 60s and 70s, and one who wrote many brilliant essays precisely on Perlstein’s themes. But Kopkind was a genuine radical, unlike Perlstein or the writers Perlstein cites as his heroes. Paul Cowan, for example, a colleague of mine in the 1970s at the Village Voice, scuttled away from radicalism as quickly as other Voice journalists of that period like Clark Whelton, who later became a speechwriter for Mayor Ed Koch... What united all these writers was hostility towards any political stance indicating active sympathy and support for Third or Second World opposition to the American empire. A regular contributor to the New Republic and Salon websites, Perlstein is no loose cannon on the ideological deck. His writing never betrays the faintest hint of heterodoxy. His differences with the Right are tactfully expressed and his judgements mostly genteel. Like the editor of the Nation, he wrote warmly about the late William Buckley Jr after the passing of that apex swine. On the other hand, Perlstein’s hostility to the radical or socialist Left extends beyond the pages of Nixonland: a recent interview with the libertarian periodical Reason referred to the ‘juvenile and destructive Abbie Hoffman’. (The tone mellows instantly when Perlstein moves on to George Wallace: ‘there was a genuine economic populism in a lot of what Wallace said.’)... The political mission of Nixonland is pretty clearly to set the stage for a candidate of liberal consensus and healing, who has since happily materialized in Barack Obama.