Date   

Re: General Comment

Anthony Boynton
 

Great. Let's move on to some substantive issues. I am waiting for all of the contributors to this contribution to make some contributions. 

Anthony

On Tue, Aug 16, 2022 at 10:59 PM Mark Lause <markalause@...> wrote:
Hear hear.  And the gravestone political crisis of our lifetime.

On Tue, Aug 16, 2022, 10:27 PM Andrew Stewart <hasc.warrior.stew@...> wrote:
It really is regrettable that we have been hogging most of the bandwidth for matters that, in the grand scheme of things, are utterly meaningless. 99% of the arguments and polemics are devoted to grandstanding on things that people have absolutely ZERO impact upon, be it a foreign policy matter or minutiae from 20th century sectarian debates or whatever else. All philosophical interpretations...

Meanwhile, we are living through one of the greatest upsurges of labor militancy in DECADES! Where are the threads discussing building interstate solidarity movements with Amazon and Starbucks workers? Louis would have loved to see that.

Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.


Re: General Comment

Mark Lause
 

Hear hear.  And the gravestone political crisis of our lifetime.


On Tue, Aug 16, 2022, 10:27 PM Andrew Stewart <hasc.warrior.stew@...> wrote:
It really is regrettable that we have been hogging most of the bandwidth for matters that, in the grand scheme of things, are utterly meaningless. 99% of the arguments and polemics are devoted to grandstanding on things that people have absolutely ZERO impact upon, be it a foreign policy matter or minutiae from 20th century sectarian debates or whatever else. All philosophical interpretations...

Meanwhile, we are living through one of the greatest upsurges of labor militancy in DECADES! Where are the threads discussing building interstate solidarity movements with Amazon and Starbucks workers? Louis would have loved to see that.

Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.


Re: General Comment

Andrew Stewart
 

It really is regrettable that we have been hogging most of the bandwidth for matters that, in the grand scheme of things, are utterly meaningless. 99% of the arguments and polemics are devoted to grandstanding on things that people have absolutely ZERO impact upon, be it a foreign policy matter or minutiae from 20th century sectarian debates or whatever else. All philosophical interpretations...

Meanwhile, we are living through one of the greatest upsurges of labor militancy in DECADES! Where are the threads discussing building interstate solidarity movements with Amazon and Starbucks workers? Louis would have loved to see that.

Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.


Re: What is the Relevance of the Russian Revolution Today? A debate

Dayne Goodwin
 

Kautsky, Lenin, Stalin and revolutionary Russia
by Paul Le Blanc, International Viewpoint, August 11
https://internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article7772

Stalin: Passage to Revolution, by Ronald Grigor Suny. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. 857 pages. $39.95 hard cover

Revolutionary Social Democracy: Working-Class Politics Across the Russian Empire (1882-1917) by Eric Blanc. Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2022. 455 pages. $36.00 paperback

Marx once commented: "Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it." Less mature activists prefer the posture of changing the world over the hard work of understanding it, but as the young Marx also thundered: “Ignorance never did any one any good!"

Inseparable from any serious commitment to changing the world for the better is an understanding – an “interpretation” – of the world. Particularly useful to revolutionary activists are disciplined and informative interpretations of previous efforts to change the world. The Russian Revolution of 1917 has, therefore, long been a focal-point for revolutionary activists. Two cutting-edge interpretations from U.S. Marxist scholars – Ronald Suny and Eric Blanc – have recently appeared, providing important insights for scholars and activists alike.
  .  .  .


On Mon, Aug 15, 2022 at 8:41 PM Dayne Goodwin via groups.io <daynegoodwin=gmail.com@groups.io> wrote:
debate between Kshama Sawant and Eric Blanc, on the relevance of the Russian Revolution Today.
Bhaskar Sunkara moderator, Haymarket Books sponsor, July 27
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=64UjVAoWwGs
_._,_._,_


Re: Foreign affairs analysis of Ukraine war

Michael Yates
 

The think tank is the Council on Foreign Affairs. Founded by David Rockefeller and friends in the early 1920s. The best book about it is by Laurence Shoup, Wall Street's Think Tank, Monthly Review Press. They have a critical role in the formation of US foreign policy, even under Trump. Needless to say, US foreign policy is imperialist to the core. Why the CFR would be an objective analyst of the war in Ukraine escapes me. It might be. Who knows. But their main concern is US power, not the plight of Ukrainians. 


Re: NYT: Sri Lanka Collapsed First, but It Won’t Be the Last

David Walters
 

ModPost: Walter, stop with your trolling. You opening statement is throwing mud. Do and again and you are on moderation.

David


Sri Lanka: the canary in the coal mine (Eric Toussaint/Balasingham Skanthakumar)

Chris Slee
 

 



Sri Lanka’s acute economic crisis and sovereign debt default, along with its people’s uprising in 2022, has drawn attention across the world. It is described as the ‘canary in the coal mine’, that is, a harbinger of the likely future for other global south countries. Eric Toussaint, spokesperson for the Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt (CADTM) interviewed via email Colombo-based Balasingham Skanthakumar of the Social Scientists’ Association of Sri Lanka and the CADTM’s South Asia network. The responses in draft were improved by Amali Wedagedera’s review and finalized on 5th August.


NYT: Sri Lanka Collapsed First, but It Won’t Be the Last

Walter Lippmann <walterlx@...>
 

This post is dedicated to our Sino-phobes:

THE NEW YORK TIMES

Sri Lanka Collapsed First, but It Won’t Be the Last

EXCERPT: The Western media accuses China of luring us into a debt trap. Tucker Carlson says environmental, social and corporate governance programs killed us. Everybody blames the Rajapaksas, the corrupt political dynasty that ruled us until massive protests by angry Sri Lankans chased them out last month.  

But from where I’m standing, ultimate blame lies with the Western-dominated neoliberal system that keeps developing countries in a form of debt-fueled colonization. The system is in crisis, its shaky foundations exposed by the tumbling dominoes of the Ukraine war, resulting in food and fuel scarcity, the pandemic and looming insolvency and hunger rippling across the world.
===
And as much as the West blames Chinese predatory lending, only 10 to 20 percent of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt is owed to China. The majority is owed to U.S. and European financial institutions or Western allies like Japan. We died in a largely Western debt trap.
===
It’s going to get worse: The I.M.F. just warned that the likelihood of a global recession is growing. As economies collapse, Western loans simply won’t get repaid, and poor nations will crash out of the dollar system that props up Western lifestyles. Then, even Americans won’t be able to money-print their way out of trouble. It’s already begun. Sri Lanka has started settling loans in Indian rupees, and India is buying Russian oil in rubles. China may buy Saudi oil with yuan.

https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/15/opinion/international-world/sri-lanka-economic-collapse.html

.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 





Chile: Improving the New Constitution after Approving

Ken Hiebert
 

https://havanatimes.org/features/chile-improving-the-new-constitution-after-approving/

“With that in mind, we offer the country this commitment to clarify, assure that the things said are true, and to combat the enormous campaign of falsehoods and lies that those in favor of Rejecting have carried out. This gives the citizens certainty, security, and adds to the likelihood that the majority of the Chilean people are going to vote to Approve,” was Teillier’s verdict.


Re: General Comment

Michael Yates
 

What I really appreciated about Louis were the many links he shared everyday, on every topic under the sun. I learned much from these. Plus, speaking just personally, Louis was a generous man, to me not least. Before we met, he mailed me the keys to his apartment so Karen and I could stay there while he was away and we were in Manhattan visiting. It is impossible to forget something like that. One obvious problems with internet communications is that we don't often meet members of a group. No doubt, if we did, we would be able to overlook some personality traits in a person we didn't like that much and accept their friendship anyway. When I was a teacher, it was a couple very conservative faculty who voted for my professorship. A couple of so-called progressives did not. This is because I had known the conservatives for a long time and took them as they were: fellow human beings, with all the goods and bads of most of us. 


Re: General Comment

William Quimby
 

Frankly, the only one bothered by sectarianism on the list are the sectarians themselves. I read the arguments
that rage back and forth for their historical references (e.g. "as Gus Hall said in ....") but the pissing contests do
not disturb me. Perhaps, if I may be bold enough to suggest to those who were (and perhaps still are) involved
in various tendancies, they could do a better job of relating their rants/diatribes/arguments/counter-arguments
to the larger questions of Marxism - class, capitalism, revisionism, exploitation, etc. for the educational
benefit of those of us who are not now, were not, or may never be so involved. Their wisdom and experience
is a treasure.

(PS I was a member of YPSL a long, long time ago!)
 

On 08/16/22 01:37 PM, Mark Baugher wrote:
On Aug 16, 2022, at 9:56 AM, Jeffrey Masko <j.alan.masko@...> wrote:
We had the chance to get rid of the pettiness of Lou after his death, but the list seems more sectarian than ever. 
I doubt that any moderator can accomplish much about the problems of sectarianism among the many Marxist tendencies that exist on earth and on this mailing list. That's not a list problem but an historical one. Nonetheless, your points are well taken and should be considered further.
Mark





Mike Pompeo & CIA Sued for Spying on Americans Who Visited Julian Assange in Ecuadorian Embassy in U.K.

Charles Keener
 

Mike Pompeo & CIA Sued for Spying on Americans Who Visited Julian Assange in Ecuadorian Embassy in U.K.


Lawyers and journalists sued the CIA and former CIA Director Mike Pompeo Monday for spying on them while they met Julian Assange when he was living in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London, where he had political asylum. The lawsuit is being filed as Britain prepares to extradite the WikiLeaks founder to the United States, where he faces up to 175 years in prison for violating the Espionage Act by publishing classified documents exposing U.S. war crimes in Iraq and Afghanistan. We speak with the lead attorney in the case, Richard Roth, who details how a private security company stationed at the London Embassy unknowingly sent images from Assange’s visitors’ cellphones and laptops as well as streamed video from inside meetings to American intelligence. He says the offenses breach a range of client privileges and could sway a U.S. judge to dismiss the case if Assange is successfully extradited.


Re: General Comment

Mark Baugher
 

On Aug 16, 2022, at 9:56 AM, Jeffrey Masko <j.alan.masko@...> wrote:

We had the chance to get rid of the pettiness of Lou after his death, but the list seems more sectarian than ever.
I doubt that any moderator can accomplish much about the problems of sectarianism among the many Marxist tendencies that exist on earth and on this mailing list. That's not a list problem but an historical one. Nonetheless, your points are well taken and should be considered further.

Mark


Re: General Comment

Jeffrey Masko <j.alan.masko@...>
 

And this post is from a "moderator," we can do better on marxmail. This is the second time Micheal has been attacked, the last time by Farans who wrapped his diatribe in praise. This seems to be fine with mods.

I've suggested to actually write and post what you can and cannot do and then hold folks accountable, like other lists do. Instead, it is the subjective opinions of moderators who cannot be disciplined or recalled by the folks on the list. Having an undemocratic mode of functioning online is par with what Jodi Dean calls communicative capitalism, but on a marx-based list?

We had the chance to get rid of the pettiness of Lou after his death, but the list seems more sectarian than ever. Folks can construe this as an attack or an opportunity to create more participation and diversity. It seems this should be, at least in part, up to the folks on the list, not just those who post regularly.



Re: General Comment

Michael Yates
 

Anthony, I don't know you from Adam. I have written about the war a bit. Not much. Search it out and see for yourself. You might note mine is a general comment. So why would you think it was about you? It really doesn't mater much to me what anyone on this list thinks. Whatever it might be, it will have little effect on the carnage in Ukraine. On all the ruined lives. I am for a negotiated settlement to stop the killing. I could shout this from the rooftops, write a million words to defend this position, offer suggestions as to how it might be achieved. None of this will matter one bit. Nor would your or anyone else's criticisms of this position on this tiny, tiny list matter in the least. 


Foreign affairs analysis of Ukraine war

John Reimann
 

For those who are unfamiliar with Foreign Affairs, it is the most serious think tank for the US capitalist class (in my opinion). That's why its analyses should be taken seriously. Here's their analysis of the present state of the war in Ukraine:

Full article:

Page url
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-repeat-failures
Request Reprint Permissions
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, the Kremlin inadvertently put its military forces in an unsustainable position, ordering them to take on more operations than they could bear. It had nearly all its soldiers surge simultaneously and rapidly into Ukraine to fight along multiple fronts. It did so without taking necessary protective measures, such as clearing routes of explosives. It had its forces advance at an unsustainable pace. As a result, Russian troops were vulnerable to ambushes, counterattacks, and severe logistical problems that cost the military enormous numbers of soldiers and equipment.  

That initial error was caused by the Kremlin’s prewar delusions. Moscow was overconfident in its intelligence, in the ability of its agents to influence events and politics inside Ukraine, and in its own armed forces. It underestimated Ukraine’s capabilities and will to fight. And it failed to account for a massive expansion of Western support to Kyiv.

But although Russia has had six months to learn from these mistakes, it appears poised to once again commit its depleted forces to an untenable mission: annexing and holding Ukraine’s Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia Provinces, or oblasts. Holding this territory will require substantial amounts of manpower and armored equipment—particularly given that the regions have contested frontlines and that Russian forces in each experience organized partisan attacks. And Moscow has lost its most advanced equipment, for which it does not have equivalent replacements. The Russian armed forces have also suffered tens of thousands of casualties, including well-trained personnel, and its current strategy for replenishment—recruiting new soldiers from a motley mix of communities and armed groups—will not create a combat effective force. There remains, in short, a mismatch between the Kremlin’s goals for Ukraine and the forces it has to deliver them.  

The Kremlin may continue with its plans anyway, concluding that by annexing these four regions, it can force a rapid end to this phase of the war, stymie Western support for Ukraine, and buy itself time to repair and regenerate its military. If Moscow cannot marshal enough resources to support this goal, however, an exhausted Russian military will struggle to hold a contested frontline of about 620 miles. Even if the Kremlin pulls all levers available, declaring a general mobilization to call up sufficient armored equipment and trained personnel, that process would still take time. Russian forces, then, are likely to face very significant resource constraints in the next year or two. This may provide Ukrainian forces with an opportunity to push back against Russia’s efforts to hold all four oblasts.

RUNNING ON EMPTY
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began with high-profile losses. As Russian troops advanced toward Kyiv and Kharkiv, they were vulnerable to intense fires and ambush tactics from a committed and increasingly well-supplied Ukrainian military. After the Russian offensive stalled and suffered heavy casualties, Moscow abandoned its plan to capture these cities. Instead, it concentrated its attacks on the Donbas—made up of Ukraine’s eastern Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts—and southern Ukraine, both places where the Russian military has had more success. Today, Russian forces have conquered the entirety of Luhansk, the vast majority of Kherson, and over half of Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia.

Seizing Kyiv was critical to one of Moscow’s key objectives at the outset of the war: fast regime change. When that failed, Russia downsized its plans, and now, the Kremlin’s revised intermediate goal has come into sharper focus. Through a series of policy announcements, leadership statements, and targeted military operations over the last three months, it appears that Russia seeks to illegally annex the provinces it has entirely or mostly occupied, potentially as early as this fall.


For the Kremlin, annexing parts of Ukraine is a means to a bigger end.
Russia has laid the administrative groundwork for such a move. It has installed Russian citizens or officials to administer occupied Ukrainian territories, appointed instructors to teach a distorted pro-Russian curriculum in schools, changed Ukrainian Internet service providers and telephone area codes to Russian ones, and confiscated Ukrainian passports to force Ukrainian citizens to acquire Russian documents. The recently installed puppet governments of occupied regions have announced so-called election commissions that could hold sham referendums on joining Russia. Moscow has created temporary security services offices in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia, nominally to help administer these southern regions but probably to break up partisan networks that could interfere with the annexation process.  

For the Kremlin, annexation would be a means to a bigger end. Should Moscow declare these territories part of Russia, it could then proclaim a cease-fire and paint continuing Ukrainian counteroffensives as attacks on what it defines as Russia. Kremlin officials might also declare that their country’s nuclear guarantees apply to all of what they consider to be the Russian Federation, as Russian President Vladimir Putin did after annexing Crimea in 2014. Such a plan assumes that the threats would deter the United States and Europe from supporting Ukraine, prompting them to curtail or even cut off arms flows to Kyiv over fears of escalation. Over time, the Kremlin hopes, Western interest in and support for Ukraine will fade, allowing Russia to set the terms of the conflict’s settlement.

Ukraine is highly unlikely to accept any annexation or cease-fire. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has declared that “freezing the conflict with the Russian Federation means a pause that gives the Russian Federation a break for rest.” Kyiv will almost certainly also continue to ask for Western assistance. Ukrainian and Russian goals through the end of 2022 are therefore on a collision course: one side is working to prevent the conflict from ossifying along a frozen line of contact while the other works to attain precisely that outcome.  

MUDDLING THROUGH
The Ukrainian and Russian militaries are entering a critical period in the weeks and months ahead, although for different reasons. In some areas, Ukrainian forces are outgunned, outranged, and in critical need of ammunition and certain weapons—thanks in part to Russia’s efforts to disable Ukraine’s defense industry. But in the near term, Ukraine may have a more sustainable position. The country has sufficient personnel, Western support, and a strong will to fight. Russia, meanwhile, has experienced troop and material losses that will be difficult to overcome. According to Western estimates, Russia has suffered between 45,000 and 75,000 wounded and killed personnel, from junior enlisted soldiers to generals. It has lost more than 5,000 pieces of equipment. Russia’s military has learned and adapted at the operational and tactical levels from its early defeats, shifting to new tactics that favor its superior firepower. But such battlefield adjustments are not enough to overcome the early and severe losses.

These deficits will make it hard for Russia to successfully hold the regions it may try to annex. At a minimum, if the Kremlin annexes them this fall, it will be doing so at a time of great vulnerability. To succeed, Moscow will have to replenish personnel and equipment at scale—tasks that will prove extremely difficult.

Consider, for instance, Russia’s shortage of soldiers. So far, Russia is taking an ad hoc approach to replenishing personnel, drawing from at least nine populations: active-duty troops stationed outside Ukraine, reservists, mercenary groups, Kadyrovtsy (fighters loyal to Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov), military prison battalions, foreign fighters, the National Guard, direct volunteers, and far-right neo-Nazi groups such as Rusich. This system is far from ideal. The Russian military and mercenary groups may be touting decent combat pay—over $3,000 a month—but they are offering short-term contracts, dropping recruitment standards, and providing only a few weeks of basic training.


Russia has experienced troop and material losses that will be difficult to overcome.
Russia could drum up more soldiers by reaching into the border troops or further into the National Guard. But the country’s ability to generate personnel will also probably reach its zenith in the coming months unless it declares a general mobilization and drafts men from across the country. Even in a best-case scenario, however, mobilization would take at least several months to a year to confer an operational benefit. Russia’s mobilization base, made of equipment in long-term storage and reservists with military experience, has been largely dormant for over a decade. Expanding the system nationwide, including by calling up military-age males with no experience, would strain it significantly; thousands of officers and noncommissioned officers needed to command mobilized units are currently fighting or have already been killed in Ukraine.

Russia’s equipment problem is just as difficult to solve. According to U.S. officials, the Russian military has committed 80 percent of its active-duty army, airborne, and marine units and their equipment to Ukraine, and it has already withdrawn additional equipment from long-term storage. Although Russia has thousands more armored vehicles and missiles in storage, they are less capable and more unreliable: gear in long-term storage, for example, is mostly old and in various degrees of serviceability, often kept for years in open fields. Russia’s defense industry still has manufacturing capacity, but with its already bottlenecked and inefficient production lines under heavy Western sanctions, Russia will struggle to mass-produce new equipment on short notice. The Kremlin has taken initial steps to shore up this sector so it can better regenerate lost gear and expand its supply of missiles, but it will take many months to several years before these measures begin to show results.

THE BATTLE AHEAD
Moscow’s troubles, however, don’t guarantee Ukraine’s success. Kyiv has also lost many troops and weapons. In the near term, Ukraine, like Russia, will probably struggle to carry out new large-scale offensives or counteroffensives. Both states could be focused on ad hoc efforts to stave off exhaustion. Ukraine will need to fight hard to deny Russia a meaningful hold on the areas it plans to annex or to contest annexation if it occurs. Kyiv will also need continued Western support to implement its qualitative advantages on the battlefield. It will need to use the momentum of its counterattacks to prevent Moscow from integrating occupied oblasts into Russia.

Kyiv has said its counteroffensive in Kherson is a priority, and it is striking Russian bases at greater distances—possibly including a naval aviation base in Crimea. Russian forces in Kherson were the most vulnerable at the start of the summer, but in recent weeks, Russia has redeployed assets there from the Donbas. Ukraine can complicate Russia’s ability to fortify and annex this vital territory by using a method that worked in the opening phases of the war: inflicting battlefield losses so stark that Russia’s military leadership becomes convinced their forces cannot hold the oblast and that their positions are, or will imminently become, unsustainable. To do that, the Ukrainian military must maintain a contested frontline, attack Russian command-and-control systems, and steadily thin out Russian forces to the point that they are combat ineffective in a particular area.

Russian military planners closely study whether their forces are combat effective, including by looking at attrition rates (also known as “critical loss” in Russian military science). For Russian ground forces, military planners projected before the war that a unit becomes ineffective when it loses 50 to 60 percent of its original strength. They estimate that a regional command-and-control network is permanently broken when 40 percent of its equipment is destroyed. They believe that an air force squadron can no longer operate when it loses 70 percent of its aircraft. If Ukraine can create a highly contested frontline—just as it did outside Kyiv and Kharkiv—with attacks on command-and-control points, high rates of equipment losses, and large Russian casualties, it may again convince Moscow to withdraw.

But for such a Ukrainian strategy to have the best chance of success, it must be in progress before Russia attempts to annex the territory it holds; that way, Ukrainian attacks can deny Russia a foothold in an area like Kherson. And even if Russia does annex Ukrainian territory and tries to force an operational pause, Kyiv and its Western supporters don’t have to comply. Russia’s overall ambitions for Ukraine, after all, remain intact. Moscow wants to annex large parts of Ukraine, it wants to demilitarize the country so that the government cannot fight against its actions, and it wants a pro-Russian leader in Kyiv. The sad reality is that annexing four regions is unlikely to be the end of Russia’s mission in Ukraine, but just one phase in Putin’s much longer project. Both Ukraine and its backers must be prepared for a protracted war.

--
“Science and socialism go hand-in-hand.” Felicity Dowling
Check out:https:http://oaklandsocialist.com also on Facebook


Re: General Comment

Anthony Boynton
 

I am sure Michael is not referring to me, because I haven't been on a barstool in years. Also, he could not be referring to me when he speaks about Ukraine because I have provided a lot of documentation for my thoughts and positions. And, as a matter of fact, I have not talked about how much money the United States spends on arms it sends to Ukraine. I have defended Ukraine's right to arm itself from any source. It is true that I have held the same principled position since I was a teenager in relation to struggles of oppressed people against invaders. At that time, in the 1960's, I defended the right of the Vietnamese people to arm themselves. The same principle applies to the Palestinians today. Possibly Michael agrees with it, but has yet to make himself clear. 

Michael, do you agree with this principle? 

As I have gotten older, I have learned to be patient. 

I am also sure that Michael is not referring to me calling people on this list "fascist supporters of Putin'' because I have never done that. I don't think Putin is a fascist, I think he is a Great Russian Nationalist, a racist, homphobic, an extreme right wing imperialist and the leader of a police state. He is also the most important leader of the growing worldwide network of extreme right wing governments and movements. 

I wonder if Michael would agree with that characterization.

I wonder what Michael actually thinks about the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He sort of implied that he thinks it was justified, but only sort of. What do you think, Michael?

All the best,

Anthony

On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 12:21 PM Farans Kalosar <fkalosar101@...> wrote:
On Sat, Aug 13, 2022 at 01:19 AM, Walter Lippmann wrote:

Even one or two of the tens of BILLIONS of dollars being flushed down the Ukraine war could provide a home and a job for every homeless person in the United States of America. And most people in the US had never even HEARD of Ukraine before February of THIS YEAR.

 

Talk about gullibility! 


Talk about a non sequitur!!  Then talk about bad faith and motiveless malice.


The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928- 1943

Michael Pugliese <michael.098762001@...>
 

"THE PURPOSE of this study is to examine the Chinese Communist
position towards the Taiwanese people and political movements
on Taiwan, during the period from 1928 to 1943, and to discuss the
impact of the 1943 Cairo Conference (which called for a return of
Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty) on Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
policies. Briefly stated, our findings reveal that: (a) between 1928
and 1943 Communist Party leaders consistently recognized the Taiwanese
as a distinct "nation" or "nationality" (minzu); (b) they acknowledged
the "national liberation movement" on Taiwan as a struggle of a "weak
and small nationality" (ruoxiao minzu) separate from the Chinese
revolution and potentially sovereign; and (c) after 1943, particularly
after the Cairo Conference, they reversed positions by disavowing
Taiwanese ethnic "separateness" and rejecting the independence of
political movements on the island.' These positions and shifts were
formalized in official CCP decisions and statements by Party leaders,
and expressed through key political terminology.

Treatment of the Taiwanese in Chinese Communist
Documents and Statements: 1928-1943

At the CCP's Sixth National Congress, held in Moscow in 1928, the
Chinese Communists took the first step toward accepting Taiwan's
future political autonomy by acknowledging that the Taiwanese were
ethnically separate from the Han.2 <SNIP> More @
https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.2307/2757657


Michael Pugliese


Re: MODERATOR'S NOTE: Mark Baugher joining the moderating team

Mark Baugher
 

On Aug 15, 2022, at 6:40 PM, Anthony Boynton <anthony.boynton@...> wrote:

Maybe he can replace me. Let's see. T
That wasn't the deal. It was to be four of us.

Mark


What is the Relevance of the Russian Revolution Today? A debate

Dayne Goodwin
 

debate between Kshama Sawant and Eric Blanc, on the relevance of the Russian Revolution Today.
Bhaskar Sunkara moderator, Haymarket Books sponsor, July 27
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=64UjVAoWwGs